

Modeling Biblical Language

*Selected Papers from the McMaster Divinity College
Linguistics Circle*



Edited by

STANLEY E. PORTER, GREGORY P. FEWSTER
AND CHRISTOPHER D. LAND

Modeling Biblical Language

Linguistic Biblical Studies

Series Editors

Stanley E. Porter

Jesús Peláez

Jonathan M. Watt

VOLUME 13

This series, *Linguistic Biblical Studies*, is dedicated to the development and promotion of linguistically informed study of the Bible in its original languages. Biblical studies has greatly benefited from modern theoretical and applied linguistics, but stands poised to benefit from further integration of the two fields of study. Most linguistics has studied contemporary languages, and attempts to apply linguistic methods to study of ancient languages requires systematic re-assessment of their approaches. This series is designed to address such challenges, by providing a venue for linguistically based analysis of the languages of the Bible. As a result, monograph-length studies and collections of essays in the major areas of linguistics, such as syntax, semantics, pragmatics, discourse analysis and text linguistics, corpus linguistics, cognitive linguistics, comparative linguistics, and the like, will be encouraged, and any theoretical linguistic approach will be considered, both formal and functional. Primary consideration is given to the Greek of the New and Old Testaments and of other relevant ancient authors, but studies in Hebrew, Coptic, and other related languages will be entertained as appropriate.

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/lbs*

Modeling Biblical Language

*Selected Papers from the McMaster Divinity College
Linguistics Circle*

Edited by

Stanley E. Porter
Gregory P. Fewster
Christopher D. Land



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Porter, Stanley E., 1956- editor. | Fewster, Gregory P., editor. | Land, Christopher D., editor. | McMaster Divinity College
Title: Modeling Biblical Language : selected papers from the McMaster Divinity College Linguistics Circle / Edited by Stanley E. Porter ; Gregory P. Fewster ; Christopher D. Land.
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2016] | Series: Linguistic Biblical Studies; 13 | Includes index. | Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016000243 (print) | LCCN 2015044051 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004309364 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004309265 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004309364 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Functionalism (Linguistics) | Bible—Language, style. | Hebrew language. | Greek language, Biblical.
Classification: LCC BS537 (print) | LCC BS537 .M634 2016 (ebook) | DDC 220.4/8—dc23
LC record available at <http://lccn.loc.gov/2015044051>

Want or need Open Access? Brill Open offers you the choice to make your research freely accessible online in exchange for a publication charge. Review your various options on brill.com/brill-open.

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 1877-7554

ISBN 978-90-04-30926-5 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-30936-4 (e-book)

Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Preface VII

Abbreviations IX

List of Contributors XII

Modeling Biblical Language: An Introduction 1

Stanley E. Porter, Gregory P. Fewster, and Christopher D. Land

PART 1

Modeling Language

- 1 Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Greek Language: The Need for Further Modeling 9

Stanley E. Porter

- 2 Aspect and *Aktionsart* Once Again 48

Francis G.H. Pang

- 3 Relative Temporal Ordering: Discourse Temporality in the Greek of the New Testament 73

Jeffrey Reber

PART 2

Modeling the Languages of the Hebrew Bible

- 4 Evaluation Theory and the Ideology of Judges 6 109

Mary L. Conway

- 5 Sam(p)son's Advent: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of Judges 13 in Hebrew and Greek 172

Anthony Pyles

- 6 Yahweh as Shepherd-King in Ezekiel 34: A Linguistic-Literary Analysis of Metaphors of Shepherding 200

Beth M. Stovell

PART 3

Modeling the Language of the Greek New Testament

- 7 Jesus before Pilate: A Discourse Analysis of John 18:33–38 233
Christopher D. Land
- 8 Towards a Model of Functional Monosemy: A Study of Creation
Language in Romans 250
Gregory P. Fewster
- 9 An Intertextual Discourse Analysis of Romans 9:30–10:13 277
Xiaxia E. Xue
- 10 Reconsidering the Meaning and Translation of Πνευματικός and
Πνεῦμα in the Discourse Context of 1 Corinthians 12–14 309
Hughson T. Ong
- 11 Metaphor Analysis with Some Help from Corpus Linguistics:
Contextualizing “Root” Metaphors in Ephesians and Colossians 339
Gregory P. Fewster
- 12 Language as Negotiation: Toward a Systemic Functional Model for
Ideological Criticism with Application to James 2:1–13 362
Zachary K. Dawson
- 13 Meaning in Bulk: The Greek Clause Complex and
1 Peter 1:3–12 391
Benjamin B. Hunt
- Index of Modern Authors 415
- Index of Ancient Sources 423

Preface

No volume of edited papers is the work of a single person, and this volume is perhaps more collaborative than most. As the Introduction makes clear, the papers presented in this volume were not just papers casually gathered together, or even those gathered on the basis of a particular theme or those assembled as the result of a particular conference. These papers are some of the results of papers presented to the McMaster Divinity College Linguistics Circle. Students come to McMaster Divinity College to study many different subjects in a variety of degree programs. Within the MA (Christian Studies) and PhD (Christian Theology) programs, students have the opportunity to study the Old and New Testaments in their original languages, Hebrew and Greek, in an intensive and linguistic way. In fact, we have maintained and continue to develop a strong emphasis upon linguistically informed study of the ancient languages, in particular Greek but also Hebrew. As a result, we frequently offer such courses as Advanced Grammar and Linguistics and Linguistic Modeling, among others. Students are not required to take these courses, and many explore various other areas of biblical studies, including traditional interpretive approaches, biblical theology, historical matters, and the like. For those who are interested in studying linguistics, we offer perhaps the largest and most rigorous program for linguistically-informed study of the Bible, attempting to encompass both Greek and Hebrew. The papers of this volume are more than sufficient evidence of the kinds of questions that we are asking and the kinds of answers that are being offered in a continuing and developing discussion. We welcome others to join in the conversation.

Due to a variety of reasons, this volume has taken longer to appear than many of us thought. As a result, the editors wish to thank the contributors for their patience as they waited for this volume to come together. Their contributions were written and presented over quite a few years in connection with the McMaster Divinity College Linguistics Circle before being revised for this volume. The Circle itself and adjacent communal efforts provided an important context for detailed and critical feedback that greatly improved the quality of the contributions herein. All of the contributors have at one time or another been McMaster Divinity College people. Some are still here, and others have moved to other institutions, where they continue to bring insights to the original languages of the Bible through their linguistic knowledge. Stanley Porter and Christopher Land, as co-founders of the Circle, work hard to organize its monthly meetings, and their editorial work followed accordingly. While Gregory Fewster has moved on from McMaster, his concern for the completion

of the volume has helped to keep the project on course. We also wish to thank Wally Cirafesi for his earlier efforts on this project.

In spite of the few disruptions along the way, we are pleased to present this volume, the result of a variety of collaborative environments. Our intention is that it will provide insights into some of the linguistic possibilities for study of the Greek and Hebrew of the Bible, as well as offering some glimpses into the work of the McMaster Divinity College Linguistics Circle and some of those associated with it.

Stanley E. Porter

Gregory P. Fewster

Christopher D. Land

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Abbreviations

AB	Anchor Bible
ABD	<i>Anchor Bible Dictionary</i>
AJT	<i>Asian Journal of Theology</i>
AnBib	Analecta Biblica
ASV	American Standard Version
BDAG	Walter Bauer, <i>A Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament</i> , 3rd ed., revised and edited by F.W. Danker
BDB	Francis Brown, S.R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, <i>A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament</i>
BDF	Friedrich Blass, Albert Debrunner, and Robert W. Funk, <i>A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature</i>
BECNT	Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
<i>Bib</i>	<i>Biblica</i>
<i>BibSac</i>	<i>Bibliotheca Sacra</i>
BIS	Biblical Interpretation Series
BLG	Biblical Languages: Greek
BLH	Biblical Languages: Hebrew
<i>BSOB</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies</i>
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBNTS	Coniectanea Biblica New Testament Series
<i>CBQ</i>	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
CBQMS	Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CEV	Contemporary English Version
CILT	Current Issues in Linguistic Theory
<i>CTJ</i>	<i>Calvin Theological Journal</i>
CTL	Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics
DBI	John Hayes, ed., <i>Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation</i>
EGGNT	Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament
EKK	Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
ESV	English Standard Version
<i>ExpTim</i>	<i>Expository Times</i>
<i>FN</i>	<i>Filología Neotestamentaria</i>
HTKNT	Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
<i>HTR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>

ICC	International Critical Commentary
IFG	<i>Introduction to Functional Grammar</i> , by Michael A.K. Halliday
<i>Int</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>
IVP	InterVarsity Press
JAAR	Journal for the American Academy of Religion
<i>JBL</i>	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
<i>JETS</i>	<i>Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society</i>
<i>JGRChJ</i>	<i>Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism</i>
<i>JLIAB</i>	<i>Journal for the Linguistics Institute of Ancient and Biblical Greek</i>
<i>JMALS</i>	<i>Journal of the Midland Association for Linguistics Studies</i>
<i>JOTT</i>	<i>Journal of Translation and Textlinguistics</i>
<i>JSNT</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</i>
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplementary Series
<i>JSOT</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</i>
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplementary Series
<i>JSPL</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters</i>
KEK	Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über Neue Testament
KJV	King James Version
LBS	Linguistic Biblical Studies
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LNTS	Library of New Testament Studies
Louw–Nida	Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Nida, <i>Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament based on Semantic Domains</i>
LSAWS	Linguistic Studies in Ancient West Semitic
<i>MJTM</i>	<i>McMaster Journal of Theology and Ministry</i>
NAC	New American Commentary
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NET	New English Translation
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIGTC	New International Greek Testament Commentary
NIV	New International Version
NLT	New Living Translation
<i>NovT</i>	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NovTSup	Supplements to Novum Testamentum
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
NSBT	New Studies in Biblical Theology
NTM	New Testament Monographs
<i>NTS</i>	<i>New Testament Studies</i>

PAST	Pauline Studies
PNTC	Pillar New Testament Commentaries
SBG	Studies in Biblical Greek
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
SBLRBS	SBL Resources for Biblical Study
SCL	Studies in Corpus Linguistics
SemeiaSt	Semeia Studies
<i>SJT</i>	<i>Scottish Journal of Theology</i>
SNTG	Studies in New Testament Greek
SNTSMS	Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SNTW	Studies of the New Testament and its World
SubBi	Subsidia Biblica
SUNY	State University of New York
SWPLL	<i>Sheffield Working Papers in Language and Linguistics</i>
<i>TDNT</i>	Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, eds., <i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i>
TiLSM	Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs
TNIV	Today's New International Version
TNTC	Tyndale New Testament Commentaries
<i>TrinJ</i>	<i>Trinity Journal</i>
<i>TSK</i>	<i>Theologische Studien und Kritiken</i>
<i>VT</i>	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
WBC	Word Biblical Commentaries
WMANT	Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
<i>WTJ</i>	<i>Westminster Theological Journal</i>
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament

List of Contributors

Mary L. Conway

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Zachary K. Dawson

Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Wake Forest, North Carolina

Gregory P. Fewster

University of Toronto, Ontario

Benjamin B. Hunt

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Christopher D. Land

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Hughson T. Ong

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Francis G.H. Pang

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Stanley E. Porter

McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario

Anthony Pyles

Queensland Theological College, Australia

Jeffrey Reber

University of Aberdeen, Scotland

Beth M. Stovell

Ambrose Seminary, Calgary, Alberta

Xiuxia E. Xue

China Graduate School of Theology, Hong Kong

Modeling Biblical Language: An Introduction

Stanley E. Porter, Gregory P. Fewster, and Christopher D. Land

While Ferdinand de Saussure is frequently hailed as the father of modern linguistics, the influence of the Prague Linguistics Circle should not be minimized.¹ This circle provided a venue for primarily (though not exclusively) European linguists, semioticians, and literary theorists to develop what would amount to some of the most significant trajectories of contemporary critical theory, namely structuralist literary analysis and linguistic functionalism. It is not uncommon to attribute certain important linguistic theories to individual members of the Circle: the functional sentence perspective (theme-rheme) to Vilém Mathesius, or markedness theory to Roman Jakobson and Nikolai Trubetzkoy, for example. However, the creativity of these thinkers was fostered, at least in part, by their involvement within a larger community of like-minded thinkers. The Prague Linguistics Circle created a climate for critical engagement with important ideas relating to language and textual analysis, as well as providing a venue for the propagation of such ideas. As far as the legacy of the Circle goes, many of the theories first developed and then disseminated by it have been significantly built upon, reworked, or rejected. But an additional legacy of the Circle has been its purpose and format, which successfully demonstrated that critical scholarship can be fostered within a communal context. Today, various linguistic, literary, and semiotic circles operate around the world, each with their own goals, objectives, and results.

With its fusion of scholarly engagement, friendship, and congeniality, the Prague Linguistics Circle has served as a model for the linguistic research being undertaken at McMaster Divinity College. Founded by Drs. Stanley Porter and Christopher Land, the McMaster Divinity College Linguistics Circle gathers monthly so that students, faculty members, and visiting scholars can present papers on topics related to modern linguistics and biblical studies. While the Circle is open to biblical research employing any number of modern linguistic theories, two consistent emphases have emerged, and they are both manifested in the present volume.

¹ See František Čermák, "Ferdinand de Saussure and the Prague School," in Eva Hajicová et al., eds., *Travaux de Cercle Linguistique de Prague n.s. Prague Linguistic Circle Papers*, 2 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1996), 59–72.

The first emphasis is that papers presented to the Circle have consistently demonstrated that modern linguistic theories are heuristically and hermeneutically useful. That is to say, linguistics helps us to think about meaning and text, as well as about how human beings use language to make meaning with texts. The papers in this volume, therefore, aim to reframe traditional questions but also to formulate altogether different questions than those usually asked in biblical studies. The second emphasis is that many members of the circle have found Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) very applicable to the heuristic and hermeneutical task just described, such that many of the essays in this volume are indebted to SFL. With regard to this tendency, however, it should be noted that various theories of language are used and applied by Circle members even in this volume. It should also be noted that SFL is itself a diverse and developing school of thought and that Circle members have not hesitated to challenge and modify aspects of the theory in order to improve it and hence render it more useful, especially for the study of ancient languages, such as Greek. The goal of this volume, then, is not to present a unified set of papers endorsing one particular view of language or one particular way of applying linguistics to biblical texts. Rather, this volume is a collection of exploratory articles that, each in its own way, demonstrates the usefulness of linguistics as a hermeneutical approach. It is our desire and aspiration that the use of linguistics in biblical studies will continue to grow and diversify, so that the insights continually emerging from the field of linguistics can be applied to important questions and concerns in the field of biblical studies.

Although SFL has been and continues to be a marginal theory within the academic discipline of linguistics, it has influenced numerous works in the discipline of New Testament studies. In the opening essay of this volume, Stanley Porter discusses the development of SFL as a theory and reflects upon the implications of this historical narrative for those who strive to employ linguistics in biblical scholarship. Porter has been a systemic functional linguist for long enough to have witnessed and been involved in some of the interesting trends that have direct bearing upon the study of ancient languages, and he draws upon these in offering comments upon SFL as a model for study of ancient Greek. Following this, we include two essays related to the linguistic construal of time. In the first, Francis Pang articulates a broad and encompassing framework within which it is possible to appreciate and articulate the difference between aspect and *Aktionsart*. Specifically, he surveys recent aspectual descriptions and demonstrates that it is over-simplistic and unhelpful to treat *Aktionsart* as a lexical classification that differentiates the meaning(s) of verbs. Following this, Jeffrey Reber explores the manner in which the human

construct of temporality is encoded in both narrative and non-narrative discourse. Employing a distinction between “real” time and “conceptual” time, Reber argues that narrative discourse recounts real events and thus encodes a successive conceptual time that observes the law of inertia. By way of contrast, Reber observes, non-narrative discourse recounts inner-world experiences and thus the conceptual time encoded in non-narrative discourse is functionally atemporal (except in the case of inner-world events presented as past real-world events).

The second major section of this volume contains papers dealing with the Hebrew Bible. Mary Conway opens the section by demonstrating the usefulness of appraisal analysis, which examines evaluative language and its role in the formation and communication of ideologies. Employing Judges 6 as a testing ground, Conway shows that the biblical figure Gideon is negatively evaluated in a manner that contrasts with the text’s positive evaluation of YHWH. Along somewhat similar lines, Anthony Pyles argues for the enduring usefulness of Kenneth Pike’s Tagmemics, employing a comparative discourse analysis of Judges 13 in the MT and LXX. At the macro level, Pyles argues, these two texts are more or less the same in terms of discourse structure, even though they employ different linguistic resources in order to produce their respective structures; at the micro level, however, the differing resources of the two languages become more significant and there are subtle differences between the two discourses. In our third and final paper on the Hebrew Bible, Beth Stovell brings together the concepts of register and conceptual blending in order to examine the use of metaphor in Ezekiel 34. She demonstrates the centrality and prominence of the shepherding metaphor in this discourse, and she shows that a responsible assessment of its meaning must be attentive to the ways in which the metaphor functions both within the wider discourse and in relation to other metaphors.

In the third section of this volume, we include a number of papers that deal with the New Testament. In the first of these papers, Christopher Land examines a brief dialogue from the Fourth Gospel and shows that even a very simple discourse analysis has the potential to clarify what is happening in a text. After examining the narrative framing of Jesus’ interrogation by Pilate, along with the topics discussed and the turns taken by each participant, Land proposes that the Roman governor is not depicted as innocent but as ignorant and impotent. Following this, Gregory Fewster investigates Paul’s use of creation language using a monosemic approach indebted to the linguist Charles Ruhl. After proposing that the abstract semantic value of *κτίσις* is simply ‘something that has been brought into existence,’ Fewster examines a small corpus of examples in

order to discern the co-textual and contextual parameters that modulate this abstract value in actual instances of usage. He then examines Paul's uses of the term in Romans, concluding that monosemy is a useful approach, provided it is coupled with a functional description of regular patterns of language usage.

Also working in Romans but using an intertextual methodology derived from the work of the linguist Jay Lemke, Xiaxia (Esther) Xue explores Paul's language as a manifestation of his social identity and his value orientations. Focusing especially on Rom 9:30–10:13, Xue argues that Paul's views on some key topics (e.g., righteousness, law, faith) are radically different from his Jewish contemporaries, even though he insists upon his brotherhood with Israel and attempts to align himself with Israel. Hughson Ong then examines (and finds wanting) the popular notion that Paul had at least a semi-technical concept of "spiritual gifts" and that 1 Corinthians 12–14 can be understood as a discussion of these "gifts." Undertaking a discourse analysis of these chapters, Ong proposes that Paul's preoccupation is better glossed as "the maintenance of order in the church through the proper exercise of tongues," with the key Greek phrases often rendered in English as "spiritual gift(s)" having no technical meaning at all.

Gregory Fewster, in his second contribution to this collection, examines the use of "root" metaphors in both Colossians and Ephesians. Employing theoretical concepts from SFL and a method indebted to corpus linguistics, Fewster describes the "root" metaphor and clarifies how it functions as part of a complex redistribution of linguistic resources. Zachary Dawson then explores the potential usefulness of appraisal analysis—and, in particular, its notion of engagement—for the tasks of rhetorical and ideological criticism. He provides a preliminary description of some Greek semantic resources that can be used for engagement, and he discusses how these resources are employed in Jas 2:1–13 in order to legitimize, naturalize, and rationalize the ideological position that it is wrong to show partiality. Finally, in the concluding essay of the volume, Benjamin Hunt describes an elaborate sentence in 1 Pet 1:3–12 using a model of inter-clausal relations indebted to SFL. By means of his explicit analysis, Hunt demonstrates that further research is needed into the intricacies of such complex constructions.

These papers represent only a small sample of the work discussed by the McMaster Divinity College Linguistics Circle since its inception. The Circle provides a welcoming but challenging environment in which to present scholarly work. As a result, many of the ideas in the papers have been further developed in subsequent research. Indeed, it is characteristic of the papers that they exemplify the preliminary and unfinished state of linguistic research into ancient biblical Greek and Hebrew. We do not regard this as a problem but as

an opportunity, and it is our intention that the present volume should capture something of the open-ended possibilities that inhere in the application of linguistics to biblical studies. If we manage to continue—and hopefully also to expand—this endeavour and this conversation, then we will have succeeded in one of the chief aims of the Circle.

PART 1

Modeling Language



Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Greek Language: The Need for Further Modeling¹

Stanley E. Porter

Introduction

Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) has established itself as a major school of linguistic thought, to the point where its major theoretician, Michael A.K. Halliday, has been recognized in several major venues for his constructive linguistic program. Robert de Beaugrande summarizes and synthesizes the major streams of his thought in his study of ten major figures in linguistic theory, including Halliday right after arguably the originator of what has now become SFL,² and Halliday is included within Margaret Thomas's fifty key thinkers in the area of language and linguistics, one of only four still living when she wrote.³ Systemic Functional Linguistics—the term by which it is known today—has been identified by a number of different names over the last seventy five years, as it developed from the more localized thought of a few individuals to the global linguistic school of thought that it is today. Within certain constraints, some of which will be mentioned and others discussed below, SFL continues to be a center for creative linguistic theorizing and modeling of language, in particular the English language, although with increased exploration of other languages. I believe that I was the first to analyze ancient Greek, in particular that of the New Testament corpus, from an SFL perspective, and, even though I have at times ventured into other areas of linguistics, most of

1 I wish to thank Margaret Berry, Nigel J.C. Gotteri, and Christopher D. Land for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and their suggestions for its improvement.

2 Robert de Beaugrande, *Linguistic Theory: The Discourse of Fundamental Works* (London: Longman, 1991), 223–64, preceded by J.R. Firth (187–222). I wonder whether a better subtitle for this work would have been “The Discourse of Fundamental Linguists” (rather than “Works”), because there are ten chapters devoted to individual scholars (one deals with two related scholars).

3 Margaret Thomas, *Fifty Key Thinkers on Language and Linguistics* (London: Routledge, 2011), 238–43 (from whom some of the bibliographical information below is taken), the other live linguists being Noam Chomsky, William Labov, and Deborah Cameron (the only woman included in the book). Thomas also includes J.R. Firth.

them structuralist and therefore directly related to SFL, I remain a committed systemic functional linguist.

From the outset of my becoming a systemicist, however, I was influenced by and worked alongside other constructive systemic thinkers regarding ancient and non-English languages, and I realized that SFL, because it is not as much a theory of language but first and foremost a theory of the *English* language, needed to be re-modeled and re-theorized for the study of an ancient, morphologically-intense and non-configurational language such as ancient Greek. I have tried to do this in various ways in my linguistic work, sometimes to the consternation of others who try to pigeonhole me within a more rigid systemic box. In this chapter, after briefly tracing a subjective (my own) history of SFL, so as to account for its theoretical orientations, I select two examples that well illustrate how systemicists must undertake within a SFL framework such reconceptualization in order to address some of the issues that are particular to Greek. I consider this short study one of many such studies that can and should be made by systemicists interested in languages with similar properties as ancient Greek.⁴

Brief History of SFL

This is not the place to offer a history of the rise and development of SFL.⁵ Such a history will no doubt be written at some time in the future.⁶ My only

4 This paper is offered in the spirit of Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen's instructive history of SFL, which I believe is regrettably far from complete and more reflective of his own purchase on the topic. Nevertheless, with his SWOT analysis, he invites such critique. See Matthiessen, "Systemic Linguistics Developing," *Annual Review of Functional Linguistics* 2 (2010): 8–63. See also for many insights Margaret Berry, "Changes in Systemic Functional Linguistics: Past Developments, Ongoing Developments (and Future Developments?)," unpublished paper delivered at the European Systemic Functional Linguistics Conference, July 2014, and shared with me by the author.

5 Besides the variety of works that refer to the writings of major figures in SFL, such as J.R. Firth, Michael Halliday, and others, and a few brief accounts such as the books mentioned above, there are other instructive partial histories of SFL, some of them relatively old now and hence incomplete. See D. Terence Langendoen, *The London School of Linguistics: A Study of the Linguistic Theories of B. Malinowski and J.R. Firth* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), a revision of the author's 1964 doctoral dissertation under Noam Chomsky. Besides the two mentioned, he also treats the early John Lyons, E.J.A. Henderson, W.S. Allen, J. Carnochan, R.H. Robins, T.F. Mitchell, J.T. Bendor-Samuel, F.R. Palmer, and N. Waterson. He states in the preface that he deleted a chapter on Alan H. Gardiner. See also Christopher S. Butler, *Systemic Linguistics: Theory and Applications* (London: Batsford Academic, 1985), esp. 1–13, but *passim*.

concern and hope is that it is fair to the early diversity within SFL that, I fear, has now been overlooked and is on the verge of being lost and forgotten.⁷ Here I merely offer a brief thumbnail sketch of major signposts along the way that I believe are important in tracing a meaningful history of SFL for those studying an ancient language such as Greek.

It is widely agreed that the primary origins of what is now called SFL are in the linguistic work of J.R. Firth, under strong influence of the sociologist Bronislaw Malinowski (whose lectures Firth attended when they both taught at the University of London).⁸ From Malinowski, Firth gained the notions of context of utterance, context of situation, and context of culture, that is, the idea of “meaning as function in context.”⁹ Firth further developed the differentiation of “system and structure.”¹⁰ In the course of his own teaching—Firth was the first professor of general linguistics in a British university—he trained a number of students, including Michael Halliday among others, so that, at the

-
- 6 Besides works above, see Geoffrey Sampson, *Schools of Linguistics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980); Robin P. Fawcett, *A Theory of Syntax for Systemic Functional Linguistics* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000), 15–106; David G. Butt, “Firth, Halliday and the Development of Systemic Theory,” in *History of the Language Sciences* (vol. 2; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), 1806–38; Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, “The ‘Architecture’ of Language According to Systemic Functional Theory: Developments since the 1970s,” in *Continuing Discourse on Language: A Functional Perspective* (ed. Ruqaiya Hasan, Christian Matthiessen, and Jonathan J. Webster; 2 vols.; London: Equinox, 2007), 2:505–62.
 - 7 Some of these issues of how SFL relates to other linguistic models, even within the functionalist camp, are raised in Christopher S. Butler and Francisco González-García, *Exploring Functional-Cognitive Space* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2014), where it is found that SFL lies “completely outside” a statistical grouping involving fifteen other linguistic approaches (481, 482).
 - 8 See J.R. Firth, *Papers in Linguistics 1934–51* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957); Firth, *Selected Papers of J.R. Firth 1952–59* (ed. F.R. Palmer; London: Longmans, 1968). For an attempt to rehabilitate Firth, see William M. Christie, Jr., *Preface to a Neo-Firthian Linguistics* (Lake Bluff, IL: Jupiter, 1980).
 - 9 Christopher S. Butler, *Structure and Function: A Guide to Three Major Structural-Functional Theories. Part 1: Approaches to the Simplex Clause; Part 2: From Clause to Discourse and Beyond* (2 vols.; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2003), 1:43. See Bronislaw Malinowski, “Classificatory Particles in the Language of Kiriwina,” *BSOS* 1.4 (1920): 33–78; Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London: Routledge, 1922); Malinowski, “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,” in C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923), 296–336; and Malinowski, *Coral Gardens and Their Magic* (New York: American Book, 1935). For a brief description of Firth’s major works on language, see Gustavo Martín-Asensio, *Transitivity-Based Foregrounding in the Acts of the Apostles: A Functional-Grammatical Approach to the Lukan Perspective* (JSNTSup 202; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 30–32.
 - 10 Butler, *Structure and Function*, 1:43.

time of his death in 1960, he had established what has come to be known as the London School of linguistics.¹¹ However, Firth's ideas, as inspiring and suggestive as they were (a characteristic inherited by Halliday), were "presented only programmatically, often obscurely, and almost never with the degree of rigour which we have come to expect of modern linguistics."¹² As a result, as Christopher Butler states, "[i]t was left to Halliday [as well as a number of other scholars] to take up the task of using Firth's ideas on context of situation, on restricted languages [what are now called registers] and on system and structure, to build a linguistic theory in which the categories and their relationships would be made explicit."¹³ Halliday, who was supervised by Firth for his PhD on Chinese (though taken at Cambridge University), responded to the challenge, although he has used English as the major language for his linguistic work.¹⁴ Besides Firth, Halliday was influenced by Malinowski, but also by various elements of the Prague school and structuralism,¹⁵ such as Louis Hjelmslev on the difference between the plane of meaning and the plane of expression (one can see Halliday's strata in incipient form here)¹⁶ and Karl Bühler on the representational function of language (though Halliday expands the categories to three rather than restricting them, as Bühler did, to primarily one function, Halliday's ideational),¹⁷ and the linguistic determinism of Benjamin Lee Whorf, who contended that language is in some way determinative for thought (reflected in Halliday's view of language as instrumental in shaping

11 Langendoen, *London School*, 1.

12 Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*, 13. Some of the other early London School/systemic scholars were Robins (another student), Mitchell, Allen, and Palmer, although there was a far larger number of especially British scholars who were influenced by Halliday or who were in some ways working in parallel with him, such as the early Lyons, Geoffrey Leech, and others.

13 Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*, 13.

14 The thesis was published as M.A.K. Halliday, *The Language of the Chinese "Secret History of the Mongols"* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959).

15 Josef Vachek, *The Linguistic School of Prague* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).

16 Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* (trans. Francis J. Whitfield; rev. ed.; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961 [1943]).

17 Karl Bühler, *Theory of Language* (trans. Donald Fraser Goodwin; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990 [1934]). See M.A.K. Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning* (London: Arnold, 1978), 48; Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social-Semiotic Perspective* (Geelong, Victoria, Australia: Deakin University, 1985), 15–17.

human experience).¹⁸ Halliday himself went through a number of stages in his own development, from his early scale and category grammar of the 1960s and 1970s, to his development of networks as expressing the meaning potential of language, his sociolinguistic emphasis, and eventually his development of his functional grammar of English, published in 1985 and revised three times, arguably the high point of his linguistic writing career.¹⁹ The nomenclature used to refer to the various forms of Hallidayan linguistics in the course of its developing from a type of neo-Firthian linguistics to a full-blown linguistic system changed from Scale and Category Grammar, to Systemic Grammar, to Systemic Functional Linguistics.²⁰

The response to Halliday's influence was phenomenal at least within Britain. There were many who were directly influenced by his teaching, as he was a lecturer and professor at such institutions as Cambridge University, the University of Edinburgh, University College London, and for a number of short-term appointments in various places, until settling at the University of Sydney in Australia, from which he is now retired. Along the way, Halliday influenced several generations of students, some of the best known being Ruqaiya Hasan,²¹ Robin Fawcett,²² J.R. Martin,²³ and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen²⁴ (collaborating with Hasan, his wife, and Matthiessen on a number of important projects).²⁵

18 Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings* (ed. John B. Carroll; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956). See Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic*, 25.

19 M.A.K. Halliday, *Introduction to Functional Grammar* (London: Arnold, 1985; 2nd ed. London: Arnold, 1994; 3rd ed. rev. Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; London: Arnold, 2004; 4th ed. rev. Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; London: Routledge, 2014). I will cite these as IFG1, 2, 3, 4.

20 See Butler, *Structure and Function*, 1:43–44.

21 So far three volumes of the collected works of Ruqaiya Hasan have been published (ed. Jonathan J. Webster; London: Equinox, 2005–). As this paper was being revised for publication, we all learned of the death of Ruqaiya Hasan, and note the sad passing of one of the major formative influences upon the fundamentals of SFL.

22 Robin P. Fawcett, *Cognitive Linguistics and Social Interaction: Towards an Integrated Model of a Systemic Functional Grammar and the Other Components of a Communicating Mind* (Heidelberg: Julius Groos; Exeter: Exeter University, 1980).

23 J.R. Martin, *English Text: System and Structure* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1992).

24 Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, *Lexicogrammatical Cartography* (Tokyo: International Language Sciences, 1995).

25 See M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Cohesion in English* (London: Longman, 1976); Halliday and Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text*; M.A.K. Halliday and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, *Construing Experience through Meaning: A Language-based Approach to Cognition* (London: Continuum, 1999).

Fawcett early on established the yearly International Systemic Workshops (which became the annual International Systemic Functional Congress), where systemicists gather to discuss their work, often resulting in publications. In the 1980s and, I believe, well into the 1990s in Britain, there were numerous departments of English language especially, but also linguistics, that were heavily influenced by SFL. These included (but are not restricted to) the University of London in several of its colleges, some Scottish universities, the University of Birmingham (the so-called Birmingham school, including John Sinclair and Malcolm Coulthard),²⁶ Hatfield Polytechnic, Lancaster University, University of Liverpool (e.g. Michael Hoey and Geoff Thompson),²⁷ University College Cardiff (e.g. Fawcett, David Young, and others),²⁸ University of Nottingham (e.g. Margaret Berry and Christopher Butler),²⁹ and many others. One university that so far as I can see is rarely if ever mentioned is the University of Sheffield, where the 7th International Systemic Workshop was held in 1980 and where I did my Ph.D. in both the biblical studies and linguistics departments. The University of Sheffield was, I believe, unique in SFL circles, as it had three systemicists in its language faculty, in two different departments, treating at least three, if not four, different and in many ways linguistically distinct languages, languages not then and in some instances still not widely studied in SFL. Graham Nixon was in the English Language department,³⁰ which was to be expected as the vast majority of SFL people seem to have been concerned with English and to have worked in English-related departments (for good reasons, as I will outline below),³¹ but Sheffield also had two systemicists in the Linguistics and Speech Science department, Nigel J.C. Gotteri who specialized in Slavonic languages (e.g. Old Church Slavonic, Bulgarian, and Polish, among

26 John Sinclair, *Trust the Text: Language, Corpus and Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2004); Malcolm Coulthard, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis* (new ed.; London: Longman, 1985).

27 Michael Hoey, *Patterns of Lexis in Text* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Geoff Thompson, *Introducing Functional Grammar* (2nd ed.; London: Hodder, 2004).

28 Robin P. Fawcett, *A Theory of Syntax for Systemic Functional Linguistics* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000); David J. Young, *The Structure of English Clauses* (London: Hutchinson, 1980).

29 See, e.g., Margaret Berry, *Introduction to Systemic Linguistics* (2 vols.; London: Batsford, 1975, 1977); and Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*; and other works.

30 G. Nixon, *Aspects of English Structure* (3rd ed.; Sheffield: Department of English, University of Sheffield, 1980); Nixon, *Patterns in English Syntax* (Doncaster: Language Press, 1993).

31 I owe this and other insights in this paper to personal correspondence with Nigel Gotteri, my supervisor in linguistics. I also studied with John Rogerson and Anthony Thiselton, both of whom were either trained in or teaching in the field of linguistics.

others) and who later joined the Russian department,³² and A.A. (Tony) Lyne, who was a French specialist within linguistics³³ (the head of the linguistics department at the time was James Milroy, himself a sociolinguist). The fourth language was ancient Greek, especially that of the New Testament, whose verbal structure I examined.³⁴

The situation for SFL is significantly different today, both in Britain and outside of it. Many if not most of the above-mentioned British departments no longer are seen as SFL-oriented, and some of them have ceased to exist altogether. The only department today, so far as I know, that would continue to be strongly identified with SFL is the Cardiff School of English, Communication and Philosophy of (now) Cardiff University, where Fawcett has spent his career. At the same time that SFL was flourishing in Britain in the 1980s and into the 1990s, it was similarly flourishing in Canada, at least in Toronto with the work of Michael Gregory,³⁵ James Benson, William Greaves, and others, and it continues to thrive in some areas of Canada. However, perhaps as a result of Halliday's own move to Australia, the center of SFL shifted to Australia and then broadened to encompass China, in particular Hong Kong but also other places in Asia, along with a number of scholars thinly spread throughout European universities (e.g. Erich Steiner and Eija Ventola).³⁶ The center in Wales remained

-
- 32 Nigel J.C. Gotteri, "Towards a Comparison of Systemic Linguistics and Tagmemics: An Interim Report and Bibliography," *JMALS* NS 7 (1982): 31–42; Gotteri, "A Note on Bulgarian Verb Systems," *JMALS* NS 8 (1983): 49–60; Gotteri, "Systemic Linguistics and Language Pathology," in *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics: Volume 2: Theory and Application* (ed. Robin P. Fawcett and David J. Young; London: Pinter, 1988), 219–25; Gotteri, "Some Slavonic Questions for Systemic Linguistics," in *Language and Linguistics: Volume 111 in the Occasional Series: Papers in Slavonic Linguistics* (ed. J.I. Press and F.E. Knowles; St. Andrews: University of St. Andrews, 1996), 119–28; Gotteri, "Toward a Systemic Approach to Tense and Aspect in Polish," in *Meaning and Form: Systemic Functional Interpretations. Meaning and Choice in Language: Studies for Michael Halliday* (ed. Margaret Berry, Christopher Butler, Robin Fawcett, and Guowen Huang; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1996), 499–507 (a revision of a paper in *SWPLL* 1 [1984]: 72–78).
- 33 A.A. Lyne, "Ideational, Interpersonal, and Textual Macrofunctions Applied to Lexicometric Work on French Business Correspondence," in *Systemic Perspectives on Discourse, Volume 2* (ed. James D. Benson and William S. Greaves; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1985), 125–35.
- 34 Stanley E. Porter and Nigel Gotteri, "Ambiguity, Vagueness, and the Working Systemic Linguist," *SWPLL* 2 (1985): 105–18; Porter, "Tense Terminology and Greek Language Study: A Linguistic Re-evaluation," *SWPLL* 3 (1986): 77–86.
- 35 Michael Gregory and Susanne Carroll, *Language and Situation: Language Varieties and their Social Contexts* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
- 36 Erich Steiner, *A Functional Perspective on Language, Action, and Interpretation* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991); Eija Ventola, *The Structure of Social Interaction A Systemic Approach to the Semiotics of Service Encounter Interaction* (London: Pinter, 1987).

in Cardiff, based around the work of Fawcett and a number of his successors such as Lise Fontaine,³⁷ but other major centers formed at the University of Sydney (with Halliday and Martin, among many others), Macquarie University (with Hasan and others),³⁸ several other Australian universities, and Hong Kong (with Matthiessen, who was earlier at Macquarie, and Jonathan Webster,³⁹ Halliday's editor of his collected essays, among still others), with the consequence that some have referred to SFL's two major orientations to grammar as Sydney Grammar and Cardiff Grammar.⁴⁰ Even within these circles, but also in other arenas, such as North America, however, SFL was often seen as a form of practical or applied linguistics that concentrated upon English and the teaching and learning of English as a second language (with many if not most of its practitioners still located in English departments), with much interaction with first-language Chinese speakers, no doubt on the basis of Halliday's original work in Chinese and his influence there. In their preface to a book on key terms in SFL, the editors list what they consider "quite a wide range" of languages, besides English, that have figured into the development of SFL (thirteen languages are mentioned; whether this development is as significant as reported is a matter of debate). Whereas French is mentioned, no Slavonic language or Greek (ancient or modern) is mentioned.⁴¹ Even the recent SFL language typology only treats French, German, Pitjantjatjara (aboriginal Australian language), Tagalog, Telugu (a Dravidian language of India), Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese, in some ways representing the areas in which SFL has thrived, continental Europe and more recently Asia.⁴²

37 Lise Fontaine, *Analysing English Grammar: A Systemic Functional Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

38 Indeed, Berry, "Changes," 13, refers to a "Macquarie Linguistics," separate from those associated with Cardiff and Sydney. See below.

39 Jonathan J. Webster, ed., *The Collected Works of M.A.K. Halliday* (10 vols.; London: Continuum, 2002–2007).

40 The two approaches are outlined in Robin P. Fawcett, *Invitation to Systemic Functional Linguistics through the Cardiff Grammar: An Extension and Simplification of Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar* (3rd ed.; London: Equinox, 2008 [1997]); the differences are also discussed in Butler, *Structure and Function*, *passim*.

41 See Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, Kazuhiro Teruya and Marvin Lam, *Key Terms in Systemic Functional Linguistics* (London: Continuum, 2010), xi; cf. also Matthiessen, "Systemic Functional Linguistics Developing," 23, who mentions a number of Asian languages, but few European and no ancient languages.

42 Alice Caffarel, J.R. Martin, and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, eds., *Language Typology: A Functional Perspective* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004).

I think that there is a good reason for these language omissions. I still vividly remember in 1985 when IFG1 was published. Halliday's work during the 1960s and 70s led directly to his very imaginative, far-reaching, and wide-ranging work of sociolinguistics that was able to bring together abstract notions such as context in the form of situational context and various functions of language (labeled metafunctions, and variously numbered), together with what came to be called the lexicogrammar of the language. There were many high hopes that Halliday was going to break through with a model of language that shattered the traditional sentential constraints, yet provided something grounded in how language functioned in context, all as instantiations of the language's code as represented by system networks. When IFG1 appeared, however, I detected a palpable sigh of disappointment by a number of systemic linguists. I know that this was not only heard or felt in Sheffield. There was a sense, I believe, that the bold metafunctional analyses that resulted in discourse analytical treatments of literature had fallen back to a more constrained set of parameters, the clause. In IFG, the "fundamental unit of organization is the clause,"⁴³ not the discourse or the context. The clause even serves, in some ways as indicated by the organization of the grammar, as the maximal (analyzable and hence structural) semantic unit, and the entire volume was organized around what was at the clausal level, below the clausal level, or above or around the clausal level—but above or around mostly in the sense of what had already been adumbrated in *Cohesion in English* as attention to the textual metafunction. There was still much to ponder and much good theorizing and modeling regarding matters of language, but Halliday had constructed what was a relatively conservative (at least in contrast to his earlier adventurism)⁴⁴ clause-based grammar that emphasized structure (syntagmatic choice) over system (paradigmatic choice) (and it is noticeable that a number of linguists began at this point to drift away from SFL, exploring other types of grammar).⁴⁵ More than that, IFG1 was not a study of language, but it was a grammar of *a* language, in particular the *English* language. The features of the grammar were

43 Halliday, IFG1, xxi. In IFG4, this statement is instead found: "The clause is the central processing unit in the lexicogrammar" (10), reflecting the influence of cognitive linguistics upon SFL.

44 Fawcett, *Theory of Syntax*, 54, calls him an "explorer."

45 See Berry, "Changes," 2, who notes the lack of system networks in IFG1 and IFG2 as well as their re-emergence in IFG3 and IFG4. She also notes that she does not think that Halliday meant IFG to represent the whole of SFL, but I suspect that many have interpreted it that way. I note not only Christopher Butler but also Richard Hudson, first with *Daughter-dependency Grammar* and then *Word Grammar*, and Michael Hoey, among others who have departed from SFL.

designed to explain English. This raised unanswered major questions about the implicit status of language universals (and questions about cross-linguistic application), such as the metafunctions, when all of the modeling was done in English. Metafunctions *may* be universal, but how many are there, when even Halliday seems ambivalent over three or four (and Fawcett posits at least eight)?⁴⁶ Halliday himself described his grammar as “no more than a minute fragment of an account of English grammar.”⁴⁷ As a result, as Butler notes, “[f]or many years, almost all of the central figures in SFG [Systemic Functional Grammar] worked on English . . . Three of the most authoritative accounts of SFG⁴⁸ . . . are based very largely on English, though with occasional comments about other languages . . . [T]hese facts have had important effects on the form of ‘mainstream’ systemic linguistics, despite the fact that Halliday himself has warned of the need for care to be taken in this area . . .”⁴⁹

An important result of the publication of IFG₁, and with it three subsequent editions as well as a number of supporting volumes, was that the focus of much SFL work both concentrated more intensely upon English, as this was admittedly a grammar of English that begged to be fleshed out by means of further work, and limited its theorizing to the categories suggested by this grammar of English. To be fair, there were a number of other studies that continued to develop other topics, including some with discourse implications, but the major focus in SFL came to be how to develop, expand, and further model English grammar from an SFL perspective. With Halliday’s statement, found at the beginning of the book, the future course of SFL was largely set. However, I believe that this statement restricted the continuing theoretical modeling that

46 See Fawcett, *Cognitive Linguistics*, chs. 7 and 8; Fawcett, *Theory of Syntax*, 51 and note 3.

47 Halliday, IFG₁, xiii. Cf. Halliday, IFG₃, ix, where he refers to “the grammar of a human language,” though he does not specify that language as English. The introduction to IFG₄ by Matthiessen seems to have an ambivalent relationship to the volume being a theory of grammar and a theory of the grammar of English. He admits that IFG₁ was “an introduction both to a functional theory of the grammar of human language in general and to a description of the grammar of a particular language, English, based on this theory” (xiii), although that is not the way Halliday describes it. Throughout the introduction, Matthiessen cannot help but note that Halliday’s work is oriented around English.

48 The works he lists are Halliday, IFG₂; Martin, *English Text*; and Matthiessen, *Lexicogrammatical Cartography*.

49 Butler, *Structure and Function*, 47. He cites Halliday, IFG₂, xxxi: “Modern linguistics, with its universalist ideology, has been distressingly ethnocentric, making all other languages look like imperfect copies of English” (found also in IFG₁, xxxi), an accusation that can probably be leveled against Halliday’s SFL as well. Note that this material apparently disappears from IFG₃ and IFG₄.

SFL deserved, limited its scope with regard to languages studied, and even led to its being characterized as (mere) applied linguistics, without its full potential being explored. Even work on such topics as register, which had held out tremendous promise in earlier forms of SFL, became relatively less significant in light of the architecture proposed by IFG1. I do not wish to dispute that much of what Halliday did in IFG1 and subsequent editions was insightful, provocative, and highly suggestive and stimulating of further research. However, besides its constrictive effect, probably fortified by Matthiessen's subsequent work that attempted more than any other to fill in the Hallidayan gaps, major theoretical questions were either unconsciously suppressed or overlooked. IFG came to represent a different type of "standard theory," the very thing that so much functional grammar wished to fight against. The point was reached where some SFL research, including some dissertations, appeared to be nothing more than wholesale acceptances of the standard theory, with perhaps the further development of one part of the system along lines already suggested. This is not to say that there was not work that called SFL, and more specifically Halliday's SFL, into question. There are a number of linguists who turned to other linguistic models, some becoming quite critical of Halliday's work, as well as others who, whether through understanding or misunderstanding, attempted to extrapolate the model and develop it for other purposes. Some of these revisionary attempts have been more successful than others, especially the work of Martin, who has in some ways defined his own competing SFL model (I will return to this below).

In this chapter, I wish to pursue some of these issues in light of the necessity of modeling the architecture of ancient Greek, and to suggest some areas in which further theorizing is to be welcomed. I cannot examine all of the areas that I think merit such examination (even though I hint throughout at some of my thoughts regarding them), but they would include the linguistic status and relationships of the strata; their relationship to register and hence linguistic or non-linguistic status; the definition of register, its relationship to genre, and the existence of sub-registers or other units (whatever they may be theorized as or called) especially within larger discourses; the metafunctions, both their number and their linguistic components, especially the role and place of logico-semantics; the linguistic units above the clause that constitute a text; the place of verbal aspect within a complete systemic functional grammar; the role of formal realizations within a fusional and/or non-configurational language; the definition of theme and rheme (and other terminology) within a non-configurational (or any non-fixed word order) language; and the definitions of markedness and prominence (among many other issues). Here I wish to examine, if only briefly, two problematic and closely related areas within

standard theory SFL: speech functions and the matter of semantics in relationship to discourse and lexicogrammar, and how they relate to each other within SFL and in heavily morphological languages such as ancient Greek. Along the way in my discussion, a number of other major issues, and even some constructive proposals, will be introduced.

Speech Functions

One of the distinctive features of SFL is its dispensing with the semantics/pragmatics divide,⁵⁰ and claiming a single semantic content level that realizes the situational context and is expressed by the lexicogrammar content stratum. I will return to semantics in the next major section below. However, here I wish to make the observation that SFL tends towards a top-down approach to language, modeling how speakers draw upon the meaning potential of the language within a situational context. In that sense, all use of language is contextual, even if only potential.⁵¹ The situational context defines the field, tenor, and mode of the discourse, resulting in a contextual configuration and identification of a register. Each of the components of context is realized semantically and these semantics are realized in the lexicogrammar. Such a linguistic architecture is designed in particular to address the question of the variety of speech roles that may be performed by the finite resources of language, by positing a semantic system of speech functions that is differentiated from and realized by the MOOD system. The clause constitutes the fundamental informational unit in SFL, and the clause is the locus of the clause as message, exchange, and representation. In interpretation of the clause in its interpersonal metafunction as exchange and realizing the tenor of the discourse, the clause is organized around the interactions of the speaker and hearer. In the interpersonal metafunction, the speaker assumes a particular speech role, as does the hearer on the basis of the speaker's stance.

Before I turn to ancient Greek, I wish to discuss this modeling of English, beginning with the lexicogrammatical stratum before turning to the semantic. The semantic choices of the speaker involve the speech functions of the

50 Not all proponents of SFL dispense with this, however, and various linguistic theories now treat the divide as a continuum. See Butler, *Structure and Function*, 45, who notes that Halliday places within semantics what others put within semantics and pragmatics.

51 The somewhat problematic nature of this framework will emerge later, when I show my concern for actual instances, not merely potential occurrences. I do not believe that resolution simply by appeal to probabilities actually addresses the concerns that I have.

language, and these semantic choices are realized by the lexicogrammatical MOOD system. The MOOD network, which Halliday lays out as early as 1970 in a paper first published in 1973, is virtually the same in IFG4 (even if later expanded).⁵² However, I think that Halliday has mixed his categories between semantic and formal labels to the point of compromising its integrity as a semantically-based lexicogrammatical system network, and that this has consequences that I will explore further below. I agree with Gotteri that two types of networks are to be differentiated within SFL, formal and semantic (I realize that the term “semantics” is used ambiguously within SFL, designating both meaning at all ranks and strata, and the semantic portion of the content plane/stratum—this is part of the problem; see below). Strictly formal networks, called by Gotteri “bogus” networks, are not bogus in the sense that they do not have validity.⁵³ To the contrary, their primary validity is to provide comprehensive networks of the formal (paradigmatic) choices available within the language. However, they are not to be confused with “genuine” networks, including lexicogrammatical ones, based upon the semantic choices of the language (in that way, these formal networks are contextualized by the language

52 See M.A.K. Halliday, *Halliday: System and Structure in Language* (ed. G.R. Kress; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 7–25, here 14 (the original form of the paper delivered in 1970); Halliday, “The Functional Basis of Language,” in *Class, Codes and Control, Volume 2: Applied Studies towards a Sociology of Language* (ed. Basil Bernstein; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 343–66, here 360; repr. in Halliday, *Explorations in the Functions of Language* (London: Arnold, 1973), 40; and in Halliday, *On Language and Linguistics* (ed. Jonathan J. Webster; Collected Works 3; London: Continuum, 2003), 298–322, here 315 (with a key to system notation in each); Halliday, IFG4, 24 and expanded 162. The MOOD system is further greatly expanded in Matthiessen, *Lexicogrammatical Cartography*, 382–445, although the confusion between strata and form and semantics appears to remain, with the majority of discussion at the lexicogrammatical level. For a critique, see Butler, *Structure and Function*, 2:37–41.

53 N.J.C. Gotteri, “When Is a System Network Not a System Network? And Is That a Fair Question? Fragments from a Continuing Discussion,” *Occasional Papers in Systemic Linguistics* 1 (1987): 5–14, esp. 7. They may well be appropriately located in the expression stratum. I note that Gotteri’s work on this was done before Halliday’s system networks were incorporated into his IFG3. Gotteri provides unique insights into system networks, so far as I can tell not fully appreciated by others within SFL. There is a sense in which Gotteri’s notion of semantics is more narrow than that of Halliday (who includes both semantics and pragmatics in his notion of contextualized meaning), but Gotteri’s efforts grow out of work on Slavonic languages that have formal features and decontextualized semantic features not adequately addressed in standard SFL theory (I cannot see a compelling reason to dismiss the notion of decontextual semantics, even within a SFL framework—as we will see, neither does Halliday, even within his lexicogrammatical systems).

system, if not by the context of situation), which are to be realized in formal structures. Networks graphically display, as options, the semantic potential of a given system. Gotteri makes clear that the strength of SFL has been in differentiating the two kinds of networks, not confusing them. Halliday has consistently mixed the two in his lexicogrammatical system network for MOOD in English,⁵⁴ but in a way that helps us to understand and offer a critique of his speech functions at the semantic stratum. Halliday's first two broad choices within his system network of MOOD are formal (clause STATUS as either major or minor; clause MOOD TYPE as either indicative or imperative). We see from this that Halliday is modeling the forms of the English MOOD system around formal structures of the clause, first whether it has a Predicator (major) or not (minor), and then whether that verb form is either an indicative or imperative (presumably) form (although Halliday may be ambiguously using these formal terms for meanings). It is only at this point—following the path through the network for the “indicative” choice—that Halliday explores what he labels INDICATIVE TYPE (which I find particularly confusing, as it appears, at least on the basis of the labels, to posit a semantic differentiation of clause types, apparently indicating some level of abstraction, simply on the basis of choice of an indicative verbal mode [i.e. mood form]). Here he differentiates declarative from interrogative types, and within interrogative types yes/no and WH-types of interrogatives.⁵⁵ A strong semantic component emerges at this point (after apparently formal differentiations), although even here the criteria seem to be based upon larger structural (clausal) patterns, that is, whether a declarative statement has a Subject^Finite structure or not, and how the interrogative is formed, all according to English syntactical patterns. As a formal exponee of the MOOD forms of English, this may have merit (although I think there are many problems), but a thoroughly semantically formulated network it is not—although it is clearly represented this way in Halliday's exposition by placing it as part of the MOOD network. However, this network does give insight into how Halliday views the relationship between the formal structures of language, in particular English, and semantics at the lexicogrammatical stratum that can help to clarify his treatment of speech functions.

54 He is not the only one. See also, e.g., Martin, *English Text*, 31, 35, 44.

55 I believe that an argument can be made to proceed from the abstract to the concrete, rather than the reverse. I believe he has his ordering of choices pretty much backwards. I would have thought that the entry condition would have been the types of clauses, and the realizations would have involved indicative, etc., verb types.

Speech functions are fundamental to how Halliday sees the clause realize meanings from the semantic stratum.⁵⁶ Halliday identifies two fundamental speech roles, “giving” and “demanding,” and how they relate to the exchange of either goods and services or information. As a result, he identifies four major speech functions: offer, command, statement, and question, each anticipating a particular default response from the hearer. These speech functions can be identified in the following figure:

<i>Exchange role</i>	<i>Goods and services</i>	<i>Information</i>
<i>Giving</i>	offer	statement
<i>Demanding</i>	command	question

FIGURE 1.1 Major (English) speech functions.

Within these speech functions, the hearer is expected to respond in the following ways: offer: acceptance (with the negative, rejection); command: undertaking (negative, refusal); statement: acknowledgment (negative, contradiction); and question: answer (negative, disclaimer). The speech functions themselves are realized by a variety of wordings in the grammar. Offers are realized by a form of question (*I’ll.../shall I...? or I’ll... , shall I?*), commands by imperative clauses (with or without a mood tag), statements by declaratives clauses (with or without a mood tag), and questions by interrogative clauses (either yes/no or WH-).⁵⁷

This identifying of speech functions—that is, speech functions performed by various types of clauses consisting of particular structures and verbal mood

56 See Halliday, IFG₁, 68–71; IFG₄, 134–39. There are similar expositions by others. See Halliday and Matthiessen, *Construing Experience*, 524; Martin, *English Text*, 31–46. Hasan attempts to systematize these relations in “Meaning in Sociolinguistic Theory,” in *Sociolinguistics Today: International Perspectives* (ed. K. Bolton and H. Kwok; London: Routledge, 1992), 80–119; repr. in *Semantic Variation: Meaning in Society and in Sociolinguistics* (ed. Jonathan J. Webster; London: Equinox, 2009), 271–308, here 283; and in Ruqaiya Hasan, Carmel Cloran, Geoffrey Williams, and Annabelle Lukin, “Semantic Networks: The Description of Linguistic Meaning in SFL,” in *Continuing Discourse on Language*, 2:697–738, here 713, taken from a mimeo from 1983. However, the systemic networks display the semantics in differing and what might be conflicting ways.

57 Halliday, IFG₁ 67; IFG₄, 136–37. This is explicitly seen in M.A.K. Halliday, “Dimensions of Discourse Analysis: Grammar,” in the *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. II. *Dimensions of Discourse* (ed. T. van Dijk; London: Academic Press, 1985), 29–56; repr. in Halliday, *On Grammar* (ed. Jonathan J. Webster; Collected Works 1; London: Continuum, 2002), 261–86, esp. 263.

forms—serves as a semantic bridge between the contextual situation and the lexicogrammar. This is done by means of the various functions that may be performed, without constraining such interpretation by the imposition of the lexicogrammar upon the semantics. In other words, always within some probabilistic context, semantics precedes lexicogrammar, and is mediated by the speech functions that convey these meanings and are then realized in the language by means of clauses that perform the four functions mentioned. There are many reasons for the analysis of speech functions in this way, especially in English. Even though SFL claims to begin with contextual situation and then semantics, it is difficult for Halliday to avoid at least the appearance of dependence in his formulation upon the MOOD system of the English language.⁵⁸ In fact, I believe that this scheme, first proposed by Halliday, reflects his view of English mood and the fact that IFG is not just a theory of language (as is sometimes implied), but specifically a grammar of the English language that is directly dependent upon the resources of that language, and hence without necessary cross-linguistic applicability—or at least that needs to be proven, not assumed.

The limiting factors involved in this analysis are (at least) several. The following are perhaps the most important. First, as noted, the speech functions are clearly constructed around the English MOOD system, as not only Halliday but Matthiessen in a later treatment makes clear.⁵⁹ This is entirely appropriate, as one might expect of a grammar of English, but seems to imply, even if inadvertently, the inverse notion that the speech functions identified are the same functions as would be found in another language, such as ancient Greek, or, to put it more precisely, that the way that speech functions are formulated for Greek are the same as an English-formulated set of speech functions (recognizing basic notions may apply to both). This is an assumption, not a proven fact (despite notions regarding linguistic theorizing and typologizing). The formulation in IFG seems to me to be based upon the clause structure of English, including its morphologically restricted set of English verbal forms (without, for example, a subjunctive form, etc., but which relies, instead, upon various modal indicators not found in, for instance, Greek). As a result, the speech functions are realized by syntactical configurations of the clause with limited modality (choices of mood forms), and hence the formulation above (in some instances extending the clause). Second, this interpersonal semantic

58 It might be possible for others to do so (such as by means of a more robust modeling of exchange structure), but this is not done in the IFG series, where exchange is limited to two moves, initiation and response. I pursue issues related to exchange structure in the next section.

59 Matthiessen, "Systemic Functional Theory," 523.

system of speech functions seems to draw upon ideational semantics when information vs. goods and services are introduced as a distinguishing criterion. This may in part be motivated by features of the rank structure of English, in which some formal restrictions of the English verbal system require the clause to be used as the minimal unit for such semantic distinctions. Third, there is unhelpful terminology regarding realizations, with the term “imperative” being used as a clause-rank label when it is more properly a lower rank (group or word) designation, even in English and even though the English imperative is the same as most of the indicative forms (raising the question of the nature of such a distinction in English between indicative and imperative, not an issue in Greek, as we will observe). Fourth, with the clause as the functional unit for semantic analysis,⁶⁰ the speech functions of English, according to Halliday, rely upon word order to express fundamental distinctions (e.g. the difference between question and statement), without any more delicate means of distinction.⁶¹ Fifth, none of the semantic terms is sufficiently defined or related to each other so as to make clear what is entailed in the use of such categories. Not commented upon is the fact that a statement is realized in the lexicogrammar by the same verb form as a question or offer, or the relationship of an offer, which is formed by a question, to what is labeled a question. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the major issue that speech functions are designed to address is not thereby solved, as so-called indirect speech acts remain unexplained. Let’s take as an example the wording *It’s hot in here*. On the one hand, Halliday may claim that he cannot determine its speech function, as he does not have a context of usage. In one sense, he is right, but even Halliday would probably say that the wording typically (probabilistically) would realize a statement. In other words, the wording *It’s hot in here* would, according to what Halliday presents on speech functions, be analyzed as, typically, an instance of a statement realized by a clause of an indicative type: declarative.⁶² This

60 This is clearly seen in Halliday’s organizing his entire grammar around the clause as message, exchange and representation. This has been the organizing principle from IFG₁ to the present. In other words, with the clause as central to a functional (semantic) linguistic system, the clause becomes the major unit for semantic analysis.

61 Other elements might be used, such as modal operators, but this is not the way that Halliday configures his speech functions.

62 The notion of probability has been important to Halliday throughout his work, even if his publications have been more recent. See, for example, the following essays: “Towards Probabilistic Interpretations” (1991), “Corpus Studies and Probabilistic Grammar” (1991), “Language as System and Language as Instance: The Corpus as a Theoretical Construct” (1992), and “Quantitative Studies and Probabilities in Grammar” (1993), all reprinted in Halliday, *Computational and Quantitative Studies* (ed. Jonathan J. Webster; Collected Works 6; London: Continuum 2005), 42–62, 63–75, 76–92, and 130–56, respectively.

explanation may suffice in the abstract, and may even work in some contexts when it can be determined that, untypically, the wording is an instance of a command realized by a clause of an indicative type: declarative. There may, however, be some contexts where it is not readily apparent which is meant. That some contexts might say that it expresses a command—though still realized by a clause of an indicative type—introduces an incongruity that is not readily explainable by Halliday's speech functions and not satisfactorily predictable regarding when this occurs. Focusing simply upon the typical use clearly does not satisfy in this (or other similar) instances, and the clear disjunction that Halliday sees between clausal structure and semantics fails to answer a fundamental set of questions regarding meaning.

This is not to say that there is not much of use in the broad contours of speech functions as developed by IFG. However, even though speech functions are dependent upon the clause as a form of exchange in both English and Greek, what has been posited for English speech functions and their realizations in the English MOOD system cannot necessarily be adopted for ancient Greek. Greek has a very different and in many ways much more morphologically rich verbal system. Greek does not have the modality system of English, but relies upon its more formally complex mood system. The result is that English relies upon various modal operators at varying (often higher) ranks to realize modality (not just or even primarily the finite verb of the Predicator), whereas Greek indicates changes in modality by choice of mood forms (Halliday's *mode*) of the verb. This suggests both that Greek has a different lexicogrammatical system for indicating what Halliday labels MOOD, but also that Greek has its own means of developing different types of speech functions, including a different means of formulating questions and commands (that is, questions and commands are formulated differently in Greek than in English and hence have different semantic features, a recognizably Whorfian formulation). As a result, there are at least two ways to formulate speech functions for ancient Greek, based upon the verbal attitudinal system. One differentiates each of the semantic systems,⁶³ while the other posits two major attitudinal systems. I develop the latter as a more satisfactory reflection of Greek semantics.⁶⁴

63 This system network posits choices among the following semantic options: assertive, projective, and directive, thereby losing the semantic similarities of the system network that I develop below.

64 I wish to thank the students in my McMaster Divinity College PhD seminar, Linguistic Modeling, in winter 2013, for their discussion of this topic and their further development of this discussion. I realize that there are other ways of formulating the Greek attitude system.

The attitudinal system of the Greek lexicogrammar, realized by the various clause types noted below, is formulated around a set of binary choices as in the English MOOD system, but with the fundamental semantic differentiation being between assertive and non-assertive. The system would look something like this (I offer the basic outlines of the interpersonal mood system, realizing that some of the most delicate choices are not represented; note that the POLARITY system is a separate simultaneous system, and PERSON and NUMBER are not included):⁶⁵




FIGURE 1.2 Systemic network of attitude expanded to indicate potential realizations of speech functions.⁶⁶

65 On system networks, see M.A.K. Halliday, "A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar" (1969), repr. in *On Language and Linguistics*, 180–84 (with examples of system networks, not all of them consistent according to the criteria above, in Halliday, "English System Networks," in *Halliday*, 101–35; repr. in *On Grammar*, 127–51); Berry, *Introduction to Systemic Linguistics*, 1:141–76; Fawcett, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 19–25; Gotteri, "When"; J.R. Martin, "The Meaning of Features in Systemic Linguistics," in *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics: Volume 1: Theory and Description* (ed. M.A.K. Halliday and Robin P. Fawcett; London: Pinter, 1987), 14–40; and Hasan, Cloran, Williams, and Lukin, "Semantic Networks," 2:697–738.

66 This system network incorporates elements of the attitude semantic system, previously proposed in Stanley E. Porter, *Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood* (SBG 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 109; and further refined in Stanley E. Porter and Matthew Brook O'Donnell, "The Greek Verbal Network Viewed from a Probabilistic Standpoint: An Exercise in Hallidayan Linguistics," *FN* 14 (2001): 3–41, esp. 40. For the semantic terminology and definitions, see Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 163–77. This system network is not to be taken as definitive, and is offered for exemplary purposes. For example, +tonal does not indicate that we know the sound system of ancient Greek, but that we believe that tonal patterns were involved in some way.

This constitutes the lexicogrammatical system network and the resulting expressions (clause types) form the basis for identifying Greek speech functions. Rather than beginning with a vague notion of speech functions that have an inconsistent, if not haphazard, relationship to the expression in the language (as I believe does Halliday), I am using the clause types as the foundation of differentiating speech functions on the basis of how the Greek language expresses them. By doing this, we are able to link the semantics and the expression.

- +assertive: -interrogative >> declarative statement (assertive clause with indicative mood form)
- +assertive: +interrogative: +affirmative >> positive question (assertive clause question formulated so as to expect a positive answer, with indicative mood form)
- +assertive: +interrogative: +denial >> negative question (assertive clause question formulated so as to expect a negative answer, with indicative mood form)
- +assertive: +interrogative: +tonal >> open question (assertive clause, with question tonally indicated)
- +assertive: +interrogative: +elemental >> τ -question (assertive clause, with question with one of the question words, with indicative mood form)
- assertive: +projective: -interrogative: -contingent >> projective statement (non-contingent projective clause, with subjunctive mood form, as in hortatory or prohibitive use when negated)
- assertive: +projective: -interrogative; +contingent >> projective contingent statement (contingent projective clause, with optative mood form, as in volitive use)
- assertive: +projective: +interrogative: +tonal; -contingent >> projective question (non-contingent projective clause, with subjunctive mood form, as in deliberative use)
- assertive: +projective: +interrogative: +elemental; -contingent >> projective τ -question (non-contingent projective clause, with question with one of the question words, with subjunctive mood form)
- assertive: +projective: +interrogative: +tonal; +contingent >> projective contingent question (contingent projective clause, with optative mood form, as in deliberative use)
- assertive: +projective: +interrogative: +elemental; +contingent >> projective contingent τ -question (contingent projective clause, with question with one of the question words, with optative mood form)
- assertive: +directive >> command (imperative mood form)

In keeping with my analysis above (and recognizably departing from Halliday’s formulation for English, as critiqued above), I believe that there is a direct linkage between the formulation of these clause types and their semantics, upon which basis the speech functions of Greek can and should be derived. Halliday, whether he realizes it or not, links his speech functions to structures (even if only by typification or probability), although he wishes to assert that meanings can be realized by various structures. I am attempting to find a way to correlate the semantics and structures more explicitly. Thus, by means of clause types with their distinctive semantic features, this lexicogrammatical network identifies the variety of potential speech functions of Greek according to what can actually be expressed in Greek and what is being expressed in Greek by using such an expression. This system also provides a means for the kind of reciprocal process necessary for examination of an ancient language. Although Halliday claims that SFL should work from semantics to grammar, as we have seen above he himself works within a reciprocal modeling framework.⁶⁷ As a result of this examination, the speech functions of Greek might then be tentatively posited for the sake of initial discussion. This system does not provide the responses of the English speech functions in IFG, although a good number of them are already suggested by the statement/question system (as distinct from the POLARITY system), which suggests the basis of exchange. The speech functions of Greek may be tentatively represented more fully as follows, still with much typification (with polarity for each function not indicated):

<i>Exchange role</i>	<i>Goods and services</i>	<i>Information</i>
<i>Giving</i>	open question	declaration
<i>Projecting</i>	projective question	projective statement
<i>Wishing</i>	projective cont. statement	positive/negative question
<i>Demanding</i>	command	τ-question
<i>Enquiring</i>	projective cont. question (?)	projective (cont.) τ-question (?)

FIGURE 1.3 Major (Greek) speech functions.

67 Cf. Halliday, IFG1, xiv; IFG2, xiv: “This word [syntax] suggests proceeding in a particular direction, such that a language is interpreted as a system of forms, to which meanings are then attached. . . In a functional grammar, on the other hand, the direction is reversed. A language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be realized,” and Halliday and Hasan, *Cohesion in English*, 4, where identifying elements precedes identifying cohesion.

In some ways, these speech functions resemble an analysis of clause types. In one sense, this attempts to move beyond the limitations of Halliday's constrained, yet still formally based categories. In another, they preserve the context-dependent framework of Halliday's speech functions by attempting to fine-tune the ways that such speech functions might be expressed, while also recognizing that such lexicogrammatical differences are semantic as well. The result is, at least in my mind, a more satisfactory way of handling the form–semantic relationship in Greek. This tentative set of speech functions—I am not satisfied that all of the functions are satisfactorily resolved—is posited for the sake of further discussion at this point, as I believe that speech functions should reflect the means by which such functions are grammaticalized. The speech functions and the semantic system network address most of the problems noted above with the traditional IFG speech-function network, not least because the network takes into account features of the Greek verbal system (admittedly something that it is not designed to do, and, I believe cannot adequately do), such as its rich mood-form morphology that results in a larger variety of formal or structurally based attitudinal semantic distinctions not possible in some other languages, such as English, without moving to higher ranks and the use of periphrasis (modals) unnecessary in Greek.⁶⁸ The system network, which is located at the lexicogrammatical stratum, provides a more satisfactory graphic representation of the meaning potential of the Greek attitudinal system. I believe further that the Greek speech functions provide a better representation for Greek than the IFG speech functions do for English, as they cover both the various ways in which negation and polarity are used in Greek and at least suggest (here lacking sufficient detail) the kinds of semantic similarities and differentiations captured in use of the subjunctive in prohibitions along with the imperative in commands.⁶⁹ A complete system network

68 This raises the question, however, of whether the system network should be understood as serving both semantic and lexicogrammatical purposes, and thereby unifying the content strata. See Martin, *English Text*, 32–33, where he claims that in Halliday (IFG1) “[n]o attempt is made to distinguish strata between grammar and meaning; rather the grammar in [sic] infused with meaning, and a stratal distinction between grammar and semantics systematically blurred.” I recognize that my theorizing may well move in this direction. However, this would not fully address the further question I address below regarding discourse semantics.

69 I do not believe that traditional SFL semantic networks capture this, because of the unfortunate (though not always maintained) disjunction between context dependency and formal realization. As a result, one might posit that all sorts of different types of constructions could be used, such as for a command, but without showing how they are lexicogrammatically related to enable such a function.

would also note the interaction of the NUMBER and PERSON systems (e.g. in so-called hortatory commanding use in the first person or the use of the negated aorist subjunctive in second person prohibitions rather than the negated aorist imperative, although the negated aorist imperative is used in third person). However, the above system network also shows that the relationship between the subjunctive form as realizing +projective: -contingent and the imperative realizing +directive is closely semantically connected within the Greek verbal network (a formal network would not necessarily capture this), so as to account for instances where structural substitution occurs (as noted above).

The above system network, however, shows that the Greek attitudinal system as realized by the verbal mood forms provides for a different means of characterization of interpersonal semantics on the basis of verbal forms and their related structures than does the English system, with its relatively under-developed verbal system and reliance upon modality. They may be able to perform the same functions, but they do so by varying means that have a direct relationship to how the languages function, and hence their semantics. I noted above that, despite implicit (or sometimes explicit) claims to the contrary, formal features are important in modeling the semantics of a given language. The proposed attitudinal speech function semantic system network above recognizes that this is necessary, especially in a morphologically rich language such as Greek. This was recognized earlier by Gotteri, who, in his analysis of Slavonic verbal systems, refers to Formal Systemic Functional Grammar.⁷⁰ By this, he means that, even within a functional grammar—at least for the modeling of some languages (morphologically rich ones such as Polish and Greek)—there is an important relationship between semantics and formal (paradigmatic) features, especially as semantic features are represented as options in a system of semantic choices realized by discrete forms or structures. Such an approach also makes possible the handling of an element that has traditionally been under-theorized in SFL—notions of tense and aspect⁷¹—and has already been

70 Gotteri, “Toward a Systemic Approach,” 505–506. I have offered some brief comments on such a “minimalist formal semantics” in Stanley E. Porter, “Greek Linguistics and Lexicography,” in *Understanding the Times: New Testament Studies in the 21st Century. Essays in Honor of D.A. Carson on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday* (ed. Andreas J. Köstenberger and Robert W. Yarbrough; Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2011), 19–61, esp. 43–46.

71 Carl Bache, *English Tense and Aspect in Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar: A Critical Appraisal and an Alternative* (London: Equinox, 2008). These have already been addressed for languages other than English in other venues. See the following note.

utilized to significant effect in research on the aspectual system of ancient Greek.⁷²

Thus, regarding this particular area of speech functions and their realization in the mood system, it appears that the analysis of English speech functions provides an inadequate basis for discussion of Greek attitudinal semantics as represented in the interpersonal metafunction of exchange. However, a semantic network that reflects the formal choices of the language provides a more satisfactory analysis of the speech functions. This must be considered within the larger framework of what is meant by semantics within SFL, which is discussed in the next section.

Lexicogrammar, Semantics and Discourse Semantics

Halliday posits a stratificational view of the architecture of language. He has long done so, even though an explicit stratification does not appear in either IFG₁ or IFG₂. Apparently as early as 1977, Halliday proposed “a model with three levels: social–contextual, semantic and grammatical, each being interpreted as a recoding of the one next above.”⁷³ However, an explicit exposition of these strata did not appear until IFG₃ of 2004, when the first chapter was significantly rewritten.⁷⁴ Halliday (or is it Matthiessen?) graphically depicts a

72 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*; and Porter and O'Donnell, “Greek Verbal Network.”

73 Christopher S. Butler, “Communicative Function and Semantics,” in *New Developments: Volume 1*, 212–29, citing M.A.K. Halliday, “Language as Code and Language as Behaviour: A Systemic-Functional Interpretation of the Nature and Ontogenesis of Dialogue,” in *The Semiotics of Culture and Language Volume 1: Language as Social Semiotic* (ed. Robin P. Fawcett, M.A.K. Halliday, Sydney M. Lamb, and A. Makkai; London: Pinter, 1984), 3–35, with three key networks from pp. 12, 13, and 15 reprinted on Butler's p. 214. I note that, in this case, the MOOD system is represented in the lexicogrammar, whereas in others it is treated (at least as part of the interpersonal metafunction) at the semantic level (Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic*, 112–13, 128–30). This is a typical problem in SFL, mentioned by Berry, “Changes,” 8, and discussed at length in Butler, *Structure and Function*, 1178–84, where he notes that Halliday himself has been ambiguous on this fact (note changes in IFG₁, 101 and IFG₂, 107 regarding transitivity, from semantic to lexicogrammatical), although in IFG₃ and IFG₄ the MOOD system is represented (though somewhat ambiguously at times) as lexicogrammatical while the metafunctions encompass all strata, and in Matthiessen, *Lexicogrammatical Cartography*, 382–429, as thoroughly lexicogrammatical. Cf. Martin, *English Text*, 31–33, who also recognizes this merging of categories. One of the results of Halliday's shifting of categories is lack of clear connection between strata.

74 The terms “stratum/strata,” “plane/s,” and “level/s” are used apparently interchangeably in Halliday IFG₃ (24–26) and 4 (24–27). For example, Halliday refers to language having “more strata” than simply sound and writing, and then discusses how the “‘content’

context stratum, two content strata, one semantics and the other lexicogrammar, and two expression strata, phonology and phonetics. This appears to capture what Halliday had earlier proposed (even if the location of the various systems fluctuates between semantic and lexicogrammatical). Thus, SFL, in at least Halliday's pronouncement of it, is seen as having a single content plane (or stratum), within which there is a semantic stratum realized by the lexicogrammatical stratum. The implications of this are that semantics is treated as the realization of the contextual factors and that the lexicogrammar is the realization of the semantics. This has elegance, in that it eliminates the highly problematic semantics vs. pragmatics divide, which continues to raise issues in other types of linguistics.⁷⁵ The semantic stratum seems to capture that meaning is distinct from system (paradigmatic)/structure (syntagmatic), even if related in some way (although not as well defined as needed, as seen above). However, such a distinction has proved to be problematic for SFL almost from the start. The above systemic analysis of the Greek attitudinal system as part of the interpersonal metafunction still does not handle all of the instances of what I identified above as indirect or implicit speech acts. The speech functions, whether as outlined for English in IFG or in the system network outlined for Greek above, still do not directly address the question of how a statement such as *It is cold in here* might (within a singular semantic stratum) be analyzed for an ancient language such as Greek (or English for that matter) as both a statement and a command, even if an indirect one. This can be the case, even when appeal is made to all usage being contextualized, only if one has a set of criteria for such determination (in this instance extra-linguistic?). What is needed is a means of determining the relationship between the semantics and the formal expression that links the form of the statement to its structure, without simply claiming that *It is cold in here* in one context is a statement and in another a command (same lexicogrammatical realization of two different speech functions). This is the purpose of formal systemic grammar, one that perhaps moves beyond the limitations of typical SFL formulation (as well as beyond the semantics/pragmatics divide).⁷⁶

expands into two," apparently indicating that this is the content stratum. However, he later refers to "stratification of the content plane" (IFG3, 24–25, IFG4, 24–25).

75 For a recent discussion, see Mira Ariel, *Defining Pragmatics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The classic illustration of the problem of definition of categories is found in the fact that volume 2 of John Lyons, *Semantics* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) overlaps significantly with Stephen C. Levinson, *Pragmatics* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

76 I find it unacceptable for grammatical analytical purposes that the SFL semantic stratum "solves" the difficulty by claiming that an identical structure is, in fact, two different semantic structures that have the same lexicogrammatical realization. Even if this were

This has been a recognized problem in SFL for a number of years. Before the publication of IFG₁, a number of proposals were made regarding how such phenomena as implicit speech acts might be addressed. Once the problem was graphically addressed in IFG₃ in 2004, there have been further responses. In two insightful articles and elsewhere, Butler identifies the problem and examines approaches to the issue.⁷⁷ Butler poses the problem this way: “A crucial question for the discourse analyst is whether the communicative function of an utterance can be accounted for within the familiar domain of syntax and semantics, or whether instead a new level of linguistic description is needed.”⁷⁸ In other words, Butler in some ways equates the communicative function of an utterance with the semantic stratum of Halliday’s architecture and wonders aloud whether the differentiation between semantics and lexicogrammar (syntax) is adequate, especially to handle such a phenomenon as indirect speech acts. The reason that Butler raises the issue is that he is unsatisfied with Halliday’s approach to the matter. In work that preceded IFG, Halliday, as noted by Butler, had outlined various categories related to the demanding of goods and services, which, as Butler states, are “reinterpreted” in various so-called semantic categories, such as “command,” “question,” and “statement.”⁷⁹ However, Butler contends, and I would concur (even taking into account IFG₄), that Halliday’s “categories are not defined,” so it is difficult to know how he would analyze two sets of sentences that Butler uses as examples:⁸⁰

to be so, appeal to context must be much more rigorous than it has been to determine what the contextual features are that motivate such semantic structures. Perhaps in contemporary English it is possible—though not always—to claim that the same wording realizes different meanings on the basis of context, but that assumes far more knowledge about context than even most contemporary users of language maintain. I do not believe that we can leave our linguistic explanations simply at the level of saying that a statement may be one or the other, or that probabilistically it may be one or the other. We are seeking ways of determining the meaning in context on the basis of the expression.

77 Christopher S. Butler, “Discourse Systems and Structures and Their Place within an Overall Systemic Model,” in *Systemic Perspectives on Discourse, Volume 1* (ed. James D. Benson and William S. Greaves; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1985), 213–28; Butler, “Communicative Function”; Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*, 148–63. A more recent treatment in light of subsequent work is found in Butler, *Structure and Function*, 2:30–55. I draw upon all of these treatments in the subsequent discussion.

78 Butler, “Discourse Systems,” 214.

79 Butler, “Discourse Systems,” 214, citing Halliday, “Language as Code.” See also Butler, “Communicative Function,” 213; Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*, 150.

80 Butler, “Discourse Systems,” 214; Butler, “Communicative Function,” 212; for the two sets respectively. They are meant to illustrate the same problem.

- (1) Can you move that table?
- (2) That table's in the way.

- (3) Can you open the window?
- (4) It's awfully stuffy in here.

The two sets of sentences are designed to be parallel and end up eliciting the same analysis. A major development in Halliday's theory is his use of the notion of congruence, which he posits as a means of accounting for inter-level relations. One of the means of explaining incongruence is through grammatical metaphor, in which lack of congruence can be accounted for by differing construals, such as grammaticalized indications of various types of orientation (e.g. subjectivity) or processes as entities.⁸¹ Grammatical metaphor, however, does not address the kinds of problems that Butler raises.

The three approaches that Butler identifies examine these two sets of sentences in different ways.⁸² The first takes an entirely semantic approach. In this accounting, all four of the examples have "potential directiveness" and this potential needs to be taken into account in the "semantic representation" of both.⁸³ This position is taken by Halliday, along with a modified form by Martin.⁸⁴ Butler notes that Halliday takes a view in which he posits a semantic relationship between, for example, the "question" as a semantic category and the "interrogative" as a grammatical category, which is at the heart of his definition of speech functions (discussed above). Butler, however, points out some of the problems with Halliday's speech functions unrelated to the concerns expressed above regarding Greek. These have not been alleviated by subsequent discussion by Halliday in later editions of IFG. Thus, there is not a clear relationship between the strata, such as the contextual, the semantic, and the lexicogrammatical, and how the various features of each correlate with each other (this is certainly seen in the discussion in the previous section regarding speech functions and the attitude system). Halliday is concerned with congruent relations among the strata and typicality (probability) in their use (as in the system for Greek outlined above), not with the kind of examples that Butler posits, which are non-congruent and not typical, at least so far as typicality is

⁸¹ Halliday, IFG4, 698.

⁸² See Butler, "Communicative Function," 212–13; cf. Butler, "Discourse Systems," 214.

⁸³ Butler, "Communicative Function," 212.

⁸⁴ Halliday, "Language in a Social Perspective," *Educational Review* 23.3 (1971): 165–88, here 173; repr. in Halliday, *Explorations*, 48–71; and in Halliday, *Language and Society* (ed. Jonathan J. Webster; Collected Works 10; London: Continuum, 2007), 43–64; and J.R. Martin, "How Many Speech Acts?" *UEA Papers in Linguistics* 14/15 (1981): 52–77.

defined as congruent. There is the further difficulty that Halliday's semantic terms are not sufficiently well defined so as to show what they encompass, and whether the examples above would constitute sub-categories.

The second approach is what Butler calls a "half-way" or "middle" approach, in which sentences (1) and (3) are recognized as having "potential directive-ness" but (2) and (4) are not.⁸⁵ Fawcett takes this approach, by differentiating between two types of sentences. Examples (1) and (3) are requests that anticipate the ability for an act to be performed, while examples (2) and (4) exemplify what he calls an "information-giver" that allows for certain deductions to be drawn.⁸⁶ Butler questions Fawcett's defense of his treatment of examples such as (1) and (3), primarily on the basis that Fawcett must identify the purpose for an utterance, its tonal pattern, whether such statements have truth values (they apparently do), and the naturalness or not of the anticipated response (e.g. if one were simply to answer yes). The appeal to purpose in all of the defenses (except the one regarding tone) is highly problematic, as Butler notes, as it requires that we move beyond the realms of any type of grammatical analysis and invoke larger than perhaps even discourse considerations.

The third approach, the one that Butler defends following Richard Hudson, takes what he calls a "surface meaning" approach,⁸⁷ and states that sentences (1) and (3) are always questions and sentences (2) and (4) are always statements, "whatever their actual communicative function in an interaction between participants."⁸⁸ This position argues that the communicative function, or what might be called illocutionary force, of such statements is not part of either the semantics or the lexicogrammar (both of which are, according to this analysis, independent of context; contra Halliday's claim, even if not his execution),⁸⁹ because they are individually context dependent and therefore unformalizable by means of independent properties. What Butler does determine, however, is that such "semantic properties are closely related to syntactic mood, though not in a one-to-one way."⁹⁰ Instead, a variety of non-syntactical but semantic properties can be identified that enable such analysis

85 Butler, "Communicative Function," 212, 217.

86 Fawcett, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 111–12.

87 Butler, "Communicative Function," 220, drawing upon Richard A. Hudson, "The Meaning of Questions," *Language* 51 (1975): 1–31.

88 Butler, "Communicative Function," 212.

89 Halliday is still independent of context by his claims to typicality or probability—to my mind a major shortcoming of his effort and an attempt at generalization that does not address the major question needing resolution.

90 Butler, "Communicative Function," 221.

(he uses an example of “sincerity conditions” from speech act theory).⁹¹ Butler concludes that “only those properties of sentences which are relatable, in a fairly direct though not one-to-one way, to surface mood, should be included in the semantic representation.”⁹² This, however, still leaves unresolved the question, as Butler recognizes, of the relationship between, on the one hand, communicative function and, on the other, semantics and lexicogrammar.

The resolution to the problem of the relationship between lexicogrammar, semantics, and communicative function, I suggest, does not require an appeal to a semantic stratum but rather an appeal to the level of discourse. There have been several proposals made regarding how to resolve this difficulty. Several proposals from pragmatics are inadequate, including H. Paul Grice’s maxims of conversation and speech-act theory. Grice’s maxims are too general to provide the kind of discourse specificity required to link communicative function with semantics and lexicogrammar.⁹³ Grice’s maxims have been institutionalized within speech-act theory, but speech-act theory itself is unable to provide the way forward, as it requires knowledge of the language user’s intention, which cannot be deduced from the individual sentences or formalized in the lexicogrammar. Nor is speech-act theory concerned with discourse itself, concentrating as it does upon utterances/sentences taken in isolation.⁹⁴

There are several related discourse-analytic approaches, however, that have been proposed over the years. In the course of his several treatments, Butler examines a number of them. The proposal of John Sinclair and Malcolm Coulthard, modified by Deirdre Burton, appears to have had the greatest significance for subsequent discussion.⁹⁵ Both Sinclair and Coulthard and Burton propose a discourse-analytic model that is syntagmatically oriented, based

91 Butler, “Communicative Function,” 221.

92 Butler, “Communicative Function,” 221–22.

93 There are other problems with Grice’s maxims with regard to ancient Greek, including their applicability, as the maxims were formulated in a modern English-language context. See Paul Grice, *Studies in the Ways of Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. 22–40 and 41–57.

94 Butler, “Communicative Function,” 222; cf. Butler, “Discourse Systems,” 216–17.

95 J. McH. Sinclair and R.M. Coulthard, *Towards an Analysis of Discourse: The English Used by Teachers and Pupils* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Deirdre Burton, *Dialogue and Discourse: A Sociolinguistic Approach to Modern Drama Dialogue and Naturally Occurring Conversation* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Burton, “Analysing Spoken Discourse,” in *Studies in Discourse Analysis* (ed. Malcolm Coulthard and Martin Montgomery; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 61–81. See also Coulthard, Montgomery, and David Brazil, “Developing a Description of Spoken Discourse,” in *Studies in Discourse Analysis*, 1–50; and Coulthard and Brazil, “Exchange Structure,”

upon Halliday's Scale and Category grammar.⁹⁶ Sinclair and Coulthard's discourse analysis is based upon classroom use of English and is generalized and extended by Burton in her application to modern drama and other types of discourse. Butler attempts to develop their proposals further, especially the categories of Burton, by emphasizing the paradigmatic dimension within a daughter-dependency framework.⁹⁷

This is not the place to go into detail regarding the discourse analytics that any of the above approaches produce, but I note that the rank scale of discourse produces the following:⁹⁸




FIGURE 1.3 *Discourse ranks.*

Acts are roughly the equivalent of clauses, whether major or minor. Moves consist of seven types: framing, focusing, opening, challenging, bound-opening, reopening. Butler refines these moves significantly by differentiating the responses to such moves, with the result that he provides a network of initiating, supporting, and other moves, each with both the type of move and its "sister" moves, so that an opening may have the purpose of "informing" or "directing" etc. Exchanges are classified as boundary exchanges and conversational exchanges, with the conversational exchanges forming the bulk of a transaction. Butler's contribution is to try to identify realization rules that are able to account for the move from system to structure, although he does so using daughter-dependency rules. These are different from the rules that Sinclair and Coulthard produce, which themselves are based upon


in *Studies in Discourse Analysis*, 82–106. Butler responds to most of these proposals in *Systemic Linguistics*, 151–61.

96 M.A.K. Halliday, "Categories of the Theory of Grammar," *Word* 17 (1961): 241–92; repr. in *On Grammar*, 37–94.

97 Butler, "Discourse Systems," 218–27; cf. Butler, "Communicative Function," 222–26. See Richard A. Hudson, *Arguments for a Non-Transformational Grammar* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

98 Butler, "Discourse Systems," 219.

a more condition-based format. Butler concludes that “[d]iscourse is seen... as a level separate from semantics and syntax, but related to these levels by realization...”⁹⁹ In one publication, he depicts this as follows:¹⁰⁰



In another, he maps it this way:¹⁰¹

Surface form > semantics > speech act classes > discourse function

This representation identifies the major issue that remains: that no one has yet to devise mapping rules or rules regarding speech-act classes so as to create a sufficiently formalized relationship between discourse and semantics. They rely upon congruence, typicality and predictability, but cannot create strongly correlative formalization.¹⁰²

We can readily see that the approach taken by Butler, already adumbrated in the work of others and especially Martin, resulted in a major bifurcation within SFL. Whereas Halliday continues to posit three levels of stratification—context, content, and expression, with the content plane or stratum divided into semantics and lexicogrammar, Martin has developed a modified stratificational architecture. Martin’s proposal emerges out of his consideration of three limitations to the Hallidayan framework. The first is what he calls “semantic motifs running through the grammar which cannot be generalized at that

99 Butler, “Discourse Systems,” 227. Cf. Martin, *English Text*, 7–28.

100 Butler, “Discourse Systems,” 227.

101 Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*, 162. Reliance upon probability is not the same as predictability—one occurs before and the other after the instance. Just because there is a given probability regarding a particular occurrence does not mean that we have found the means of finding the environments to result in such probabilities, which I believe are necessary.

102 Further efforts, for example, by Margaret Berry, “Systemic Linguistics and Discourse Analysis: A Multi-Layered Approach to Exchange Structure,” in *Studies in Discourse Analysis*, 120–45; and Michael Stubbs, “Motivating Analysis of Exchange Structure,” in *Studies in Discourse Analysis*, 107–19; and Stubbs, *Discourse Analysis: The Sociolinguistic Analysis of Natural Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 84–146, do not address this particular problem.

level because of their diverse structural realisations,”¹⁰³ which prompts him to suggest that there is a more abstract stratum than either syntax or semantics, as normally defined (he treats here examples from Halliday in which significantly differing process types construe an event in generally similar ways). The second consideration is grammatical metaphor. In such an instance, non-congruence prompts positing a “literal” level and a figurative level, which figurative level suggests semantic layers beyond that of the “literal” level. The third is text itself. If the clause is the maximal semantic unit (what Martin calls “the most embracing grammatical unit”),¹⁰⁴ then, even taking cohesion into account, there appears to be a level of semantics beyond merely cohesion. The result is that Martin argues for the “text” as “a semantic unit” that merits “a level of discourse semantics stratified with respect to lexicogrammar on the content plane,” so as to “permit generalisations to be made across structural and non-structural textual relations.”¹⁰⁵ As a result, Martin proposes a model of stratification that includes the following levels: context, content strata of discourse semantics and lexicogrammar, and expression.¹⁰⁶ So far as I can see, he does not develop criteria for linking the discourse semantic plane with the lexicogrammatical. In his major work outlining this theory of discourse semantics, Martin does not develop what meaning beyond the clause might look like. That is reserved for a later volume that he co-authors with David Rose, reflecting a trend in SFL to move structures to higher strata.¹⁰⁷ In this volume, they identify six discourse systems as part of the discourse semantic stratum (distinguishing it from social activity and grammar). Each is a component of one of the three SFL metafunctions: appraisal (expanded in another book

103 Martin, *English Text*, 16.

104 Martin, *English Text*, 17.

105 Martin, *English Text*, 19.

106 Reasserted in J.R. Martin and David Rose, *Genre Relations: Mapping Culture* (London: Equinox, 2008), 29; and Martin, “Systemic Functional Linguistics,” in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Discourse Analysis* (ed. Ken Hyland and Brian Paltridge; London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 101–19, here 102. Berry, “Changes,” 13, sees a convergence of different streams within SFL on such higher levels, such as the discourse semantic stratum.

107 J.R. Martin and David Rose, *Working with Discourse: Meaning Beyond the Clause* (2nd ed.; London: Continuum, 2007); and J.R. Martin, “Discourse Studies,” in *Continuum Companion to Systemic Functional Linguistics* (ed. M.A.K. Halliday and Jonathan J. Webster; London: Continuum, 2009), 154–65; endorsed by Mary J. Schleppegrell, “Systemic Functional Linguistics,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (ed. James Paul Gee and Michael Handford; London: Routledge, 2012), 21–34, esp. 25.

by Martin and Peter White)¹⁰⁸ and negotiation, components of the interpersonal metafunction; ideation and conjunction, components of the ideational metafunction; and identification and periodicity, components of the textual metafunction.

There are several observations to make here. The first is that the number of strata remains relatively the same. That is, there is a context level, a bifurcated content level, and an expression level, and Martin himself limits the number of non-phonological levels to two, claiming that languages do not recognize three or more such strata.¹⁰⁹ Thus, in some sense, the debate is the relationship between Martin's discourse semantics and Halliday's semantic stratum. We have seen above, however, that the two do not mean the same thing. For Halliday, speech functions are located in the semantic stratum, and it appears that the kinds of discourse considerations raised by Sinclair and Coulthard, Burton, and Butler are not adequately treated within such a framework, though it is designed to do so. For Martin, it would appear that such considerations as communicative functions (so-called by Butler) would be treated as discourse semantics, as a level of abstraction that is able to describe the overarching semantic patterns that he has identified. However, this means that the kinds of semantics identified at the clausal level have difficulty finding a place within Martin's descriptive matrix. He does not appear to address the question of what might be called clausal semantics or even semantics in the more limited sense. Butler does not resolve such an issue either. There appears to be a need for a second semantic stratum, in order to differentiate what Butler identifies as the difference between discourse semantics and clausal semantics, or else to posit that clausal semantics are part of the lexicogrammar. The latter suggestion in some ways is more consistent with Halliday's basic supposition that form or structure and semantics are interdependent. If this is the case, then lexicogrammar includes content that is related to the clause, including the lexicogrammar as lexical and grammatical content and semantics of the clause, with the remaining additional levels of meaning being part of the discourse semantics. There is merit to such an analysis.

108 J.R. Martin and P.R.R. White, *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

109 Martin, "How Many Speech Acts," 58, although Butler, *Systemic Linguistics*, 151; Butler, "Communicative Function," 215. I do not need to enter into the discussion here of the nature of the difference between labeling the semantic stratum as simply semantics or discourse semantics.

A second observation concerns the discourse-analytical scheme itself. The various attempts to model discourse are provocative and potentially productive, although they appear not to have been picked up even in English SFL studies. This is not the place to offer a critique of them, except to note the following potential difficulties. Butler's attempt to model discourse draws too heavily upon daughter-dependency grammar and thus does not fully integrate his approach with the systemic nature of SFL. The work of Sinclair and Coulthard, generalized by Burton, is also not systemically integrated. Even Martin and Rose's six features, while provocative, are not systemically integrated so as to model the discourse semantic stratum in the same way as the semantic stratum or lexicogrammar. The biggest problem, however, is that there is a lack of formalization of the variety of discourse uses and how they are first analyzed and then realized in the semantics/lexicogrammar. The reason for positing a stratum of discourse semantics is to stratify the analysis so that one can both differentiate meanings from forms and structures and provide a means of correlation. So far as I can tell, in the literature, there is not even a clear indication of how one moves from discourse semantics to semantics. Some of the categories are relatively self-evident, such as an "opening" or a "boundary," but other categories are not self-evident. For example, within an exchange, what are the criteria for identifying a "challenge" or even a "supporting" move?¹¹⁰ Further, these are identified for English and not necessarily applicable to other social contexts. Perhaps most importantly, the relatively self-evident categories are not the ones that pose the major problems. In many of the discussions, the statements by participants are clear in their communicative functions. The major issue raised here—and the one that is most pressing for an ancient language—is when the communicative function is undetermined, as in the examples cited by Butler. Such an ambiguous communicative function could be labeled a number of different ways (if it is argued that the labeling does not matter in such an instance, then the entire scheme is called into question). I think that it is a shame that much of the discussion initiated by Sinclair, Coulthard, Burton, and Butler has been lost sight of in recent SFL discussion, but it is understandable, as no one has yet to model sufficiently the discourse semantic structure.

In any case, it appears that none of the proposed solutions is satisfactory at this point for the study of ancient Greek—at least in those instances where

110 This remains an unresolved issue. See Margaret Berry, "Dynamism in Exchange Structure" (unpublished paper) and "Challenging and Supporting Moves in Discourse" (unpublished paper), following up her work in, for example, "Systemic Linguistics" and "Is Teacher an Unanalysed Concept?" in *New Developments, Volume 1*, 41–63.

the clausal semantics are insufficient. As a result, there are several different alternatives to consider for the modeling of ancient Greek discourse and its relation to the content plane/stratum. One proposal would retain three strata—context, content, and expression—but posit a more complex content plane/stratum consisting of discourse semantics, clausal semantics, and lexicogrammar. This models Greek as realizing its context in its content plane/stratum, which consists of discourse semantics, clausal semantics, and lexicogrammar (in that sense, it may even be possible to speak of there being two instantiated meanings of a given form, its clausal semantic and discourse semantic meaning). Thus, the attitudinal semantic network would perhaps be located at the clausal semantic stratum or even straddling the clausal semantic stratum and the lexicogrammar. This model, however, still does not formalize the relationship between semantics and discourse. A second proposal would be to adopt Martin's discourse semantics and lexicogrammar as the two content strata. This would have the advantage of recognizing the ambiguity in much SFL regarding where the MOOD system is located. The attitudinal system of Greek could still be located in the lexicogrammar. This would make clear that semantics and lexicogrammar are to be directly related as in Formal Systemic Functional Grammar. This would still, however, not formalize the relationship between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics.

The final proposal is to adopt from SFL the two traditional content strata, semantics and lexicogrammar. I do not think that it makes much difference whether the semantics stratum is labeled semantics or discourse semantics, so long as the distinction between potential and actualization places emphasis upon determining the semantics of actualization (as I have attempted here) not simply invoking potential without resolution (as it does not answer the major questions posed above). One way of doing this—though one not often used in SFL because of its frequent conflation of potential and actual—is the distinction between function and use, two terms that are often interchanged. The two terms, “function” and “use” are employed in SFL in unfortunately similar or even identical ways. For example, there “are two distinct, but ultimately related, senses of ‘function’ as a technical term” in SFL. “In one sense, ‘function’ refers to use of language; this is extrinsic functionality. In the other sense, ‘function’ refers to the internal organization of language, this is intrinsic functionality. In SFL, the term ‘function’ is used in the sense of intrinsic function.”¹¹¹

111 Matthiessen, Teruya and Lam, *Key Terms*, 101. Intrinsic function can be used for the overall or the local organization of language (101–102). Such confusion over function and use is found throughout SFL writings. As only a single example, see Halliday, *Explorations*, 7: a “functional approach to language means, first of all, investigating how language is used.”

One of the major bedeviling issues is understanding SFL as being concerned to be able to model language use in context. This, however, calls for analysis that moves beyond the realm of linguistics and into non-linguistic semiotic systems. I think that we must distinguish between function and use. SFL should be concerned to model language function in context, that is, how language functions as a complex meaning system, but it cannot be expected to model use in context, even if such use is predictable, as such predictions are non-linguistic and not formalizable.¹¹² To use an extreme analogy, a piano's function is to be a musical instrument, which is realized by a pianist playing it. A piano may also be used for a variety of other things (even if all directly related to the piano), such as furniture, as a stand for flowers and other knick-knacks, or even as firewood. This invokes non-linguistic semiotic systems that cannot be formalized in the same way as musical uses. In a somewhat similar way, the variety of uses to which language may be put cannot be readily or easily (or entirely and satisfactorily, even by means of probability) formalized, but its functions can, especially when it is seen in relation to the lexicogrammar. I would posit that the attitudinal system above captures the meaning potential of the semantics, and even function in context, and grammaticalizes these by means of the various systemic and structural realizations, of which the attitude system is a part (realized in mood forms and others).

This follows Butler's third option as outlined above. However, rather than taking a maximalist view of context and an explicitly minimalist view of form and structure (standard SFL theory), this proposal takes a minimalist view of context and an explicitly maximalist view of form and structure. Martin and Rose adopt a view similar in some ways when they speak of the "extravagant descriptions of lexicogrammar" in SFL (though of English), in which "a good deal of analysis that is relegated to semantics or pragmatics in formal models is managed at a less abstract level of interpretation."¹¹³ Although they then push for a more elaborate semantics at the discourse level, I would argue that such elaboration often moves beyond function to use, and is therefore non-linguistic in the sense that it is not formalized (or formalizable), an essential feature of dealing with an ancient language such as Greek. Halliday captures this when he depicts the eco-social environment as something different from the semantics and lexicogrammar of the language.¹¹⁴ By invoking register theory, Hasan well illustrates a similar formulation when she depicts the

¹¹² See Stubbs, *Discourse Analysis*, 93.

¹¹³ Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 29.

¹¹⁴ M.A.K. Halliday, "Introduction: On the 'Architecture' of Human Language," in *On Language and Linguistics*, 1–29, here 13.

use of language as the “raw data of text,” as distinct from the “situation types relevant to some specific group of texts,” which are linguistic but non-structural, and, taken as a whole as they represent: the content plane/stratum, the meaning potential found in semantic systems, the macrofunctions, the formal networks representing the grammatical potential, and the actual grammatical structures.¹¹⁵ This proposed modeling of semantics is compatible with the discussion of register outlined by Lukin and others, who note that this fits well within a tripartite stratal analysis of context, semantics/lexicogrammar, and expression.

The example of Rom 5:1 illustrates my analysis. There is widespread dispute over whether the clause should read: εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν (‘we have [ind.] peace with God’) or εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν (‘let us have [subj.] peace with God’). The external text-critical evidence is clearly in support of the use of the subjunctive verb form, yet most recent interpreters (but not earlier ones) argue for the indicative on the basis of context. I do not intend to argue for either here, although I believe that the subjunctive reading is correct.¹¹⁶ Instead, I wish to discuss the semantics of ancient Greek by discussing the difference in meaning between the two readings, that is, how language functions differently here on the basis of the difference in verbal mood form. The system network above describes the four different choices as:

- +assertive: -interrogative >> declarative statement (assertive clause with indicative mood form): gloss ‘we have peace with God’
- +assertive: +interrogative: +tonal >> question (assertive clause, with question tonally indicated): gloss ‘do we have peace with God?’
- assertive: +projective: -interrogative; -contingent >> projective statement (non-contingent projective clause, with subjunctive mood form, as in hortatory or prohibitive use when negated): gloss ‘let us have peace with God’

115 Ruqaiya Hasan, “The Place of Context in a Systemic Functional Model,” in *Continuum Companion*, 166–89, here 173. Cf. Annabelle Lukin, Alison R. Moore, Maria Hereke, Rebekah Wegener, and Canzhong Wu, “Halliday’s Model of Register Revisited and Explored,” *Linguistics and the Human Sciences* 4.2 (2011): 187–213, where it is clear that confusion arises, even in a modern context, from expressions that are not semantically formally realized. The example from a medical episode supports the notion that language function linked to forms and structures, and not use, avoids confusion and deadly mistakes.

116 For recent discussion, see Robert Jewett, *Romans* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 344; Stanley E. Porter, *The Letter to the Romans: A Linguistic and Literary Commentary* (NTM 37; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2015), 114–15.

-assertive: +projective: +interrogative: +tonal; -contingent >> projective question (non-contingent projective clause, with subjunctive mood form, as in deliberative use): gloss 'should we have peace with God?'

The second and fourth choices are rarely, if ever, suggested, although they are both lexicogrammatically and clause semantically legitimate construals of the Greek. The question is how the Greek is functioning within this discourse context. The speech function is either a declarative statement or a projective one, or possibly an instance of a (projective) question. These are not merely lexicogrammatical descriptions but clausal semantic as well. One must at this point enter into questions that shift from lexicogrammar and clausal semantics to discourse semantics (function in context) to consider a range of larger interpretive issues that are non-linguistic in nature in order to answer this question, such as situational configuration. Such considerations would include the argument of Romans, the purpose of Romans, the theology of Paul including his views of justification, reconciliation, etc., and the like. I do not think that any notion of probabilities can provide an adequate answer to this question. However, we can raise questions regarding use but we cannot answer them. We have not considered the "uses" of this particular clause, because these uses are non-linguistic in nature.¹¹⁷ For example, Paul may be making the declarative statement, "we have peace with God," but using it as a command, as if to say, "since we are justified by faith, we must—that is, you must—be at peace with God." Or, Paul may be making the tonally-indicated question, "do we have peace with God?" as if to indicate the use that either we must have peace with God (command) or to project a question to the Romans, "shall we have peace with God?" We could describe similar kinds of uses, and more, with the instance of the subjunctive verbal mood form as well. We might speculate on how Paul "used" these statements within Romans, but such analysis would be speculative, not linguistically grounded in the contextual situation, semantics or lexicogrammar.¹¹⁸ The point is that we have either a declarative or projective statement or question, depending upon our understanding of the

117 I do not believe that the typical SFL characterization of potential does justice to these possible uses. The SFL sense of use as always in some sense contextualized seems to be an unhelpful notion, especially for discussion of actual instances of language. The notion of contextualization must become so general as to be hypothetical.

118 J.B. Lightfoot, *Notes on Epistles of St. Paul from Unpublished Commentaries* (London: Macmillan, 1904), 284, implicitly seems to have grasped this matter in his (unfortunate) employment of the term "imperative."

choice of verbal mood form, and this fundamentally determines its speech function. This is a realization of the verbal choice as indicating the function of the clause in context. The system network at the lexicogrammatical level as the basis of speech functions linked to clause types, an instance of Formal Systemic Functional Grammar, therefore apparently provides the best explanation of the attitudinal/mood system and the content plane/stratum (contextual semantics, clausal semantics, and lexicogrammar) in ancient Greek.

Conclusion

This discussion examined some elements of the history and development of SFL as a means of describing some of its potential limitations—at least in its standard theory—for working with ancient languages, especially those that are morphologically rich and non-configurational, such as ancient Greek. SFL has concentrated upon English, and so in many ways it cannot help that its major theoretical framework is highly reflective of English grammar—sometimes perhaps even unwittingly so. Despite some indications otherwise, the very conceptualization of SFL as a functional model in the Whorfian mode demands that it be reconceptualized for other languages. Some work has been done along these lines, but more work still needs to be done. This paper follows up on previous proposals related to the Greek verbal system and related areas by proposing a number of other areas requiring such reconceptualization. In this paper, I have discussed two closely related issues within SFL, speech functions and the related stratal configuration of language. As a result, I believe that I have shown limitations of both standard (and other) theory SFL regarding English, but more than that, that I have demonstrated how the basic architecture of language as proposed by SFL must be reconfigured, in particular to examine ancient Greek. I realize that many of my suggestions require much further discussion, but I believe that working within a Formal Systemic Functional Grammar, as proposed by Gotteri and already shown to be effective for other morphologically rich languages such as Polish and other Slavonic languages, as well as Greek verbal aspect, provides an appropriate entry point for further discussion.

Aspect and *Aktionsart* Once Again¹

Francis G.H. Pang

Introduction

Since the first English monograph-length work on New Testament verbal aspect appeared in the late 1980s,² research on the Koine verbal system has become a popular topic in the field of biblical Greek.³ Twenty years of research has greatly enhanced our understanding of the Koine Greek verbal system,

1 A shorter version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, San Francisco, November 2011.

2 Stanley E. Porter, *Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood* (SBG 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1989).

3 Monograph-length works in English include Buist M. Fanning, *Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek* (Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Kenneth L. McKay, *A New Syntax of the Verb in New Testament Greek: An Aspectual Approach* (SBG 5; New York: Peter Lang, 1994); Mari Broman Olsen, *A Semantic and Pragmatic Model of Lexical and Grammatical Aspect* (Outstanding Dissertations in Linguistics; New York: Garland, 1997); Rodney J. Decker, *Temporal Deixis of the Greek Verb in the Gospel of Mark with Reference to Verbal Aspect* (SBG 10; New York: Peter Lang, 2001); T.V. Evans, *Verbal Syntax in the Greek Pentateuch: Natural Greek Usage and Hebrew Interference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Constantine R. Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood, and Narrative: Soundings in the Greek of the New Testament* (SBG 13; New York: Peter Lang, 2007); Constantine R. Campbell, *Verbal Aspect and Non-Indicative Verbs: Further Soundings in the Greek of the New Testament* (SBG 15; New York: Peter Lang, 2008); Toshikazu S. Foley, *Biblical Translation in Chinese and Greek: Verbal Aspect in Theory and Practice* (LBS 1; Leiden: Brill, 2009); David L. Mathewson, *Verbal Aspect in the Book of Revelation: The Function of Greek Verb Tenses in John's Apocalypse* (LBS 4; Leiden: Brill, 2010); Wally V. Cirafesi, *Verbal Aspect in Synoptic Parallels: On the Method and Meaning of Divergent Tense-form Usage in the Synoptic Passion Narratives* (LBS 7; Leiden: Brill, 2013). See also the discussion in the first half of Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson, eds., *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics: Open Questions in Current Research* (JSNTSup 80; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), 18–82. One can also find the discussion of aspect in recent Greek grammars (although they may not agree in every aspect): Richard A. Young, *Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach* (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 105–31, esp. 105–107; see also Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; Sheffield: JSOT, 1994), 20–61; and to a lesser extent, William D. Mounce, *Basics of Biblical Greek Grammar* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 126; and Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the*

but the full impact of these studies has yet to be seen in the larger field of New Testament scholarship. Although commentaries published in the past two decades have shown, slowly but surely, a better awareness of the discussion of aspect, much of the discussion has yet to find its way into the broader spectrum of works in biblical studies and theology.⁴ Part of the reason for this apparent lack of interest is surely the high degree of technicality that is characteristic of linguistics. The interdisciplinary nature of the subject matter,⁵ and the fact that the conclusions drawn by researchers have often been quite different from one another, if not outright contradictory, does not help advance the discussion.⁶ However, while the differences among works on Greek verbal aspect are frequently highlighted, the agreement among them is at the same time downplayed. In contrast to popular sentiment, there are in fact quite a few places upon which scholars have reached an agreement.⁷ It is vital to the advancement of biblical scholarship that scholars articulate clearly the things

New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 499–512. See also D.A. Carson, *Exegetical Fallacies* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 65–77.

- 4 For example, D.A. Carson, *The Gospel According to John* (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991); Robert Horton Gundry, *Mark: A Commentary on His Apology for the Cross* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000); Douglas J. Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996); and D.E. Aune, *Revelation* (WBC 52A–C; Nashville: Nelson, 1997–98). The forthcoming commentary on the Johannine epistles by D.A. Carson (NIGTC) is promised to be the first commentary that fully incorporates verbal aspect. See Andrew David Naselli, “A Brief Introduction to Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek,” *Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal* 12 (2007): 28–31; and Andreas J. Köstenberger and Robert W. Yarbrough, eds., *Understanding the Times: New Testament Studies in the 21st Century* (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2011), 356–57.
- 5 Even within the body of work there is a concern that the complexity of the subject matter may hinder the study of the New Testament. There is also the popular sentiment that works of a linguistic nature are difficult for biblical students to grasp due to the interdisciplinary nature of linguistics. See Wallace, *Greek Grammar*, ix–xv, and Stanley E. Porter, “Greek Linguistics and Lexicography,” in *Understanding the Times: New Testament Studies in the 21st Century* (ed. Andreas J. Köstenberger and Robert W. Yarbrough; Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2011), 19–61. See also Joseph D. Fantin, *The Greek Imperative Mood in the New Testament: A Cognitive and Communicative Approach* (SBG 12; New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 322–33, but also note the author’s concern on p. 326 n. 46.
- 6 See, for example, the comment in Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, *The First Letter to the Corinthians* (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 42–46.
- 7 See, for example, Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, “New Testament Greek Language and Linguistics in Recent Research,” *CBR* 6 (2008): 215–22; Stanley E. Porter, “In Defence of Verbal Aspect,” in *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics: Open Questions in Current Research* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), 31–34; and Constantine R. Campbell, *Basics of Verbal Aspect in Biblical Greek* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 32–33.

on which they agree and then employ those ideas in order to benefit the larger field of New Testament studies. The aim of this essay is to provide a broad and encompassing framework that has the capacity to facilitate constructive discussion, particularly discussion of the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction.

There are three parts to this study. An initial section provides a brief history of contemporary aspectology research and examines the various terms that are associated with aspect and *Aktionsart*. This is followed by a brief discussion of how the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction is represented in various New Testament Greek aspect studies, with special attention given to the use of Zeno Vendler's verb classes within the study of verbal aspect. After this necessary ground clearing, a second section focuses on the nature of the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction and focuses on the semantics/pragmatics distinction made in certain works on Greek aspect. In the final section, I put Vendler's classification under scrutiny and ask: (1) should these classes be viewed as a property of the verb or clause; and (2) how useful is this classification in the discussion of Greek verbal aspect?

Terminology and the History of Aspectology

Regarding the definition of verbal aspect, an oft-cited quotation from Ronald Macaulay provides a healthy note of caution. In his review of Bernard Comrie's seminal work on aspect, he likens the study of aspect to a dark forest full of "obstacles, pitfalls, and mazes which have trapped most of those who have ventured into this much explored but poorly mapped territory."⁸ It is possible for curious readers to get a fairly good idea of the complexity of the discussion by simply going through the numerous terms used to describe aspect and *Aktionsart*. In a recent work summarizing the development of the study of aspect, one author lists at least four labels for what has traditionally been called verbal aspect along with five labels for *Aktionsart*.⁹ These labels are not merely different ways of referring to a single linguistic phenomenon; they also highlight different nuances that are intended by different linguists when

8 R.K.S. Macaulay, "Review of Comrie and Friedrich," *Language* 54 (1978): 416–20, as quoted in Robert I. Binnick, *Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 135.

9 For Aspect: verbal aspect, grammatical aspect and viewpoint aspect. For *Aktionsart*: situation aspect, lexical aspect, eventualities, and situation. See Robert I. Binnick, "Aspect and Aspectuality," in *The Handbook of English Linguistics* (ed. B. Aarts and A. McMahon; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 244–50.

it comes to distinguishing between the two categories. To understand these nuances, a brief outline of the history of the development of these terms is necessary.¹⁰

Despite the relatively late development of modern aspect terminology, one can find traits of the modern conceptions of aspect and *Aktionsart* (literally 'kind of action') in the works of the ancient Greeks. Aristotle distinguishes two descriptions of states of affairs, a distinction which centuries later was adopted by western philosophers as the foundation for a taxonomy of verb classes,¹¹ and it is the Stoics who first recognized the aspectual dimension of the Greek verbal system and thus distinguished between complete and incomplete actions. This distinction anticipates the modern notion of a perfective vs. imperfective grammatical aspectual opposition.¹² The modern conception of verbal aspect (perfectivity vs. imperfectivity) is largely a development generated from the

-
- 10 The following outline of the history of development and various definitions discussed in this section are based on the following articles and other works as cited. Due to the scope of this discussion, it is not my intention to go into detail on the history of the development of various disciplines within the field of verb semantics. See Sasse's work cited below for a critical review of the development of various sub-topics within aspectology. Robert I. Binnick, "Temporality and Aspectuality," in *Language Typology and Language Universals* (ed. Martin Haspelmath et al.; vol. 1; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), 557–67; Binnick, "Aspect and Aspectuality," 244–68; Hana Filip, "Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*," in *Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning* (ed. Klaus von Stechow et al.; Handbooks of Linguistics and Communication Science 33.2; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), 1186–1217; Hans-Jürgen Sasse, "Recent Activity in the Theory of Aspect: Accomplishments, Achievements, or Just Non-Progressive State?," *Linguistic Typology* 6 (2002): 199–231; and H.J. Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality: The Interaction between Temporal and Atemporal Structure* (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 64; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 33–67.
- 11 There have been different kinds of taxonomies proposed in the past, e.g., trichotomy classification (Taylor) or quadripartition (Vendler). See Barry Taylor, "Tense and Continuity," *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1 (1977): 205–19 and Zeno Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 97–121. See also H.J. Verkuyl, "Aspectual Classes and Aspectual Composition," *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12 (1989): 39–41.
- 12 Paul Friedrich, "On Aspect and Homeric Aspect," *International Journal of American Linguistics* 40.4 (1974): S9. The Stoic aspectual distinction quickly faded into the background and was eventually ignored by grammarians for several generations until well into the Middle Ages in the work of Maximus Planudes (AD 1260–1305). For the development, see R.H. Robins, *The Byzantine Grammarians: Their Place in History* (TiLSM 70; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993), 227–33.

Slavic language group.¹³ The term *aspect*, imported into the Western European grammatical tradition in the early 19th century, translates the Russian term вид (*vid*).¹⁴ At first it was used to encompass modern conceptions of both aspect and *Aktionsart*, but later it became specific to the Slavic notion of an aspectual opposition (perfective vs. imperfective), which was something opposed to *Aktionsart*.¹⁵ It is only since the 1930s that the term *aspectology* has been used to refer to the study of verbal aspect and other cross-linguistic phenomena related to aspect.¹⁶ The aspectual opposition of perfective and imperfective that is found in Slavic languages such as Russian is overtly marked on every verb through affixation or stem alternations.¹⁷ The role of verbal aspect is pervasive in this language group. Since this contrast of aspect is explicit in Russian

-
- 13 See Binnick, *Time and the Verb*, 135–40. For a comparison of the way the perfective/imperfective distinction is represented in English and Slavic languages (esp. Bulgarian), see Krasimir Kabakchiev, *Aspect in English: A “Common-Sense” View of the Interplay between Verbal and Nominal Referents* (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 75; Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 1–29.
- 14 Regarding the technical (linguistic) use of ‘aspect,’ Maslov names Reiff as the first to borrow the French term in 1828. See I.U.S. Maslov, “An Outline of Contrastive Aspectology,” in *Contrastive Studies in Verbal Aspect: In Russian, English, French and German* (ed. I.U.S. Maslov et al.; Heidelberg: J. Groos, 1985), 1.
- 15 This is pointed out by Robert Binnick and Russian aspectologists I.U.S. Maslov and J. Forsyth. See James Forsyth, *A Grammar of Aspect: Usage and Meaning in the Russian Verb* (Studies in the Modern Russian Language; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 356 n. 3; Maslov, “An Outline of Contrastive Aspectology,” 1 and n. 1; and Binnick, *Time and the Verb*, 139–40. For the use of the term to encompass both categories in English speaking scholarship, see Sapir’s use of the term and Jespersen’s even broader definition in Edward Sapir, *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921), 114 n. 22 and Otto Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924), 286–89.
- 16 The work of Roman Jakobson provided an important benchmark for subsequent investigations. See R. Jakobson, “Zur Struktur des russischen Verbums,” in his *Selected Writings II: Word and Language* (The Hague: Mouton, 1932), 3–15. For the two major approaches to the study of Slavic aspect, see Jadranka Gvozdanović, “Perfective and Imperfective Aspect,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Tense and Aspect* (ed. Robert I. Binnick; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 784–96. For an outline of how aspectuality is expressed in Russian, see Binnick, *Time and the Verb*, 19–29 and Carlota S. Smith, *The Parameter of Aspect* (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 297–341.
- 17 Smith, *The Parameter of Aspect*, 298–300; Henriëtte de Swart, “Verbal Aspect,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Tense and Aspect* (ed. Robert I. Binnick; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 756–58; Maslov, “An Outline of Contrastive Aspectology,” 1–44 and James E. Miller, “Tense and Aspect in Russian” (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1970), 1–28.

grammar, it is often labeled *grammatical aspect*.¹⁸ Related aspectual oppositions are also found in other languages, as has been shown by cross-linguistic studies and typological research.¹⁹

Grammatical aspect is often set apart from lexical aspect. As mentioned above, verb class research finds its roots in the Aristotelian dichotomy of performance (κίνησις) and activity (ἐνέργεια).²⁰ This ontological distinction between different states of affairs has taken many labels and interpretations throughout the centuries, but it is best known as a distinction of telicity (telic vs. atelic), that is, the notion that some actions tend towards a goal.²¹ The semantic and ontological nature of this Aristotelian distinction and its encoding in language gives rise to two historically related concepts: verb classes and *Aktionsarten*.²² Verb classes are typically described within philosophical literature,²³ and they are shaped by the works of philosophers tracing back to Ryle, Kenny, and Zeno Vendler,²⁴ whose quadripartition classification of States, Activities, Accomplishments, and Achievements laid the foundation for subsequent works.²⁵ The domain of the verb class was established as an important

18 Maslov labels it 'overt aspect' (Maslov, "An Outline of Contrastive Aspectology," 21).

19 For a list of languages that have the same aspectual opposition, see Östen Dahl and V. Valupillai, "Perfective/Imperfective Aspect," in *The World Atlas of Language Structures Online* (ed. Martin Haspelmath et al.; Munich: Max Planck Digital Library, 2008), available online at <http://wals.info/feature/65>. Accessed in September 2011. See also de Swart, "Verbal Aspect," 756–65.

20 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1048b18–36. But see David R. Dowty, *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar: The Semantics of Verbs and Times in Generative Semantics and in Montague's PTQ* (Synthese Language Library 7; Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 52–3.

21 For a list of comparable terms that have been used to characterize the same ontological distinction, including for instance: terminative (cursive), resultative (irresultative), durative (non-durative), punctual (non-punctual), bounded (unbounded), accomplishment/performance (activity), etc., see Östen Dahl, "On the Definition of the Telic-Atelic (Bounded-Nonbounded) Distinction," in *Syntax and Semantics: Tense and Aspect* (ed. Philip J. Tedeschi and Annie E. Zaenen; New York: Academic Press, 1981), 79–81.

22 Filip, "Aspectual Class and Aktionsart," 1187.

23 Details can be found in Dowty, *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar*, 52–55. This is not to suggest that this is the only effort of classifying English verbs according to their aspectual characteristics. Slavic linguists such as Voroncova (1948) and Ivanova (1961) were among the first to try to identify verb classes according to their procedural characters. See Kabachiev, *Aspect in English*, 19–22.

24 Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949); Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (Studies in Philosophical Psychology; London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1963) and Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy*.

25 For example, the works of Dowty (1979), Mourelatos (1978) and Verkuyl (1972/1993) are related to (or a response to) Vendler's class. See also Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, "Events,

area of linguistic research in the 1980s. According to Hana Filip, the description of verb classes was mainly motivated by two goals. First, to formulate “explanatory hypotheses for the existence of aspectual classes,” and second, to explicate “the nature of compositional processes needed in the derivation of aspectual classes” at the wider level of verb phrases and sentences.²⁶

Developing independently within the field of philology in the late 19th century, the study of *Aktionsart* has its roots in Indo-European and Semitic studies.²⁷ The study of *Aktionsart* mainly concerns how various kinds of action (terminative, resultative, iterative, semelfactive, etc.) are lexicalized by means of “overt derivational word-formation devices.”²⁸ During the first half of the 20th century, the relevant discussions were mainly concerned with a perceived differentiation of the morphological forms (word-formation) that are responsible for encoding *Aktionsart* as opposed to grammatical aspect.²⁹ This in turn prompted scholars to focus their attention on morphology, which marks grammatical aspect, and hence to search for the invariant meaning of the perfective and imperfective morphology.³⁰ Comrie defines grammatical aspect as “different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation,” with imperfective aspect referring to that which “pays attention to the internal structure of the situation.”³¹ The idea of defining perfectivity as viewing an action in its totality (i.e., as having reached its end) has been especially popularized by Comrie in contemporary work on aspect.³² This way of looking at

Processes, and States,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2 (1978): 415–34, H.J. Verkuyl, *On the Compositional Nature of the Aspects* (Foundations of Language. Supplementary Series 15; Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972) and Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality*. For Biblical Greek, see the following discussion on the works of Fanning and Olsen.

26 Citing Krifka’s and Verkuyl’s works as examples. See Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1187.

27 For the history of research of *Aktionsart* in ancient Greek, see Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 26–50 and Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 30–46.

28 Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1187.

29 See also the work of Forsyth in morphologically marked procedural categories in Russian: Forsyth, *A Grammar of Aspect*, 19–20.

30 Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1189–90 and Binnick, “Temporality and Aspectuality,” 561–62. Markedness theory was also introduced in the study of aspectual theory during this period. The dominant view on Slavic linguistics at the time was that the perfective is the marked category in a privative opposition with the imperfective.

31 Bernard Comrie, *Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 16–21.

32 Comrie, *Aspect*, 16.

perfectivity led scholars to make a distinction between aspect as a viewpoint category (i.e. viewpoint aspect) and *Aktionsart* as a category mainly concerned with the temporal properties of situations (i.e., Carlota Smith's 'situation aspect').³³ However, since the early 1970s, the two rather separate traditions of verb classification and *Aktionsart* have begun integrating into one discipline. *Aktionsart* study has gradually moved into the realm of lexical semantics and has separated itself from discussions of grammatical aspect by "loosening its dependence on overt derivational morphology" and by "merging with aspectual classes in the Aristotelian sense."³⁴ A new combined field now bears the label *lexical aspect*.³⁵

These developments have created a notorious problem in aspectual study, namely, the question of how to relate grammatical aspect and lexical aspect to one another.³⁶ To date, contrasting proposals regarding the two categories show no sign of settling the issue. On the one hand, there are scholars who insist that it is impossible to clearly separate the two categories,³⁷ whereas the more widespread view is that at both formal and semantic levels, verb classes

33 Smith, *The Parameter of Aspect*, 17–38, 61–96. Effort has also been given to argue for a distinction between aspect as a subjective category and *Aktionsart* as an objective category. See Bache for an outline and the unattainability of the notion of pure subjectivity or pure objectivity. See also Carl Bache, "Aspect and Aktionsart: Towards a Semantic distinction," *Journal of Linguistics* 18 (1982): 67–72.

34 Filip, "Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*," 1188.

35 To some, the label 'lexical aspect' is rather misleading in the sense that procedural or aspectual character is not expressed by one lexical item (verb alone) but also at the levels of verb phrases and sentences (multiple lexical items). See below for more detail. See also Verkuyt, *A Theory of Aspectuality*, 33–67 and Susan Deborah Rothstein, *Theoretical and Crosslinguistic Approaches to the Semantics of Aspect* (Linguistics Today; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008), 2–3.

36 The distinction between grammatical aspect and lexical aspect is one of the major issues of a thematic panel at the CHRONOS conference, an annual international conference devoted to research on the semantics and pragmatics of markers of tense, aspect, modality, and evidentiality (TAME). For detail on the latest CHRONOS conference (2011), CHRONOS 10's website: <http://www1.aston.ac.uk/lss/news-events/conferences-seminars/chronos-10/> (accessed Oct 2011).

37 See Comrie, *Aspect*, 6–7 n. 4, and later, B. Comrie, "Some Thoughts on the Relation between Aspect and Aktionsart," in *Functional Grammar: Aspect and Aspectuality, Tense and Temporality: Essays in Honour of Alexander Bondarko* (ed. Adrian Barentsen and Youri Poupynin; Munich: Lincom Europa, 2001), 43–49. See also John Lyons, *Semantics* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:705–10 and Mourelatos, "Events, Processes, and States," 415–34.

and *Aktionsart* should be clearly distinguished from grammatical aspect.³⁸ The issues at stake are threefold. First, one must decide whether the grammatical opposition of perfective/imperfective is dependent on the lexical aspectual feature of telicity, or whether the two are independent systems.³⁹ This brings back the old dichotomy between the so-called Eastern or Slavic view of aspectual study, which clearly distinguished the two, and the so-called Western view, which maintained that Aristotelian classes are the foundation of all aspectual distinctions.⁴⁰ Second, one must inquire whether Vendler's verb classes are a characterization of verbs, verb phrases or other larger units of analysis.⁴¹ This affects our understanding of the semantic nature of the category, that is, whether we should treat it as an ontological phenomenon or a linguistic phenomenon. This in turn contributes to the discussion of the distinction between the two categories (grammatical aspect and lexical aspect). Third, since the work of Vendler is largely based on the study of English verbs, one must consider cross-linguistic variation in the encoding of verb classes. In other words, there is a need for language-specific diagnostic procedures of these classes. Such diagnostic procedures would benefit the cross-linguistic study of aspect by avoiding an unhealthy reliance on translation, something which is common in non-English lexical aspect studies, and especially in works concerning New Testament Greek aspect.

38 See for example the work of Dowty (1977), Dahl (1985), Smith (1997), Verkuyl (2005), and Filip (2011). Dowty, *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar*; Östen Dahl, *Tense and Aspect Systems* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 26–27; Smith, *The Parameter of Aspect*; H.J. Verkuyl, “How (in-)sensitive Is Tense to Aspectual Information?,” in *Crosslinguistic Views on Tense, Aspect and Modality* (ed. Bart Hollebrandse et al.; Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), 145–69; and Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1190–93.

39 For the former, see Jürgen Bohnemeyer and Mary Swift, “Event Realization and Default Aspect,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 27 (2004): 263–96; for the later, see Olga Borik and Tanya Reinhart, “Telicity and Perfectivity: Two Independent Systems” (paper presented at the Symposium on Logic and Language [LOLA 8], Debrecen, Hungary, 2004), 13–34. Refer to the discussion below.

40 Dahl, “Telic-Atelic,” 80–81 and Kabakchiev, *Aspect in English*, 31–53. See also Sasse, “Recent Activity in the Theory of Aspect,” 212–9.

41 For the former, see, e.g., Rothstein (2004); for the later, see Verkuyl (1993/2005) and Rappaport Hovav (2007). Susan Deborah Rothstein, *Structuring Events: A Study in the Semantics of Lexical Aspect* (Explorations in Semantics; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality*; H.J. Verkuyl, “Aspectual Composition: Surveying the Ingredients,” in *Perspectives on Aspect* (ed. H.J. Verkuyl et al.; Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 19–39; and M. Rappaport Hovav, “Lexicalized Meaning and the Internal Temporal Structure of Events,” in *Theoretical and Crosslinguistic Approaches to the Semantics of Aspect* (ed. Susan Rothstein; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007), 13–42.

Aspect and *Aktionsart* in Koine Greek

Turning to aspectual studies in New Testament Greek, five major proposals have appeared in the past twenty-five years.⁴² Their major arguments have been summarized nicely elsewhere, and it is thus not necessary to rehash them here.⁴³ I will instead focus strictly on the handling of the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction in these works.

Most scholars in the field recognize, albeit to different degrees, that aspect and *Aktionsart* should be distinguished as two separate categories at the theoretical level. All would agree that Greek verbal aspect is a grammatical category and that *Aktionsart* is a function of the meaning of a lexical item together with other clausal constituents. The main disagreement in the field is the role that *Aktionsart*, which is not a grammatical category, should occupy in the discussion of aspectual meaning. Working with a model based on Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), Porter considers *Aktionsart* irrelevant to the discussion of the grammatical category of verbal aspect. In his view, *Aktionsart* is a matter of lexical semantics, and the discussion of lexical meaning should not interfere with grammar.⁴⁴ Porter also questions the legitimacy of using Vendler's classification in Greek aspect study, calling into question the prominence that lexis is given over grammatical aspect.⁴⁵ He has thus "focused most of his considerable energies on developing a consistent semantic theory of Greek verbal morphology," and has put aside in the discussion the interaction between tense-form, lexis, and other co-textual factors.⁴⁶ As a result, Decker, who uses Porter's model as the foundation of his work, has been forced to consult other works in order to come up with a usable definition of lexical aspect.⁴⁷

42 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*; Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*; McKay, *A New Syntax*; Olsen, *A Semantic and Pragmatic Model*; and Campbell, *Verbal Aspect*.

43 See for example Porter and Pitts, "New Testament Greek Language and Linguistics," 215–22; Naselli, "Brief Introduction," 15–28; and Francis G.H. Pang, "Aspect, *Aktionsart*, and Abduction: Future Tense in the New Testament," *FilNeot* 23 (2010): 129–40.

44 Porter, "In Defence of Verbal Aspect," 37.

45 Stanley E. Porter, "Aspect Theory and Lexicography," in *Biblical Greek Language and Lexicography: Essays in Honor of Frederick W. Danker* (ed. Bernard A. Taylor et al.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 212–14.

46 D.A. Carson, "An Introduction to the Porter/Fanning Debate," in *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics*, 24–25.

47 Decker draws on the works of Bache, Fanning, Fleischman, and Binnick to construct his definition of *Aktionsart*. See Decker, *Temporal Deixis*, 26, 176 nn. 118, 120.

On the other side of the spectrum, both Fanning and Olsen rely on Vendler's classification as the basis of their analysis. Fanning's work focuses on the interpretation of *Aktionsart* (inceptive, punctual, continuous, etc.) at the sentence level and on how aspectual class (procedural character) and aspectual form (grammatical aspect) contribute to the overall aspectual meaning of a sentence.⁴⁸ Olsen, on the other hand, starts by delineating various properties of lexical aspect and then construes the overall aspectual meaning of a clause by looking at the interaction of different properties of lexical and grammatical aspect.⁴⁹ She also relies on Vendler's classification and adopts Fanning's categorizing of Greek verbs into various aspectual classes.⁵⁰

Compared to the works just mentioned, Campbell's approach is in the middle of the spectrum. Although he scarcely refers to Vendler's classes in his discussions of *Aktionsart*, one can easily find traditional *Aktionsart* in his discussion of the interpretation of actual texts. This is particularly demonstrated in his attempts to follow the patterns of aspect–*Aktionsart* interaction and to work backwards in order to uncover the aspectual value of the Future form.⁵¹ Following Bache, he makes several distinctions between the two categories: whereas aspect is regarded as primarily subjective (although not entirely so), *Aktionsart* is regarded as primarily objective (again, not entirely so); aspect is a semantic category while *Aktionsart* is pragmatic;⁵² and whereas aspect concerns the perspective of the speaker on an action, *Aktionsart* concerns how the nature of an action can be objectively determined.⁵³

Kenneth McKay also distinguishes grammatical aspect from *Aktionsart* and relates the latter to the lexical distinction in verb types, which he argues is analogous to aspect.⁵⁴ He stresses the importance of context in determining the translation of each aspectual form. However, he does not follow Vendler's classification of verb class but rather opts for a simpler distinction between action and stative verbs, claiming that subclassifications of action verbs rely too heavily on English.⁵⁵ Trevor Evans also points out the dangers of relying on

48 Fanning further subcategorizes Vendler's category of Achievement into Climaxes and Punctuals. See Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 154–63.

49 For an outline of her approach, see Olsen, *A Semantic and Pragmatic Model*, 25–27, 60–65.

50 She rejects the new subcategories added by Fanning (Climax and Punctual). See Olsen, *A Semantic and Pragmatic Model*, 215–16.

51 Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood*, 141–51; see my response in Pang, "Aspect, *Aktionsart*, and Abduction," 129–59.

52 More on this in the next section.

53 Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood*, 10–11.

54 McKay, *A New Syntax*, 27–29.

55 McKay, *A New Syntax*, 29.

Vendler's English-based classification. In a chapter where he briefly describes the Greek verbal system, Evans maintains that the distinction between aspect and *Aktionsart* is that aspect is a grammatical category and *Aktionsart* a lexical category. To him the main distinction between the two categories is that aspect is realized through grammatical marking whereas *Aktionsart* is not.⁵⁶ He contends that *Aktionsart* is a metalinguistic category, which mainly concerns lexical semantics. Although he sees the value of applying Vendlerian classes to the study of *Aktionsart*, he also expresses the reservation that there are "methodological weaknesses" in the classification, citing verbs that switch classes (re-categorization) under different verbal situations.⁵⁷

As one of the respondents to the Porter/Fanning debate, Schmidt's comment rings true even today. After reviewing Fanning's handling of *Aktionsart*, he concludes that "[t]he relationship between the two categories of aspect and lexical *Aktionsart* will need much more study."⁵⁸ Indeed, as mentioned above, not much has been done in the past decade that advances the discussion of the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction. The last two questions mentioned above in the survey of contemporary aspect study are also relevant to New Testament aspect study, particularly concerning the criteria on which verb classifications are based and also the exact semantic nature of the classifications.

A Distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics?

Within the body of works on the verbal system of New Testament Greek, it is a prevalent notion that a semantics/pragmatics distinction ought to be maintained when speaking of the interaction between aspect and *Aktionsart*.⁵⁹ This distinction allegedly refers to two different areas of linguistic investigation, both of which deal with the study of meaning but which nevertheless have distinct objects of study.⁶⁰ Broadly speaking, 'semantics' is supposed to be

56 He later adds that *Aktionsart* may become grammaticalized through time. Evans, *Verbal Syntax*, 18–21.

57 Evans, *Verbal Syntax*, 20.

58 Daryl D. Schmidt, "Verbal Aspect in Greek: Two Approaches," in *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics*, 66. Cf. Buist M. Fanning, "Approaches to Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek: Issues in Definition and Method," in *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics*, 46–62.

59 See for example Decker, *Temporal Deixis*, 26–28; Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood*, 24–26; and Naselli, "Brief Introduction," 18–19.

60 For a general overview of the two disciplines and their distinctions, see D.A. Cruse, *Meaning in Language: An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics* (3rd ed.; Oxford Textbooks in Linguistics; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13–15 and Stephen C.

responsible for compositionally constructed sentence (literal) meaning, while ‘pragmatics’ is supposed to be focused on utterance meaning.⁶¹ This traditional understanding of the distinction is in part built on the fact that the prevalent approach to semantics involves truth-conditionality. Semantics concerns the meaning of lexical items in their immediate co-text; pragmatics focuses on meanings in actual utterance contexts. It is also a distinction between conventional meaning and use, such that “semantics studies the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions, while pragmatics deals with how speakers use expressions in context.”⁶² In more recent years, however, this traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics distinction has been challenged by the semantic underdetermination view.⁶³ Thus, the boundary between the two disciplines has become blurry and has remained a battlefield between truth-conditional semanticists and pragmaticists.⁶⁴

One reason for the fierce debate is the question of how to define pragmatics as an academic discipline. It is notoriously difficult to come up with a precise

Levinson, *Pragmatics* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–5. For a different view, see Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:114–17; 2:607–13. For the history and recent development of the distinction, see Kent Bach, “The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What it is and Why it Matters,” in *The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View* (ed. Ken Turner; Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface 1; Oxford: Elsevier, 1999), 66–84; Claudia Bianchi, “Semantics and Pragmatics: The Distinction Reloaded,” in *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction* (ed. Claudia Bianchi; Stanford: CSLI, 2004), 1–11; and Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt, “Semantics/Pragmatics Boundary Disputes,” in *Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning* (ed. Klaus von Heusinger et al.; HSK 33.3; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012).

- 61 Cruse further distinguishes among three divisions in the study of semantics: (1) lexical semantics, the study of the meaning of words; (2) grammatical semantics, the study of meaning at the clausal or sentential level; and (3) logical semantics, the relations between natural language and the formal logical system. See Cruse, *Meaning in Language*, 13–15.
- 62 Linguists call this a traditional understanding of the distinction. See Bianchi, “Semantics and Pragmatics,” 2 and Mira Ariel, *Pragmatics and Grammar* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1–3.
- 63 Radical pragmaticists would go as far as saying that semantic analysis alone cannot fully recover utterance meaning, and pragmatic enrichment is needed to complete the process. See Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt, “Semantics-Pragmatics Interface,” in *The Routledge Pragmatics Encyclopedia* (ed. L. Cummings; London: Routledge, 2010), 458–62.
- 64 See for example S. Davis, “The Distinction between Pragmatics and Semantics,” in *The Pragmatic Perspective: Selected Papers from the 1985 International Pragmatics Conference* (ed. J. Verschueren and M. Bertuccelli-Papi; Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1987), 685–93.

definition of pragmatics.⁶⁵ In fact, until recently the domain of pragmatics has always been defined negatively. It has been considered the “wastebasket of linguistics” by linguists and philosophers alike.⁶⁶ It is a discipline that covers a wide range of topics (e.g., reference and deixis, conversational implicature, ambiguity, presupposition, speech acts, conversational structure, etc.),⁶⁷ so it is rather difficult to create a definition that would include all of these topics (e.g., code/inference, truth-conditionality, sentence and utterance meaning, context dependency, meaning and implicature, cancellability etc.).⁶⁸ Given this level of complexity in the matter of definition, it is not surprising that it is equally, if not more, difficult to pinpoint the exact nature of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics.⁶⁹ A recent trend has seen the discussion move in two extreme directions. At one end of the spectrum is truth-conditional semantics, which insists on the traditional division of labor. Its practitioners insist that the goal of semantics is to assign truth conditions to sentences, and they happily leave other indexicals and demonstratives to pragmatics. At the other end of the spectrum is radical contextualism, which doubts the usefulness of truth-conditional semantics and opts instead for a complete revamp of the discipline by means of a truth-conditional pragmatics.⁷⁰ It is obviously outside of the scope of this paper to go into great detail about these developments or to attempt their resolution. My purpose is simply to demonstrate the complicated relationship that now exists between the two academic disciplines,

65 Levinson's attempt to give fourteen definitions of pragmatics is a good example (Levinson, *Pragmatics*, 5–34). Some semanticists do not think it is altogether necessary to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics. Lyons discusses many of what are considered to be topics within pragmatics (like deixis and speech-acts) in his second volume of *Semantics* (Lyons, *Semantics*, 2:570–786).

66 See Jacob L. Mey, *Pragmatics: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 12–55. For a general summary of the issue of the semantics/pragmatics boundary, see Bianchi, “Semantics and Pragmatics,” 1–9. See also John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 50–51.

67 See Levinson, *Pragmatics*, 1–53 and Cruse, *Meaning in Language*, 313–94.

68 To illustrate this, all linguists will agree that the phenomenon of deixis belongs to pragmatics, since it concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the context of utterance. However, even though it passes the test of context-dependency, it fails to meet the non-truth-conditionality criteria. See Levinson, *Pragmatics*, 54 and Ariel, *Pragmatics and Grammar*, 1–3.

69 For a code and inference distinction, see the recent work of Ariel, *Pragmatics and Grammar*, 1–107.

70 See Claudia Bianchi, *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction* (CSLI Lecture Notes; Stanford: CSLI, 2004), 15.

and hence to explain why the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is so badly blurred.

In the investigation of the Greek verbal system, it is Porter who first introduced the semantics/pragmatics distinction. He mentions it only in passing, in his discussion on the manner in which Koine Greek uses deictic indicators to grammaticalize tense.⁷¹ The semantics/pragmatics distinction is also one of the many illustrations that he uses to describe the idea of levels of meaning in texts.⁷² Yet apart from a few notes, mainly concerning how aspectual meaning and temporal meaning are represented in Greek, Porter does not use the semantics/pragmatics distinction at all.⁷³ Likewise, Fanning maintains that aspect is a grammatical category, something that “distinguish[es] it from the closely related feature of ‘procedural character’ which is inherent in actual situations.”⁷⁴ Under his analysis, aspect is semantically distinct from procedural characteristics (or lexical aspect), and the aspectual oppositions (grammatical aspect) are “of a different semantic order from procedural oppositions.”⁷⁵ In a manner similar to Carlota Smith, Fanning argues for a two-level understanding of aspect and insists that aspect should be analyzed both at a definition level, which describes the basic aspectual oppositions, and at a function level, which describes the function of the aspects in combination with lexical and other co-textual features.⁷⁶ Although it may sound like Fanning here is applying a meaning vs. use distinction to aspect and *Aktionsart*, in fact he never uses the term pragmatics to describe either the inherent meaning of a verb or *Aktionsart*.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 82–83.

⁷² Porter utilizes Dahl’s notion of primary/basic vs. secondary meaning; prototypical and secondary foci; and also meaning and implicature, as described by Comrie. See Dahl, *Tense and Aspect Systems*, 3, 9–11 and Bernard Comrie, *Tense* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 18–26.

⁷³ Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 82–3, 97, 107.

⁷⁴ Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 49.

⁷⁵ Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 50 and Buist M. Fanning, “Greek Presents, Imperfects, and Aorists in the Synoptic Gospels: Their Contribution to Narrative Structuring,” in *Discourse Studies and Biblical Interpretation: A Festschrift in Honor of Stephen H. Levinsohn* (ed. Steven E. Runge; Bellingham, WA: Logos, 2011), 158.

⁷⁶ Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 420–21. He restates this idea in his later works, insisting that although aspect is central to the Greek verbal system, his main concern rather is how aspect interacts with other co-textual features, which produces the full sense of the text. See Fanning, “Approaches to Verbal Aspect,” 52–53 and Fanning, “Greek Presents,” 157–59.

⁷⁷ In fact, when recounting McCoard’s work on the meaning of the Perfect, Fanning himself seems to agree with McCoard’s distinction between linguistic context (the verb’s lexical

The semantics/pragmatics distinction is tied to the discussion of verbal aspect, although somewhat implicitly and with a broader meaning, in the volume that documents the so-called Porter/Fanning debate.⁷⁸ In the introductory essay, Carson recounts Porter's argument for the function of the tense-forms, and he summarizes his observations by noting that the main focus of Porter's work is "on the semantics of the morphology of the Greek verb, not on pragmatics."⁷⁹ Similar to Fanning's second level of functional interpretation, here Carson uses pragmatics as an umbrella term to describe factors that affect the interpretation of the verb used in particular contexts, mainly referring to lexis, context, and deixis. However, it is not clear whether the context in view here is linguistic context (co-text) or utterance context. It is most likely that co-textual factors such as adjunct and complement phrases are in view. Similar comments are found in Carson's suggestion to Fanning that "his future work will have to demonstrate a greater grasp of the fundamental distinction between semantics and pragmatics."⁸⁰ Carson's concern with Fanning's work is that although he has devoted himself to explaining how verbs are used in context (pragmatics) and how to tie them to an interpretation in *Aktionsart* terms, he has not spent enough time explaining the semantics of the morphology of the tense-forms.⁸¹

Until this point in the discussion, the term 'pragmatics' was generally used by scholars to describe either meaning expressed by deictic indicators or, in a broader sense, meaning in context (i.e., use). However, a trend is visible in works that have appeared subsequent to the Porter/Fanning debate. These works have begun to extend the semantics/pragmatics distinction so as to

sense and adverbial features) and pragmatic inferences (the interpreter's knowledge of the real world and its affairs), but he does not tie this distinction to the discussion of aspect and *Aktionsart*. This seems to reflect a clear distinction between contextual factors (co-text/linguistic context) and pragmatic factors (context of utterance/inferences/implicature). However, given the lack of discussion regarding definitions of the relevant linguistic terms, it is rather difficult to be certain. See Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 107–20.

78 Porter and Carson, *Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics*. The first part of this volume consists of a collection of works centering on the works of Porter and Fanning as presented at the Greek Language and Linguistics session at the 1991 SBL annual meeting.

79 Carson, "An Introduction to the Porter/Fanning Debate," 24.

80 Carson, "An Introduction to the Porter/Fanning Debate," 25.

81 Carson adopts the same broad meaning of semantics and pragmatics, claiming that in general semantics concerns meaning and pragmatics concerns the context (Carson, *Exegetical Fallacies*, 72–73).

encompass the relationship between aspect and *Aktionsart*.⁸² Among the major monograph-length works in New Testament Greek aspect, Decker's was the first to explicitly make a connection between the two distinctions. He characterizes the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction as one between a grammatical category and a contextual category. He claims that *Aktionsart* "is a pragmatic category based on the meaning of the word (lexis) as it is used in a particular context."⁸³ Decker's notion of the aspectual meaning of a verbal complex, that is, a verb-phrase with all relevant co-textual factors, is similar to a compositional approach to clause level aspectual meaning.⁸⁴ In fact, when he unpacks this notion in a footnote, he explicitly ties the semantics/pragmatics distinction to a distinction between meaning at the word level and meaning at the clause level.⁸⁵ Therefore, when he categorizes the subcomponents within the verbal complex, he considers both the utterance context (e.g. deixis) and *Aktionsart* as pragmatics. However, Decker's *Aktionsart* is in fact the meaning of a verb class at the clause level, that is, the meaning of a lexeme (by itself a matter of semantics) combined with its co-textual factors as a construct, which is similar to what others would call lexical aspect.⁸⁶

Following similar definitions, Campbell summarizes the state of research by saying that "most of the major participants in recent discussion regard aspect as a semantic category..." and that "*Aktionsart* is regarded as a pragmatic category."⁸⁷ Campbell refers to the works of Porter, Fanning, and Evans

82 Mari Olsen's work is not included in this discussion (see next section), since the semantic/pragmatic distinction in her model is not directly related to the aspect/*Aktionsart* distinction, but has more to do with the oppositions within lexical aspect (within verb classes), which is the subject matter of the next section. For an overview of Olsen's model, see Olsen, *A Semantic and Pragmatic Model*, 3–22.

83 Decker, *Temporal Deixis*, 26, 153–5.

84 Decker, *Temporal Deixis*, 27–28.

85 Decker, *Temporal Deixis*, 176 n. 120, where Decker cites Binnick and Fleischman. Binnick points to Verkuyl for the compositional nature of the Vendlerian class but does not take it as a pragmatic category. And Fleischman distinguishes between lexical aspect (v) and *Aktionsart* (vp) in terms of the level of analysis (v vs. vp). See Binnick, *Time and the Verb*, 457–58 and Suzanne Fleischman, *Tense and Narrativity: From Medieval Performance to Modern Fiction* (Texas Linguistics Series; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 22.

86 See, for example, Olsen, *A Semantic and Pragmatic Model*, 14–17, who also adheres to a compositional approach to lexical aspect.

87 Campbell cites Porter, Fanning, and Evans in Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood*, 24. The same is articulated in Carson, "An Introduction to the Porter/Fanning Debate," 24–5 and more recently (citing Campbell) in Naselli, "Brief Introduction," 18–19.

for this categorical distinction.⁸⁸ However, although both Porter and Fanning do consider aspect a matter of semantics, they do *not* categorize *Aktionsart* as a matter of pragmatics. And as mentioned above, Evans's comment on the distinction rests on grammaticality, not on an explicit semantics/pragmatics contrast. It is thus not unreasonable to deduce that Campbell is primarily working with Decker's model. Basically, these two scholars understand semantics to be the study of meaning at the word level and pragmatics to be the study of meaning at the clause level. Since verbal aspect is universally considered to be a property of the verbal tense-form while *Aktionsart* depends on various contextual factors, under this understanding of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, aspect and *Aktionsart* belong to different disciplines within linguistics.⁸⁹

Thus, on one level, Campbell is right when he says the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is of vital importance to the debate.⁹⁰ It is especially important whenever deictic markers are a central topic of discussion. However, when it comes to the relationship between aspect and *Aktionsart*, the semantics/pragmatics distinction may not be the best way to characterize the interaction. There are several reasons. First, as mentioned above, the definitions and boundary of semantics and pragmatics as separate disciplines are notoriously difficult to determine. The two terms are pregnant with unwanted connotations and have a complicated and controversial history. New and less confusing terminology is to be preferred. Second, not all scholars agree about the exact nature of *Aktionsart* or about how to characterize the relationship between lexical aspect (verb classes) and the traditional notion of different 'kinds of action' (inceptive, iterative, etc.). A third reason for new and better terminology is that, for those scholars who categorize *Aktionsart* as pragmatic, the focal point of the category is not related to the traditional distinction between meaning and implicature but to a distinction between verb meaning and clause meaning. In fact, at the risk of overgeneralization, what most scholars are trying to do in their analysis of the Greek verbal system is to describe the same phenomenon. Most of them are trying to find a way to describe how

88 Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood*, 24.

89 In fact, he expands this idea in his recent introductory work, breaking up the meaning components in a clause-level analysis. His framework to analyze *Aktionsart* Interaction is similar to Decker's concept of verbal complex. In this framework, the *Aktionsart* of a verb (probably the overall value of the verb-phrase) is the sum of the verbal aspect and the lexical aspect (verb class) and how they combine to interact with other co-textual factors. See, for example, his analysis of the Present tense-form *Aktionsart* in Campbell, *Basics of Verbal Aspect in Biblical Greek*, 63–68.

90 Campbell, *Verbal Aspect, the Indicative Mood*, 25.

the core aspectual value, which is expressed by tense-form, should be interpreted when combined with lexical, co-textual, and contextual factors.⁹¹ It is without dispute that grammaticality should be put at the center of the discussion of the distinction between aspect and *Aktionsart*, so perhaps we should call it a distinction between grammatical and contextual. However, similar to the term *pragmatics*, the different meanings of the term *context* can also cause unnecessary confusion.⁹² To further complicate matters, these factors are not all contextual: the discussion of verb classes is a matter of lexical semantics and philosophy, and the interaction of particular verb classes with co-textual/clausal elements is a matter of clausal semantics and syntax. It is thus not difficult to see that the key to the distinction between aspect and *Aktionsart* lies in how one understands the exact nature of *Aktionsart*. Specifically, at what level of description should we include *Aktionsart*? Should we treat it as a philosophical or ontological category that models events and thus as an extra-linguistic discussion? Or should we treat it as a linguistic category or even a grammatical category, and try to come up with diagnostics for the classification of verbs/clauses and rules that govern the interaction of these classes with lexical and co-textual factors?

Vendler's Classes and *Aktionsart*

Now we move to the discussion of *Aktionsart*, aspect, and the so-called aspectual classes. Here, a comment almost twenty years ago acts as a good starting point. Referring to Porter's work, Carson said this: "I suspect his aspect theory will find wider and more rapid acceptance if he now devotes more attention to a systematic articulation of the ways in which a wide range of factors impinge on the meaning of a verb in a particular context. The Vendler-Kenny taxonomy, for instance, could easily be adapted to dealing with the challenge of exegesis where the interpreter has adopted Porter's aspect theory." Here I wish to follow up on Carson's comment by making two observations about the state of scholarship today after twenty years of research. (1) We still need a systematic explanation of how aspectual classes or *Aktionsart* can be modeled in a language system so as to account for the complex interactions that exist between lexical semantics, clausal semantics, and even wider contextual factors. And (2) we

91 The one exception is Porter, as mentioned in the above section.

92 A better distinction is to use more precise labels like context of utterance and co-text, or the Firthian notion of context of situation and context of culture. See Lyons, *Semantics*, 2:607–13.

need to reconsider whether the Vendler-Kenny taxonomy is a good starting point and whether it is really so easily adaptable to the study of Greek verbal aspect.

Are Vendler's Classes Helpful?

The Problem of Transferability

I will begin with the second question: does the Vendler-Kenny taxonomy have a good linguistic foundation? It is a well-documented fact that Vendler's four classes are intended "to capture the most common time schemata implied by the use of *English verbs*."⁹³ Yet despite the fact that Vendler developed his classification solely through an analysis of English verbs, there have been several attempts since the 1960s to apply these classes in cross-linguistic studies and in the field of language acquisition.⁹⁴ How successful have these attempts been?

As it is pointed out by Wolfgang Klein in a recent work, there are two ways to classify verbs in English into temporal categories.⁹⁵ One way is to differentiate classes using the semantic intuitions of a native speaker. However, it is obvious that such cognitive exercises are highly subjective and often fuzzy. Thus, linguists usually turn to a second method, which can be called the diagnostic approach. The diagnostic approach looks at "the way in which verbs are affected by syntactic or morphological operations."⁹⁶ For example, how do verbs interact with temporal adjuncts or the progressive marker? Although the superiority of this second method seems obvious, in cross-linguistic studies of verb classification it remains tempting to appropriate Vendler's classes with some minor modifications, or to assign verbs to the classes in a quasi-intuitive manner.

As for Vendler himself, he and several other scholars substantiated verbal classes by means of three diagnostic tests that now belong to "the standard toolkit" for detecting internal temporal meaning.⁹⁷ Moreover, since Vendler, numerous revised criteria, both syntactic and semantic, have been proposed. For example, David Dowty lists eleven diagnostic tests to distinguish Vendler's

93 Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy*, 98–99 (emphasis mine).

94 For example, in a few European languages (Icelandic, Italian, Georgian, Croatian), Asian languages (Japanese, Korean, Tagalog), and others. For a brief list, see Robert D. Van Valin, *Exploring the Syntax-Semantics Interface* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32.

95 Wolfgang Klein, "How Time Is Encoded," in *The Expression of Time* (ed. Wolfgang Klein and Ping Li; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), 62.

96 Klein, "How Time Is Encoded," 62.

97 Filip, "Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*," 1189.

four classes, and Robert Van Valin expands the list of classes to six (and their causative versions) and provides seven diagnostic tests.⁹⁸ But, of course, Van Valin quickly points out that these tests are language specific and that “it is necessary to adapt these tests to features of the language under investigation.”⁹⁹ Hana Filip also voices this concern when she says that,

[I]t is not always entirely clear what exactly the diagnostic criteria used by various researchers test for in linguistic expressions, and since the most common linguistic tests were developed based on English data, not all the tests are transferable across natural languages, due to language-specific properties, and those that seem to be require some clarification whether they in fact access the same aspectually relevant properties in different languages.¹⁰⁰

Although the transferability of diagnostic tests has been widely questioned in linguistic literature, this has hardly prevented people from transferring them to the study of languages other than English.¹⁰¹ In Greek aspect study, those works that apply Vendler’s classes make few modifications to them apart from expanding some of the subcategories, and rarely do we see any systematic diagnostic tests tailor-made for Greek.¹⁰² It has been pointed out by many that tests involving the progressive marker or progressive meaning are not applicable to languages such as Greek, but the usefulness of the other standard tests

98 Dowty, *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar*, 52–60. The two classes that Van Valin adds to Vendler’s four are Carlota Smith’s semelfactive class and a derivation class of verb phrases, which he labels Active Accomplishments and is basically the telic use of an activity verb (Van Valin, *Syntax-Semantics*, 32–41).

99 Van Valin, *Syntax-Semantics*, 32, 35. For example, the progressive test is an English specific test, which only works for a language that has a progressive marker, like Turkish or Icelandic.

100 Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1192.

101 Klein, “How Time Is Encoded,” 62–64 and Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1189–90.

102 Evans also points out that these studies depend heavily on the dated English gloss of LSJ lexicon. See T.V. Evans, “Future Directions for Aspect Studies in Ancient Greek,” in *Biblical Greek Language and Lexicography*, 204–205. However, this is not to say that there has been no attempt to come up with diagnostic analyses for Greek. Efforts have been made recently, although on a rather small scale, to bridge the gap between Vendler’s classes and the study of the Greek of the New Testament. See, for example, Rachel M. Shain, “Exploring *Aktionsart* in Corpora: A Case Study of Koine Greek *Erchomai* and *Eiserchomai*,” *Journal of Greek Linguistics* 11 (2011): 221–48, which is based on her Master’s thesis, Rachel M. Shain, “The Preverb *eis-* and Koine Greek *Aktionsart*” (MA thesis, Ohio State University, 2009).

is still to be determined. This is one of the areas in which more energy needs to be invested before the relationship between inherent lexical meaning and grammatical aspect can become meaningful.

Verb, VP, or Clause?

Of course, the transferability of the diagnostic tests is not the only yardstick by which we can measure the usefulness of Vendler's classes or their applicability to Greek. We also need to ask whether the classes should be applied to verbs or to some larger unit like the verb phrase, the clause, or even the entire sentence.

A good starting point for this discussion is the fact that, while Vendler's classes are typically characterized in terms of the presence or absence of particular semantic properties or features such as stativity, telicity, durativity or punctuality, etc., and while discussions of these features usually focus specifically on verbs in themselves, whenever linguists have tried to revise Vendler's classes they have done so by drawing attention to the following three temporal features:¹⁰³

1. Qualitative Change/Transition: does the content expressed involve a change of state (stative vs. non-stative)?
2. Boundedness: does the content expressed have an initial and a final boundary (activity vs. accomplishment/achievement)?
3. Duration/Length: for bounded content, what is the length of the interval (momentary or long)?

As it turns out, these roughly correspond to three types of diagnostic tests: adverbial modification, aspectual modification, and entailment criteria.¹⁰⁴ Adverbial modification, including the so-called in/for tests, checks whether a verb phrase (VP) can be combined with a specific adverbial phrase. For example, the in-adverbial and for-adverbial tests are used to distinguish activity VPs from accomplishment VPs, with the for-adverbial test also being used to distinguish further between accomplishments and achievements. In other words, these tests are for the features of boundedness and duration. The aspectual modification tests check whether the VP in question is accessible to an aspectual modification like the progressive test for English stative verbs, which tests for qualitative change. And finally, entailment criteria distinguish a VP through

103 See Klein, "How Time Is Encoded," 59 and Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality*, 65–6 for two such generalizations.

104 See, for example, Dowty, *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar*, 60.

logical entailments. For example, the progressive entailment test distinguishes activity VPs from accomplishment VPs.¹⁰⁵

This consistent move toward classes that can be defended with reference to broader grammatical phenomena is symptomatic of a theoretical problem. As Verkuyl points out in a review of aspectual classes based on the work of Vendler and Kenny, “none of the parameters is systematically related to constituents of natural language, except for the verb.”¹⁰⁶ He rightly contends that this failure stems from a philosophical bias, and that Vendler’s classes are thus best viewed as ontological categories rather than linguistic categories. After all, it is well documented in the linguistic literature that surface verbs manifest considerable variability in their assignment to Vendler’s classes depending on numerous co-textual factors.¹⁰⁷ The basic meaning of a verb does *not* fully determine class projection.¹⁰⁸ This is why subsequent classifications, such as those by David Dowty and others, have extended the relevant domain of study from verbs to verb phrases so as to encompass other temporal entities.¹⁰⁹ More recently, the relevant domain has been extended so as to include atemporal entities as well, which means that the domain basically encompasses the whole clause.¹¹⁰ In fact, after Dowty’s analysis and the advent of event semantics in the 1980s, non-temporal criteria have been very much in the spotlight.¹¹¹ Yet, although this insight has gradually been accepted in subsequent linguistic frameworks, full scale integration of the relevant meaning components has not yet been developed in the study of Greek aspect.

A Systematic Classification?

This brings us back to the first issue I raised in relation to Carson’s comment: the need for a systematic articulation of Greek aspectual classes. Currently, some scholars might say that compositionality is nothing new in Greek aspect studies. In fact, it might even be said that there have been studies that have

105 The same entailment test with a for-adverbial is a criterion for the Homogeneity property. See Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality*, 43–44.

106 Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality*, 66.

107 See, for example, Sasse, “Recent Activity in the Theory of Aspect,” 215–16 and Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1189–90. Even Vendler himself uses abstract verb phrases (he calls them ‘terms’) in his examples instead of verb lexemes. See Vendler, *Linguistics in Philosophy*, 97–121.

108 Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1191.

109 Dowty, *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar*, 185.

110 See Verkuyl, *A Theory of Aspectuality*. See also Klein, “How Time Is Encoded,” 59.

111 Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1193.

integrated multiple clausal constituents into a single analysis.¹¹² However, the point of departure for these studies is always the lexical meaning of a verb as given by one of Vendler's classes. These discussions do not take Vendler's classes as semantic categories relevant to the clause; rather, they rush into the matter of compositional processes, that is, how the alleged inherent lexical meaning interacts with other temporal markers and clausal constituents, and they focus all of their energy on how these classes interact with grammatical aspect. I suggest that there are several issues that need to be clarified before such discussions become meaningful.

As mentioned above, we first need to ask whether the philosophical tradition of Vendler—that is, the Aristotelian tradition—is the best starting place. As Klein rightly points out, we are not trying to describe “what is the case in reality but the way in which languages grasp and encode reality in lexical contents.”¹¹³ Second, we need to look at alternative frameworks with which to model the relevant classes. More precisely, we need to consider whether lexical aspect should be treated as at least a clause level semantic category. Quite a few competing frameworks are available from which we might choose.¹¹⁴ Third, we need to come up with diagnostic tools that are native to the Greek language. Borrowing directly from Vendler is indefensible, so we need to figure out what might constitute valid empirical evidence for aspectual classes.¹¹⁵ And finally, we need to determine how to approach the compositional process in Greek aspect study. Existing proposals typically start with inherent lexical meaning and move on to discuss how this meaning interacts with the properties of other clausal constituents, including grammatical aspect operators. They then conclude with an overall aspectual meaning or aspectual interpretation of the sentence. In my opinion, however, we still need to determine whether grammatical aspect and temporally classified clauses inhabit a single level of

¹¹² E.g., Fanning and Olsen.

¹¹³ Klein, “How Time Is Encoded,” 61.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Van Valin's RRG approach, Dik's functional grammar approach, Dowty's and others' event semantics approach, Mourelatos's tripartite agentivity-neutral classification, and the SFL approach. See Sergej Tatevosov, “The Parameter of Actionality,” *Linguistic Typology* 6 (2002): 317–24; S.C. Dik, *The Theory of Functional Grammar* (2 vols.; 2nd rev. ed.; Functional Grammar Series 20–21; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), 1:105–26; M.A.K. Halliday and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, *Construing Experience Through Meaning: A Language-Based Approach to Cognition* (Open Linguistics Series; London: Continuum, 1999), 466–506; and Erich Steiner, *A Functional Perspective on Language, Action, and Interpretation: An Initial Approach with a View to Computational Modeling* (Natural Language Processing; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991), 225–36.

¹¹⁵ Filip, “Aspectual Class and *Aktionsart*,” 1193.

abstraction. That is, is it self-evident that discussions about the inherent meaning of a verb and its interaction with other relevant clausal components should inevitably make reference to grammatical aspect? Perhaps the two should be treated as altogether separate categories. A recent study of Modern Greek, for example, has demonstrated that perfectivity is independent of telicity.¹¹⁶ Perhaps we need to rethink our assumptions and reconsider whether we can safely treat the two systems as dependent.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay has retraced the development of verbal classes and has examined how they contribute to the study of Greek verbal aspect. In particular, I have suggested that *Aktionsart* or aspectual classes should be viewed as a property at the clause level, and that more discussions about classification criteria are needed. I have also attempted to move the discussion of compositional processes forward by suggesting that grammatical aspect and aspectual classes should perhaps be treated as independent systems.

116 Athina Sioupi, "Morphological and Telicity Aspect with Accomplishment vps in Greek," in *Crosslinguistic Views on Tense, Aspect and Modality*, 131–44. See also Geoffrey C. Horrocks and Melita Stavrou, "Actions and their Results in Greek and English: The Complementarity of Morphologically Endcoded (Viewpoint) Aspect and Syntactic Resultative Predication," *Journal of Semantics* 20 (2003): 297–327. For cross-linguistic studies, see Borik and Reinhart, "Telicity and Perfectivity," 13–34. But cf. Bohnemeyer and Swift, "Event Realization and Default Aspect," 263–96. For a language specific analysis, see Verkuyl, "How (in-)sensitive Is Tense to Aspectual Information?," 145–69.

117 For example, does the presence of a singular or plural object change the aspectual meaning of the Aorist so that it ceases to be a semelfactive action in certain contexts and becomes an accomplishment action? Or is this change always independent of the Aorist itself, as a matter of clause level semantics?

Relative Temporal Ordering: Discourse Temporality in the Greek of the New Testament

Jeffrey Reber

Introduction

The intention of this essay is two-pronged. The first task is to establish two foundational points with respect to discourse temporality in the Greek of the New Testament. These are (1) that it is the human conceptual construct of time that is channelled into the linear structure of New Testament Greek narrative materials—not real time—and that this grammatical representation of conceptual “B-series” time records a judgment of succession;¹ and (2) that this affords the “locating” resources that are interactively at work with three dynamic event structures. This, it will be argued, is the formal apparatus of basic temporal reference for the writer/speaker’s narrative viewpoint within the Greek language.² The second task is to propose a theoretical foundation and a propositional calculus for the non-narrative viewpoint of a speaker/writer of the Greek New Testament.³

1 Originally conceived by John McTaggart (1908), B-series time is where a series of events runs “from earlier to later, its generating relation earlier (later) than.” See Richard M. Gale, *The Language of Time* (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 9; see also J.M.E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” *Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy* 17 (1908): 457–74.

2 At this point it must suffice to say that a speaker/writer’s “viewpoint” can be narrative (real world) or non-narrative (inner-world). The chosen viewpoint of the writer/speaker reflects their intended purpose for the discourse, i.e. whether to recount real events (observed events), or communicate the subject matter of their inner-world. In due course this concept is fully explicated.

3 The Relative Temporal Ordering (hereafter RTO) calculus (non-narrative viewpoint) is an attempt to formalize the temporal reference system of New Testament Greek. For alternative uses of the event calculus see Robert Kowalski and Marek Segot, “A Logic-Based Calculus of Events,” in *The Language of Time: A Reader* (ed. Inderjeet Mani et al.; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 222.

The end result of these efforts will be a formalized microcosm of both viewpoints (narrative and non-narrative) of the Greek New Testament. The micro-model is applied to a range of evidentiary samples from the Greek New Testament, to include: conduct, exhortation, prayer, and narrative—holding a model exception to be model failure.⁴ At the completion of this testing section, a summary of the research is offered.

Theoretical Foundations of Discourse Temporality: Linguistic Analysis of the Greek Language and Conceptual Time

According to the account of Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras was “the first person who gave a precise definition of the parts of time.”⁵ However, Protagoras’s and all other characterizations of real time are of no direct relevance for linguistic analysis, because real time is merely raw data for a user of language to express.

-
- 4 In the final section of this study, the RTO model is applied to literary samples from Philippians and Acts. The headings used to describe the literary “form(s)” of those samples (i.e., salutation etc.) are taken from the commentaries of P.T. O’Brien (*The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* [NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991], viii, ix), Leon Morris (*The Epistle to the Romans* [PNTC; Leicester: Apollos, 1988], 35, 54, and *Kant’s Introduction to Logic, and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures* (trans. and ed. Thomas Kingsmill Abbot; New York: Philosophical Library, 1963), 49).
 - 5 According to the account of Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras was πρῶτος μέρος χρόνου διώρισε (see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers: Books 6–10* [trans. R.D. Hicks; 2 vols.; LCL 185; London: William Heineman, 1925], 464). The English translation of Laertius is contested by scholars. R. Pfeiffer suggests correctly that the immediate surrounding context is with respect to rhetoric (*History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968], 38). Yet, there is no explicit reference to or mention of ῥῆμα (‘verb’) in the Greek text as in the Loeb English translation. Rather, the conclusive evidence for understanding the reference to “time” is later in the account where Laertius places διήγησιν (narrative, as one of seven πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων ‘stock forms of discourse’) on the lips of Protagoras. “Narrative” is a discourse form connected to perceived events (see the argument below), and perceived events selected for narration can only be in the absolute past of conceptual experience. Thus, if past is established as a “time” with διήγησιν then, of course, there is also necessarily a relative present to the past (in conceptual experience); and if present and past, then there is also that which is “about to come.” Protagoras evidently made this same connection—perhaps through his study of conceptual experience and language (rhetoric).

The feature of objective reality that is of primary “significance to linguistic analysis [is] man,” i.e. the human.⁶

The speaker starts with ideas (or mental representations) of their experience in time and s/he has to find out how to express these given ideas. This “expressing” must move from “within to without”—not from without to within.⁷ Thus, it is the communication of the human conceptualization of time that is the primary concern of linguistic analysis.⁸ For this reason, the linguistic analysis of discourse temporality in the Greek New Testament is concerned with the human conception of time,⁹ and how that conception is grammatically expressed in the Greek language.

Aristotle's Epistemological Time

The human conception of time is essentially the Aristotelian model.¹⁰ Aristotle's great insight was that our epistemological framework fuses together real time

-
- 6 William E. Bull, *Time, Tense, and the Verb: A Study in Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, with Particular Attention to Spanish* (University of California Publications in Linguistics 19; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 114. Bull did not consider “man” to be an entity normally “identified with reality.”
 - 7 See O. Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924), 46. Jespersen argues that whenever we speak or write we start from the notional, that is, our concept of the real world (56, 57). This article presents an argument that expands Jespersen's hypothesis to include both realms of experience (the objective world and the inner-world). From an epistemological standpoint, whether we are dealing with the real physical world or the world of our minds, the raw material conceived of is necessarily conceptualized. As such, the events that have been channeled into a given discourse are a writer/speaker's personal perspective of reality. This, of course, includes the events that a writer/speaker selects to recount (over others).
 - 8 In this study, “the term conceptualization is interpreted broadly as . . . any kind of mental experience.” This is an adaptation of the definition offered in Ronald W. Langacker, “Conceptualization, Symbolization, and Grammar,” in *The New Psychology of Language: Cognitive and Functional Approaches to Language Structure* (ed. Michael Tomasello; Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998), 3 (italics his).
 - 9 Langacker considers cognitive analysis to be under the rubric of functionalism. He notes that “within functionalism, cognitive linguistics stands out by emphasizing the semiological function of language and the crucial role of conceptualization in social interaction.” See Langacker, “Conceptualization,” 1.
 - 10 Aristotle believed that our thoughts were “iconically” faithful representations of external reality (see T. Givón, “The Functional Approach to Grammar,” in *The New Psychology of Language: Cognitive and Functional Approaches to Language Structure*, 42). I depart from his “real” time theory on this point. When I use the expression “the Aristotelian model,”

and conceptual time. To us, the conceptual supervenes itself onto the real. The result of supervenience is that, in our experience, these two times—the real and the conceptual—are indistinguishable.

However, epistemological time is not absolute;¹¹ it is a subjective, relative, and dependent time.¹² It is dependent on objects changing in space (i.e. events). It is subjective and relative, in that this “change” does not exist without the conceptual experience of humans. In short, we do not realize the existence of time “when we do not distinguish any change.”¹³ Aristotle’s theory contributes two crucial points to this emerging discussion of conceptual time: (1) time “has to be cognitively real and involve a cognitively real construal of time”;¹⁴ (2) this cognitively real construal of time is realized through our subjective engagement with a perpetually changing reality. This perpetually changing reality is conceptually experienced as time flow.¹⁵

The Necessity of Communication and the Recasting of Observed Events into the Linear Structure of Discourse to Form Greek Narratives

Since we are social beings dependent on language for communication,¹⁶ our conceptual experience of time flow must, of necessity, be brought under the

I am referring to Aristotle’s theory of time with my adaptations. I argue that his theory of time is an epistemological construct—not real time because it assumes causation. However, to reconfigure his temporal model into a workable epistemological theory of time requires supervenience.

- 11 “Absolute” implies the theory of spacetime advanced in Newtonian physics.
- 12 Similar to Aristotle, Leibniz “believed that time is relative in the sense that it is dependent on the events that occur: no events, no time. . . .” See M. van Lambalgen and Fritz Hamm, *The Proper Treatment of Events* (Explorations in Semantics; Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 17. For a full treatment of Leibniz’s relational view of spacetime, see Olivia Levrini, “The Substantialist View of Spacetime Proposed by Minkowski and Its Educational Implications,” *Science & Education* 11.6 (2002): 603–4.
- 13 See Aristotle, *Physics* 4.11.218b.
- 14 Jaszczolt is summarizing M. van Lambalgen and F. Hamm’s temporal model. See K.M. Jaszczolt, *Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 105.
- 15 “Real time does not flow; the flow of time belongs to human experience (internal consciousness of time).” See Jaszczolt, *Representing Time*, 31.
- 16 Kamp correctly points out that “our everyday interactions with the world, with each other and with ourselves depend on [language].” See H. Kamp and Martin Stokhof, “Information

rules of grammatical representation.¹⁷ These rules dictate that our subjective temporal experiences be channeled into the structural constraints of linear discourse. But, how exactly the Greek language grammatically represents a speaker or writer's subjective construal of time is often misunderstood by contemporary scholars and grammarians.¹⁸

Greek and Later Misunderstandings of Greek Discourse Temporality

This confusion is not new. It seems to originate with the Greek philosopher Protagoras, who in the fifth century B.C.E. was the first to recognize tenses.¹⁹ For Protagoras, "the grammatical category of tense was not clearly distinguished from the logical category of time."²⁰ Robert Binnick claims that this commixing of tense and time continued well after Protagoras, because the Greeks

in Natural Language," in *Handbook on the Philosophy of Information* (ed. Pieter Adriaans and Johan Van Benthem; Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming), 1.

- 17 Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Introduction to Logic, and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures* (ed. and trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbot; New York: Philosophical Library, 1963), 27. Kant recognized that "one may speak, however, without knowing grammar, and he who speaks without knowing it has really a grammar, and speaks according to rules of which, however, he is not aware" (1).
- 18 Circa 120 BCE, in "The Grammar of Dionysios Thrax" (trans. T. Davidson [*The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 8 (1874)]), 335, morphology determines the tenses or "times" as past, present, and future. In the modern era (1800 to the present), morphologically encoded absolute tense remains the prevailing tense model. Indicative of this period are G.B. Winer, *A Grammar of the New Testament Diction: Intended as an Introduction to the Critical Study of the Greek New Testament* (trans. E. Masson; 6th ed.; Philadelphia: Smith, English, 1859), 279–80, 283; E.D. Burton, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1888), 6; H.P.V. Nunn, *A Short Syntax of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 10; J.G. Machen, *New Testament Greek for Beginners* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1923), 20, 67, 81; A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (4th ed.; Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 825; J.W. Wenham, *The Elements of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 78, 96; W.D. Mounce, *Basics of Biblical Greek Grammar* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993), 126, 158, 194; D.B. Wallace, *The Basics of New Testament Syntax: An Intermediate Greek Grammar* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 213.
- 19 See John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 10.
- 20 Robert I. Binnick, *Time and the Verb: A Guide to Tense and Aspect* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10. Binnick notes that "Plato implicitly suggests a tense distinction in his discussion of the three times, his is usually interpreted as a purely logical categorization, not yet a grammatical one" (9).

not only used the same term, *khronos*, for time and tense, but also used the same terms for times and their corresponding tenses (“past time” and “past tense”), and did not clearly comprehend the problems caused by doing so. When they came to examine the forms of the verbs, they were unable to fully escape the misleading appeal of the model of three times, three tenses, though it was inadequate for accounting for the facts of their own language; their theories of meaning led them to conclude that, if there were three times, there must be three tenses.²¹

In addition to confusion between tense and time brought about by equivocal terminology, Binnick addresses the “misleading appeal” between verb-form and the intuitive time frames (past, present, and future).²² What is misleading is that the intuitive frames of temporal experience do not correlate with the verb-forms of the language. In fact, the verb-forms in the Greek language apparently never had that primary application.²³ Nevertheless, as noted above, the confusion continues in the modern era.

21 Binnick, *Time*, 10. Binnick also contends that “[t]he ancient Greeks had already achieved a high degree of what contemporary linguists call ‘observational adequacy.’ They were largely able to accurately record all the facts of their language. But they failed to a great extent to provide any ‘descriptively accurate’ account, being unable to organize the facts of tense into a coherent, explicit system. And insofar as they made any attempt at an ‘explanatorily adequate’ account, they were unsuccessful.” See Binnick, *Time*, 131; see also Stanley E. Porter, *Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood* (SBG 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 18–20.

22 In the RTO system, the future tense-form is taken to represent the imagining of events that may occur, or the “expectation” of events that may occur. As such, the form can only occur in the non-narrative viewpoint (see below). This determination is made in light of cognitive research and various ontological issues related to defining the future. Notable, however, is that its occasion in the test samples (below) supports Porter’s contention that when it is employed by a speaker/writer, it accompanies a degree (attitude) of certainty (Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* [2nd ed.; BLG 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994], 44). That conclusion, in turn, implies that the form grammaticalizes the “language user’s perspective on the relation of the verbal action to reality” and is, therefore, a mood category rather than an aspect (Porter, *Idioms*, 50). For issues involved with future time and verbs see Porter, *Idioms*, 44; Suzanne Fleischman, *The Future in Thought and Language: Diachronic Evidence from Romance* (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 36; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1; and Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*, 872–78.

23 Porter confirms that “the original function of the so-called ‘tense stems’ of the verb in Indo-European languages (of which Greek is one) was not levels of time (past, present, or future), as many suppose, but one of verbal aspect.” See Porter, *Idioms*, 20.

Ultimately, the issue at hand comes down to this question: if temporality is not morphologically expressed, then what is signified by the verb-forms? The short answer is that the verb-forms of the Greek language express aspect, not temporality.²⁴ This fact has been satisfactorily evidenced by scholars such as Porter and McKay.²⁵ To encode temporality, Greek writers used causal event sequencing generally following “the principle of chronological order.”²⁶ This

24 See Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 88. Porter defines verbal aspect as “a synthetic semantic category (realized in the forms of verbs) used of meaningful oppositions in a network of tense systems to grammaticalize the author’s reasoned subjective choice of conception of a process” (Stanley E. Porter, *Studies in the Greek New Testament: Theory and Practice* [SBG 6; New York: Peter Lang, 1996], 27; Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 88). A proper discussion of the relationship between verbal aspect and the RTO version of discourse temporality is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one crucial interconnection should be pointed out: both verbal aspect and the RTO system operate from an “author’s personal (subjective) axis.” For a discussion of subjectivity and verbal aspect see Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 88; Wally V. Cirafesi, *Verbal Aspect in Synoptic Parallels: On the Method and Meaning of Divergent Tenseform Usage in the Synoptic Passion Narratives* (LBS 7; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 64 n. 60. For a discussion of subjectivity and time see Paul Davies, *God and the New Physics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 120–24; also Douglas Estes, *The Temporal Mechanics of the Fourth Gospel: A Theory of Hermeneutical Relativity in the Gospel of John* (BIS 92; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 79, 90.

25 McKay states that “the verb forms do not in themselves signify time” (Kenneth L. McKay, “Time and Aspect in New Testament Greek,” *NovT* 34.3 [1992]: 209–28, 225).

26 Klein provides a definition of the principle along with a helpful illustration: “the construction of texts typically follows certain temporal constraints, the best known of which is the ‘principle of chronological order’: ‘Unless marked otherwise, the order of mention corresponds to the order of events.’ Thus, a sentence such as *He fell asleep and switched the light off* sounds distinctly odd because it violates this principle” (Wolfgang Klein, “Time in Language, Language in Time,” *Language Learning* 58 [2008]: 10). Although different terminology is sometimes used for the principle, chronologically ordered discourse is widely accepted by scholars. A few of note are Johan van Benthem, *The Logic of Time: A Model-Theoretic Investigation into the Varieties of Temporal Ontology and Temporal Discourse* (2nd ed.; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 114; Bernard Comrie, *Tense* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 61, 67; H. Reichenbach, *The Philosophy of Space & Time* (trans. M. Reichenbach and J. Freund; New York: Dover, 1958), 138; Alexandra Georgakopoulou and Dionysis Goutsos, *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 42; and Jae Hyun Lee, *Paul’s Gospel in Romans: A Discourse Analysis of Rom 1:16–8:39* (LBS 5; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 32.

Greek narrative event strings adhere to the principle, with attention to the following points: (1) what Klein terms “marked otherwise” correlates to temporal deixis in the Greek language. Temporal deixis “markers” can reorder a causal sequence of finite events in the narrative discourse to be different from the manifest sequence. For example, in Gal 2:12, Paul writes: *πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἔλθεῖν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιν.*

sequencing principle is in accord with Kant's (and others') conceptual rules of understanding; namely, that our real experiences are discretely channeled

In actual fact, the chronology of events was Cephas (Κηφᾶς) μετὰ τῶν ἔθνῶν συνήσθιεν, before ἐλθεῖν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου, though in 2:12 the order in the text is reversed. (2) In Klein's example the principle is applied to only finite verbs. Non-finite event forms (e.g., infinitive and participle), do not conform to the principle of chronological order. To make the distinction clear in this work, hereafter "finite" forms are termed events, and non-finite forms are referred to by category e.g., participle. (3) The principle also does not imply that an entire narrative block of events necessarily follows an absolute linear chronology. Rather, the speaker/writer of Greek narratives could use deictic place indicator(s) and/or other literary devices (time markers etc.) to signal the closure of one narrative episode and the beginning of another. It was acceptable practice for a narrative writer in antiquity to not adhere to an absolute linear chronology in an adjoining (previous or subsequent) section, as Estes makes clear in, *The Temporal Mechanics*, 132–51. However, this does not diminish the fact that within each narrative episode event strings adhere to the causal principle of chronological order.

There is also much confusion over the chronological sequence of events in narrative and the expression of event simultaneity. As just stated, the principle is only applicable to finite events in narrative discourse. It does not account for deictic/pragmatic modification of those events. When just finite narrative events are chronologically sequenced, a contemporaneous event is not possible. For any event in a sequence to be contemporaneous with an anterior/posterior one, temporal modification is necessary (either deictic or pragmatic). One example will illustrate this point. If the first finite event of a string is *John ran to the store*, and the subsequent event in the string is *a car traveled to the store*, to indicate simultaneity between the two events requires that adverbial modification, such as: *while*, *at the same time as*, *alongside of*, *as*, etc. be added to one of the events in the string. But, there cannot be contemporaneous time in this given (narrative) string with just the finite events: *John ran to the store*, and *a car traveled to the store*. It should be noted also that modern physics rules out the possibility of finite event simultaneity due to the constant speed of light. For a further discussion see Estes, *The Temporal Mechanics*, 80–82, 95.

A contemporaneous action is possible (excepting temporal deixis or pragmatic assignment), if Porter's assertion of participle positioning with respect to the finite verb is accepted. Porter argues that participles occurring "after the finite (or other) verb on which it depends [tend to refer to] concurrent (simultaneous) or subsequent (following) action" (Porter, *Idioms*, 188). However, the primary semantic feature of non-finite verbs is verbal aspect, not time. So, the RTO model assigns relative temporal reference implicature to non-finite forms according to their use in the surrounding context (which accounts for syntax) (Porter, *Idioms*, 181). This procedure is in line with current scholarly opinion. See Porter, *Idioms*, 187.

into the structural (linear) constraints of discourse,²⁷ encoded in event chains “ordered by precedence.”²⁸ This channeling of real events necessarily effectuates sequential movement of the horizontal discourse. Thereby, enumeration is generated.²⁹ Enumeration, in turn, affords B-series time measurement scalars: earlier (later) than.³⁰

Temporal Reference for the Narrative Viewpoint: Formalization of the Possible Event Structures

However, the generation of enumerating scalars to represent encoded time is one thing, while the application of those resources for temporal reference (i.e., locating events in time) is entirely another. In order to apply the scalars and hence to actualize temporal reference in narrative discourse, one observed event in a given sequential discourse string must have a definable temporal priority as ‘earlier than’ the subsequent observed event.

27 Ter Meulen notes: “since the world does not come prepackaged into events, our linguistic actions partition the continuously changing situation into discrete events.” See Alice G.B. ter Meulen, *Representing Time in Natural Language: The Dynamic Interpretation of Tense and Aspect* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 120.

28 See van Benthem, *The Logic*, 114; see also Dahl, *Tense*, 112.

29 Aristotle contended, οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις (‘time, then, is not movement, but that to which movement is numerically assigned’) (Aristotle, *Physics* 4.11.219b; translation mine). In the RTO model, only observed events are those “that are inherently countable” (see Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, “Events, Processes, and States,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2 [1978]: 415). The RTO definition of observed (narrative) and not observed (non-narrative) events is provided at n. 31 and n. 46 below.

30 Aristotle organized the times according to relative differentia, as for him the times had only relative (existence) meaning: ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδέν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων· ὁ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου τὸ δ’ ὕστερον (‘for none of the parts of time is enduring. And how can that which is not enduring have any position? Rather, of time it would be better to say that it has relative order, since it has precedence: before and after’) (Aristotle, *The Organon: The Categories*, 6.5a [Cooke, LCL], translation mine). Kierkegaard’s understanding is quite similar, noting: “Time is an endless succession without any proper present, past, or future.” See S.U. Zuidema, *Kierkegaard* (International Library of Philosophy and Theology: Modern Thinkers Series; Philadelphia: P & R, 1960), 23.

The phenomenal world's way of attaining this temporal priority is causation in the manner dictated by the "*commonsense principle of inertia*, [namely]:³¹ a property persists unless it is caused to change by an event."³² Inertial causation *actualizes* a temporal priority because it forces an exchange point at which a relative relationship between two events materializes and can be recognized. To illustrate this, let us assume there is a person who is stationary and observing a visual field containing two events: "E1" and "E2." In the field, "E1" continues in motion until the motion is affected by event "E2." At the observed causal exchange point between "E1" and "E2," "E1" is recognized to be earlier than "E2" as "E2" affected "E1."³³ Now, since only events from the phenomenal world are channeled into discourse to form narrative strings (see above discussion), it follows that these channeled real event strings will retain this same inertial (causal) event structure that transforms causality into temporal priority.

The Tripartite Event Exchange Complex and the Resulting Algorithm

What is necessary, then, is to identify the possible notions of cause that can actualize this exchange-point-generated temporal priority and thereby substantiate the assignment of the relative scalar 'earlier than' to a subject event in the narrative string. There are only three causes that can force an exchange point between phenomenal events in New Testament Greek narratives:

-
- 31 A narrative event, then, is strictly defined as one that is enumerable (i.e., countable) and subject to laws of physics (causality). This necessitates that the event is (1) observed in the real world, and is (2) affected in the real world.
 - 32 The name of the principle and the definition are from van Lambalgen and Hamm, *The Proper Treatment*, 36 (italics original). There is also a Galilean version of inertia, where "there are actually two states of inertia—rest and uniform motion" (see Nancy R. Pearcey and Charles B. Thaxton, *The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy* [Wheaton: Crossway, 1994], 170). For another version of the law applied to event structure see D. Gabbay and J. Moravcsik, "Verbs, Events, and the Flow of Time," in *Time, Tense, and Quantifiers: Proceedings of the Stuttgart Conference on the Logic of Tense and Quantification* (ed. Christian Rohrer; Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1980), 59.
 - 33 Reichenbach, *The Philosophy*, 135–43 asserts that "if 'E2' is the effect of 'E1', then 'E2' is called later than 'E1'." However, it is possible that 'E2' could be started earlier than 'E1', but still effect 'E1'. In that scenario 'E2' is not later than 'E1'. For there to be causal priority, the parameters must delimit the scope of observation to only the causal exchange point—not to include event origins, because it is only at the exchange point that the causal relationship transforms into a measurable temporal priority. This adaptation of Reichenbach's illustration is the basis for the Event Exchange Complex developed in this work for the narrative viewpoint.

Direct Cause 1: The actor/subject who starts doing or is doing an event does not actively continue the doing, thereby terminating the first event and initiating a second one.³⁴

Direct Cause 2: An outside agent (person or thing) forces the subject to stop doing the event.

Indirect Cause 1: An outside agent (person or thing) forces the (subject's) event to stop doing, causing the actor/subject to cease doing the event.

With the three notions of causation formulated, a temporal reference application rule can be established: *for each event in a narrative string that can be terminated by one of the three causes, the scalar 'earlier than' will be assigned to that event.*³⁵

But note, when the designation 'earlier than' is assigned to an event, it will be taken to hold to a 'past' temporal frame,³⁶ because all observed events that are recounted and assigned 'earlier than' must take place in the relative 'past' of the speaker/writer's axis of orientation; namely, the recounting activity.³⁷ For this reason, all narrative viewpoint events (all observed events) that are

34 In the real world, if a subject/actor discontinues the application of force to the event activity, the event ends. In other words, a subject must apply continual force for an event to be ongoing.

35 As indicated previously (n. 26 above) non-finite event forms (e.g., infinitive and participle) do not follow the temporal principles outlined in this analysis (causality or inertia). For this reason, the procedure followed with non-finite forms is to assign relative temporal reference implicature according to their use in the surrounding context (which accounts for syntax). Saying this is not meant to imply that observed non-finite event forms (participle or infinitive) cannot terminate an anterior finite event. They can in some verb-modifying relations. For instance, when a verb-modifying (observed) participle functions in certain circumstantial relations (attendant circumstances, causal, purpose/resultive, etc.) it can terminate an anterior finite event (e.g., λέγοντας in Acts 6:13 in the test samples). When a circumstantial relation occurs in the test samples it is notated as such. See Porter, *Idioms*, 190–93; see also Richard A. Young, *Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach* (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 156–58.

36 The semantic distinction between the so-called progressive or simple sense is not a deictic decision (John Lyons, *Semantics* [2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977], 2:687, 688). In the translations of this work, an attempt is made to apply the "simple" sense with reasoned consistency. Where the English would be awkward, or the context dictates the progressive extension, it is applied.

37 This can also be described as the absolute past of the speaker/writer.

designated ‘earlier than’ are assigned a default “pastness” (implicature) in the RTO model.³⁸

Applying the Exchange Complex to Locate Narrative Events

In order to illustrate this proposed procedure for temporal reference application, the model will be applied to Matt 8:15. The verse reads: *καὶ ἥψατο τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀφῆκεν αὐτὴν ὁ πυρετός, καὶ ἡγέρθη καὶ διηκόνει αὐτῷ*. In this selection, the narrative string contains four atomized event complexes:

1. καὶ ἥψατο τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς
2. καὶ ἀφῆκεν αὐτὴν ὁ πυρετός
3. καὶ ἡγέρθη
4. καὶ διηκόνει αὐτῷ

According to the details provided in the surrounding context, Peter’s mother-in-law had a fever (ὁ πυρετός). This condition can be assumed to continue contingent upon a causal agent that affects (cures) the condition. That agent is Jesus, when he forces the exchange point between the first two event complexes by touching the woman (ἥψατο τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς), as it is stated that the effect of his touch was the fever (ἀφῆκεν αὐτὴν), an example of Direct Cause 2.

Next, the woman was apparently reclining due to the fever. It must be assumed that this inertial condition of reclining would have persisted, except the reason for her reclining—the fever—was eliminated. Nevertheless, clearly when she rose up (ἡγέρθη) her reclining state terminated, thus an exchange point that generates temporal priority is established between the two events, an example of Direct Cause 1. Finally, when she arose, it is reported that διηκόνει αὐτῷ. In so doing, she terminates the previous event of rising, creating an exchange point which forces a temporal priority between these two events, again by means of Direct Cause 1.³⁹

38 For other scholars who also ascribe past time to narrative material see: Comrie, *Tense*, 26 and Dahl, *Tense*, 112. Though “pastness” is the default temporal frame, this “pastness” can be forcibly cancelled by several contextual factors (deixis indicators, syntax, etc.). See below for the other contextual features that can forcibly cancel the default implicature.

39 Using the terminative complex developed in this work is one of several possible methods to identify causal priority. Another effective method is commonsense entailments. A commonsense entailment is a way of deriving the temporal priority between two successive events by reconstructing the consequences of the event activities and determining

Applying the Scalar ‘Earlier Than’

In accordance with the algorithm outlined above, the enumeration resources of B-series time can now be applied to locate the events of this sequence string in time. When the fever left the woman, the previous event (καὶ ἤψατο τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς) had to have taken place. At that causal exchange point, it is actualized as ‘earlier than’ the next event: ἀφῆκεν αὐτὴν ὁ πυρετός. As such, καὶ ἤψατο τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῆς can now anchor the subsequent string of events in ‘past’ time. An appropriate rendering would be: “And he touched her.” From this point, each successive event was similarly terminated by direct causes, so each is assigned ‘earlier than.’ With this explanation, a reasonable English translation for Matt 8:15 can be offered: “and he (Jesus) touched her hand, and the fever left her, and she rose up and served him.” In no instance can this implicature be cancelled by the given context, confirming the analysis.

Handling Reordering Deixis in the Application Model

Although Matt 8:15 provides an illustration of the basic temporal reference procedure for observed events, there is one particular variety of contextual indicators that can add complexity to the application of the temporal reference model, namely, reorienting temporal deixis (e.g. **πρό**).⁴⁰ As the name suggests, a reorienting deictic indicator is a means by which a speaker/writer can manipulate the real world event sequence that is depicted in a given narrative string.

the temporal priority that is inherent between those activities. Making a commonsense entailment would involve using inductive reasoning to determine the causal priority depicted between two event activities taking place. For example: When Peter’s mother-in-law begins the final event of this string διηκόνει αὐτῷ, that event activity involves walking, consequently the previous event activity ἡγέρθη could not continue—so the activity related to ἡγέρθη must be terminated prior to her being able to διηκόνει αὐτῷ. In this example, the use of commonsense entailment elicits the same temporal priority between events as the termination complex. This use of commonsense entailments is an adaptation of the ideas offered in Alex Lascarides and Nicholas Asher, “Temporal Interpretation, Discourse Relations, and Commonsense Entailment,” in *The Language of Time: A Reader*, 359; and Kowalski and Segot, “A Logic-Based Calculus,” 230.

40 Porter lists “three classes of time deixis.” For a description see Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 101. All the special notations used to indicate specific categories in this paper, such as the boldface for **πρό** to indicate temporal deixis, are listed in the Appendix.

Nevertheless, as the following example shows, when the interpretive procedure is adjusted to account for the temporal value (or dictated causal priority) of the indicator, the Exchange Complex can then be applied without compromising the method just outlined. For instance, in Gal 2:12 the manifest sequence reads: *πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἔλθειν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν*. In actual fact, the real chronology of events was *μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν* **before** *τοῦ ἔλθειν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου*.⁴¹

Properly handled, the interpreter would be prompted by the reorienting indicator *πρὸ* to begin with the second event of the sequence: *μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν* and then proceed to the first: *τοῦ ἔλθειν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου*. When that step is taken, it is clear that *μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν* was terminated by Direct Cause 2, when the first event occurred (*τοῦ ἔλθειν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου*). Thus, the second event would be assigned ‘earlier than’ the first event in “past” time. The English rendition would read: “**before** certain ones from James came, he ate with the Gentiles.” As the example clearly shows, once the reorienting indicator is compensated for, the temporal reference application model is fundamentally unchanged. What the model does require is an informed and knowledgeable interpreter, who will make the proper model adjustments to account for the relevant contextual information.

A Narrative Viewpoint

It has been shown that discourse temporality in the Greek language is not a result of verb morphology. Rather, it is a result of functional considerations. Specifically, how a particular mode of discourse functions with respect to a speaker/writer’s literary purpose—as literary purpose is the organizing principle of Greek literary structure.

When a Greek speaker/writer purposed to recount real events, this choice to communicate was a commitment to physical laws governing empirical

41 The presence of the temporal indicator is not a matter of dispute (see Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* [2nd ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994], 523). Neither is the “real” order of events as presented here, namely that Peter was in table-fellowship with the Gentiles prior to “certain ones” from James arriving. See Ronald Y.K. Fung, *The Epistle to the Galatians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 106–7; see also Ernest De Witt Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (ICC; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 103–107.

phenomena.⁴² Real events are observed, and real events follow the law of inertia. This inertial law dictates event structure, which, in turn, determines temporal reference. When a Greek speaker/writer made this purposed choice to recount a given string of observed events, s/he triggered a series of Greek language mechanisms to facilitate the task of recounting. Therefore, making these necessary choices, as outlined above, allowed the speaker/writer to create a literary form fulfilling their purposed intent. For this reason, in a real sense, the writer's communicative purpose to recount real events is a narrative viewpoint—a literary apparatus of the Greek language used just to facilitate the recounting of observed events (see Figure 3.1, below).⁴³

The Non-Narrative Viewpoint

Not only do we conceptualize our real world experiences, we also conceptualize our inner-world experiences. Our conceptual faculties assemble the conceived subject matter of our inner-worlds into various cohesive formations of understanding. These formations are of two types: formed ideas and vivid episodic imagery.⁴⁴ When a speaker/writer communicates the formed matter

42 Using modern physics, Estes has similarly determined that narratives are “temporally dynamic.” He notes: “a narrative chronicles a series of events or actions” . . . , a “series of events connected by both chronology and causality.” However, he also claims that non-narrative modes of discourse are “temporally static.” It will be shown that the biblical evidence does not support this claim. Rather, the argument presented in this study (below) is that New Testament non-narrative events are functionally atemporal, but express an emanating relative time (another dynamic time) with respect to the speaker/writer's temporal axis of orientation—the absolute present. See Estes, *The Temporal Mechanics*, 8–9, 72, and 75.

43 Figure 3.1 is initiated with “human sensory experience” due to the space constraints of this essay. There is no association intended with John Locke's theory of “innatism,” which theorizes that ideas are formed only from human sensory experience. See Carl F.H. Henry, *God, Revelation, and Authority* (6 vols.; Wheaton: Crossway, 1999), 1:310–14.

44 This inner-matter (i.e., formed ideas and vivid episodic imagery) occurs in an inner-world that is not subject to time and space in the manner of physical entities. To be more specific: the inner-world has a prevailing set of laws operable within the physical (human) world that operates according to the laws of physics and a four-dimensional spacetime. However, only real events can obtain a position in spacetime—thought-matter cannot. For the discussion and calculation procedure to locate a real event in spacetime see Stephen Hawking, “Space and Time Warps,” accessed October 2, 2012, online: <http://www.hawking.org.uk/space-and-time-warps.html>, 52–55.

from this inner-world, they do so with the purposed intent to exhort, convince (persuade), prove, instruct, relay information, express personal beliefs, or advance facts for further consideration.

As with observed events, inner-world event tokens must be channeled into the structural constraints of discourse. But the realm of the inner-world does not operate according to the laws of physics. Rather, our rational mechanism channels the formed subject matter of the inner-world into the particular logical structures (formulas) efficacious to the specific purposes of a discourse unit.⁴⁵ These logical structures take one of three specific manifestations: (1) a simple personal statement in the form of a declaration, claim, identity statement etc.,⁴⁶ (2) complex constructions consisting of simple personal statements in the form of declarations, claims, and identity statements etc.,⁴⁷

Two types of inner-matter (hereafter referred to as “inner-world events”) can be profitably distinguished in non-narrative discourse:

1. “Ideas,” which include: imagined scenarios, believed/expected (or hoped for) events to come, and the subject matter of our personal belief systems. Ideas are about the world, “but they are not in the world” as observed events. See Jan van Voorst, *Event Structure* (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science 59; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1988), 25.

2. “Vivid Episodic imagery.” A mental representation(s) that includes real event imagery from the past, either figurative events or the metaphorical use of the real-world event imagery by humans, or orchestrated events (real or figurative) attributed to the Divine.


In Lee’s four categories of the predicator, “ideas” and “vivid episodic imagery” would correlate to mental process, relational process and “other process: behavioral, verbal, and existential processes.” See Lee, *Romans*, 57.

45 Speaker/writers “draw upon” logical structures in order to successfully achieve certain purposed social ends. Thus the structures function as a resource within purposed Greek discourse. I am advancing the “draw upon” notions of Terry Winograd, *Language as a Cognitive Process. Vol. 1: Syntax* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1983), 274.

46 Similar to the non-narrative proposal I am offering, Aristotle, in *On Interpretation*, considered the “verb” (or *rhêma*) to be a logical category concerned with “the logical concept of a proposition” ... “*not a grammatical one*.” See Binnick, *Time*, 10 (emphasis mine).

47 Simple statements are those without logical connectors (and, or, etc.) and are called functional propositions. Simple statements are of the type: *Jesus is Lord*. Those with connectors are complex logical constructions. Complex constructions are constructed by connecting simple propositions.

What I am contending is that ideas are given a logical formulaic structure (as simple or complex statements) during the purposed channeling of inner-world subject matter into the language. This theory is closely related to the philosophy of language offered by Leibniz. However, Leibniz seems to consider the significance of the formalization of logical structures to be “a way to come to (self-)consciousness,” whereas I am inextricably linking the logical structuring of language to purposed communication types (narrative, non-narrative). For an explanation of Leibniz’s metaphysics (a version of apriorism)

FIGURE 3.1 *Sensory experiences and logical structures.*

and (3) vivid episodic imagery or personal beliefs that are recounted as real events and capable of being integrated into simple or complex constructions (see Figure 3.1).

Simple (1) and Complex (2) Personal Statements

The formed ideas and held beliefs of the inner-world that are purposefully channeled into discourse using logical structures (1) and (2) take the classical form of propositions.⁴⁸ That is, they are statements with truth-value.⁴⁹ Yet it

and theory of language see Hans Ineichen and Phillip Stoellger, "Linguistics," in *The Encyclopedia of Christianity* (ed. E. Fahlbusch et al.; Leiden: Brill, 1999–2003), 3:285; see also Henry, *God*, 1:314–19.

⁴⁸ Lee suggests that non-narrative discourse can progress sequentially, not by chronological order of events (as with narratives), but by way of topical or logical relations. See Lee, *Romans*, 32.

In the Greek language a logical formulation can be channeled into the discourse according to a speaker/writer's stylistic discretion. Meaning, the formulaic presentation of the structure is interchangeable, it does not have to strictly follow 'cause to effect' or 'if... then...' etc. The formulas can also be presented in the inverse scenario, e.g., 'effect to cause.' In other words, the structural ordering is immaterial to the operation of the formula. The two possible ordering scenarios for the formula ('cause to effect' or 'effect to

is only an observed event in the real world that can attain to a meaningful bivalence,⁵⁰ because the truth-value of an inner-world propositional statement (simple or complex) is ultimately unattainable. As such, simple inner-world statements (1) and complex inner-world constructions (2) are logically contingent constructions.

Simple (1) and Complex (2) Personal Statements as Functionally Atemporal

A contingency cannot realize enumeration and without enumeration the inner-events that make up simple personal statements cannot attain to 'real' temporality. Consequently, personal statements (1) and complex formulas (2) are functionally atemporal. The primary semantic feature of their events is verbal aspect⁵¹ and attitude⁵²—not time.

Only contingent logical priority can be realized within logical formulas.⁵³ Propositional operators are the mechanisms used by a speaker/writer to

cause') are logically equivocal. For instance Jude 1:6, 7 contains two material (causal) conditionals that have the logical structure of 'cause to effect' ("because . . . so . . ."), while Rom 1:8 contains a material (causal) conditional that has a structural presentation of 'effect to cause' ("I give thanks . . . because . . .").

- 49 "What makes the proposition the fundamental unit is the fact that only a whole proposition can be true or false—that, as we say, it has a truth-value" (H. Reichenbach, *Elements of Symbolic Logic* [New York: Free Press, 1947], 6, italics removed). In Aristotelian logic, truth-value is restricted to personal assertions (statements). See Aristotle, *Categories* 4.2a. To eliminate the ambiguity typically associated with the term, Aristotle's definition is adopted for this study.
- 50 See Jaszczolt, *Representing Time*, 77. Reichenbach admits that the content of propositions cannot just have formulaic truth-value (see Reichenbach, *Elements*, 183) because, "any obscurity upon the agreement or disagreement of the ideas. . . [and the proposition is] . . . uncertain" (Isaac Watts, *Logic* [1847 ed.; Grand Rapids: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 2008], 168). Only the occurrence of observed events is not uncertain.
- 51 There are three verbal aspects in Greek: (1) Perfective aspect, where "the action is conceived of by the language user as a complete and undifferentiated process"; (2) Imperfective aspect, where the "action is conceived of by the language user as being in progress"; and (3) Stative aspect, where the "action is conceived of by the language user as reflecting a given (often complex) state of affairs." See Porter, *Idioms*, 21, 22.
- 52 "[M]ood forms indicate the speaker's 'attitude' toward the event." For a detailed treatment of the 'attitude' particular to the indicative and each non-indicative mood form, see Porter, *Idioms*, 50–61.
- 53 Reichenbach refers to this phenomenon as the "logical necessity" embedded in the structural property of the respective (logical) formula. See Reichenbach, *Elements*, 183.

establish the contingent ordering priority between simple statements in a given logical formula. These connective operators (i.e. trigger words) give a semantic structure to each particular logical formula, such as: ‘if... then...’ (conditional), ‘...with the result that...’ (result), ‘...if and only if... then...’ (bi-conditional) etc.⁵⁴ Each basic formulaic structure can be extended into a logical macro-structure that includes several additional operators or operator combinations. Regardless of the final structural composition, each simple statement within the formula is an independent monad of the inner-world containing subject-matter that emanates from the speaker/writer’s relative axis of orientation—the absolute present.⁵⁵ Accordingly, the process of locating (i.e. providing temporal implicature for) each inner-event begins with the default assignment of “presentness,” then accounts for verbal aspect, attitude, relevant contextual features, and finally, the logical priority expressed by the connective operators of the larger formulaic structure.

A Non-narrative Example of a Complex Personal Statement

The following example will illustrate the points presented thus far for the non-narrative viewpoint. In Gal 3:29, Paul advances the following statements: εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ, ἄρα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ σπέρμα ἐστέ. This construction consists of two simple propositional statements combined to form a complex material conditional formula (sub-class logical necessity). The logical structure is represented in the calculus of propositions as ‘ $a \supset b$ ’:⁵⁶

The ‘a’ proposition consists of the statement: εἰ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ

The ‘b’ proposition consists of the statement: ἄρα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ σπέρμα ἐστέ

The material conditional of logical necessity (symbolized with the operator ‘ \supset ’) dictates: if ‘a,’ it follows necessarily that (then) ‘b.’

54 See William Gustason and Dolpe E. Ulrich, *Elementary Symbolic Logic* (2nd ed.; Prospect Heights: Waveland, 1989), 14. The possible types of formulas and a description of the formulas are provided in the section titled: “The Propositional Calculus for Simple and Complex Statements” (below).

55 My contention is simply that every contingent propositional statement emanates from the speaker/writer’s absolute present. This idea is an adaptation of Quentin Smith’s notion of “presentism.” For a detailed treatment of the theory of ‘presentism’ see Quentin Smith, *Language and Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), v, 251.

56 For a further explanation of the complex material conditional (sub-class logical necessity) symbolized as ‘ $a \supset b$,’ see the section titled: “The Propositional Calculus for Simple and Complex Statements” (below).

The truth-value possibilities for this logic formula can be determined after assigning ‘T’ (true) and ‘F’ (false) to all of the possible truth-value combinations for the formula ‘ $a \supset b$ ’ in the following truth-table:⁵⁷

TABLE 3.1 *Truth-table for the material conditional ‘ $a \supset b$ ’*⁵⁸

‘a’	‘b’	‘ $a \supset b$ ’
T	T	T
T	F	T
<u>F</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>F</u>
F	F	T

Table 3.1 clearly illustrates that if the simple propositional statement in column ‘a’ is false (i.e. if it is the case that *ὕμεις Χριστοῦ* is false); and the simple propositional statement in column ‘b’ is assigned a ‘true’ value (i.e. it is the case that *Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστὲ* is true), then Paul’s complex logical construction: *εἰ ὕμεις Χριστοῦ, ἄρα τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστὲ* (symbolized as ‘ $a \supset b$ ’) is false. The highlighted truth-values listed in row three of the table verify this conclusion. Also evident in the table is that the logical formula proves true for the other three possible truth-value combinations for the complex construction ‘ $a \supset b$ ’.

However, to actually establish a truth-value of Paul’s (personal) simple statements, whether ‘a’ or ‘b,’ there must be a corresponding observed event. But, in fact, the antecedent (*εἰ ὕμεις Χριστοῦ*) was not knowable, observed—or even observable at the time of the discourse. Therefore, the consequent (‘b’) could not possibly be realized in Paul’s formula: ‘ $a \supset b$.’ Instead, at the time of writing, Paul’s formula was a contingent scenario that had real world

57 Truth-value is established with respect to a statement in a “particular context (provided that the [statement] is used unambiguously in that context and, in all its occurrences, is used to make just one claim).” A statement can be said to have the “truth-value ‘T’ in a particular context if and only if it is used unambiguously there and expresses something *true*, and will be said to have the truth-value ‘F’ in that context if and only if it is used unambiguously to express something *false*” (Gustason and Ulrich, *Elementary*, 10, italics original).

58 A truth-table lists all the possible assignments of truth-value for a specific logical formula. All of the possible truth-value assignments for Paul’s logical formula ‘ $a \supset b$ ’ are listed in Table 1.

potentiality—yet remained in a state of perpetual contingency. The net effect is that the potential succession from the antecedent ('a') to the consequent ('b') is unrealized. As such, the contingent formula 'a \supset b' cannot enumerate. Therefore, no temporal relationship between the inner-events is possible.

Temporal Reference in the Inner-World

This Gal 3:29 example evidences that Paul's simple statements do not of themselves effectuate enumeration. For Paul to say only *ὁμοίως Χριστοῦ* or only *τοῦ Ἀβραάμ σπέρμα ἐστὶ* is to merely make two personal (and hopeful) yet interchangeable inner-world propositional declarations. Devoid of truth-value, neither atomized inner-world statement can attain enumeration or logical priority. Rather, each declaration emanates from the author as an emerging 'present' proposition (at the time of writing). But, when Paul's simple declarations are channeled into a logical structure befitting his purposed discourse, then the connective operators appropriate to his purpose ('if... then...') are added, and those trigger words force a logical priority between the slots affixed to the antecedent and consequent operators. Nevertheless, without enumeration there is no temporal relationship possible between the events—only a potential logical priority. Instead, the compelling semantic features of these inner-events are verbal aspect and attitude (mood).

In line with this conclusion, a reasonable translation for Gal 3:29 can be rendered: "If you are of Christ, then you are Abraham's seed." All simple and complex propositional constructions can be interpreted using the same procedure. All statements are assigned implicature based on the following interpretive prerogative: (1) verbal aspect, (2) attitude, and (3) logical priority (if contextually relevant).⁵⁹

The Propositional Calculus for Simple and Complex Statements

The final step with logical structures (1) and (2) (simple and complex personal statements) is to formalize a list of their logical formulas by type. In the following sections, those lists are provided beginning with the calculus of functions used for simple personal statements (1).⁶⁰

59 As with the narrative viewpoint, the default implicature of the non-narrative viewpoint can be forcibly cancelled by refining deixis or another contextual necessity (see the full discussion below).

60 In order to preserve space, I have restricted the list of logical formulas to those found in the test samples analyzed in this study.

Category (1): Simple Personal Statement Types and Their Archetypal Propositional Function⁶¹

All simple personal statements are either: (a) personal claims/beliefs/judgments,⁶² (b) assertions/declarations, (c) believed and advanced fact(s), or (d) timeless and gnomic statements. An example characteristic of each statement type could include the following:

- a. Personal claims/beliefs/judgment: ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ (Gal 2:20).
- b. Assertion/declaration: φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ (Phil 2:15).
- c. Advancement of a believed fact: ὁ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο (Gal 1:7 referencing the gospel).
- d. Timeless statements of the type: ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν (1 John 4:8),⁶³ as well as the so-called gnomic, where the moments of applicability are habitual, that is, occurring at some scheduled or regular intervals.

All simple statements, regardless of type, are built upon the archetypal propositional function: $f(x)$.⁶⁴

Category (2): Complex Statements and Their Propositional Structures

The calculus of complex propositions connects atomized (simple) propositions using various logical operators (i.e., ‘and,’ ‘... if and only if...’ etc.). In actual discourse, it is not necessary to have the exact wording associated with the connective operator. What is necessary is a paraphrased equivalence for the operator. The various types of complex propositions include:

-
- 61 Propositional functions are a way to symbolize the relations of atomic propositions that do not include a propositional operator (trigger) (i.e., ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘if... then...’ etc.). For further details on the calculus of propositional functions see Reichenbach, *Elements*, 80.
 - 62 I employ slashes “/” between type sub-categories to acknowledge that some of the sub-category characteristics can undoubtedly overlap with other connected sub-categories.
 - 63 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 99. A timeless event is “seen to be outside of temporal considerations. For example, this usage is particularly frequent in the kinds of statements which occur in theology and mathematical propositions.” See Porter, *Idioms*, 33.
 - 64 All logic formulas are represented using universal variables. All logic symbols are listed in the Appendix.

Material bi-conditional ('... if and only if ...') is of the logical form: ' $a \equiv b$ '. The material bi-conditional is a "bilateral conditional." That is, an equivalence formula dictating that both sides of a conditional construction are simultaneously true. So, 'if and only if 'a' is true then 'b' is true'; and also the reverse must hold: 'if and only if 'b' is true then 'a' is true.'⁶⁵

Material conditional (if 'a' ... then 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \supset b$ ' (i.e., 'if 'a' is true, then 'b' is true').

Material conditional of logical necessity (if 'a' ... then [it follows necessarily that] 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \supset b$ '.⁶⁶

Material conditional of causal conditional (if 'a' ... then [necessarily as cause to effect] 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \supset b$ '.⁶⁷

Propositional Conjunction ('a' ... and ... 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \cdot b$ '.⁶⁸

Propositional Disjunction ('a' ... or ... 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \vee b$ '.⁶⁹

Subjunctive purpose relationship ('a' ... with the intention, direction, or purpose of [so that] 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \diamond b$ '.⁷⁰

Subjunctive result relationship ('a' ... with the result that 'b') is of the logical form ' $a \square b$ '.⁷¹

Test Samples and Corresponding Analysis

The first text specimen for consideration is Phil 2:12–18.⁷² The passage is analyzed in two sections: 2:12–16a and 2:16b–18. The first section contains only

65 "Material" in logical terminology signifies that "there is not necessarily any connexion of meaning between the antecedent and consequent." See Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:145.

66 In a logical conditional, "the connection claimed to hold between antecedent and consequent is one of premise to conclusion." See Gustason and Ulrich, *Elementary*, 47, 48.

67 In a causal conditional, "linking antecedent and consequent is one of cause to effect." See Gustason and Ulrich, *Elementary*, 48.

68 The typical function of a conjunctive operator is to conjoin two simple propositional units into a complex one (e.g., καί in Phil 2:18 below). But, it is also possible for a conjunctive operator to indicate a relationship of logical priority between two elements that it conjoins, i.e., _____ and (subsequently) _____. See Lyons, *Semantics*, 1:143, 44.

69 An inclusive disjunctive 'or' can indicate that either 'a' or 'b,' or both 'a' and 'b' are true. See Reichenbach, *Elements*, 23.

70 See Porter, *Idioms*, 232, 33.

71 See Porter, *Idioms*, 234, 35.

72 The chart titled "Philippians: 2:12–2:18" is designed to accompany the analysis. The chart includes trigger words, logical formulas, English translations, and other pertinent information not always detailed in the analysis section.

non-narrative inner-world events of type (1): simple propositional statements and (2): complex propositional constructions. Scholars such as P. O'Brien assert that the first section (2:12–16a) contains both exhortative material (2:12–13) and admonitions to encourage ideal Christian conduct (2:14–16).⁷³

The second section (2:16b–18) will be used to introduce the third (3) logical structure category: vivid episodic imagery or personal beliefs that are recounted as real events. This third type of logical structure includes figurative events, the metaphorical use of real-world event imagery by humans and orchestrated events (real or figurative) attributed to the Divine.

Philippians: 2:12–18

TABLE 3.2 *Philippians 2:12–18: Inner-world viewpoint*

Verse	Indicator(s) and/ or Trigger word(s)	Relevant Specimen	Logical Construction and formula	English Translation
2:12	πάντοτε ὑπηκούσατε	καθὼς πάντοτε ὑπηκούσατε	Category 1 (simple): belief formula: 'f(x)'	just as you always obey
2:12	κατεργάζεσθε	τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε	Assigned Relative implicature	Work out your salvation!
2:13	ἐστίν	θεὸς γὰρ ἐστίν ὁ ἐνεργῶν	Category 1 (simple): Advancement of facts formula: 'f(x, y)'	God is the one who works . . .
2:14	ἵνα γένησθε	Πάντα ποιεῖτε	Category 2 (complex): Imperative functioning as the protasis of a subjunctive intentional purpose construction	Do all things!

73 O'Brien considers Phil 2:12–18 to be a single text section. See O'Brien, *Philippians*, 271.

Verse	Indicator(s) and/ or trigger word(s)	Relevant specimen	Logical construction and formula	English translation
2:15		ἵνα γένησθε ἄμεμπτοι καὶ ἀκέραιοι	apodosis Two-part Subjunctive Formula: 'a \diamond b'	so that you might become blameless and pure
2:15	φαίνεσθε ὡς . . .	φαίνεσθε ὡς φωστῆρες ἐν κόσμῳ	Category 1 (simple): assertion 'f(x, y)'	you shine as lights
2:16a	λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες, εἰς	λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες, εἰς καύχημα ἐμοὶ εἰς ἡμέραν Χριστοῦ	Category 2 (complex): material conditional Formula (part 1): 'a \supset b'	(if) you hold fast to the word of life, then I shall boast in the day of Christ
2:16b	ὅτι οὐκ εἰς κενὸν ἔδραμον	ὅτι οὐκ εἰς κενὸν ἔδραμον	Contingent personal statement of belief (part 2a): (if 'part 1' is true, then) Belief formula: '¬f(x, y)'	<i>I did not run in vain</i>
2:16b	οὐδὲ εἰς κενὸν ἐκοπίασα	οὐδὲ εἰς κενὸν ἐκοπίασα	Contingent personal statement of belief (part 2b): Belief formula: '¬f(x, z)' Complete three-part formula: 'a \supset b' \supset '¬f(x, y)' \vee '¬f(x, z)'	<i>Not (did I) labor in vain</i>
2:17	Ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ	εἰ καὶ σπένδομαι ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ	Category 2 (complex): material conditional: logical necessity (part 1)	But, even if I am to be poured out as a drink offering and . . .
2:17	χαίρω καὶ συγχαίρω	χαίρω καὶ συγχαίρω πάσιν ὑμῖν	Part 2(a)	(then) I rejoice and rejoice with you all
2:18	τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καί	τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁμεῖς χαίρετε καὶ συγχαίρετε μοι	Part 2(b) Complete three-part formula: 'p \supset (r . s) . (s . r)'	and similarly you rejoice and rejoice with me!

Analysis and Explanation of Philippians 2:12–16a

Phil 2:12: The inner-world propositional statement of personal judgment/belief... *πάντοτε ὑπηκούσατε* includes refining temporal deixis and is therefore assigned default implicature accentuating (positionally) the temporal refinement. As stated above, imperatives, such as *κατεργάξασθε*, are assigned implicature relative to the context.

Phil 2:13: The copulative *ἐστίν* signals an inner-event. The atomic statement: *θεὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνεργῶν* can be easily understood as an advancement of believed facts, a forceful assertion, or a personal belief. With either option, the statement is a simple proposition and is assigned the corresponding present implicature.

Phil 2:14: The first complex formula of the subject passage is a subjunctive purpose construction. The trigger *ἵνα* typically signals (along with *γένησθε*) the subjunctive mood, and it is the mood that primarily governs the interpretation of all subjunctive complex constructions.⁷⁴

Phil 2:15: The words *φαίνεσθε ὡς* are indicators of an inner-event. The absence of a connective operator is a signal that *φαίνεσθε ὡς* is an atomic (comparative) assertion. As such, it is assigned the default present implicature.

Phil 2:16a: This passage contains a two-part complex formula. Part one is a material conditional in the logical form of ‘if... then...’ The antecedent of the formula is *λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες* and is assigned the present (default). The consequent begins with the trigger word *εἰς*. The metaphorical usage (resultive) of *εἰς* is well attested by scholars to indicate the intended result of action.⁷⁵ So, the compelling feature of the consequent is the formula’s contingent intention (signaled by *εἰς*), captured well with the word *shall*.

Vivid Episodic Imagery or Personal Beliefs Recounted as Real Events

Introduction to Logical Structure Category (3)

In order to complete the analysis of Phil 2:16, it is first necessary to introduce a third category of inner-events (logical structure category [3]). This category

⁷⁴ Since “time is (as many grammarians recognize) of no direct consequence in the non-Indicative Moods,” particular attention is given to expressing the attitude of non-indicative mood forms. Therefore, when non-indicative forms are included in a complex logical formula, the structural progression of the formula does not reflect logical time, but the particular attitude of the non-indicative verb-form. See Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 81.

⁷⁵ See Porter, *Idioms*, 153; see also C.F.D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 70.

is most accurately described as heterogeneous, because it contains both narrative and non-narrative features. Because its inner-events are not “strictly” observed, however, it is properly a non-narrative viewpoint.

Inner-world Events Treated as Past Real World Events

Certain inner-world events can be presented in a given non-narrative discourse as real events in past time. When this occurs, the occasion is a speaker/writer putting forward vivid episodic imagery using events (real or figurative) that are not observed, but that are treated as past real world events.⁷⁶ Correspondingly, the event takes the default implicature of a real past event, because the event is taken to hold in the speaker/writer’s absolute past (relative to the recounting activity).

Since the events are not observed, they are not subject to the laws of physics (causation or inertia) and thus do not follow the Tripartite Event Exchange Complex (above) for real events. Instead, they are restricted to event strings that are not causally directed. However, they are versatile: (a) they can form event strings that are topical or consequential, and (b) they can be integrated into logical structures (1) and (2).

Three types of inner-events are included in category (3): (a) figurative event imagery, (b) the metaphorical use of real event imagery, and (c) real or figurative events orchestrated by and attributed to the Divine that are not causally directed.⁷⁷ Rather, they are linked topically or consequentially to the speaker/writer’s topic of discourse.⁷⁸ With the addition of this third inner-world category (3), the inner-events in Phil 2:16b (part 2) can now be analyzed.

76 I include this category after concluding that the Greek New Testament speaker/writer places certain types of non-observed events to hold in the past of the recounting activity. Linguist R.H. Robins makes this same observation about Aristotle’s “logical concept of the proposition” in the Greek language (see Binnick, *Time*, 10, 11; Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 1.3.5). Aristotle’s notion was that a proposition of the type: “God created the world” can be asserted to hold as true at a certain time. In the case of this particular proposition it is the past (thus create-ed). Not specified by Robins, however, is that the assignment of “past” to an event assumes the particular event holds relative to the absolute present of the person recounting the proposition. Also missed by Robins (and a point confused by Aristotle, I suspect) is that this idiomatic usage is restricted to propositions that a speaker/writer treats as a real past event. Some examples of this category from the New Testament include: Rom 1:2, 5, and 6; and Jude 1:5 (ἀπώλεσεν), 6 (τετήρηκεν), and 7 (πρόκεινται). Other examples are included below.

77 See William Croft, *Verbs: Aspect and Causal Structure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 281; see also Smith, *Language*, 249.

78 Simply put, a Divine event consequence occurs when one event is described as a Divine consequence of (but not strictly speaking caused by) another event described in the string

Analysis and Explanation of Philippians 2:16b–18

Philippians 2:16b (part 2) contains two (atomic) metaphorical statements making use of real event imagery:

1. οὐκ εἰς κενὸν ἔδραμον
2. οὐδὲ εἰς κενὸν ἔκοπίασα.⁷⁹

The two atomic statements are combined into one complex propositional structure by combining the disjunctive and negative operators to form ‘¬’ (‘nor’). This complex proposition then can be reinserted into the larger contingent construction initiated at 2:16a dictating that ‘if and only if’ (represented by the material bi-conditional ‘↔’) the antecedent from part 1 is true (λόγον ζωῆς ἐπέχοντες in 2:16a), then and only then can Paul boast (εἰς καύχημα ἐμοί) and have confirmation that in his past labors οὐκ εἰς κενὸν ἔδραμον οὐδὲ εἰς κενὸν ἔκοπίασα. As Paul is depicting these two simple metaphorical statements (2:16b) as past events (relative to his absolute present of recounting), they are assigned an absolute pastness.”

Phil 2:17–18: The connective operators Ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ (‘but even if...’) are the trigger words introducing the antecedent of a three-part (contrastive) conditional formula. In the antecedent proposition, the passive verb-form (σπένδομαι) sets forth the contingent condition for the construction and is assigned present implicature. The consequent has one major conjunctive operator (and ‘&’) conjoining a set of complex conjunctive formulas:

1. χαίρω καὶ συγχαίρω πάνσιν ὑμῖν
2. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑμεῖς χαίρετε καὶ συγχαίρετέ μοι.

The whole construction provides a clear example of why there cannot be an assumed logical succession from antecedent to consequent that entails an interpretation of temporal succession from absolute present to an absolute future time. If a future time frame is applied to the two elements in “2” (συγχαίρω πάνσιν ὑμῖν and συγχαίρετέ μοι), it would cause this contingent consequent to be unattainable—even if the antecedent was satisfied. In other words, if Paul was “to be poured out” satisfying the antecedent, he will not in a future time be able to rejoice with them! This failure to fulfill the condition

(Divine or otherwise). Similar ideas are presented in Lascarides and Asher, “Temporal Interpretation,” 355.

79 As in Phil 2:16a, the two instances of εἰς in 2:16b are the preposition’s metaphorical extension. See Porter, *Idioms*, 152.

of the formula's consequent would render Paul's hypothetical conditional an unsound formula,⁸⁰ as the formula then has a true antecedent but an unattainable consequent—even when the antecedent is hypothetically true. This issue is rectified only if the entire consequent of the formula is in the absolute present (of the speaker/writer's axis of orientation). In that scenario, the antecedent of the formula can be hypothetically true and the consequent can be hypothetically true or false, but with either truth-value, the formula then has a sound logical structure.

Temporal Conclusions of Philippians 2:12–18

In the Philippians sample there were sixteen total inner-events. All were analyzed and assigned implicature in accordance with the guidelines set forth above for the non-narrative model. Those guidelines dictate that Greek temporal analysis should proceed in the following order: (1) verbal aspect, (2) attitude, and finally (3) logical priority (if contextually relevant).

All inner-events of this passage have been shown to emanate from the absolute present of the writer/speaker. This time, when expressed, can be modified or cancelled by refining temporal deixis (*πάντοτε* in 2:12) or certain types of syntactical structures (i.e. indirect discourse or temporally ordered participles etc.).⁸¹ In this test sample, there is no instance where the assigned implicature can be canceled by the context, confirming the analysis.

Acts 6:12–15

A much more decisive test comes with Acts 6:12–15, because the passage includes intertwining narrative and non-narrative sections. Moreover, some of the non-narrative sections contain the hybrid inner-events of logical structure (3) (metaphorical and figurative).

Analysis and Explanation of Acts 6:12–15

Acts 6:12–13a: The indicator for a narrative viewpoint is the initial clause of 6:12: *συνεκίνησάν τε τὸν λαόν*, because it clearly indicates an observed event. Accordingly, the Tripartite Event Exchange Complex (above) is employed to anchor the first event. The first event exchange point is established when they, which encompasses the group described as *τινες τῶν ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς τῆς*

80 An 'unsound' argument is either invalid or has a false premise. In this instance a posterior assignment of logical time would bring about a false premise. See Gustason and Ulrich, *Elementary*, 6.

81 For examples of indirect discourse see Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 82. For examples of temporally ordered participles see Porter, *Idioms*, 187–90.

λεγομένης Λιβερτίνων καὶ Κυρηναίων καὶ Ἀλεξανδρέων καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ Κιλικίας καὶ Ἀσίας from 6:9, “seized” Stephen (συνήρπασαν αὐτόν) in 6:12. At this exchange point, they could no longer be inciting (or stirring up) the crowd or ἐπιστάντες (“standing by”). Therefore, Direct Cause 1 is applied at συνήρπασαν αὐτόν and ἐπιστάντες in 6:12. At that point enumeration is possible, and the first event (συνεκίνησαν) can be assigned as anterior to the second event (ἐπιστάντες). Thus, it is necessarily after they incited the people that they stood by. Moreover, when they were in the act of seizing Stephen, they were no longer standing by (ἐπιστάντες).

The subsequent sequence of events, συνήρπασαν and ἤγαγον, follow this same pattern using Direct Cause 1. When the false witnesses do begin speaking to the council, the arranging (ἔστησαν) of the false witnesses is an activity that has ceased. Thus, the false witnesses upon λέγοντας are the agents that effectuate Direct Cause 2 and end ἔστησάν τε μάρτυρας ψευδεῖς in 6:13. Since all the remaining events fit within the Exchange Complex of the narrative model, they are all assigned the default implicature.

TABLE 3.3 Acts 6:12–13a: Narrative viewpoint

Verse	Indicator(s) and/or trigger word(s)	Relevant specimen	Event(s) terminated by	English translation
6:12	συνεκίνησάν τε τὸν λαόν	συνεκίνησάν τε τὸν λαὸν καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ	συνήρπασαν	(and) so they incited the people and . . .
6:12	ἐπιστάντες	ἐπιστάντες	συνήρπασαν	Those who stood by
6:12	συνήρπασαν	συνήρπασαν αὐτόν	ἤγαγον	(they) seized him
6:12	ἤγαγον	καὶ ἤγαγον εἰς τὸ συνέδριον	ἔστησάν τε	(they) led (him) into the Sanhedrin
6:13	ἔστησάν	ἔστησάν τε μάρτυρας ψευδεῖς	λέγοντας (circumstantial relation, see n. 36 above)	(and) they arranged false witnesses
6:13	λέγοντας	λέγοντας		who said

TABLE 3.4 Acts 6:13b–14: Inner-world viewpoint

Verse	Indicator(s) and/ or trigger word(s)	Relevant specimen	Logical construction and formula	English translation
6:13	μάρτυρας ψευδεῖς λέγοντας	ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος οὐ παύεται λαλῶν ῥήματα κατὰ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἁγίου [τούτου]	Category ‘(1)’ (simple): advancement of facts formula: ‘¬ f(x, y)’	This man does not cease speaking words against this holy place ...
6:14a	ἀκηκόαμεν γάρ	ἀκηκόαμεν γάρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος	Category ‘(3)’: Personal statement using figurative imagery (past implicature)	for <i>we heard</i> him say
6:14b	ὅτι... καταλύσει	Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος οὗτος καταλύσει τὸν τόπον τοῦτον	Category ‘(2)’ (complex): advancement of facts (conjunctive operator) Part 1: ‘a’	that this Jesus of Nazareth shall destroy this place
6:14b	καὶ ἀλλάξει	καὶ ἀλλάξει τὰ ἔθνη	Part 2: ‘b’ Complete two-part formula: ‘a . b’	and (shall) change the customs
6:14c	ἃ παρέδωκεν... Μωϋσῆς	ἃ παρέδωκεν ἡμῖν Μωϋσῆς	Category ‘(3)’: Personal statement using metaphorical event imagery (past implicature)	Which <i>Moses</i> <i>delivered</i> to us

TABLE 3.5 Acts 6:15a–b: Narrative viewpoint

Verse	Indicator(s) and/or trigger word(s)	Relevant specimen	Event(s) terminated by	English translation
6:15a	ἀτενίσαντες	ἀτενίσαντες εἰς αὐτόν	(See n. 26)	(while) gazing at him
6:15b	οἱ καθεζόμενοι	οἱ καθεζόμενοι ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ	(See n. 26)	Those who were seated in the Sanhedrin

TABLE 3.6 Acts 6:15c: Inner-world viewpoint

Verse	Indicator(s) and/ or trigger word(s)	Relevant specimen	Logical construction and formula	English translation
6:15c	ώσεί	εἶδον τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ πρόσωπον ἀγγέλου	Category '(3)': Personal statement using metaphorical event imagery (simple past implicature)	<i>saw his face</i> as the face of an angel.

Acts 6:13b–14a: In 6:13a, when the μάρτυρας ψευδεῖς λέγοντας, the event was observed. However the content of their speech consists of inner-events, as according to the narrator their report was ψευδεῖς. Therefore, in 6:13b the witnesses begin to advance a series of statements containing contrived facts. The first of these begins with: ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος οὐ πᾶνεται λαλῶν. . . . In this atomic propositional statement, λαλῶν functions as a complement for the finite verb πᾶνεται. Since it is a simple propositional statement, it is assigned present implicature. Also constructed as one proposition is 6:14a: ἀκηκόαμεν γὰρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος. However, here the speaker is clearly employing vivid (episodic) figurative imagery using an event that was not observed (as it is still part of the false testimony), yet is treated as a past real world event.⁸² Accordingly, past implicature is assigned.

In 6:14b, a conjunctive operator (καί) connects two simple propositions advancing facts:

1. Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος οὗτος καταλύσει τὸν τόπον τοῦτον
2. ἀλλάξει τὰ ἔθνη

82 See the discussion in the section (above) titled “Vivid Episodic Imagery or Personal Beliefs Recounted as Real Events.”

Both inner-events have future forms, so both are marked with implicature indicating certainty (shall). With their final statement (6:14c), the speakers put forward a particularly vivid metaphor from the past (*παρέδωκεν ἡμῖν Μωϋσῆς*) intended to create a poignant image for those in attendance. As such, it is a category (3) inner-event requiring a 'past' assignment.

Acts 6:15: The writer lists observed events in 6:15a–b: *ἀτενίσαντες* and *οἱ θαυεζόμενοι*. As such, these narrative viewpoint participle forms are treated in accordance with their use in the surrounding context. In 6:15c the writer sets forth a propositional statement of belief (*εἶδον τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ πρόσωπον ἀγγέλου*) triggered by the comparison (*ὡσεὶ*) of Stephen's face to the face of an angel. The way in which the attendees saw Stephen's face is not an observed event. Rather, it is another vivid metaphor in this passage selection using events that are not observed, yet treating them as past real world events. Therefore, past implicature is assigned to the verb-form as with the previous instances.

Temporal Conclusions of Acts 6:12–15

The Acts test passage contains sixteen events distributed between both narrative and non-narrative units. Inclusion of this passage evidences the ability of the model to assign temporal reference in accordance with the stipulations outlined for both viewpoints. In each instance the guidelines were followed and in no instance can the assignment be canceled by the context.

Summary

This study has offered a two-part discourse temporality model for the Greek New Testament. The first part is a narrative viewpoint, containing only observed events that adhere to the law of inertia (causation). The second is the non-narrative viewpoint which contains only inner-world events. Although more extensive testing is necessary, the RTO model has achieved successful results with limited samples from both viewpoints and has shown the capability to transition from one viewpoint to the other without model failure. Moreover, the model has evidenced a viable means of temporal integration with Porter's existing verbal aspect framework.

For the RTO model to be considered an alternative to existing Greek New Testament temporal frameworks (relative or morphologically based absolute time), it will need to be tested in much larger text sections, and across a wider selection of authors. This will be the goal of future work.

Appendix

Logic Symbols Used in the Essay

Truth functional negation: \neg

Truth Functional implication: \supset

Truth Functional disjunction: \vee

Truth Functional conjunction: \cdot

Special Notations Used in the Essay

italics = orientating or reorientation deixis

boldface = non-finite verb form

bold italics = personal statement using real event imagery

SMALL CAPS = refining deixis

PART 2

Modeling the Languages of the Hebrew Bible



Evaluation Theory and the Ideology of Judges 6

Mary L. Conway

Introduction

Since Hebrew narrative is so reticent, it is often difficult to determine the attitude of the implied author towards his or her characters and their actions. The study of evaluation, or appraisal, as it is often known, is proving useful in regard to this challenge. As Sarangi points out:

The view that language functions at both descriptive and evaluative levels is a long-standing one. Different scholars have captured these functions under different categories—which can roughly be labeled *informational* and *affective*—and have debated their inter-relationship. It makes sense to see these functions not as two separate entities but as intricately intertwined along a communication continuum, very much like a double helix.¹

Appraisal involves such issues as authorial stance, expression of affect, and judgments made in the text of people and behaviours. In exegetical terms, it is important to understand which words and deeds are considered ethical and which are condemned, which characters are role models and which are censured.² One such situation is in the book of Judges and involves Gideon's use of signs to determine YHWH's will. The Gideon episode in Judges 6 is used here as a test case for adapting appraisal theory for Hebrew; this article

1 Srikant Sarangi, "Evaluating Evaluative Language," *Text* 23 (2003): 166.

2 Geoff Thompson and Susan Hunston, "Evaluation: An Introduction," in *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse* (ed. Susan Hunston and Geoff Thompson; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6, give three general reasons why evaluation is important: "1. to express the speaker's or writer's opinion, and in doing so to reflect the value system of that person and their community; 2. to conduct and maintain relations between the speaker or writer and hearer or reader; 3. to organize the discourse."

constitutes an initial foray into the application of appraisal to Hebrew narrative in order to evaluate its usefulness.³

Hebrew narrative is multi-perspectival; evaluations are sometimes given by a narrator who directly addresses the audience, and sometimes expressed through the dialogue of various characters, including YHWH himself.⁴ It is generally accepted that in the biblical texts the narrator is reliable and omniscient, accurately reporting events and dialogue and developing characters.⁵ The book of Judges is deeply interested in what is right or wrong in the eyes of YHWH as opposed to what is good in the eyes of humanity.⁶ As Younger notes,

Canonically, the Law (esp. as expressed in Deuteronomy) serves as the filter for evaluating the actions of the individuals within the stories. While it is easy to fall into the trap of moralizing these stories, it is also easy to underestimate their didactic value, for they are not mere chronicles.⁷

However, even if the narrator's direct commentary and his representation of events and dialogue can be trusted, it is not always clear just what these speeches or situations imply about the appropriateness of various actions or the uprightness of various characters. Consequently, many exegetes have relied on their own moral instinct to decide these questions, so that such judgments are slanted by the exegete's own religious and cultural upbringing. Consideration of the original historical-social context is absolutely necessary, but even this does not help to decide every case. Literary criticism has made some progress in using characteristics of the text itself to search for clues, but its methodology is often based on moral and aesthetic opinions or impressions

3 This article represents an early attempt to apply appraisal to Hebrew narrative. For a modified and more fully developed methodology that has been applied to all of the major judges, see Mary L. Conway, "The 'New Perspective' on Appraisal: Evaluation in the Book of Judges as Revealed by the Narrative Appraisal Model" (PhD diss., McMaster Divinity College, 2013), which is forthcoming in 2016 in Eisenbrauns' LSAWS series, tentatively titled *Judging the Judges: A Test Case in Narrative Appraisal*.

4 W. Randolph Tate, *Biblical Interpretation: An Integrated Approach* (rev. ed.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1997), 95.

5 Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 157–58; Tate, *Biblical Interpretation*, 87–88, 94–96. Note that this study is not an attempt to establish authorial intent, or to argue any particular view of authorship/redaction. It is concerned with the voice of the text, represented in narrative by the narrator.

6 See Judg 2:11; 3:7, 12 (x2); 4:1; 6:1; 10:6, 15; 13:1; cf. Judg 14:3, 7; 17:6; 21:25.

7 K. Lawson Younger, *Judges and Ruth* (The NIV Application Commentary; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002), 124.

rather than data, and differing critics offer differing judgments based on their own interpretive lenses.⁸ In recent years, however, linguists have begun to look for indications of evaluative stance in the vocabulary and grammar of the text itself.⁹ Work has been done in English that considers the role of syntax, lexis, and ideational content in contributing to an understanding of evaluation in text.¹⁰

In order to access the ideology of the text, Martin and White's Evaluation/Appraisal Theory, which has been designed for use in English, will be adapted and applied to the Hebrew text of Judges 6, an excerpt from the Gideon narrative.¹¹ As Thompson and Hunston explain:

Ideologies do not exist in silence, but neither are they usually expressed overtly. They are built up and transmitted through texts, and it is in texts that their nature is revealed. . . . Because ideologies are essentially sets of

8 For example, Mieke Bal's feminist agenda has a significant impact on her interpretation of the narratives in Judges in Mieke Bal, *Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics of Coherence in the Book of Judges* (Chicago Studies in the History of Judaism; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

9 Ruth E. Page, "An Analysis of Appraisal in Childbirth Narratives with Special Consideration of Gender and Storytelling Style," *Text* 23 (2003): 213; "[T]he subsystems identified in APPRAISAL analysis are less concerned with structural features and instead emphasize semantic criteria. This is helpful as a move towards examining a different dimension in the construction of a speaker's opinion, but given the levels of subjectivity involved, the categorization is rather less determinate and cannot be carried out without close attention to contextual factors."

10 For example, J.R. Martin and P.R.R. White, *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Mary Macken-Horarik, "Appraisal and the Special Instructiveness of Narrative," *Text* 23.2 (2003): 285–312; Susan Hunston and Geoffrey Thompson, eds., *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*; P.R.R. White, "Beyond Modality and Hedging: A Dialogic View of the Language of Intersubjective Stance," *Text* 23.2 (2003): 259–84; P.R.R. White, "Evaluative Semantics and Ideological Positioning in Journalistic Discourse: A New Framework for Analysis," in *Mediating Ideology in Text and Image: Ten Critical Studies* (ed. Inger Lassen et al.; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2006); J.R. Martin and David Rose, *Working with Discourse: Meaning Beyond the Clause* (2nd ed.; New York: Continuum, 2007).

11 The terms "evaluation theory" and "appraisal theory" tend to be used interchangeably. The term "attitudinal stance" is also sometimes used. There is also some overlap here with "point of view" in literary analysis. Thompson and Hunston prefer the term "evaluation" since it expresses a "user orientation" and "allows us to talk about the values ascribed to the entities and propositions which are evaluated" (Thompson and Hunston, "Evaluation," 5).

values—what counts as good or bad, what should or should not happen, what counts as true or untrue—evaluation is a key linguistic concept in their study.¹²

Rather than intuitively deriving the ideology of Judges 6, the appraisal model will provide linguistic evidence that, when used in conjunction with literary, social, and historical analysis of the text, will provide a more robust basis for drawing exegetical conclusions.

Theoretical Linguistic Context

SFL: Halliday

Many linguists who study appraisal theory take a “broadly functional approach” and their work is based on the systemic functional linguistics of Halliday.¹³ Although space precludes an extensive overview of SFL, those aspects which are relevant to evaluation will be briefly discussed. Halliday gives a great deal of attention to modality (modalization and modulation) but significantly less to considerations of attitudinal meaning, although he does include them in his discussion of the interpersonal metafunction. According to Painter:

Within systemic-functional linguistics (SFL), the idea that a speaker always adopts a position in relation to the addressee and a stance in relation to what is said is a longstanding and fundamental one, modeled in terms of an ‘interpersonal’ linguistic resource that is always in play when the parallel ‘ideational’ one construes meaning.¹⁴

Martin and White focus on interpersonal meaning in written discourse.¹⁵ The following diagram is a generalized representation of their view of the system of functional grammar:¹⁶

¹² Thompson and Hunston, “Evaluation,” 8.

¹³ Thompson and Hunston, “Evaluation,” 2.

¹⁴ Clare Painter, “Developing Attitude: An Ontogenetic Perspective on Appraisal,” *Text* 23.2 (2003): 184.

¹⁵ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 7. Martin and White view the structure of context and register within the model somewhat differently than Halliday and Matthiessen. See below.

¹⁶ Based on M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (3rd ed.; rev. and ed. Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; London: Arnold, 2004), 25 (see also 30); Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 32.




FIGURE 4.1 *Register recontextualized by genre.*

Interpersonal meaning is realized in different ways and at different levels of abstraction. In written text this moves from graphology to lexicogrammar (the level of words and structures), to discourse semantics (the level of meaning beyond the clause). Martin and White emphasize that each subsequent level is not “made up” of elements of the previous level, but “realized” through them at a more abstract level of organization.¹⁷ They place evaluation within discourse semantics for three reasons: (1) “the realization of an attitude tends to splash across a phase of discourse, irrespective of grammatical boundaries,” (2) an attitude “can be realized across a range of grammatical categories,” and (3) it involves grammatical metaphor, which involves “tension between wording and meaning.”¹⁸

Halliday’s level, “context,” is subdivided by Martin and White into two levels: “register,” which consists of patterns of discourse patterns, and “genre,” “a system comprising configurations of field, mode and tenor selections which unfold in recurring stages of discourse—a pattern of register patterns.”¹⁹ Field refers to what is happening in context, “the activity and domain of experience.”²⁰ Mode “is concerned with the role played by language in the

¹⁷ Martin and White. *Language of Evaluation*, 9.

¹⁸ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 11.

¹⁹ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 27, 32.

²⁰ Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen et al., *Key Terms in Systemic Functional Linguistics* (Key Terms Series; London: Continuum, 2010), 95.




FIGURE 4.2 *Appraisal system network.*

context in which it operates.”²¹ Tenor is “the role relationships entered into by the interactants taking part in a given context.”²² These include institutional roles, power, familiarity, speech role, valuation (“the assignment of positive and negative value loadings to different aspects of field”), and affect (“the role adopted by the interactants in terms of emotional charge”).²³ According to Martin and White, appraisal is located “in discourse semantics as a pattern of lexicogrammatical patterns construing evaluation.”²⁴ In recent years, evaluation theory, as a subset of systemic functional linguistics, has received increased attention in the literature.

21 Matthiessen et al., *Key Terms*, 144.
22 Matthiessen et al., *Key Terms*, 217.
23 Matthiessen et al., *Key Terms*, 217.
24 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 32.

Evaluation and Appraisal: System Diagrams

The Appraisal network is represented in diagrammatic form,²⁵ so that the relationships of the component parts are evident. Multidimensionality is indicated by brace brackets and indicates a logical 'and'. Choices are represented by curved brackets and indicate a logical 'or'.²⁶ Those parts of the model that have limited application to the Hebrew text have been set in boldface. APPRECIATION will not be discussed here since virtually all evaluation in Judges is of people rather than things. The other items will not be utilized here because there is not enough detail in the terse Hebrew narrative to identify or distinguish them with any confidence.

Evaluation Theory

The Model and Its Adaptation to Hebrew

Direct Textual Realization

All of the manifestations of APPRAISAL may be realized in the text in a variety of lexicogrammatical ways. Martin and White comment: "Because we are developing **attitude** as a discourse semantic system, we can expect its realizations to diversify across a range of grammatical structures."²⁷ Hebrew narrative is notoriously terse, does not encode most nuances of modality in the verb itself, and has very few adjectives and adverbs. These factors make the identification of realizations of evaluation in Hebrew a challenge. Nevertheless, Hebrew offers a variety of ways for expressing evaluative language, as the following categories and examples demonstrate.²⁸

25 A few modifications to Martin and White's model have been made, including the incorporation of the realis/irrealis and congruent/ironic choices.

26 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 14.

27 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 45.

28 See Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 45–46. Those realizations that do not apply to Hebrew are omitted. Realizations of evaluative language that are not suggested by Martin and White but seem applicable to Hebrew are marked by an asterisk (*). Thompson and Hunston also identify three general areas which contain evaluative information—lexis, grammar, and text—and survey the literature for suggested realizations within these categories. Their conclusions overlap Martin and White, but do offer distinctive suggestions, some of which have been included below (Thompson and Hunston, "Evaluation," 14–22).

Modification of Participants and Processes

The Hebrew language contains very few adjectives as modifiers for participants. For example, Hebrew narrative seldom describes participants as “evil” (for example, “the evil Samson”) and avoids modifying actual persons or groups as inherently “being evil” (that is, evil is not predicated of people as in “Samson was evil”). It does, however, frequently condemn them for “doing the evil thing.” By implication, those who do evil things may be evaluated as evil themselves. However, other forms of modification are available, such as construct chains, apposition, prepositional phrases, stative verbs, and relative clauses.

Examples:

וְעָתָה אִם־בְּאֵמֶת וּבִתְמִיּוּם עָשִׂיתֶם (Judg 9:16)

If you have acted with truth and integrity... (although modifying the action, this by implication also modifies the people who act)

וַיִּשְׁכֹּר בָּהֶם אֲבִימֶלֶךְ אֲנָשִׁים רִיקִים וּפְחָזִים (Judg 9:4)

And he hired with it worthless and reckless fellows. (direct modification)

Although Hebrew is adverb poor, Waltke and O'Connor also point out various ways of modifying processes: adverbial accusatives (nouns modifying verbs), infinitive constructs, infinitive absolutes, particles, prepositional phrases, subordinate clauses, and, of course, adverbs, including interrogative adverbs.²⁹ In functional terms, many of these would be classified as “modifiers” or “adjuncts.”

Examples:

וַיֹּאמֶר יִפְתָּח אֲלֵיהֶם אִישׁ רִיב הָיִיתִי אֲנִי וְעַמִּי וּבְנֵי־עַמּוֹן מְאֹד (Judg 12:2)

Jephthah said to them, “I and my people were at great strife with the sons of Ammon.”

וַתִּזְעַק בְּקוֹל גָּדוֹל (1 Sam 28:12)

She cried with a loud voice.

וַתֹּאמֶר הִלְךְ אֵלַי עִמָּךְ (Judg 4:9)

She said, “I will surely go with you.”

29 Bruce K. Waltke and Michael Patrick O'Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 74–75.

Affective Mental and Behavioural Processes

Mental processes that realize AFFECT are verbs such as שמח ("to rejoice") and ירא ("to fear"). Affective behavioural processes are expressed in verbs such as בכה ("to weep").

Examples:

וַיִּיטֵב לֵב הַכֹּהֵן (Judg 18:20)

The priest's heart became glad. (mental)

וַיִּזְעֻקוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־יְהוָה (Judg 10:10)

Then the sons of Israel cried out to YHWH. (behavioural)

**Conditional "if... then..." Statements*

"If... then..." statements are a method of inscribing doubt or lack of commitment to an evaluative statement. According to Perkins, in some statements "there is no indication as to whether the condition is (or will be) fulfilled or not, whereas in [others] it is implied that the condition is not fulfilled."³⁰ These are of some interest in the book of Judges since it is not uncommon for people to ask for confirmation of uncertainty by using "if... then..." statements to request a miraculous sign confirming a proposed or irreal situation or evaluation. Thus, they are of significance in evaluation that involves AFFECT: (IN)SECURITY as well as JUDGMENT: tenacity.³¹ In fact, Perkins calls "if" a "modal particle."³²

Example:

אִם טֹל יְהִיָּה עַל־הַגִּזְזָה לְבִדָּה וְעַל־כָּל־הָאָרֶץ חָרֵב וַיֵּדַעְתִּי כִּי־תוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל
כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ (Judg 6:37)

If there is dew on the fleece only, and it is dry on all the ground, then I will know that you will deliver Israel through me, as You have spoken.

30 Michael R. Perkins, *Modal Expressions in English* (Open Linguistics Series; London: Francis Pinter, 1983), 111.

31 Note that (IN)SECURITY is in small capitals since it is the basis of a further subsystem, but tenacity is in lower case because it is not.

32 Perkins, *Modal Expressions*, 111.

Grammatical Metaphors

The particular use of grammatical metaphor included here is the “nominalised realization of qualities (joy, sadness, sorrow) and processes (grief, sobs).”³³ In Hebrew this includes such lexis as עָנִי (“misery”), אֲשֵׁרִי (“happiness”), and בְּכוֹת (“weeping”).

Example:

לֹא־עֲבַדְתָּ אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּשִׂמְחָה וּבְטוֹב לֵבָב (Deut 28:47)
You did not serve YHWH your God with joy and a good heart.

Rhetorical Questions

Questions of the rhetorical kind are not asked to elicit information, but for their impact or effect. Thus, they can be useful in encoding evaluation. In the example in Judg 2:2 below, God is well aware of what the Israelites have done, but his rhetorical question expresses both AFFECT (displeasure) and JUDGMENT (sanction).

Examples:

וְלֹא־שָׁמַעְתֶּם בְּקוֹלִי מִהֲיוֹאתִי עֹשִׂיתֶם (Judg 2:2)
“But you have not listened to my voice. What is this you have done?”

וַיֹּאמֶר גַּעַל בֶּן־עֶבֶד מִי־אַבִּימֶלֶךְ וּמִי־שֶׁכֶם כִּי נַעֲבֹדֵנוּ (Judg 9:28)
Then Gaal the son of Ebed said, “Who is Abimelech, and who is Shechem, that we should serve him?”

Lexical Metaphor

Lexical metaphors include tropes such as metaphors and similes that “represent a recoupling of a congruent realization involving semantic junction.”³⁴ They are relatively rare in narrative prose but appear more frequently in poetry.

Example:

וְאֵהָבָיו כִּי־עָאֵת הַשָּׁמֶשׁ בִּגְבוּרָתוֹ (Judg 5:31)
Let those who love him be like the rising of the sun in its might.

³³ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 46.

³⁴ Matthiessen et al., *Key Terms*, 138.

יָבֹאוּ כְּדִי אֲרֵבָה לָרֹב (Judg 6:5)

They would come in like locusts for number

**Semi-fixed Expressions*

A semi-fixed expression is a term used by Channell in her analysis of evaluative language.³⁵ It is used in this study as an idiom or set phrase which is used repeatedly and acts more or less as an evaluative lexical unit. Thus, “they forsook YHWH” (וַיַּעֲזֹבוּ אֶת־יְהוָה) is used five times in Judges alone (2:12, 13; 10:6, 10, 13) and carries with it a negative evaluation of the subjects of the phrase.

Examples:

וַיִּחַר־אַף יְהוָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל (Judg 2:14, 20; 3:8; 6:39; 10:7)

The anger of the Lord burned against Israel.

וַיַּעֲבֹדוּ אֶת־הַבַּעַלִּים וְאֶת־הָעֲשֵׁרֹת (Judg 2:11, 13; 3:7; 10:6, 10)

They served the Baals and the Asheroth.

**Negatives*

According to Labov, negatives are not an inherent part of narrative, since narrative describes what happens, and negatives are what does not happen. Therefore negatives “provide a way of evaluating events by placing them against the background of other events which might have happened.”³⁶ They thus may expand the dialogic space to include alternatives, and may raise the force of an evaluation by contrasting it with its opposite.³⁷ These negatives

35 Joanna Channell, “Corpus Based Analysis of Evaluative Lexis,” in *Evaluation in Text*, 39: “The focus is on [the evaluative] function where it is carried by individual lexical items, or by semi-fixed expressions, rather than on examples where the function is carried by whole sentences or stretches of text.”

36 William Labov, *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), 381. Labov identifies four types of evaluation in narrative: intensifiers, comparators, correlatives, and explications (pp. 380–87). He classifies negatives as a type of “comparator.”

37 The role of negatives in raising the force of an evaluation must be assessed with caution, however, since their impact is inconsistent even in English, with which we are much more familiar. For example, consider: They sinned/transgressed < > They did not obey me; She forgot < > She did not remember; He was evil < > He was not good; They were weak < > They had no power. The effect seems to raise the evaluative force of verbs but lower it for modifiers.

may carry the evaluative function alone or in conjunction with other elements: the first example below is also a rhetorical question.

Examples:

הֲלֹא שְׁלַחְתִּיךָ (Judg 6:14)

Have I **not** sent you?

וְלֹא־עָשׂוּ חֶסֶד עִם־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל (Judg 8:35)

They did **not** show loyalty to the sons of Israel...

All of the textual realizations given above can be used to express many different types of evaluation, both AFFECT and JUDGMENT, as will be explained further below.

Indirect Realization

All of the above techniques are methods in which evaluation is “directly inscribed in discourse through the use of attitudinal lexis.”³⁸ This is not always the case, however. Martin and White argue that, even where specific evaluative language is not used, ideational elements can be intentionally included which carry their own implicit attitudinal loads; thus, they “invoke” attitudes.³⁹ The audience is then able to infer from these the stance of the author. In response to accusations of subjectivity, Martin and White respond: “[A]voiding invoked evaluation of this kind amounts to a suggestion that ideational meaning is selected without regard to the attitudes it engenders—a position we find untenable.”⁴⁰ They remind us that this kind of subjectivity is not individual but social, a product of communities of interpretation contemporaneous with the text, and thus avoids a merely idiosyncratic reading. Invocation, more so than inscription, is dependent on its co-text and context, and interpreters must immerse themselves in Israelite culture and Hebrew language in order to assess evaluations as accurately as possible.⁴¹

Although Martin and White do not formally define the term “token” in their monograph, this is the word that they use to identify ideational content that

³⁸ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 61.

³⁹ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 62–63.

⁴⁰ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 62.

⁴¹ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 66.

evokes or provokes an evaluation or attitudinal response.⁴² On their website, however, they go into more detail:

The picture is complicated, however, by the possibility that the JUDGEMENT assessment may be more indirectly evoked or implied—rather than explicitly inscribed—by what can be termed ‘tokens’ of JUDGEMENT. Under such tokens, JUDGEMENT values are triggered by superficially neutral, ideational meanings which nevertheless have the capacity in the culture to evoke judgemental responses (depending upon the reader’s social/cultural/ ideological reader position).⁴³

One example given by Martin and White is taken from Proulx’s novel, *The Shipping News*. Partridge evaluates Quoye’s newspaper article with, among others, the expression: “No quotes.”⁴⁴ In and of itself this could be considered a neutral comment. However, in the context of contemporary newspaper copy writing, an article without quotations or a television news story without “sound bites” is understood to be a disaster. In the charts summarizing the evaluative content of texts, they use the symbol “t” to indicate a token, or implied evaluation (e.g., “t, –capacity”).⁴⁵ According to the authors, their function is to extend the prosodies “inscribed by the explicitly evaluative items.”⁴⁶

Of course, no evaluative token is independent of the textual and social context. For example, in Judges the clause complex “There was no king in Israel; all the people did what was right in their own eyes” occurs twice (17:6; 21:25). Taken in isolation, especially in a contemporary democratic society, these passages might well evoke a positive evaluative response, since it seems that everyone followed their conscience and tried to do what was right. In the original context, however, they most likely evoked a negative evaluative response, in spite of the “did what was right” language. Doing “right in their own eyes” is negative if it is contrasted to walking obediently in the commandments of YHWH, doing right in *his* eyes.

42 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 64. See also pp. 61–68.

43 P.R.R. White, “Appraisal Outline,” <http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/AppraisalOutline/AppraisalOutlineWPFiles.html>.

44 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 70, in conjunction with the evaluation chart on p. 75.

45 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 75.

46 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 76.

Ironic Realization

One aspect of realization that is only touched on by Martin and White is the idea of ironic evaluation.⁴⁷ This does not focus only on the basic idea of sarcasm (e.g., saying “Telling her you couldn’t go in to work because you were sick was really honest!” to a friend who is actually going to play golf), but also on what I call “levels of evaluation,” a type of dramatic irony in which the reader has a broader perspective than the immediate evaluative statement and recognizes that the evaluation would be different if viewed from different points of view. An example of this would be the Moabite oppression of Israel in the time of Ehud. Whereas oppression is unethical from the perspective of the Israelites (–**propriety**), it is ethical when the reader considers that actually YHWH is using the Moabites to discipline Israel for their sin (+**propriety**).

Prosody

Evaluative language does not always occur in discrete instances scattered through a text. Rather, these manifestations tend to overlap, accumulate, and expand as the discourse progresses; they can “spread out and colour a phase of discourse as speakers and writers take up a stance.”⁴⁸ Martin and White base their use of prosody on Halliday’s description of interpersonal meaning. Halliday states:

[T]his interpersonal meaning... is strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring... [T]he effect is cumulative; with each one the speaker reaffirms his own angle on the proposition... [W]e shall refer to this type of realisation as ‘prosodic’, since the meaning is distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse.⁴⁹

Since evaluation is a component of the interpersonal metafunction, it is logical that it is expressed in this way. Elsewhere Halliday expands on this idea:

⁴⁷ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 221.

⁴⁸ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 43.

⁴⁹ M.A.K. Halliday, “Modes of Meaning and Modes of Expression: Types of Grammatical Structure and Their Determination by Different Semantic Functions,” in his *On Grammar* (ed. Jonathan Webster; Collected Works of M.A.K. Halliday 1; London: Continuum, 2002), 205.

The speaker's attitudes and assessments, his judgements of validity and probability; his choice of speech function, the mode of exchange in dialogue—such things are not discrete elements that belong at some particular juncture but semantic features that inform continuous stretches of discourse. It is natural that they should be realized not segmentally but prosodically.⁵⁰

Thus, as Macken-Horarik concludes, "The coupling of so-called neutral messages with heavily appraised ones puts the less attitudinal ones into an evaluative schema if only because of the 'company these words keep'."⁵¹ This has the effect of raising the reliability of interpretation of more neutral evaluations.⁵²

There are three types of prosodic realization outlined by Martin and White: "saturation," "intensification," and "domination."⁵³ Saturation occurs where the prosody manifests itself opportunistically in various forms wherever it can in the clause or discourse. Intensification is the amplification of prosody through repetition, sub-modification, exclamation, or use of superlatives in order that it may have a greater impact. Finally, domination occurs when the prosody is distributed over connected parts of the discourse. As Martin and White explain: "With this kind of Prosodic realisation then, although the relevant interpersonal meanings may be realized locally . . . they colour a longer stretch of discourse by dominating meanings in their domain."⁵⁴

50 M.A.K. Halliday, "Text Semantics and Clause Grammar: How Is a Text Like a Clause?" in *On Grammar*, 239.

51 Mary Macken-Horarik, "Envoi: Intractable Issues in Appraisal Analysis?" *Text* 23.2 (2003): 314.

52 Compare the concept of prosody with Battistella's idea of "markedness assimilation" and Longacre's idea of "peak" or "zone of turbulence." See Edwin L. Battistella, *Markedness: The Evaluative Superstructure of Language* (SUNY Series in Linguistics; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 69–70; Robert E. Longacre, *Joseph: A Story of Divine Providence: A Text Theoretical and Textlinguistic Analysis of Genesis 37 and 39–48* (2nd ed.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003), 18.

53 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 20–21.

54 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 21.

Components of the Model

The ATTITUDE System

In this study we will consider the two components of ATTITUDE that are most significant to Judges 6: AFFECT and JUDGMENT.⁵⁵

AFFECT

Martin and White define AFFECT (traditionally called “emotion”) as “concerned with registering positive and negative feelings.”⁵⁶ The feelings of people in Judges—and especially of YHWH—are very relevant to determining the acceptability of behaviours, since inappropriate behaviours often cause negative feelings in those who observe or are affected by them, just as appropriate behaviours result in positive feelings.

AFFECT may be expressed in the text as a “quality” which describes a participant (“an evil servant”), which is attributed to a participant (“the king was angry”), or which illustrates the manner of processes (“the woman went sorrowfully”). It may be expressed as a “process,” either mental (“their sins angered him”) or behavioural (“the old man wept”). AFFECT may also be included as a “comment” on a situation (“sadly, the child died”).⁵⁷ It should be noted, however, that most of these realizations are much less common in Hebrew than in English. Wherever possible, examples have been taken from the book of Judges, but occasionally, where these are unavailable, examples have been drawn from other narrative texts in the Hebrew Bible.

UN/HAPPINESS

UN/HAPPINESS not only “involves the moods of feeling happy or sad,” but also whether these feelings involve a general undirected mood or are expressed in surges of behaviour, and whether they are directed “at a Trigger by liking or disliking it.”⁵⁸ For example, the Israelites’ misery in Judg 2:4 was a negative emotion experienced within themselves expressed behaviourally by weeping, but YHWH’s anger in Judg 2:14 was a negative emotion directed against the Israelites, triggered by their sinfulness, and expressed in an act of discipline.

55 Although the model also includes Appreciation as a component, which is defined as “evaluations of semiotic and natural phenomena, according to the ways in which they are valued or not in a given field,” it will not be applied in this study. We are primarily concerned with the evaluation of behaviour of people and groups, and Appreciation deals with “evaluations of things” rather than behaviours. See Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 58.

56 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 42.

57 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 46.

58 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 49.

TABLE 4.1 UN/HAPPINESS

UN/HAPPINESS	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
unhappiness (negative)		
misery (undirected mood: 'in me')	וַיִּשָּׂאוּ הָעָם אֶת־קוֹלָם וַיִּבְכוּ And the people lifted up their voices and they wept. (Judg 2:4)	וַיַּצַּר לָהֶם מְאֹד They were severely distressed. (Judg 2:15)
antipathy (directed feeling: 'at you/it')	וַיַּחַר־אַף יְהוָה בִּישְׂרָאֵל וַיִּתֶּנֶם בְּיַד־ שָׂסִים וַיִּשְׁסוּ אוֹתָם The anger of YHWH burned against Israel and he gave them into the hand of plunderers and they plundered them. (Judg 2:14)	כָּל־אֲשֶׁר יֵצְאוּ יַד־יְהוָה הָיְתָה־בָּם לְרָעָה Wherever they went, the hand of the LORD was against them for evil. (Judg 2:15)
happiness (positive)		
cheer (undirected mood: 'in me')	וַיְהִי כִּי טוֹב לָבָם וַיֵּאמְרוּ קְרָאוּ לְשִׁמְשׁוֹן וַיִּשְׁחָק־לָנוּ וַיִּקְרָאוּ לְשִׁמְ־ שׁוֹן מִבֵּית הָאֲסִירִים וַיִּצְחַק לִפְנֵיהֶם וַיַּעֲמִידוּ אוֹתוֹ בֵּין הָעַמּוּדִים It so happened when they were in high spirits, that they said, "Call for Samson, that he may amuse us." (Judg 16:25)	וַתִּשְׁקֹט הָאָרֶץ אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה Then the land was at rest for forty years. (Judg 3:11) וַיֵּיטֵב לֵב הַכֹּהֵן The priest's heart became glad. (Judg 18:20)
affection (directed feeling: 'at you/it')	וַיָּקָם אִישָׁהּ וַיֵּלֶךְ אַחֲרֶיהָ לְדַבֵּר עִל־ לָבָה לָהּ שִׁיבּוֹ Then her husband arose and went after her to speak to her heart in order to bring her back. ⁵⁹ (Judg 19:3)	וַיְהִי אַחֲרֵי־כֵן וַיֵּאָהֵב אִשָּׁה בְּנַחַל שֹׁרֵק וּשְׁמָהּ דִּלִּילָה After this it came about that he loved a woman in the valley of Sorek, whose name was Delilah. (Judg 16:4)

59 Reading לְהַשִּׁיבָה with the *qere*.

IN/SECURITY

Feelings of “peace and anxiety in relation to our environs” are classified as IN/SECURITY.⁶⁰ These emotions can also be expressed as ongoing dispositions or moods and as surges of behaviour, whether actions or words. The difference between disquiet and surprise on the one hand, and between confidence and trust on the other, are not clearly articulated in the model, but seem to be related once again to directed and undirected emotions.⁶¹ That is, based on the examples given, “disquiet” seems to refer to an internal mood or state, whereas “surprise” seems to be a response to external events; “confidence” appears to refer to trust in oneself, but the term “trust” is limited to trusting in others beyond oneself. For example, Gideon’s anxiety in regard to his family and neighbours is a general negative state of anxiety within him, and is not directed at specific people for specific reasons. It is expressed behaviourally by his decision to carry out his actions by night. Since these assumptions are not explicitly articulated in Martin and White, they are included in square brackets in the charts below.

TABLE 4.2 IN/SECURITY

IN/SECURITY ⁶²	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
insecurity (negative)		
disquiet [undirected: 'in me']	וְהָיָה כְּאִשֶּׁר יֵרָא אֶת־בֵּית אָבִיו וְאֶת־ אֲנָשֵׁי הָעִיר מַעֲשֹׂת יוֹמָם וַיַּעַשׂ לַלַּיְלָה	יֹאמַר אֵלָיו גִּדְעוּן בִּי אֲדֹנִי וְיֵשׁ יְהוָה עִמָּנוּ וְלִמָּה מִצָּאֲתָנוּ כָּל־זֹאת

60 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 49.

61 “Disquiet” and “surprise” might seem to indicate a mood vs. a surge of emotion, but this cannot be so since this distinction is represented by the columns of the chart. Perhaps the vocabulary used for these elements is misleading and should be revised.

62 The somewhat artificial nature of the category boundaries is particularly evident in regard to IN/SECURITY. The distinction between behaviour/disposition (especially disposition) and directed/undirected is rather fuzzy. One could assert that the anxiety was directed against his household and the townspeople, but it seems to be directed to them very generally and vaguely, to the point where the insecurity has become a general state of mind. No specific reasons or incidents are mentioned. An argument might be made, however, for directed insecurity. The distinction between perceived and actual threat is also relevant. An actual threat falls more into the category of UN/HAPPINESS: FEAR. DIS/INCLINATION may also involve fear or threats (see below) so there may be overlap here as well. Perhaps the value of the model is to raise awareness of factors that contribute to affect and the effect they have on meaning rather than to categorize them discretely and definitively.

IN/SECURITY	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
	And it happened that as he was too fearful of the household of his father and the men of the town to do it by day he did it by night. (Judg 6:27b)	Then Gideon said to him, "My lord, if it is that YHWH is with us, then why have all these things happened to us?" (Judg 6:13) ⁶³
[unpleasant] surprise ⁶⁴ [directed feeling: 'at you/it']	וַיִּפֹּן בְּנִימִן אַחֲרָיו וְהָיָה עָלָה כָּלִיל- הָעִיר הַשְּׂמִימָה וְאִישׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל הִפֹּךְ וַיִּבְהַל אִישׁ בְּנִימִן Benjamin looked behind them; and behold, the whole city was going up <i>in smoke</i> to heaven. Then the men of Israel turned, and the men of Benjamin were terrified. (Judg 20:40–41)	וַיִּקְחוּ אֶת־הַמִּפְתָּח וַיִּפְתְּחוּ וְהָיָה אֲדֹנֵיהֶם נָפַל אֶרְצָה מָת Then they took the key and opened them, and behold! Their lord, fallen to the ground, dead. (Judg 3:25b)
security (positive) confidence [undirected: 'in me/us']	וַיֹּאמֶר גַּם־לְאַנְשֵׁי פְּנוּאֵל לֵאמֹר בְּשׁוּבִי בְּשָׁלוֹם אֶתֶּן אֶת־הַמִּגְדָּל הַזֶּה: So he spoke also to the men of Penuel, saying, "When I return safely, I will tear down this tower." (Judg 8:9) ⁶⁵	וַיָּבֹאוּ עַל־לִישׁ עַל־עַם שָׁקֵט וּבִטָּח They came to Laish, to a people secure and trusting. ⁶⁶ (Judg 18:19)
trust [directed feeling: 'at you/it/him/her']	וַיָּשָׁב אֶל־מַחֲנֶה יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיֹּאמֶר קוּמוּ כִּי־גִתָּנוּ יְהוָה בְּיָדְכֶם אֶת־מַחֲנֶה מִדְּיָן: He returned to the camp of Israel and said, "Arise, for YHWH has given the camp of Midian into your hands." (Judg 7:15)	וַיֹּאמֶר מִיכָה עֲתָה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי־יֵיטִיב יְהוָה לִי כִּי הָיָה־לִּי הַלֵּוִי לְכֹהֵן Then Micah said, "Now I know that YHWH will do good to me because I have the Levite for a priest." (Judg 17:13)

63 It is possible that this is directed. The boundaries at times are difficult to determine.

64 "Surprise" here means only unpleasant surprises that result from insecurity. Perhaps "shock" would be a better way of representing this.

65 It is apparent in context that this is confidence and not trust because of the sudden dominance of 1cs verbs in the prosody and markedly reduced references to YHWH.

66 Although the NASB uses the gloss "trusting," there is no indication that they trusted *in someone/thing outside themselves*. Therefore this is tagged as confidence.

DIS/SATISFACTION

The emotion of DIS/SATISFACTION “deals with our feelings of achievement and frustration in relation to the activities in which we are engaged”;⁶⁷ it is “concerned with telos (the pursuit of goals).”⁶⁸ In this case, however, the feelings can be experienced not only as moods and surges of behaviour, but also directly as a participant in them or indirectly as a spectator of them. For example Jephthah expresses his dissatisfaction (displeasure) as a participant when his daughter comes out first to greet him, frustrating his hopes of a positive sequel to his victory—a sacrifice of some animal in thanksgiving—and plunges him instead into sorrow and despair. His emotion is expressed in a behavioural surge when he tears his clothes and cries out.⁶⁹

TABLE 4.3 DIS/SATISFACTION

DIS/SATISFACTION	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
dissatisfaction (negative)		
ennui (spectator) ⁷⁰	וַיֵּרֶד יְהוָה לִרְאוֹת אֶת־הָעִיר וְאֶת־הַמִּגְדָּל אֲשֶׁר בָּנוּ בְנֵי הָאָדָם: וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה הֵן עָם אֶחָד וְשָׂפָה אֶחָת לְכֻלָּם וְזֶה הַחֹלֶם לַעֲשׂוֹת וְעַתָּה לֹא־יִבָּצֵר מֵהֶם כָּל אֲשֶׁר יִזְמֹוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת The LORD came down to see the city and the tower which the sons of men had built.	וַיִּנָּחֶם יְהוָה כִּי־עָשָׂה אֶת־הָאָדָם בָּאָרֶץ וַיִּתְּעַצֵּב אֶל־לִבוֹ The LORD was sorry that He had made man on the earth, and He was grieved in His heart. (Gen 6:6)

67 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 50.
68 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 49.
69 Obviously, Jephthah also experiences UNHAPPINESS in this situation. He is heart-broken and sorrowful. Jephthah doubtless also experiences fear of what he must do (DISINCLINATION). At times it is difficult to differentiate between emotional responses and, indeed, more than one can be present at any one time. This is tagged in the appraisal charts below. As with most models, some artificiality and fuzziness creeps in. Models are necessarily simplified representations of reality, not reality per se.
70 No examples of this were found in Judges, therefore ennui is grayed out in the system diagram above.

DIS/SATISFACTION	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
	<p>The LORD said, "Behold, they are one people, and they all have the same language. And this is what they began to do, and now nothing which they purpose to do will be impossible for them." (Gen 11:5–6)</p>	
displeasure (participant)	<p>וַיְהִי כִּי רָאוּתוֹ אוֹתָהּ וַיִּקְרַע אֶת־בְּגָדָיו וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלֶּהָ בְּתִי הִכְרַעַתִּי וְאֵתִי הָיִיתִי בְּעֵקְרִי</p> <p>When he saw her he tore his clothes and said, "Alas, my daughter, You have brought me very low, and you are among those who trouble me." (Judg 11:35)</p>	<p>וְאִם יָרַע בְּעֵינֵיכֶם לַעֲבֹד אֶת־יְהוָה בְּחֵרוֹ לְכֶם הַיּוֹם אֶת־מִי תַעֲבֹדוּן</p> <p>If it is disagreeable in your sight to serve the LORD, choose for yourselves today whom you will serve. (Josh 24:15)⁷¹</p>
satisfaction (positive)		
interest (spectator)	<p>וַיֹּאמֶר שָׁמְשׁוֹן אֶל־אָבִיו אוֹתָהּ קַח־לִי כִּי־הִיא יְשֵׁרָה בְּעֵינֵי</p> <p>And Samson said to his father, "Get her for me, for she is right in my eyes." (Judg 14:3)⁷²</p>	<p>כִּי־אָמַר לֹא יִסְכֹּן־גֹּבֶר בְּרָצְתוֹ עִם־אֱלֹהִים:</p> <p>For he has said, "It profits a man nothing when he is pleased with God." (Job 34:9)</p>
pleasure (participant)	<p>וְסָרְנֵי פְלִשְׁתִּים נֹאסְפוּ לִזְבֹּחַ וּבַח־גִּדּוֹל לְדָגוֹן אֱלֹהֵיהֶם וּלְשִׁמְחָה</p> <p>Now the lords of the Philistines assembled to offer a great sacrifice to Dagon their god, and to rejoice (Judg 16:23)</p>	<p>וַיִּנְאֹל דָּנִיֵּאל הַצֶּלַח בְּמַלְכוּת דָּרְיוֹשׁ וּבְמַלְכוּת כּוֹרְשׁ פַּרְסִיָּא</p> <p>So this Daniel enjoyed success in the reign of Darius and in the reign of Cyrus the Persian. (Dan 6:28 [29])</p>

⁷¹ Joshua is urging them to respond behaviourally to their feelings, but at this point they have neither acted nor spoken.

⁷² At this point Samson is a spectator although he later becomes a participant in the relationship with the woman.

DIS/INCLINATION

Martin and White also describe the “irrealis affect” of DIS/INCLINATION and suggest English lexical examples:⁷³

TABLE 4.4 DIS/INCLINATION 1

DIS/INCLINATION	Surge (of behaviour)	Disposition
fear (negative)	tremble, shudder, cower	wary, fearful, terrorized
desire (positive)	suggest, request, demand	miss, long for, yearn for

The lexis “suggest, request, demand” is odd for “desire/surge of behaviour,” since a person who does these things is trying to control the inclination of another person to act, not demonstrating their own inclination to do so. For example, in 2 Sam 3:13 (“I demand one thing of you, namely, you shall not see my face unless you first bring Michal, Saul’s daughter, when you come to see me”), “demand” says nothing about the inclination of David to bring Michal, but tries to affect Abner’s inclination to do this. The verse as a whole, however, does express his disposition of desire for her, so perhaps David’s act of demanding an action of someone else does indeed express his own desire as well. However, I would tend to tag this as a token (ideational content) rather than lexis. It is difficult to suggest appropriate lexis for the mental process “desire” that expresses itself in behaviour. Perhaps the physical processes “persevere in xing” or “persist in xing,” or the like, where *x* is an action.

Martin and White do not develop this idea in their system network; however, here I have decided to include DIS/INCLINATION as AFFECT: IRREAL since it plays a significant role in the narratives of Judges. Fear in DISINCLINATION is distinct from UNHAPPINESS in that it has an anticipated, irreal stimulus rather than an actual one.

73 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 48.

TABLE 4.5 DIS/INCLINATION 2

DIS/INCLINATION Surge (of behaviour)		Disposition
fear (negative)	וְלֹא־שָׁלַח הַנַּעַר חֶרְבּוֹ כִּי יִרָא כִּי עוֹדֵנּוּ נָעַר: But the youth did not draw his sword, for he was afraid, because he was still a youth. (Judg 8:20) ⁷⁴	וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם גִּדְעוּן לֹא־אֶמְשֹׁל אֲנִי בָכֶם But Gideon said to them, “I will not rule over you . . .” (Judg 8:23) ⁷⁵
desire (positive)	וַיֹּאֲלֵה הַכְּנַעֲנִי לְשִׁבְתָּ בְּאֶרֶץ הַזֹּאת: the Canaanites persisted in living in that land. (Judg 1:27)	וַיֵּט לָבָם אַחֲרֵי אֲבִימֶלֶךְ כִּי אָמְרוּ אֲחִינוּ הוא: ... and their heart was inclined to follow Abimelech, for they said, “He is our brother.” (Judg 9:3)

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT “deals with attitudes towards behaviour, which we admire or criticise, praise or condemn.”⁷⁶ It involves assessment of character and behaviour which may be divided into ESTEEM, which deals with normality, capacity, and tenacity, and SANCTION, which has to do with veracity and propriety.⁷⁷ Martin posits that JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION may be considered “institutionalizations of AFFECT” which act in the process of socialization: “JUDGMENT as AFFECT recontextualized to control behaviour (what we should and should not do), APPRECIATION as AFFECT recontextualized to manage taste (what things are worth).”⁷⁸

SOCIAL ESTEEM

The positive aspects of JUDGMENT: SOCIAL ESTEEM, include normality (how unusual or special someone is), capacity (how capable someone is), and tenacity (how resolute someone is). Martin and White rightly point out that indicators of JUDGMENT—whether ESTEEM or SANCTION—are context dependent. For example, one evaluating community may positively esteem

74 In this case it is actually the refraining from a behaviour that is significant.
75 Note also that “fear” may not involve actually being afraid; the disinclination may result from other motives such as ethical or compassionate ones.
76 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 42.
77 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 52.
78 J.R. Martin, “Introduction,” *Text* 23.2 (2003): 173–74.

a person who demonstrates caution, whereas another may consider a cautious person weak or indecisive. This is sometimes reflected in differing lexical nuances (“cautious” vs. “hesitant,” perhaps) but often the same word can have opposite meanings in different cultures or local communities.⁷⁹

TABLE 4.6 *Social esteem*

Social esteem	Positive (Admire)	Negative (Criticize)
normality how special?	<p>וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו יְהוָה עִמָּךְ גִּבּוֹר הַחַיִּל</p> <p>And he said to him, “YHWH is with you, valiant warrior.” (Judg 6:12)</p> <p>הִנֵּה־נָא אִישׁ־אֱלֹהִים בְּעִיר הַזֹּאת וְהָאִישׁ נִכְבָּד</p> <p>Behold now, there is a man of God in this city, and the man is held in honor. (1 Sam 9:6)</p>	<p>וַיֹּאמֶר גַּעַל בֶּן־עֶבֶד מִי־אַבִּימֶלֶךְ וּמִי־שָׁכֶם כִּי נַעֲבָדְנוּ הֲלֹא בֶן־יִרְבֵּעַל וְזָבֹל פָּקִידוֹ עֲבָדוּ אֶת־אֲנָשֵׁי חָמוֹר אָבִי שָׁכֶם וּמַדּוּעַ נַעֲבָדְנוּ אֲנַחְנוּ</p> <p>Then Gaal the son of Ebed said, “Who is Abimelech, and who is Shechem, that we should serve him? Is he not the son of Jerubbaal, and <i>is</i> Zebul <i>not</i> his lieutenant? Serve the men of Hamor the father of Shechem; but why should we serve him?” (Judg 9:28)</p>
capacity how capable?	<p>וְאִם־יָדַעְתָּ וְיִשְׁכֶּם אֲנִשִּׁיחִיל וְשִׁמְתֶּם שָׂרֵי מִקְנֶה עַל־אֲשֶׁר־לִי</p> <p>... and if you know any capable men among them, then put them in charge of my livestock. (Gen 47:6)</p>	<p>וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו בִּי אֲדֹנָי בְּמָה אוֹשִׁיעַ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל הִנֵּה אֶלְפֵי הַדָּל בְּמַנַּשֶּׁה וְאֲנֹכִי הַצָּעִיר בְּבֵית אָב</p> <p>He said to him, “Lord, how will I deliver Israel? Behold, my clan is the most powerless in Manasseh, and I am the least in my father’s house.” (Judg 6:15)</p>
tenacity how dependable?	<p>וַיַּעַשׂ אֱלֹהִים בַּן בַּלַּיְלָה הַהוּא</p> <p>God did so that night. (Judg 6:40)</p> <p>כִּי נֶאֱמָנִים נִחְשְׁבוּ</p> <p>... for they were considered reliable (Neh 13:13)</p>	<p>וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֵלָיו אִישׁ אֶפְרַיִם מִהֲיִדְבָּר הַזֶּה עָשִׂיתָ לָנוּ לְבִלְתִּי קְרָאוֹת לָנוּ כִּי הִלָּכָה לְהִלָּחֵם בְּמִדְיָן</p> <p>Then the Ephraimites said to him, “What have you done to us, not to call us when you went to fight against the Midianites?” (Judg 8:1)</p>

79 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 52. It is partially for this reason that examples from Judges are given as full verses rather than individual words throughout this study.

SOCIAL SANCTION

SOCIAL SANCTION includes judgments of veracity (how truthful someone is) and propriety (how ethical someone is).⁸⁰ Martin and White explain:

Social sanction on the other hand is more often codified in writing, as edicts, decrees, rules, regulations, and laws about how to behave as surveilled by church and state—with penalties and punishments as levers against those not complying with the code. Sharing values in this area underpins civic duty and religious observances.

This has obvious relevance for the book of Judges, since YHWH’s sanction is based on whether Israel observes those laws which he has established rather than on regulations and standards collectively determined by the community. In other words, sanction is usually norm-referenced rather than peer-referenced.

TABLE 4.7 Social sanction

Social sanction	Positive (Praise)	Negative (Condemn)
veracity (truth) how honest?	<p>עֵתָהּ זֶה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי אִישׁ אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה וְדַבַּר־יְהוָה בְּפִיךָ אֱמֶת</p> <p>Now I know that you are a man of God and that the word of the LORD in your mouth is truth. (1 Kgs 17:24)</p>	<p>וַיִּבְגְּדוּ בַעֲלֵי־שֹׁכֶם בְּאַבְיִמֶלֶךְ ... and the lords of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech. (Judg 9:23)</p>
propriety (ethics) how far beyond reproach?	<p>וַיַּעֲבֹדוּ הָעָם אֶת־יְהוָה כָּל יְמֵי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ</p> <p>And the people served YHWH all the days of Joshua. (Judg 2:7)</p>	<p>סָרוּ מִהָר מִן־הַדֶּרֶךְ אֲשֶׁר הָלְכוּ אֲבוֹתָם לְשֹׁמֵעַ מִצֻּוֹת־יְהוָה</p> <p>They turned aside quickly from the way that their fathers walked in observing the commandments of YHWH. (Judg 2:17)</p>

80 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 52.

The ENGAGEMENT System

According to Martin and White, who base their taxonomy on Bakhtin's dialogism, ENGAGEMENT includes "those meanings which in various ways construe for the text a heteroglossic backdrop of prior utterances, alternative viewpoints, and anticipated responses . . . The taxonomy is directed towards identifying the particular dialogistic positioning associated with given meanings."⁸¹ Some statements, such as "bare assertions," are monoglossic rather than heteroglossic. Their phrasing makes no obvious reference to, or implied acknowledgment of, other points of view.⁸² These statements may be subdivided into two groups. The first is those in which the content is "taken-for-granted," presuppositions or givens which are no longer considered to be at issue, and therefore construe a reader who is in agreement with the statement. The second is those which, although they have a monoglossic form, are focal points for discussion and therefore very much "at issue," not taken-for-granted.⁸³ These construe a reader who may need to be convinced and are often followed by supportive arguments.

The ENGAGEMENT system focuses on heteroglossic utterances. The first distinction concerns whether an utterance makes allowances for alternative positions: those which do are dialogically expansive and those which do not are dialogically contractive.⁸⁴ Martin and White emphasize that the lexical choices that indicate these stances must not be taken in isolation, but in context, since they "may vary systematically under the influence of different co-textual conditions, and across registers, genres, and discourse domains."⁸⁵ Note that although the subdivisions of the ENGAGEMENT system may prove valuable when considering larger sections of Scripture, the subcategories seem too delicate for application to Judges 6. Therefore, the evaluative resources in the chart below will normally be identified simply as dialogically contractive, dialogically expansive, or as bare assertions.

CONTRACT

Contractive utterances, by their use of lexical or syntactical strategies, adopt a stance toward a proposition which implies its truthfulness. In other words, the

81 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 97.

82 White, "Beyond Modality," 263.

83 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 101.

84 See White, "Beyond Modality," 261–62, and *passim*.

85 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 103.

authorial voice endorses the proposition and “aligns itself with the external voice which has been introduced as the source of that proposition.”⁸⁶ Thus, they are dialogically contractive since they tend to discourage alternative voices and positions. Further subdivisions of this category will not be described in depth here since they are too delicate for most of the narrative in Judges 6.

EXPAND

Expansive utterances have the opposite effect to contractive utterances. In these situations the authorial voice distances itself from the proposition, implying uncertainty or doubt. The stance implies that the proposition is still at issue and therefore encourages alternative views. These texts are dialogically expansive.⁸⁷ Again, further subdivisions of this category will not be described in depth here. Suffice it to say that EXPAND is the general term for evaluative language that makes room in various ways for other heteroglossic voices.

The GRADUATION System

According to Martin and White, “a defining property of all attitudinal meanings is their gradability.”⁸⁸ This applies to all aspects of ATTITUDE in that they “construe greater or lesser degrees of positivity and negativity.”⁸⁹ FORCE involves graduating according to intensity or amount with regard to things that are scalable (e.g. ‘a slightly foolish person’), whereas FOCUS considers graduating according to prototypicality, where things are normally not inherently scalable, that is, “the degree to which they match some supposed core or exemplary instance of a semantic category” (e.g. ‘a true king’).⁹⁰ Only FOCUS will be considered in relation to Judges 6. The force of an evaluation may be upgraded by the use of techniques such as numbers, modifiers, and repetition. For example, ‘nine hundred iron chariots’ (Judg 4:3) raises the evaluation of the enemy’s strength by the use of numbers and the modifier “iron.”

86 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 103. The authors do not specify whether the “external” voice is external to the specific discourse (e.g. one voice in a conversation) or external to the entire text. Both cases are probably applicable, depending on the genre.

87 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 103.

88 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 135.

89 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 135.

90 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 137.

Appraisal Analysis Charts

The APPRAISAL analysis below is based on Martin and White's model; however, some modifications and additions have been made. The "Lexical evidence/Syntactic evidence/Token" column with its associated coding has been added for clarity. The symbol "t" indicates that this is a "token": an invoked rather than an inscribed evaluation.⁹¹ The column headed "C/E/M" has been added as a simplified analysis of ENGAGEMENT. It records whether the evaluations are dialogically contractive (C), expansive (E), or are monoglossic bare assertions (M).⁹² The existence of different levels of evaluation is indicated in the appraisal charts by an "I" in the "C/I" column, where "I" stands for "ironic" and "C" for "congruent." Also, the realizations of evaluation have been given in both English and Hebrew. I have chosen to give the full text of the chapter since evaluation is only fully understood in context, and extracting isolated words or phrases proved to be confusing for readers. I have chosen to use the tilde (~) instead of a + or – to indicate ambiguous evaluations rather than drawing conclusions on the basis of too little evidence. The symbol ∞ is used to indicate an unreal situation of a normally real evaluation, that is, one that is anticipated or hoped for but that has not yet occurred.⁹³ Prosodies are indicated by a label at the beginning and consistently coloured font in the AFFECT and JUDGMENT columns. Note that I have chosen to use functional labels wherever possible, for example, "modifier" rather than "adjective" or "adverb" and "command" rather than "imperative." This is because SFL is concerned with the function of language in construing meaning. Grammatical form is still very significant, but it is possible for several forms to accomplish the same function, and also for one form to accomplish several functions (for example, the *yiqtol* or prefix conjugation) in different contexts.

The Gideon Narrative (Judges 6–8)

Introductory Remarks

The story of Gideon has a number of interpretive challenges, one of which is the question of the practice of "putting out a fleece"—that is, setting up an arbitrary test to which God must respond—as a method of obtaining divine guidance. Some commentators use the passage to support the practice while others have argued that God did not endorse Gideon's action. However, the

91 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 75.

92 For more information see last section.

93 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 91 n. 7.

“fact” still remains: in the narrative, was not Gideon’s action honored by God, implying his approval of this behaviour? How can the reader know whether an action is considered proper and ethical if the text does not explicitly say so? As already noted, in Hebrew narrative, the voice of the narrator has traditionally been considered reliable when commenting on or reporting a situation. However, even if this is conceded, it is still not always clear what either the narrator, or God, thinks of a person or action. Using the appraisal model for the Gideon story may disambiguate each situation and help the interpreter to handle the evidence more thoroughly and less subjectively.

There is a significant pattern of evaluation at the level of discourse in ch. 6 of the Gideon narrative. It focuses on the signs of the fleece which were requested by Gideon but which ultimately reveal something of the character of YHWH.⁹⁴

*Analysis of the Text*⁹⁵

As is evident from the accompanying appraisal analysis chart, the story of Gideon begins with a significant cluster of negative evaluations stated monoglossically by the narrator. This leads into a section which provides background material for the narrative. First, the Israelites are assessed negatively in regard to their ethical propriety: they “did the evil thing” (v. 1; **–propriety**). This is a general assessment of their way of life, which is characterized by apostasy, rather than a specific assessment of one situation or action. Subsequently, the Midianites and Amalekites are also given a clear negative assessment (vv. 3–4; **–propriety**). The word שָׁחַת (“destroy”) is predicated of them twice in close proximity, and they are metaphorically compared to locusts, insects which are feared and loathed due to their propensity to destroy food supplies and, consequently, life itself. This evaluation is ironic, however, since as agents of YHWH they are acting according to his will. The effect of all this on Israel is also negative (**–HAPPINESS**, **–normality**), and the emphatic adverb מְאֹד (“very, exceedingly”) stresses the intensity of their affective state.⁹⁶ In their inability to overcome the enemy (**–capacity**) their behavioural response was that יָצְקוּ אֶל־יְהוָה (“they cried to YHWH”).

94 Much more could be said about the character of Gideon. This interpretation will focus primarily on the character of YHWH.

95 Space does not permit analysis of all evaluative language and tokens, so those that are most significant for Gideon’s challenge to the character of YHWH will be discussed.

96 As Daniel I. Block, *Judges, Ruth* (NAC 6; Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1999), 253, notes, “Israel ‘became small’ (*wayyiddal*), which says as much about her emotional state as about her economic condition.”

The narrative action actually begins in v. 7 when YHWH sends a prophet to respond to Israel's cry. This response from YHWH, a judgment speech expressed in contractive monoglossic language clearly designed to eliminate argument (**CONTRACT: PROCLAIM**), sets up a powerful comparison between his ethical and faithful behaviour on their behalf in delivering them from their oppressors and remaining with them through the wilderness (t, +**propriety**; t, +**tenacity**; t, +**capacity**),⁹⁷ and their unfaithful and unethical behavior (–**propriety**, –**tenacity**, –**capacity**) in ignoring their God and disobeying him. The phrase *וְלֹא שָׁמְעֶתֶם בְּקוֹלִי* can imply both “not listening” and “not obeying,” and their resultant helplessness.⁹⁸ In the light of this negative portrayal of Israel, the evaluation of Gideon (+**normality**, +**capacity**) by the angel of YHWH in v. 12 may be ironic: how can a timid young man hiding in his threshing floor for fear of the enemy be called *גִּבּוֹר הִחַיִּל* (“most valiant warrior”)?⁹⁹ As the following discussion indicates, Gideon was an unlikely choice to deliver Israel: he was fearful, resentful, cynical, and the son of a man who owned a shrine to the pagan god Baal.¹⁰⁰

97 L. Juliana M. Claassens, “The Character of God in Judges 6–8: The Gideon Narrative as Theological and Moral Resource,” *Horizons in Biblical Theology* 23.1 (2001): 57, rightly points out that the repetition of *ics* verbs in YHWH's account of his actions on behalf of Israel emphasizes his identity and Israel's primary sin as apostasy.

98 J. Alberto Soggin, *Judges, a Commentary* (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981), 112, comments that the passage (6:7–10) “does not have any connection with the context,” but it is clearly connected to the cycle of oppression and deliverance.

99 See Yairah Amit, *The Book of Judges: The Art of Editing* (Biblical Interpretation Series; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 252. It is possible, of course, that God is evaluating Gideon on his potential rather than present realities. For further comments on the significance of this appellation and its connection to v. 14 see Soggin, *Judges, a Commentary*, 119. Block's interpretation that the angel is flattering Gideon to gain his co-operation, and that Gideon recognizes the similarity of his call to that of the great leader Moses, is less likely (Block, *Judges, Ruth*, 259–60). Although many scholars have pointed out the similarities between the calls of Gideon and Moses, this similarity should not be overstressed. See for example Lee R. Martin, “Power to Save!?: The Role of the Spirit of the Lord in the Book of Judges,” *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 16.2 (2008): 33–34; Gregory T.K. Wong, “Gideon: A New Moses?” in *Reflection and Refraction* (Leiden: Brill, 2006). As Butler comments, “I would rather see Gideon as becoming an antitype to Moses” (Trent C. Butler, *Judges* [WBC 8; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2006], 200). Space does not permit a full development of the comparison here.

100 Martin, “The Role of the Spirit,” 33, unconvincingly suggests that Gideon was an appropriate choice since he was “aware” of the Exodus tradition and, through his syncretistic father, was “aware” of the idolatry of Israel.

The next section of the dialogue, in which Gideon's evaluative language is consistently heteroglossic, is crucial to understanding the thrust of the passage as a whole. In spite of YHWH's pronouncements, Gideon opens up God's claims for dialogue (**EXPAND: ENTERTAIN**) by means of the expository questions, thus encouraging alternate assessments.¹⁰¹ Verse 13, with its "if...then..." conditional statement and its two interrogative adverbs, *לָמָּה* ("why?") and *אֵי* ("where?"), not only inscribes Gideon's insecurity (**-SECURITY**), but also presents his challenge to YHWH on several fronts.¹⁰² His truthfulness is questioned (**-veracity**) since, if indeed YHWH were "with them," the Israelites would not be experiencing so many difficulties. His dependability is disputed, since he had brought them up out of servitude in Egypt but had now apparently abandoned them (**-tenacity**). His ability is questioned (**-capacity**), not only because YHWH's miracles have apparently ceased, but also since Israel's oppression by a foreign country empowered by foreign gods implies that YHWH is less powerful. Finally, the ethics of YHWH's behaviour are contested (**-propriety**), since he is allowing his own people to suffer. This complex assault which opens God's character up to dispute does not, however, motivate YHWH to defend himself; he merely reiterates his command, and insists that Gideon has the strength to deliver Israel. In doing so, he addresses Gideon's insecurity and misery and affirms his capability—but to no avail. Gideon is still doubtful.

Verse 15 is a minor but significant prosody of self-evaluative expressions of inadequacy (**-capacity**) on the part of the "most mighty warrior."¹⁰³ The expression *אֵיךְ אֶעֱשֶׂה* is a "formula for beginning a conversation with a person of higher rank,"¹⁰⁴ and indicates Gideon's sense of inferiority. His question "How shall I deliver Israel?" clearly inscribes his sense of inadequacy, and

101 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 105.

102 Ironic, considering what Block, *Judges, Ruth*, 256 calls the "people's persistent perfidy." He remarks, "If God raises a deliverer for Israel, it is an entirely gracious act. There has been no hint of repentance nor any announcement of divine forgiveness."

103 According to Butler, *Judges*, 203, "[Gideon] calls his family the poorest one in the tribe, yet his father owns property and supports a worship place for Baal as we will soon learn. Far from being the poorest or weakest in the tribe, Gideon's father is a clan leader and one of the strongest economically and politically in the tribe." Without seeing into the mind of Gideon, it is impossible to determine whether he is putting on an act of helplessness, either to give an appearance of humility or to get out of responsibility (see for example Tammi J. Schneider, *Judges* [Berit Olam; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2000], 105, 108), or whether he genuinely does feel insecure in the face of Midianite oppression in spite of his family's advantages.

104 HALOT, 122–23. This is an abbreviated way of saying, "if any harm results from my addressing you, may it come on me, Lord."

yet its interrogative form expands the evaluation to allow for other possibilities in YHWH's response.¹⁰⁵ This is followed by two superlative modifiers, *הַדָּל* ("the lowest/most helpless") and *הַצָּעִיר* ("the smallest/youngest"), expressing the inferior position of his clan, and of himself within that clan; thus, Gideon effectively deems himself the "lowest of the low" (**-capacity, -normality**).¹⁰⁶ YHWH's reply indeed offers an alternative perspective; God reassures him that regardless of his inadequacy, God himself would be with him and enable him to defeat all of Midian as if it were only one man.

Circumstances, however, have caused Gideon's doubt to become deeply entrenched; he is still uncertain, and, for the first time, asks YHWH for a sign. Another "if . . . then" statement follows, positing an irreal state in which Gideon is favored by God (**∞ +normality**)—the way that Gideon would like the situation to be rather than how it actually appears to be to him—and asking for supernatural confirmation. "If . . . then . . ." statements are by nature dialogically expansive since they imply two possible outcomes. It is interesting in the light of subsequent events that Gideon simply asks for a sign, and does not specify what that sign should be.

Verse 21 confirms Gideon's desired (irreal) evaluation of himself as one favored by God (**+normality**): the angel of the Lord causes fire to spring from his staff and consume the offered meal. In this case the confirmation is directly connected to an evaluation of Gideon. This fact will become significant later in the passage. Before setting out to destroy the Midianites, however, Gideon is given a task to do closer to home which is also a test of his character. He is to tear down the altar to Baal and the Asherah next to it on his father's land and build an altar to YHWH (vv. 25–26), thus establishing the propriety of his own worship before presuming to deal with pagan foreigners.¹⁰⁷ It is both interest-

105 It is likely that this verse implies sarcasm, but this does not preclude the possibility of Gideon being open to suggestion.

106 This evaluation may perhaps be ironic. It may seem that Gideon is merely putting on an act of poverty and inferiority since his father has cattle and owns a shrine, and the family seems to have some status in the community. It may simply be that this is the language of deference and modesty. However, in the context of Gideon's excessive doubt and reluctance throughout the narrative, it is likely that he actually feels inadequate to the task of confronting the army of the Midianites. See Butler, *Judges*, 203; Schneider, *Judges*, 105; Soggin, *Judges, a Commentary*, 119–20.

107 It is probably also true, as Victor H. Matthews, *Judges and Ruth* (New Cambridge Bible Commentary; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 86, suggests, that the destruction of the pagan altar is intended to make clear that the victory to come will be credited to YHWH, not Baal.

ing and significant that at the same time that Gideon is testing YHWH, YHWH is also testing Gideon.¹⁰⁸

Verse 27 reinforces Gideon's timid nature, by stating that he was "too afraid" to do it by day (**-security**) in spite of the angel's reassurance (v. 23), perhaps not without some justification since the men of the town attempted to kill him on discovering his deed. Joash, his father, is supportive, however, and he offers a negative evaluation of the false god, Baal.¹⁰⁹ Joash's sneering rhetorical question ("Will *you* contend for Baal, or will *you* deliver him?") and his "if...then..." statement ("If he is a god, let him contend for himself") in v. 31 both accuse Baal of a total lack of ability to defend himself (**-capacity**). In contrast to the pathetically incompetent Baal, the powerful "Spirit of YHWH" comes upon Gideon, enabling him for his task (v. 34) and indicating his special status (**+normality**).

In spite of all the affirmations of YHWH's support that Gideon has received, however, he still distrusts God.¹¹⁰ This uncertainty and distrust runs like a thread throughout Judges 6, hearkening back to the narrator's intensely negative prosody in his evaluation of the Midianites and Amalekites (vv. 1–5) and Gideon's own extremely doubtful prosody in his challenge to YHWH in v. 13. Therefore, Gideon once again asks for a sign to confirm YHWH's veracity, tenacity, propriety, and capacity, the first sign of the fleece.¹¹¹ He wants evidence of God's truthfulness: that he will act according to what he has spoken; of God's ability and dependability: that he can be counted on to accomplish his plans; and of God's ethical propriety: that he will address and relieve the oppression and suffering of Israel.¹¹² The magnitude of Gideon's distrust and the importance

¹⁰⁸ See Butler, *Judges*, 205.

¹⁰⁹ Block, *Judges, Ruth*, 270 suggests that the destruction of Baal's altar has convinced Joash of the "folly of his pagan ways."

¹¹⁰ Interestingly Butler notes (*Judges*, 209): "The deity's personal name, *Yahweh*, which has dominated the story almost entirely to this point slips from view. The more generic, less personal, more transcendent term *Elohim*, 'God,' is used. By replacing *Yahweh* with *Elohim*, the narrator places some distance between Gideon and God, distance that had not been there when Gideon was making his commitments and following God's leadership."

¹¹¹ Soggin, *Judges, a Commentary*, 121, notes that asking for a sign is not inappropriate in and of itself in the OT context, and points out a situation in which Ahaz is criticized for not asking for a sign (Isa 7:10–25). The appropriateness of Gideon's specific requests for signs must be evaluated in context.

¹¹² It is interesting that Gideon does not recognize the justice and propriety of YHWH's discipline in response to Israel's sin. It may be that he is not aware of that sinfulness, or that he thinks YHWH's discipline is excessive.

of the requested reassurance are indicated by the double “if...then...” construction, and in the double use of the phrase “You will deliver Israel” (vv. 36–37) in both the protasis and the apodosis. The simple phrase in v. 38 is the response: “And it was so.” Its very succinctness and directness suggests that the accomplishment of the task is a simple matter for a powerful God, implying that the destruction of the enemy will be simple, too.

Gideon, however, is yet again unconvinced. Gideon’s evaluation of YHWH’s character is still **–tenacity**, **–veracity**, **–capacity**, and **–propriety**. He requests another sign, even though there are numerous inscribed indications that he himself realizes that this action is not appropriate: the use of cohortative and jussive verbs, the particle of entreaty and deference (נָא), and the expressed realization that the repeated request might well anger YHWH (v. 39).¹¹³ Again, the response is direct: “God did so that night” (v. 40).¹¹⁴ The sign of the fleece was a down payment or token that YHWH was willing and capable of doing what he promised. It now becomes apparent that the mocking of Baal’s inadequacy in v. 31 serves as a foil to YHWH’s power and majesty. Ultimately, in Judg 8:28, God accomplishes in actual fact what he promised through the signs: Midian is finally subdued and Israel has rest for forty years.

It is important to clarify the exact nature of Gideon’s signs involving the fleece. The evaluative language in the text makes it clear that what is at stake, that what Gideon doubts, and that what the sign is intended to confirm, is the character of YHWH. Gideon distrusts not only God’s ability to defeat the enemy (**–capacity**), but also his truthfulness, reliability, and morality (**–veracity**, **–tenacity**, and **–propriety**). What the results of the double sign of the fleece confirm is the character of YHWH: his **+capacity**, **+veracity**, **+reliability**, and **+propriety**. Unlike the first sign in v. 17, they say absolutely nothing about Gideon or the appropriateness of his actions. There is no evidence in the text that the fact that God honored the arbitrary and doubting request for signs and responded to them constitutes a confirmation of the practice of using signs to determine the will of God; to the contrary, it is clear that Gideon knew

113 Some point out that the first sign was more likely to be fulfilled since the fleece would tend to absorb more water than the beaten ground. This may have provoked Gideon to ask for the less likely second test. See for example Soggin, *Judges, a Commentary*, 133.

114 According to Butler, *Judges*, 210, “We see only what God did. We do not hear how Gideon reacted. We never hear a word from God. Thus in this test narrative, we find a bit of distance developing between Gideon and God.” There is no doubt that Gideon’s repeated testing tries YHWH’s patience even as he responds to it in order to accomplish his goal in delivering Israel.

the will of God—after all, he had been told what to do by God in a face-to-face encounter—but nevertheless doubted.¹¹⁵ If anything, the fact that YHWH honored Gideon's request says more about his patience and mercy than about Gideon's practices. The character of YHWH is the central idea of this whole episode and structures it; the character of YHWH is confirmed in spite of Gideon's challenges and doubt.

Conclusion

This analysis of the material in Judges 6 has given a quick overview of the potential of the linguistic evaluation model; there is much more that could be said. Evaluation theory itself is relatively new, and continues to be refined and developed, and its application to biblical languages is in its infancy.¹¹⁶ Of course, evaluation theory is not a magic bullet that will resolve all questions of ideology in the text, but it is an extremely valuable tool to have in the exegetical toolbox along with other literary, historical, and socio-cultural approaches.

115 As Daniel I. Block, "Will the Real Gideon Please Stand Up? Narrative Style and Intention in Judges 6–9," *JETS* 40.3 (1997): 360, rightly points out, the signs were not genuine attempts to determine God's will, but an attempt to manipulate God and to get out of the responsibility of attacking the Midianites.

116 The only other biblical scholar I know that uses evaluation theory is James Dvorak of Oklahoma Christian University, who completed his dissertation on appraisal in biblical Greek. See James D. Dvorak, "The Interpersonal Metafunction in 1 Corinthians 1–4: The Tenor of Toughness" (PhD diss., McMaster Divinity College, 2012).

Appendix

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token ¹¹⁷	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
Gideon (Judges 6)			
6:1	Then the sons of Israel did the evil thing in the eyes of YHWH; and YHWH gave them into the hands of Midian seven years.	“the evil thing” Invoked evaluation Invoked evaluation “seven” Modifier	וַיַּעַשׂוּ בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל הָרָע בְּעֵינֵי יְהוָה וַיִּתְּנֵם יְהוָה בְּיַד־מִדְיָן שִׁבְעַת שָׁנִים:
6.2	The power/hand of Midian was strong against Israel. [was strong]	“power/ hand” “strong” Stative as modifier	וַתְּעַז יַד־מִדְיָן עַל־יִשְׂרָאֵל [וַתְּעַז]
	Because of Midian the sons of Israel made for themselves the dens which were in the mountains and the caves and the strongholds.	Invoked evaluation	מִפְּנֵי מִדְיָן עָשׂוּ לָהֶם בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת־ הַמְּנִהָרוֹת אֲשֶׁר בְּהָרִים וְאֶת־הַמְּעֻרוֹת וְאֶת־הַמְּצֻדוֹת:
6.3	For it was when Israel had sown, that the Midianites would come up with the Amalekites and the sons of the east and go up against them.	Invoked evaluation	וְהָיָה אִם־זָרַע יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעָלָה מִדְיָן וַעֲמָלֶק וּבְנֵי־קֶדֶם וְעָלוּ עָלָיו:
	[go up against them.]	“go up against”	[וְעָלוּ עָלָיו:]

¹¹⁷ Invoked rather than inscribed evaluation.

¹¹⁸ These codes represent items which are dialogically contractive (C), expansive (E), or are monoglossic (M).

¹¹⁹ The code I represent items which are or ironic (I) in terms of the levels of evaluation, that is, the evaluation may be positive from one perspective and negative from another. Evaluations that work at only one level are assumed to be congruent (C) and are not marked.

C/E/M ¹¹⁸	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I ¹¹⁹	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Israelites	Narrator			–propriety
C	force > raise	Israelites	YHWH			
M		Israelites	Narrator			–capacity
		YHWH	Israelites	I ¹²⁰		–propriety
M	force > raise	Israelites	Narrator		(applies to two rows above)	
M		Midian	Narrator			+capacity
M	force > raise	Midian	Narrator			
M		Israelites	Narrator		Saturating Prosody t, –SECURITY: confidence/ trust ¹²¹	
M		Israelites	Narrator		t, –SECURITY: confidence/trust	
M		Midianites	Narrator			+capacity

120 Note that this evaluation is negative from the perspective of the Israelites. From the perspective of YHWH, who is using the Midianites to discipline the Israelites, it may be considered positive in some sense, although the fact that these tribes are being used to achieve a purpose does not necessarily imply that YHWH approves of them or what they are doing per se. Thus they are labelled ironic (I).

121 The symbol “t” indicates that this is a “token”: an invoked rather than an inscribed evaluation (Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 75).

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:4	So they would lay siege against them	Invoked evaluation	וַיַּחֲנוּ עֲלֵיהֶם
	[lay siege against them]	“lay siege against”	[וַיַּחֲנוּ עֲלֵיהֶם]
	and destroy the produce of the earth	Invoked evaluation	וַיִּשְׁחִיתוּ אֶת־יִבּוֹל הָאָרֶץ
	[destroy]	“destroy”	[וַיִּשְׁחִיתוּ]
	as far as Gaza,	Modifier	עַד־בּוֹאֵד עָזָה
	and leave no sustenance in Israel as well as no sheep, ox, or donkey. ¹²²	Invoked evaluation	וְלֹא־יִשְׁאִירוּ מִחַיָּה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְשֶׁה וְשׁוֹר וְחֻמּוֹר:
6:5	[no]	Negation	[לֹא]
	For they would come up with their livestock and their tents, they would come in like locusts for number,	Lexical metaphor as Modifier	כִּי הֵם וּמִקְנֵיהֶם יַעֲלוּ וְאֹהֲלֵיהֶם וּבָאֻן ¹²³ כְּדִי־אַרְבֶּה לָרֹב וְלָהֶם
	both they and their camels were not countable;	“countable” Negated Modifier	וְלִגְמָלֵיהֶם אֵין מִסְפָּר וַיָּבֵאוּ
	and they came into the land to devastate it.	“devastate”	בָּאֲרֶץ לְשַׁחֲתָהּ:

122 A single section of discourse may give the reader more than one piece of evaluative information.

123 Qere.

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Israelites	Narrator		t, –SECURITY: confidence/trust	
M		Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator			+capacity
M		Israelites	Narrator		t, –SECURITY: confidence/trust	
M		Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator	I		–propriety
M	force > raise	Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator			
M		Israelites	Narrator		t, –SECURITY: confidence/ trust	
M		Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator			–propriety
M	force > raise	Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator			
M	force > raise	Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator			+capacity
M	force > raise	Israelites	Narrator		t, – SECURITY: confidence/ trust	
M	force > raise	Midianites, Amalekites, camels	Narrator			+capacity
M		Midianites, Amalekites	Narrator	I		–propriety ¹²⁴
M		Israelites	Narrator		t, –SECURITY: confidence/trust	

124 This example of metaphor might also be “–valuation” in the area of APPRECIATION, if the invading hoards were considered “things” (Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 56–61).

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:6	So Israel was brought very low	“brought low” Stative as modifier	וַיְדַלּ יִשְׂרָאֵל
	[very]	Modifier	מְאֹד
	because of Midian,	Modifier	מִפְּנֵי מִדְיָן
	and the sons of Israel cried to YHWH.	“cried”	וַיִּזְעֻקוּ בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־יְהוָה:
6:7	Now it came about when the sons of Israel cried to YHWH on account of Midian,	“cried” Repetition	וַיְהִי כִּי־זָעַקוּ בְנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־יְהוָה עַל־אֲדֹת מִדְיָן: [זָעַקוּ]
6.8	that YHWH sent a prophet to the sons of Israel, and he said to them, “Thus says YHWH, the God of Israel, ‘It was I who brought you up from Egypt	Invoked evaluation	וַיִּשְׁלַח יְהוָה אִישׁ נָבִיא אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם כֹּה־אָמַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲנֹכִי הָעֹלִיתִי אֶתְכֶם מִמִּצְרַיִם
	and brought you out	“brought out”	וְאֶצִּיא אֶתְכֶם
	from the house of slavery.	Invoked evaluation	מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים:

125 Martin and White use the symbol ∞ to indicate evaluations of what the evaluator would like to be true, not what actually is true (*Language of Evaluation*, 91 n. 7).

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Israel	Narrator		–HAPPINESS –SECURITY: confidence/ trust	–normality –capacity
M	force > raise	Israel	Narrator			
M		Midian	Narrator	I		–propriety
M		Israelites	Narrator		–HAPPINESS –SECURITY: confidence/trust	–capacity
M		Israelites	Narrator		–HAPPINESS –SECURITY: confidence/ trust	–capacity
M	force > raise	Israelites	Narrator			
M		YHWH	YHWH			t, +propriety +capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		Saturating Prosody ∞ +SECURITY: trust ¹²⁵	
C		YHWH	YHWH			+propriety +tenacity +capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C		YHWH	YHWH			+propriety
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6.9	‘I delivered you	“delivered”	וַאֲצַל אֶתְכֶם
	from the power of the Egyptians	“power”	מִיַּד מִצְרַיִם
	and from the power of all your oppressors,	“power”	וּמִיַּד כָּל־לֹחֲצֵיכֶם
	[all]	Modifier	[כָּל]
	[oppressors]	“oppressor”	[לֹחֲצֵיכֶם]
	and dispossessed them before you	“dispossess”	וַאֲגָרַשׁ אוֹתָם מִפְּנֵיכֶם
	and gave you their land,	“give”	וַאֲתַנְּנָה לָכֶם אֶת־אֲרָצָם
6:10	and I said to you, “I am YHWH your God; you shall not fear the gods of the Amorites in whose land you live	Command ¹²⁶	וְאָמַרְתָּ לָכֶם אֲנִי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם לֹא תִירָאוּ אֶת־אֱלֹהֵי הָאֻמִּי אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם יוֹשְׁבִים בְּאֲרָצָם
	[you shall not fear]	Negation	[לֹא תִירָאוּ]
	But you have not obeyed me.”	Negation	וְלֹא שְׁמַעְתֶּם בְּקוֹלִי:

126 “Command (I)” is used for imperative forms, “Command” is used for negated imperfects (there is no negative imperative in Hebrew) and imperfects that follow in sequence on after imperatives and have the force of an imperative. Function is prioritized over form.

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
C		YHWH	YHWH			+propriety +capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C		YHWH	YHWH			+propriety +capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C		YHWH	YHWH			+propriety +tenacity +capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C	force > raise		YHWH		(Applies to 2 rows above)	
C		oppressors	YHWH			−propriety
C		YHWH	YHWH			+capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C		YHWH	YHWH			+capacity
C		Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C		YHWH	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	+propriety
C	force > raise	Israelites	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C	force > raise	YHWH	YHWH		−SATISFACTION	
C	force > raise	Israelites	YHWH			−propriety

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:11	Then the angel of YHWH came and sat under the oak that was in Ophrah, which belonged to Joash the Abiezrite as his son Gideon was beating out wheat in the wine press in order to save it from the Midianites.	Invoked evaluation	וַיָּבֹא מֵלָאֵךְ יְהוָה וַיֵּשֶׁב תַּחַת הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר בְּעֶפְרָה אֲשֶׁר לְיוֹאָשׁ אֲבִי הָעֶזְרִי וַיַּדְעֹז בְּנוֹ חֲבֵט חֲטִים בְּגֶת לְהַנִּיס מִפְּנֵי מִדְיָן:
6:12	The angel of YHWH appeared to him and said to him, “YHWH is with you, ¹²⁷ O most valiant warrior.” [most]	Invoked evaluation “valiant” Modifier Superlative modifier	וַיֵּרָא אֵלָיו מֵלָאֵךְ יְהוָה וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו יְהוָה עִמָּךְ גִּבּוֹר הַחַיִּל: [הַחַיִּל]
6:13	Then Gideon said to him, “O my lord, if YHWH is with us, then why has all this happened to us? And where are all His miracles which our fathers told us about, saying, ‘Did not YHWH bring us up from Egypt?’ But now YHWH has abandoned us	Conditional if ... then ... , Interrogatives “abandoned”	וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו גִּדְעֹז בִּי אֲדֹנִי יְהוָה עִמָּנוּ וְלָמָּה מָצָאתָנוּ כְּלִיזָאת וְאַיָּה כְּלִינִפְלְאוֹתָיו אֲשֶׁר סִפְרוּ לָנוּ אֲבוֹתֵינוּ לֵאמֹר הֲלֹא מִמִּצְרַיִם הֵעֲלָנוּ יְהוָה וַעֲתָה נִטְשָׁנוּ יְהוָה

127 According to Trent C. Butler, *Judges*, WBC 8 (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), 201: “Such a greeting indicated material wealth and personal good fortune (Gen 26:28; Judg 1:22; Ruth 2:4; 1 Sam 16:18; 18:12, 14; 20:13; 2 Sam 7:3; 2 Kgs 18:7; 1 Chr 9:20; 22:11, 16; 15:2; 2 Chr 20:17; Zech 10:5; compare Num 14:43).”

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Gideon	Narrator		Saturating Prosody t, –SECURITY: confidence/trust t, –HAPPINESS	
M		Gideon	(angel of) YHWH ¹²⁸			+normality
M		Gideon	(angel of) YHWH	I?		+normality +capacity
M	force > raise	Gideon	(angel of) YHWH	I?		
E		YHWH	Gideon			t, –veracity t, –propriety t, –tenacity t, –capacity (see 6:40; 8:28)
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust –HAPPINESS	
M ¹²⁹		YHWH	Gideon	I		–tenacity –propriety
M		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust –HAPPINESS	

128

For the purposes of this study, the angel of YHWH and YHWH will be considered the same. Indeed, in the text the appellations switch back and forth. See Newsom, “Angels (Old Testament),” 1:248–253; Butler, *Judges*, 200.

129

Although this is a monoglossic bare assertion, it is a focal point for discussion and therefore very much at issue, not taken-for-granted.

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
	and given us into the hand of Midian.”	Fixed expression: “give into the hand”	וַיִּתְּנֵנוּ בְּכַף־מִדְיָן:
6:14	YHWH looked at him and said, “Go in this your strength and deliver Israel from the hand of Midian. [your strength]	Command (I), command “your strength”	וַיִּפֶּן אֵלָיו יְהוָה וַיֹּאמֶר לְךָ בְּכַחַד זֶה וְהוֹשַׁעְתָּ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל מִכַּף מִדְיָן [בְּכַחַד]
	Have I not sent you?”	Rhetorical question	הֲלֹא שְׁלַחְתִּידָּךְ:
6:15	He said to Him, “O Lord, how shall I deliver Israel?	Interrogative	וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו בִּי אֲדֹנָי בְּמָה אוֹשִׁיעַ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל
	Behold, my family is the most poor/helpless in Manasseh, [most]	“poor/helpless” Modifier Superlative modifier	הִנֵּה אֶלְפִי הַדָּל בְּמַנַּשֶּׁשׁ [ה]
	and I am the most insignifi- cant in my father’s house.” [most]	“insignificant” Modifier Superlative	וְאֲנֹכִי הַצָּעִיר בְּבֵית אָבִי: [ה]
6:16	But YHWH said to him, “Surely/indeed I will be with you,	Modifier Invoked evaluation	וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו יְהוָה כִּי אֶהְיֶה עִמָּךְ
	and you shall defeat Midian as one man.”	“defeat” Modifier	וְהִכִּיתָ אֶת־מִדְיָן כְּאִישׁ אֶחָד:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		YHWH	Gideon			–tenacity –propriety
M		Gideon	Gideon		t, –SECURITY: trust	
C		Gideon	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: confidence	
C		YHWH	YHWH			+normality
M		Gideon	YHWH	I		+capacity
E		Gideon	YHWH		– INCLINATION ∞ +SECURITY: trust	–tenacity
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: confidence	Saturating Prosody –capacity –normality
M		Gideon's family	Gideon		–SECURITY: confidence	–capacity –normality
	force > raise	Gideon's family	Gideon			
		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: confidence	–capacity –normality
	force > raise	Gideon	Gideon			
C	force > raise	YHWH	YHWH		∞ t, +SECURITY: trust	t, +tenacity
M		YHWH	YHWH			
M		Gideon	YHWH			+capacity
M	force > raise	Gideon	YHWH			

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:17	So Gideon said to Him, “If now I have found favor in your sight, then make for me a sign that it is you who speak with me.	Conditional if . . . then . . . statement, א particle	וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו אִם־נָא מְצָאתִי חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ וַעֲשִׂיתָ לִּי אֹת שְׂאֵתָהּ מִדְּבַר עָמִי:
6.18	“Please do not depart from here until I come back to you, and bring out my offering and lay it before you.” And he said, “I will remain until you return.” [not depart]	א particle Negated “depart”	אֶל־נָא תִמָּשׁ מִזֶּה עַד־בֹּאִי אֵלַיךָ וְהֵצֵאתִי אֶת־מִנְחָתִי וְהִנַּחְתִּי לְפָנֶיךָ וַיֹּאמֶר אֲנֹכִי אֵשֵׁב עַד שׁוּבֶךָ: [אֶל־תִּמָּשׁ]
6.19	Then Gideon went in and prepared a young goat and unleavened bread from an ephah of flour; he put the meat in a basket and the broth in a pot	--	וַיֵּדְעֹן בָּא וַיַּעַשׂ גְּדִי־עִזִּים וַאֲפֶת־קֶמַח מִצּוֹת הַבָּשָׂר שָׁם בְּסֶל וְהִמְרֹק שָׁם בְּפָרוֹר וַיּוֹצֵא אֵלָיו אֶל־תַּחַת הָאֵלָה וַיִּנָּשׁ:
6.20	The angel of God said to him, “Take the meat and the unleavened bread and lay them on this rock, and pour out the broth.” And he did so.	Commands (I) Invoked evaluation	וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו מְלָאךְ הָאֱלֹהִים קַח אֶת־ הַבָּשָׂר וְאֶת־הַמִּצּוֹת וְהִנַּח אֶל־הַסֶּלַע הַלֵּז וְאֶת־הִמְרֹק שִׁפּוֹךְ וַיַּעַשׂ כֵּן:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
E		∞ Gideon	YHWH		–SECURITY: trust	∞ +normality (see 6: 21)
C		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
C	force > raise	Gideon	Gideon			
C		Angel of God	Angel of God			+normality
M		Gideon	Narrator			t, +propriety

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	"Lexical" Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:21	Then the angel of YHWH put out the end of the staff that was in his hand and touched the meat and the unleavened bread; and fire sprang up from the rock and consumed the meat and the unleavened bread. Then the angel of YHWH vanished from his sight.	Invoked evaluation confirms the conditional if ... then ... above (6:17)	וַיִּשְׁלַח מִלֶּאֱדָי יְהוָה אֶת־קֶצֶה הַמִּשְׁעָנָה אֲשֶׁר בְּיָדוֹ וַיִּגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר וּבַמִּצּוֹת וַתַּעַל הָאֵשׁ מִן־הָצוּר וַתֹּאכַל אֶת־הַבָּשָׂר וְאֶת־הַמִּצּוֹת וּמִלֶּאֱדָי יְהוָה הָלַךְ מֵעֵינָיו:
6:22	When Gideon saw that he was the angel of YHWH, he said, "Alas, O Lord God!	Interjection	וַיֵּרָא גִדְעוֹן כִּי־מִלֶּאֱדָי יְהוָה הוּא וַיֹּאמֶר גִּדְעוֹן אֵלֶּהָ אֲדֹנָי יְהוָה
	For now I have seen the angel of YHWH face to face."	Invoked evaluation	כִּי־עַל־כֵּן רָאִיתִי מִלֶּאֱדָי יְהוָה פָּנִים אֶל־פָּנִים:
6:23	YHWH said to him, "Peace to you,	"peace"	וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ יְהוָה שָׁלוֹם לָךְ
	do not fear;	Negated Command	אַל־תִּירָא
	[not fear]	Negated "fear"	[אַל־תִּירָא]
	you shall not die."	Negated Command	לֹא תָמוּת:
	[not die]	Negated "die"	[לֹא תָמוּת]
6:24	Then Gideon built an altar there to YHWH and named it YHWH is Peace. To this day it is still in Ophrah of the Abiezrites.	Invoked Evaluation	וַיִּבֶן שֵׁם גִּדְעוֹן מִזְבֵּחַ לַיהוָה וַיִּקְרָא לוֹ יְהוָה שָׁלוֹם עַד הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה עוֹדָנוּ בְּעֹפְרַת אֲבֵי הָעֹזְרִי:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Gideon	(angel of) YHWH			t, +normality (see 6:17)
M		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust –HAPPINESS	
M		Gideon	Gideon		t, –SECURITY: trust	
M		Gideon	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C	force > raise	Gideon	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C		Gideon	YHWH			
C		Gideon	YHWH		∞ +SECURITY: trust	
C	force > raise	Gideon	YHWH			
M		Gideon	Gideon		t, +SECURITY: trust	

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6.25	Now on the same night YHWH said to him, “Take your father’s bull and a second bull seven years old, and pull down the altar of Baal which belongs to your father, and cut down the Asherah that is beside it;	Command (I) Commands, repetition	וַיְהִי בַלַּיְלָה הַהוּא וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ יְהוָה קַח אֶת־פֶּרֶה־הַשּׁוֹר אֲשֶׁר לְאָבִיךָ וּפֶרֶה שְׁנִי שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים וְהַרְסֵתָ אֶת־מִזְבֵּחַ הַבַּעַל אֲשֶׁר לְאָבִיךָ וְאֶת־ הָאֲשֵׁרָה אֲשֶׁר־עִלָּיו תִּכְרֹת:
6.26	and build an altar to YHWH your God on the top of this stronghold in an orderly manner, and take a second bull and offer a burnt offering with the wood of the Asherah which you shall cut down.”	Commands	וּבִנִיתָ מִזְבֵּחַ לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ עַל רֹאשׁ הַמְּעוֹז הַזֶּה בְּמַעְרְכָה וּלְקַחְתָּ אֶת־הַפֶּרֶה הַשְּׁנִי וְהַעֲלִיתָ עֹלָה בְּעֵצֵי הָאֲשֵׁרָה אֲשֶׁר תִּכְרֹת:
	[in an orderly manner]	Adverbial, “orderly manner”	[בְּמַעְרְכָה]
6:27	Then Gideon took ten men of his servants and did just as YHWH had spoken to him; and because he was too afraid of his father’s household and the men of the city to do it by day, [too afraid ... to do]	Invoked evaluation “afraid” Stative as modifier Superlative modifier	וַיִּקַּח גִּדְעוֹן עֲשָׂרָה אַנְשִׁים מֵעַבְדָּיו וַיַּעַשׂ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר אֱלֹהֵי יְהוָה וַיְהִי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָרָא אֶת־בֵּית אָבִיו וְאֶת־ אֲנָשֵׁי הָעִיר מַעֲשֹׂת יוֹמָם [יָרָא ... מַעֲשֹׂת]
	he did it by night.	Invoked evaluation	וַיַּעַשׂ לַיְלָה:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
C		YHWH	YHWH			+capacity +normality
C	force > raise	Israelites	YHWH	I		∞t, propriety
C	force > raise	YHWH	YHWH			+normality
C	force > raise	Israelites	YHWH			∞+capacity
M		Gideon	YHWH			∞ +propriety
M		Gideon	Narrator			t, +propriety
M		Gideon	Narrator		Dominating Prosody –SECURITY: confidence/ trust	
M	force > raise	Gideon	Narrator			
M		Gideon	Narrator		t, –SECURITY: confidence/trust	+propriety

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:28	When the men of the city arose early in the morning, behold,	Adverb	וַיִּשְׁכְּמוּ אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר בַּבֹּקֶר וְהִנֵּה
	the altar of Baal was torn down, and the Asherah which was beside it was cut down, and the second bull was offered on the altar which had been built.	Invoked evaluation	נָתַן מִזְבֵּחַ הַבַּעַל וְהָאֲשֵׁרָה אֲשֶׁר-עָלָיו כָּרְתָהּ וְאֵת הַפָּר הַשֵּׁנִי הָעֹלָה עַל- הַמִּזְבֵּחַ הַבְּנוּי:
6:29	They said to one another, “Who did this thing?”	Interrogative	וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל-רֵעֵהוּ מִי עָשָׂה הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה
	And when they searched about and inquired,	“searched” “inquired”	וַיִּדְרְשׁוּ וַיִּבְקְשׁוּ
	they said, “Gideon the son of Joash did this thing.”	Invoked evaluation	וַיֹּאמְרוּ גִדְעוֹן בֶּן-יֹאשׁ עָשָׂה הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה:
6:30	Then the men of the city said to Joash, “Bring out your son, that he may die,	Command (I) Jussive verb	וַיֹּאמְרוּ אַנְשֵׁי הָעִיר אֶל-יֹאשׁ הוּצֵא אֶת-בְּנֶךְ וְיָמָת
	[that he may die]	“die”	[וְיָמָת]
	[that he may die,]	Invoked evaluation	[וְיָמָת]
	because he has torn down the altar of Baal, and because he has cut down the Asherah which was beside it.”	Invoked evaluation	כִּי נָתַן אֶת-מִזְבֵּחַ הַבַּעַל וְכִי כָרַת הָאֲשֵׁרָה אֲשֶׁר-עָלָיו:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Men of the city	Narrator		–SECURITY: surprise	
M		Gideon	Narrator			+propriety
E		Men of the city	Men of the city		–SECURITY –SATISFACTION	
M		Men of the city	Narrator		–SECURITY	
M		Gideon	Men of the city	I		Saturating Prosody t, –propriety
C		men of the city	men of the city			+capacity +normality
C		men of the city	men of the city		+INCLINATION	
M		men of the city	men of the city		–SATISFACTION	
M		Gideon	men of the city		t, –HAPPINESS t, –SECURITY	
M		Gideon	men of the city	I		t, –propriety
M		Gideon	men of the city		t, –SATISFACTION	
M		Gideon	men of the city	I		t, –propriety

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	"Lexical" Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:31	But Joash said to all who stood against him, "Will you contend for Baal, or will you deliver him? Whoever will plead for him shall be put to death by morning. If he is a god, then let him contend for himself, because someone has torn down his altar." [let him contend]	Rhetorical question "put to death" Modifier Conditional if... then ... Jussive verb	וַיֹּאמֶר יוֹאָשׁ לְכָל אֲשֶׁר-עָמְדוּ עָלָיו הָאֵתָם תִּרְבִּיּוּן לְבַעַל אִם-אַתֶּם תּוֹשִׁיעַ- עוֹן אוֹתוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִרְבֵּי לוֹ יוֹמָת עַד-הַבֹּקֶר אִם-אֱלֹהִים הוּא יִרְבֵּי לוֹ כִּי נִתֵּן אֶת-מִזְבְּחוֹ: [יִרְבֵּי]
6:32	Therefore on that day he named him Jerubbaal, that is to say, "Let Baal contend against him," because he had torn down his altar.	Invoked evaluation	וַיִּקְרָא-לוֹ בַּיּוֹם-הַהוּא יִרְבֵּעַל לֵאמֹר יִרְבֵּי בּוֹ הַבַּעַל כִּי נִתֵּן אֶת-מִזְבְּחוֹ:
6:33	Then all the Midianites and the Amalekites and the sons of the east assembled themselves; and they crossed over and camped in the valley of Jezreel.	—	וְכָל-מִדְיָן וְעַמְלֵק וּבְנֵי-קֶדֶם נֶאֱסָפוּ יַחְדָּו וַיַּעֲבְרוּ וַיַּחֲנוּ בַּעֲמֵק יִזְרְעֶאל:
6:34	So the Spirit of YHWH came upon Gideon; and he blew a trumpet, and the Abiezrites were called together to follow him.	Invoked evaluation	וְרוּחַ יְהוָה לָבָשָׁה אֶת-גִּדְדֵּעוֹן וַיִּתְקַע בְּשׁוֹפָר וַיִּזְעַק אֲבִיעִזְרֵי אַחֲרָיו:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
E		Baal	Joash			–capacity – normality
M		men of the city	Joash		–SATISFACTION	–propriety
M	force > raise	men of the city	Joash			
E		Baal	Joash			∞ +capacity
E		Baal	Joash		–INCLINATION	
M		Gideon	Narrator			t, +capacity t, +normality
M		Gideon	Narrator	I		t, –propriety
–	–	–	–	–	–	–
M		Gideon	Narrator > YHWH		t, +SECURITY: trust	+normality ¹³⁰

130 This positive evaluation would be according to a cultural norm, in that YHWH's spirit comes on those he is pleased with and departs from those he is displeased with (e.g. Saul).

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	"Lexical" Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:35	He sent messengers through-out Manasseh, and they also were called together to follow him ; and he sent messengers to Asher, Zebulun, and Naphtali, and they came up to meet them .	Invoked evaluations	ומלאכים שלח בכל־מנשה ויזעק גם־הוא את־ריו ומלאכים שלח באשר ובזבולון ובנפתלי ויעלו לקראתם:
6:36	Then Gideon said to God, "If ...	Conditional if ... then ...	ויאמר גִּדְעֹן אֶל־הָאֱלֹהִים אִם־...
	"If you will deliver Israel through me,	"deliver"	אִם־יִשָּׁד מוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל
	as you have spoken/ promised, ...	"spoken/ promised"	כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ:
6:37	... behold, I will put a fleece of wool on the threshing floor. If there is dew on the fleece only, and it is dry on all the ground, then I will know that [only] ... [all]	Conditional if ... then ... Modifiers	הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי מַצִּיג אֶת־גִּזְתֵּי הַצֶּמֶר בְּגֶרֶן אִם טל יהיה עַל־הַגִּזָּה לְבִדָּה וְעַל־כָּל־ הָאָרֶץ חָרֵב וְיָדַעְתִּי [לְבִדָּה] ... [כָּל]
	you will deliver Israel through me,	"deliver"	כִּי־תוֹשִׁיעַ בְּיָדִי אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל
	as you have spoken/ promised."	"speak/ promise"	כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ:
6:38	And it was so . When he arose early the next morning and squeezed the fleece, he drained the dew from the fleece, a bowl full of water.	Invoked evaluation (confirms conditional if ... then ... above)	וַיְהִי־כֵן וַיִּשָּׁכֶם מִמַּחֲרַת וַיִּזְר אֶת־הַגִּזָּה וַיִּמָּץ טל מִן־הַגִּזָּה מְלֹא הַסֶּפֶל מִים:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
M		Gideon	Narrator		t, +SECURITY: trust	t, +normality
E		Gideon	Gideon		Saturating Prosody –SECURITY: trust	
E		YHWH	Gideon			Saturating Prosody ∞ +capacity ∞ +propriety
E		YHWH	Gideon			∞ +veracity ∞ +tenacity
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
E	force > raise	Gideon	Gideon			
E		YHWH	Gideon			∞ –propriety ∞ –capacity
E		YHWH	Gideon			∞ –veracity ∞ –tenacity
C		YHWH (confirmed)	Gideon			t, +veracity t, +tenacity t, +propriety t, +capacity

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
6:39	Then Gideon said to God, “Do not let your anger burn against me	Negated jussive verb	וַיֹּאמֶר גִּדְעוֹן אֶל־יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶל־יָחִיד אִפְּדֵ בִי
	[anger]	“anger”	[אִפְּדֵ]
	that I may speak once more;	Cohortative verb	וַאֲדַבְּרָה אִךְ הַפֶּעַם
	[once more]	Modifier	[אִךְ הַפֶּעַם]
	please let me make a test once more with the fleece,	Imperfect verb with אֵין with cohortative meaning	אֲנִסֶּה נָא יְרֵק־הַפֶּעַם בַּגֶּזֶה
	[once more]	Modifier	[רֵק־הַפֶּעַם]
	let it now be dry only on the fleece,	Jussive verb with אֵין	יְהִי־נָא חָרֵב אֶל־הַגֶּזֶה לְבִדָּה
	and let there be dew on all the ground.”	Imperfect verb with cohortative meaning	וְעַל־כָּל־הָאָרֶץ יִהְיֶה־טֶל:
	[only] ... [all]	Modifiers	[לְבִדָּה] ... [כָּל]
6:40	God did so that night; for it was dry only on the fleece, and dew was on all the ground.	Invoked evaluation	וַיַּעַשׂ אֱלֹהִים כֵּן בַּלַּיְלָה הַהוּא וַיְהִי־ חָרֵב אֶל־הַגֶּזֶה לְבִדָּה וְעַל־כָּל־הָאָרֶץ הָיָה טֶל:

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
E		Gideon	YHWH		–HAPPINESS	
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
E	force > raise	Gideon	Gideon			
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
E		YHWH	Gideon			∞ +tenacity ∞ +veracity ∞ +propriety ∞ +capacity
E	force > raise				(Applies to 2 rows above.)	
E		YHWH	Gideon			∞ +tenacity ∞ +veracity ∞ +propriety ∞ +capacity
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
E		YHWH	Gideon			∞ +tenacity ∞ +veracity ∞ +propriety ∞ +capacity
E		Gideon	Gideon		–SECURITY: trust	
E	force > raise	YHWH	Gideon		(Applies to 4 rows above.)	
C		YHWH (confirmed)	Gideon			t, +tenacity t, +veracity t, +propriety t, +capacity
C		Gideon	Gideon		t, +SECURITY: trust	

(cont.)

Jdg	Appraising Items (English: NASB modified)	“Lexical” Syntactic Token	Appraising Items (Hebrew)
...
	[only]... [all]	Modifiers	[לְבָדָה]... [כָּל]
8:28	So Midian was subdued before the sons of Israel,...	“subdue” (confirms the conditional if... then ... above in 6:36)	וַיִּכְנַע מִדְיָן לִפְנֵי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

C/E/M	Graduation	Who is Appraised	Appraiser	C/I	AFFECT	JUDGEMENT
E	force > raise					(Applies to 2 rows above.)
...
M		Midian	Narrator			– capacity
M		YHWH	Narrator			t, + veracity t, + tenacity t, + propriety t, + capacity

Sam(p)son's Advent: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of Judges 13 in Hebrew and Greek

Anthony Pyles

Introduction

Over the last fifty years a revolution has taken place in the field of biblical studies, a revolution which has proven to be of immense benefit in understanding biblical texts in their original languages. This revolution has come about in the application of modern linguistics to the languages and texts of biblical literature, and it has led to great advances in our understanding of everything from Greek syntax to Hebrew orthography to Aramaic word order.¹

At first glance this is a bit like saying there has been a revolution in carpentry with the introduction of electric power tools, a statement so broad as to be uninteresting. But reflect for a moment on what this means. A woodworking tool as commonplace as a router did not exist prior to World War I; yet this simple tool has revolutionized cabinetry and empowered 'do-it-yourselfers' the world over. Likewise the category of discourse analysis, an approach forged in modern linguistics, has the potential to do great things for biblical scholars, providing them with a power tool for exegesis, criticism, translation, and interpretation. But what exactly is discourse analysis, and how has it been applied in biblical studies? Are there other avenues of research for which it may prove useful? After surveying these questions I will argue that a tagmemic model of discourse analysis provides an ideal yet little explored approach to understanding the relationship between texts in the Hebrew Bible and their Old Greek translation(s). I will then demonstrate this potential by developing and applying a method of comparative discourse analysis to the birth narrative of Samson (Judges 13).

¹ See, for example, Walter Ray Bodine, ed., *Linguistics and Biblical Hebrew* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992); Randall Buth, "Word Order in Aramaic from the Perspective of Functional Grammar and Discourse Analysis" (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1987); Eugene A. Nida, "Implications of Contemporary Linguistics for Biblical Scholarship," *JBL* 91 (1972): 73–89; Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (BLG 2; 2nd ed.; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994).

Discourse Analysis

General Description

The majority of linguistic schools are concerned with analysis at or below the level of the sentence;² so much so, in fact, as to limit the domain of linguistic investigation to isolated sentences. The statement of John Lyons is typical: "*The sentence is the largest unit of grammatical description*. A sentence is a grammatical unit between the constituent parts of which distributional limitations and dependencies can be established, but which can itself be put into no distributional class."³ Schools of discourse analysis, on the other hand, concern themselves with texts or discourses, that is, coherent combinations of sentences. These approaches (and indeed their name is Legion) all have in common an assumption that linguistic data and structures requiring and inviting description exist above the level of the clause or sentence. Not only are there linguistic phenomena beyond the sentence interesting in their own right, but they also have been shown to directly impact lower-level linguistic phenomena, from pronouns to phonology. Linguists of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) noticed this in their fieldwork,⁴ and the work of European scholars confirms this. De Beaugrande and Dressler summarize the beginnings of textlinguistics thus:

Karl-Erich Heidolph (1966) notes that the factors of accent, intonation, and word-order within a sentence depend on the organization of other sentences in the vicinity. He suggested that a feature of "mentioned" vs. "not mentioned" could be inserted into the grammar to regulate these factors. Horst Isenberg (1968, 1971) follows Heidolph with a further enumeration of factors which cannot be solved within the bounds of the isolated sentence, such as pronouns, articles, and sequences of tenses.

2 This is especially true of linguistics in North America. Writing about the situation in North America Robert Longacre states: "As an heir of American structuralism, Pike did not receive much direct encouragement to study discourse" (Robert E. Longacre, "Discourse," in *Tagmemics: Volume 1: Aspects of the Field* [ed. Ruth M. Brend and Kenneth Lee Pike; Trends in Linguistics 1; The Hague: Mouton, 1976], 1–44 [2]).

3 Lyons is here expanding on Bloomfield's definition of a sentence. John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 172–73 (italics original).

4 "These problems [in the analysis of Maxakali clauses] proved to be severe and unsolvable without some reference to some unit higher than the clause-sentence itself" (Longacre, "Discourse," 10). Cf. in particular James Loriot and Barbara Hollenbach, "Shipibo Paragraph Structure," *Foundations of Language* 6 (1970): 43–66, on which see below.

He adds features intended to capture the status of noun phrases, e.g. knownness, identity, identifiability, generality, and contrastivity. He also appeals to coherence relations like cause, purpose, specification, and temporal proximity.⁵

While all discourse analysis is concerned with supra-sentential information, this field of linguistic research is far from unified, whether in regard to goals, methods, or terminology. The terms *discourse analysis*, *text grammar*, *textlinguistics*, and others are sometimes used interchangeably and at other times with quite different endeavors in view. *Discourse analysis*, though the most prevalent technical expression in North American contexts, is particularly susceptible to confusion with *conversation analysis*, which focuses on the interaction of participants in a conversation. The primary object of study in discourse analysis is a text or discourse, i.e., a definable linguistic unit above the level of the sentence (and often the paragraph).

Its Use in Biblical Studies

Much work has been done in biblical studies using a variety of discourse analytical models.⁶ The 1980s and 90s saw the introduction of discourse analysis into the mainstream of biblical studies, with both significant monographs and collections of essays.⁷ Interest has continued to grow since this initial beginning.

5 Robert-Alain de Beaugrande and Wolfgang U. Dressler, *Introduction to Text Linguistics* (London: Longman, 1981), 24.

6 For a comprehensive bibliography of discourse analysis in general, but also with a particular view to biblical studies, see Kirk E. Lowery, "A Classified Discourse Analysis Bibliography," in *Discourse Analysis of Biblical Literature: What it is and What it Offers* (ed. Walter Ray Bodine; SemeiaSt; Atlanta: Scholars, 1995), 213–53.

7 E.g., Robert D. Bergen, ed., *Biblical Hebrew and Discourse Linguistics* (Dallas: SIL, 1994); David Alan Black et al., eds., *Linguistics and New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis* (Nashville: Broadman, 1992); Bodine, ed., *Discourse Analysis of Biblical Literature*; David Allan Dawson, *Text-Linguistics and Biblical Hebrew* (JSOTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994); Robert E. Longacre, *Joseph: A Story of Divine Providence: A Text Theoretical and Textlinguistic Analysis of Genesis 37 and 39–48* (2nd ed.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003 [1989]); Alviero Niccacci, *The Syntax of the Verb in Classical Hebrew Prose* (JSOTSup 86; Sheffield: JSOT, 1990); Stanley E. Porter, "Discourse Analysis and New Testament Studies: An Introductory Survey," in *Discourse Analysis and Other Topics in Biblical Greek* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson; JSNTSup 113; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 14–35; Stanley E. Porter and Jeffrey T. Reed, eds., *Discourse Analysis and the New Testament: Approaches and Results* (JSNTSup 170; SNTG 4; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999); E.J. van Wolde, ed., *Narrative Syntax and the Hebrew Bible: Papers of the Tilburg Conference 1996* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

One of the most promising schools of discourse analysis in use in biblical studies today is that of Tagmemics, as developed by Kenneth Pike and Robert Longacre. Though little-used by New Testament scholars, Longacre and his disciples have applied this method to numerous prose texts in the Hebrew Bible.⁸ As this is the model that I will adapt for the purposes of the present article, it behooves me to elucidate its development, theoretical assumptions, and methodology.

Tagmemics

The Theory

The Hierarchical Nature of Language

Tagmemics is a comprehensive theory of human behavior in general, though most of its applications have taken place in linguistics.⁹ Its foundational assumptions are: (1) human behavior can be divided into contrastive, meaningful units; (2) these units are properly understood in their context (rather than in isolation); (3) these units combine hierarchically, such that a larger unit comprises (one or more) smaller units; and (4) descriptions from varying perspectives are complementary.¹⁰ On the last assumption, Kenneth Pike outlines three different, complementary perspectives that invite analysis—all

-
- 8 E.g., Dawson, *Text-Linguistics and Biblical Hebrew*; Roy L. Heller, *Narrative Structure and Discourse Constellations: An Analysis of Clause Function in Biblical Hebrew Prose* (HSS 55; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2004); Robert E. Longacre, "Building for the Worship of God: Exodus 25:1–30:10," in *Discourse Analysis of Biblical Literature*, 21–49; Robert E. Longacre, "The Discourse of the Flood Narrative," *JAAAR* 47 (1979): 89–133; Robert E. Longacre, "Genesis as Soap Opera: Some Observations about Storytelling in the Hebrew Bible," *JOTT* 7 (1995): 1–8; Longacre, *Joseph*; Robert E. Longacre, "Who Sold Joseph into Egypt?," in R. Laird Harris et al., eds., *Interpretation and History: Essays in Honour of Allan A. MacRae* (Singapore: Christian Life, 1986), 75–91. For further discussion, see below.
- 9 Cf. the seminal monograph on Tagmemics: Kenneth Lee Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior* (Janua linguarum Series maior 24; 2nd. rev. ed.; The Hague: Mouton, 1967). The theory has also been applied fruitfully in anthropology and ethnomusicology; cf. Mridula Adenwala Durbin, "Linguistic Models in Anthropology," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 1 (1972): 383–410; Kenneth Lee Pike, "Mixtec Social 'Credit Rating': The Particular Versus the Universal in One Emic World View," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 83 (1986): 3047–49.
- 10 These assumptions are laid out and described more fully, in particular with regard to Pike's views (as opposed to those of Longacre), in Linda K. Jones, "A Synopsis of Tagmemics," in *Current Approaches to Syntax* (ed. Edith A. Moravcsik and Jessica R. Wirth; Syntax and Semantics 13; New York: Academic, 1980), 77–96.

of which are built into tagmemic theory. The first of these is that of a particle: analyzing linguistic structures as discrete units. The second is that of a wave: viewing units as merging and overlapping. The third view, which looks at units in relationship with other units, is called a field perspective.¹¹

Regarding the second assumption, the importance of context is a rallying cry for teachers of exegesis the world over. A single word can convey a variety of nuances when it occurs in one sentence versus another. In the same way, “She then gave him the boot” means one thing in a conversation about shopping for footwear, and quite another in a discussion of someone’s performance review or ex-boyfriend. Tagmemics, because of its concern with all of human behavior, is able to incorporate context into the levels of hierarchy in its analysis (whether as a particle, a wave, or a field). All human communication and behavior, then, is hierarchical. Consider this statement from Pike:

Reductionism is inadequate. We do not have access to the ultimate minimum units; our successors may find even smaller bits of matter or of energy, just as our contemporaries have gone deeper than did those Greeks who talked earlier about atoms. And there are thresholds where the whole cannot be equated to parts in mere combination; hierarchy is needed, with threshold phenomena . . . Then any discipline can enter wherever it chooses, by an arbitrary—human—choice for pleasure or profit, and build upwards to expanding complexity, and downwards to descending complexity (not downward to ultimate simplicity, since the parts are, once more, viewable only by man in system, in structure, in emic relations to causation as deduced by man in man’s system—and this is not simple). Biology may choose to enter via a living cell, going up, for example, to man and down to photosynthesis—or something else. In linguistics, I personally choose to enter *not* at the level of the sentence, nor even by use of a feature of a sound (for example, voicing), but at the level of *social interaction* of person with person. This leads directly to dialogue, personal response, and definition of sentence in relation to dialogue.¹²

In tagmemic description the basic unit is a tagmeme, which combines with other tagmemes to form a syntagmeme of the next level up in hierarchy. These concepts will be explained at greater depth in what follows. However, this

11 Cf. Kenneth Lee Pike, *Linguistic Concepts: An Introduction to Tagmemics* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), xi–xii.

12 Pike, *Linguistic Concepts*, xiii.

concept of tagmemes, which combine into syntagmemes, is what facilitates the ability of Tagmemics to describe language phenomena at any level, from morphemes to discourses. It also allows for the analysis of other human behavior, such as social interactions, jokes, and musical compositions.

The Tagmeme

With respect to language, the units are termed tagmemes. In early Tagmemics, as well as the subsequent work of Longacre, tagmemes have two features: slot and class. The slot is the relation occupied by the tagmeme in a given construction, whereas the class is the set from which a tagmeme may be drawn.¹³ A tagmeme is thus represented as having two cells:¹⁴

slot	class
------	-------

FIGURE 5.1 *The tagmeme.*

The dual consideration of both slot (function) and class (filler) enriches linguistic description by allowing for simultaneous functional and structural labeling. This is a significant advantage over non-functional linguistic approaches, which are concerned with structure without any regard to the meaning of the language as it is used. Consider the following example:

The sentence “The intrepid hunter shot the charging buffalo” has three main constituent parts: (1) the intrepid hunter, (2) shot, and (3) the charging buffalo. How can these constituents be described? We can say that the constituents are subject, predicate, object—but this misses the “stuff” of which the sentence is composed. We could say that the

13 We could equally well call the slot and class by the terms “function” and “filler.” Cf. Robert E. Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse* (Topics in Language and Linguistics 3; 2nd ed.; New York: Plenum, 1996), 270.

14 Pike went on to develop tagmemes with further features, attempting to account for as much detail as possible. The unwieldy growth expanded up to nine cells at one point before diminishing to a four-cell model. In his own work on discourse, Longacre has used the two-celled tagmeme throughout his career and is followed by many in this. Cf. Kenneth Lee Pike, “The Tetrahedron as a Model for the Four-Cell Tagmeme in its Multiple Relations,” in *Text and Tagmeme* (ed. Kenneth Lee Pike and Evelyn G. Pike; Open Linguistics; Norwood: Ablex, 1983), 104–24.

sentence is composed of noun phrase, verb phrase, and noun phrase—but this misses the function of the three parts. Tagmemics suggests: Why not refer to *both*; the former as *slots* or *functions* and the latter as fillers (representatives of a filler set). Hence the three parts of the sentence are: Subject filled by noun phrase, transitive predicate filled by (minimal) verb phrase, and object filled by noun phrase.¹⁵

The notion of slot and filler makes the tagmeme very adaptable. One may think of a greeting slot in a telephone conversation, which can be filled by any member in a class of standard greetings: “Hello?” or “How may I help you?” or “Who’s calling?” etc. This adaptability is also what makes tagmemics useful for describing other human behavior: imagine a call-to-worship slot in a worship service, which can be filled by any member in a class of exhortations from the Psalms.

The Syntagmeme

Tagmemes are building blocks, the constituents of larger units. These larger units are termed syntagmemes. Because these units combine hierarchically, any level in a hierarchy can be viewed as a tagmeme (a constituent part) or a syntagmeme (a construction built from constituent parts).¹⁶ For example, in the first sentence of this paragraph, the word “Tagmemes” is itself a tagmeme: it is a subject-slot filled by the plural noun “tagmemes,” and it combines with other phrase tagmemes into the first-sentence syntagmeme. But we could also view the sentence as a tagmeme, a particular sentence that fills an “introductory sentence” slot and that combines with other sentence-level tagmemes to form this paragraph-level tagmeme. From morpheme up to the level of text, the linguist may proceed with an analogous analysis. Words are the constituent tagmemes of phrase syntagmemes, a clause is a syntagmeme comprised of phrase tagmemes, clauses combine to form sentences, paragraphs are formed of sentences, etc.

Tagmemics and Discourse Analysis

Because Tagmemics is concerned with units in context and does not limit itself a priori to the level of the sentence, it has been ripe for use in the analysis of discourse since its very beginnings. There was never any reason or limitation within the theory that required stopping at the level of sentence tagmemes;

¹⁵ Longacre, *Joseph*, 60–61.

¹⁶ There are, of course, practical limitations. For example, a morpheme arguably has zero constituent structure and thus cannot be analyzed as a syntagmeme on its own. Cf. Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*, 280.

instead there was the possibility of continuing on up to consider entire texts in terms of the hierarchical units that comprise them. It did not take many years for precisely this kind of analysis to begin. In fact, such work is seen as early as 1958. James Lorient, working on Shipibo in Peru, resorted to description of slot-functions (tagmemes) in paragraph-sized units to explain the phenomena of certain conjunctions. The conjunctions could not be adequately described any other way. This unpublished work was presented at numerous workshops to other SIL personnel and subsequently published as a co-authored paper.¹⁷

Robert Longacre in particular has gone on to develop and apply a method of discourse analysis in the tagmemic model. Longacre and his colleagues working with SIL often found it necessary to resort to discourse analysis to explain features of languages in Central America, Irian Jaya, and other parts of the world. This long history of fieldwork has given shape to Longacre's theory, displayed most fully in his *Grammar of Discourse*.¹⁸

The Work of Robert Longacre

General Work

Two components of Longacre's theory are particularly helpful in discourse analysis. The first is his theory of exponence. Simply put, the function of a tagmeme on a given level may be expounded by a set of syntagmemes from the same or a different level. For primary exponence, the function of a tagmeme is expounded by syntagmemes of the next level down in a hierarchy. Thus, one would "expect discourse to be composed primarily of sentences, sentences to be composed primarily of clauses, clauses primarily of phrases, etc."¹⁹ But there are other forms of exponence, as well: recursion (i.e. nesting, or same level exponence), backlooping (i.e. higher level exponence, e.g., a relative clause as a constituent in a noun phrase), and level-skipping (i.e. exponence that skips over levels in the hierarchy, such as an entire paragraph serving as the object of a verb of speech). The recognition of this variety of exponence allows for the concept of embedding, where sub-paragraphs or even whole embedded discourses can be identified and handled accordingly. It also eliminates the need to pose a hierarchical level between paragraph and text, because one text can be embedded within another.

17 Cf. the discussion of Lorient's work and its impact in Longacre, "Discourse," 8–10, and *passim*. For the later published material see Lorient and Hollenbach, "Shipibo Paragraph Structure."

18 Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*. Particularly rich are the distillation and synthesis in ch. 9, "A Framework for Discourse Analysis," 269–317.

19 Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*, 276.

The second element of Longacre’s theory that is especially beneficial is the delineation of text-types.²⁰ By employing three parameters (agent orientation, contingent succession, and projected time) a number of possible text-types can be categorized into one of eight cells:²¹

	+ Agent Orientation	–Agent Orientation	
+ CONTINGENT SUCCESSION	NARRATIVE	PROCEDURAL	
	Prophecy	How-to-do-it	+ Projection
	Story	How-it-was-done	– Projection
– CONTINGENT SUCCESSION	BEHAVIORAL	EXPOSITORY	
	Hortatory Promissory	Budget Proposal Futuristic Essay	+ Projection
	Eulogy	Scientific Paper	– Projection

FIGURE 5.2 *Text-types.*

Two immediate caveats must be added: first, additional parameters (e.g. tension) may prove useful in further delineation of text-types (thus producing more than eight possibilities); second, not all text-types are necessarily realized in the surface structure of a given language (i.e. one language may manifest eight distinct text-types whereas another only manifests four). For those text-types which are realized, however, languages will employ different devices (often verbal aspect) to encode ‘on-’ or ‘off-line’ information within a given type. (For example, in English the simple past forms the backbone of

20 Longacre describes the text-types as ‘discourse types.’ This creates confusion, especially in his monograph on the Joseph narrative, where he goes on to consider the role of dialogue in narrative. I will use the more transparent term ‘text-type.’

21 Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*, 10.

narrative discourse, whereas imperfect verbs supply some kind of background information.)

Work in Biblical Hebrew

Longacre has taken the theory, developed over decades of fieldwork and distilled in his *Grammar*, and applied it extensively to Biblical Hebrew, most notably in his analysis of the Joseph narrative.²² In this innovative monograph he posits verb ranking schemes (clines) for narrative, predictive, and hortatory text-types in Hebrew:²³

Hebrew Narrative Text-type	
Band 1:	1. <i>wayyiqtol</i>
Storyline	
Band 2:	2.1. <i>qatal</i> initial (without ו)
Secondary	2.2. Noun + <i>qatal</i> (with noun in focus)
Band 3:	3.1. הַנִּלְוָה + participle
Backgrounded	3.2. Participle
Activities	3.3. Noun + participle
Band 4:	4.1. <i>wayyiqtol</i> of הִיה
Setting + terminus	4.2. <i>qatal</i> of הִיה
	4.3. Nominal clause (verbless)
	4.4. Existential clause with וְ
Band 5	5. Negation of verb clause: irrealis (any band)

FIGURE 5.3 *Hebrew narrative verb cline.*

Hebrew narrative is structured on a *wayyiqtol* backbone. This verb form is, as it were, the least marked form for narrative, and forms the skeleton. Other verb forms in the bands of the chart are like successive layers of muscle, flesh, and clothing placed onto the narrative. A secondary storyline is formed by *qatal* forms, whereas participles encode activities that lie in the background of the narrative events. 'Be' verbs, verbless clauses, and existential clauses all provide information relevant to the setting. Negated verb clauses encode information that is contrary-to-fact and hence irrealis, so they are furthest removed from the storyline.

²² Longacre, *Joseph*.

²³ These charts are adapted from Longacre, *Joseph*, 79, 106, 21, respectively.

Hebrew Predictive Text-type	
Band 1:	1. <i>weqatal</i>
Line of Prediction	
Band 2:	2.1. <i>yiqtol</i>
Backgrounded	2.2. Noun + <i>yiqtol</i> (with noun in focus)
Predictions	
Band 3:	3.1. הַיָּהּ + participle
Backgrounded	3.2. Participle
Activities	3.3. Noun + participle
Band 4:	4.1. <i>weqatal</i> of הִיהַ
Setting	4.2. <i>yiqtol</i> of הִיהַ
	4.3. Nominal clause (verbless)
	4.4. Existential clause with יֵשׁ

FIGURE 5.4 *Hebrew predictive text-type verb cline.*

The predictive text-type in Biblical Hebrew is built on a skeleton of *weqatal* forms. Simple *yiqtol* clauses also serve a predictive function but are off-line. Participles, as in narrative, record activity that somehow lies in the background, and ‘be’ verbs and verbless and existential clauses provide setting. A predictive text-type may also have an irrealis band that specifies what will not come to pass. It may be useful to include *qatal* forms as the topmost form in the setting, band 4.

Hebrew Hortatory Text-type	
Band 1:	1.1. Imperative (2p) (unranked)
Primary line of	1.2. Cohortative (1p) (unranked)
Exhortation	1.3. Jussive (3p) (unranked)
Band 2:	2.1. לֹא + jussive/ <i>yiqtol</i>
Secondary line	2.2. Modal <i>yiqtol</i>
of Exhortation	
Band 3:	3.1. <i>weqatal</i>
Results/Consequences	3.2. יִהְיֶה/לֹא + <i>yiqtol</i>
(Motivation)	3.3. (Future) <i>qatal</i>
Band 4:	4.1. <i>qatal</i> (of past events)
Setting (Problem)	4.2. Participles
	4.3. Nominal clause (verbless)

FIGURE 5.5 *Hebrew hortatory text-type verb cline.*

The hortatory text-type is built on a backbone of volitional forms. A secondary line of exhortation consists of prohibitions and volitional uses of the *yiqtol* form. Other forms supplying motivation for the exhortation make up band 3, whereas *qatal* forms referring to the past, participles, and verbless clauses all provide setting information.

Longacre does not provide a verb cline for expository discourse; however, on the basis of Longacre’s comments, Dawson hesitantly offers one, adapted below:²⁴

Hebrew Expository Text-type	
Band 1:	1.1. Nominal clause (verbless)
Primary line of Exposition	1.2. Existential clauses (with אִין or וְיִ)
Band 2:	2. הִיהַ clauses
Secondary line of Exposition	
Band 3:	
Band 4:	4. Clauses with most action
Context/Setting	and transitivity

FIGURE 5.6 *Hebrew expository text-type verb cline.*

These charts will form the basis of the analysis of the Hebrew text of the Samson cycle.

Work in Biblical Greek

Longacre has also applied his tagmemic discourse analysis to texts in New Testament Greek. In one case he has examined the pericopes in Mark 5, demonstrating the backbone nature of the aorist tense in Greek narrative. He posits a verb rank cline for the narrative with aorist clauses at the top. He then shows how the story can be abstracted or generated by removing or replacing the various levels of the cline in order. In the process, he also compares the abstract obtained from the aorist clauses with the presentation in Matthew. The cline he offers is adapted and presented here as a provisional approach to the Greek text.²⁵

24 Dawson, *Text-Linguistics and Biblical Hebrew*, 116.
25 Robert E. Longacre, “Mark 5.1–43: Generating the Complexity of a Narrative from its Most Basic Elements,” in *Discourse Analysis and the New Testament: Approaches and Results* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Jeffrey T. Reed; JSNTSup 170; SNTG 4; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic,

Greek Narrative Text-type	
<hr/>	
Band 1:	1. Aorist and its consecutives (postposed participles)
Storyline	1.2. Preposed participles dependent on an aorist
Band 2:	2.1. (Historical) Present and its consecutives
Secondary	2.2. Preposed participles dependent on the historical present
Band 3:	3.1. The Imperfect and its consecutives
Backgrounded	3.2. Preposed participles dependent on the imperfect
Activities	
Band 4:	4.1. Be verbs (εἶμί and γίνομαι) and verbless clauses
Setting + terminus	
Band 5	5. Negation of verb clause: irrealis (any band)

FIGURE 5.7 *Greek narrative text-type verb cline.*

Comparative Discourse Analysis

Goal: The Same House?

In Longacre's model of discourse analysis the verb forms of a given text-type provide the structure of the text. We could conceive of the different levels of the cline in a given text-type as the component parts of a house under construction: for Hebrew narrative, the *wayyiqtol* forms are the studs that form the walls; *qatal* forms are the top plates; participial clauses are the joists; nominal and copula clauses are the roof decking. Greek narrative, I submit, has a similar structure for narrative house-building using its own cline (tentatively offered by Longacre and adapted above in Figure 5.7). Comparative discourse analysis, then, asks whether, in the process of translation, one ends up with the same house. Will the walls be in the same place? Will the shape of the rooms, and of the roof, be the same?

1999), 169–96; the verb cline is from p. 179. I have taken the liberty of adding an irrealis band to match the Hebrew narrative text-type's verb cline. Longacre did not, in his article on Mark 5 or in other work I have found, posit any other verb rank clines for Greek.

A related question might involve an inside look at the individual rooms, or the way boards are joined. Is it consistent? For example, *qatal* forms serve different functions in Hebrew narrative, where they provide a secondary storyline, versus a Hebrew hortatory text, where they provide setting information. How are these represented in different text-types in Greek translation? Are they by the same or by different forms? Even if we have the same house, do the rooms look the same?

Anticipated Difficulties

Any cross-linguistic endeavor must come to terms with the fact that language B does not have the same set of resources as language A. This is often noted with regard to vocabulary, but it is also true with regard to the verbal systems of Hebrew and Greek. For example, Hebrew does not have a subjunctive or optative mood, and its participles are not aspectual. How then will a translator render a Hebrew narrative in Greek, and what use will be made of the range of available options? Will there be discernible criteria used by the translator, or not?

Analyzing the Hebrew

Analysis of the Hebrew will proceed by dividing the text into clauses, labeled by chapter.verse.clause. For example, 13.2.5 would refer to the fifth clause in chapter 13 verse 2. The Hebrew will be presented one clause per line. Main clauses are on the right margin, subordinate clauses are indented one half-inch, speech is indented one-and-a-half inches, and subordinate clauses within speech are indented a further half-inch.²⁶ (Speech embedded within speech will be indented an inch more rather than only a half-inch.) The identification of text-types (including those of embedded texts) will proceed on the basis of the foregoing clines.

To assist the reader in visually identifying what level a given clause belongs to, the following font face alterations will be made to the verb forms (or entire clause, if verbless) for any identified text-type:

26 This charting method is adapted from that used in Dawson, *Text-Linguistics and Biblical Hebrew*.

Band 1	<i>Verb</i> (Hebrew verbs in light font)
Band 2	Verb
Band 3	Verb
Band 4	Verb
Band 5	Verb

FIGURE 5.8 *Verb labels.*

Analyzing the Greek

The Greek text will likewise be divided into clauses and indented with reference to the left margin. I will then attempt to identify text-types. Narrative will be analyzed according to the foregoing cline (Figure 5.7). Since Longacre has not proposed clines for text-types in Greek other than narrative, the identification of non-narrative text-types will rely on the eight-celled chart that classifies text-types in terms of Agent Orientation, Projection, and Contingent (Temporal) Succession.

Making and Assessing the Comparison

Once both analyses are complete, comparison will begin. Important questions will be addressed, such as: Do the general shapes of texts line up? For any discovered embedded non-narrative text types in Hebrew, how are they represented in Greek translation? Are there instances where attempts to provide a wooden translation in Greek have changed the shape of a text-type? What differences exist on the micro as well as the macro level? How has the translator chosen to represent various Hebrew verb forms in Greek, and are such representations affected by the text-types in which they occur?

The Birth Narrative of Samson: A Test Case

Introduction: Issues and Text(s)

The narrative passage I have chosen for a test-case is Samson's birth narrative in Judges 13. This may occasion the raising of eyebrows, for the relationship between the extant Masoretic Hebrew text of Judges and the competing Old Greek manuscripts, specifically Alexandrinus (LXX^A) and Vaticanus (LXX^B), is

difficult to sort out. Furthermore, a critical edition of Greek Judges is lacking.²⁷ On the other hand, in favor of this narrative selection is its modest size, a variety of embedded text-types, and its relative familiarity.

For the sake of my test case I will be comparing MT Judges as preserved in BHS and OG Judges as witnessed to in Rahlfs's A text (based on LXX^A and related manuscripts), with resort to the apparatuses of BHS and the Brooke-Maclean edition of Judges as deemed necessary. Scholars have judged LXX^A to be less contaminated with the slavish literalness of the so-called Kaige rescension; thus, though the underlying Hebrew may differ from MT, LXX^A is also more likely to represent idiomatic Greek.²⁸ It will be assumed except where untenable that LXX^A is translated from a Hebrew Vorlage very close to that preserved in MT;²⁹ those occasions where this seems most unlikely will require comment but are not likely to hinder the overall project.

Analysis of MT

Judges 13 manifests a narrative text-type, whose backbone is the *wayyiqtol* verb-form. Other text-types can be seen in embedded speech sections, and are identified below.

וַיִּסְפוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לַעֲשׂוֹת הָרַע בְּעֵינֵי יְהוָה	13.1.1
וַיִּתְּנֵם יְהוָה בְּיַד־פְּלִשְׁתִּים אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה: פ	13.1.2
וַיְהִי אִישׁ אֶחָד מִצָּרְעָה מִמְּשַׁפַּחַת הַדָּגִי	13.2.1
וּשְׁמוֹ מְנוּחַ	13.2.2
וַאֲשֶׁתוֹ עֲקָרָה	13.2.3
וְלֹא יָלְדָה:	13.2.4
וַיָּרָא מְלֹאךְ־יְהוָה אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה	13.3.1
וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלֶיהָ	13.3.2

27 The closest to a critical edition of OG Judges is the Brooke-Maclean edition, which prints the text of LXX^B with other manuscripts collated in two apparatuses. A critical text (such as the Göttingen editions) has not yet been attempted.

28 This is, of course, a mixed bag. LXX^A may represent more idiomatic Greek; however, LXX^B shows more evidence of revision toward a proto-Masoretic text, which might facilitate comparison with MT as available in BHS. Cf. the next note.

29 The text-critical issues involved in justifying this stance are fascinating but beyond the scope of this paper. One must begin somewhere, even if subsequent text-critical work will modify beginning presuppositions. For a detailed discussion of the issues, see Philip E. Satterthwaite, "To the Reader of Judges," in *A New English Translation of the Septuagint: And the Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included under That Title* (ed. Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195–200.

הִנֵּה־נָא אֶת־עֶקְרָה ³⁰	13.3.3
וְלֹא יִלְדֶּתָּ	13.3.4
וְהָרִית	13.3.5
וְיִלְדֶּתָּ בֶּן׃	13.3.6
וְעֵתָהּ הַשְּׁמִרִי נָא ³¹	13.4.1
וְאַל־תִּשְׁתִּי יוֹן וְשֹׁכֵר	13.4.2
וְאַל־תֹּאכְלִי כָל־טֶמְאָה׃	13.4.3
כִּי הִנֵּךְ הָרָה ³²	13.5.1
וְיִלְדֶּתָּ בֶּן	13.5.2
וּמִזֶּה לֹא־יֵעָלֶה עַל־רֹאשׁוֹ	13.5.3
כִּי־נִזְיֹר אֱלֹהִים יִהְיֶה הַנֶּעֱר	13.5.4
מִן־הַבֶּטֶן	
וְהוּא יַחַל לְהוֹשִׁיעַ אֶת־יִשְׂרָאֵל מִיַּד פְּלִשְׁתִּים׃ ³³	13.5.5
וַתֵּבֵא הָאִשָּׁה	13.6.1
וַתֹּאמֶר לְאִישָׁהּ לֹא־מֶר	13.6.2
אִישׁ הָאֱלֹהִים בָּא אֵלַי ³⁴	13.6.3
וּמְרָאָהּ כִּמְרָאָה מִלֵּאדָּהּ הָאֱלֹהִים נֹרָא מְאֹד	13.6.4
וְלֹא שְׂאֵלְתִּיהוּ	13.6.5
אִי־מָזָה הוּא	13.6.6
וְאֶת־שְׁמוֹ לֹא־הִגִּיד לִי׃	13.6.7
וַיֹּאמֶר לִי	13.7.1
הִנֵּךְ־הָרָה ³⁵	13.7.2
וְיִלְדֶּתָּ בֶּן	13.7.3
וְעֵתָהּ אֶל־תִּשְׁתִּי יוֹן וְשֹׁכֵר ³⁶	13.7.4
וְאַל־תֹּאכְלִי כָל־טֶמְאָה	13.7.5
כִּי־נִזְיֹר אֱלֹהִים יִהְיֶה הַנֶּעֱר מִן־הַבֶּטֶן עַד־יוֹם מוֹתוֹ׃ ³⁷	13.7.6

30 13.3.3–6 manifests a predictive text-type.

31 13.4.1–5.5 manifests a hortatory text-type.

32 13.5.1–2 provides backgrounded prediction that gives grounds for the exhortation.

33 This clause marks a return to a predictive text-type at the close of the angel's speech.

34 13.6.3–7.6 manifests a narrative text type with other embedded text-types in the reported speech.

35 13.7.2–3 manifests a predictive text-type which may or may not be resumed in 7.6.

36 13.7.4–5 manifests a hortatory text-type. Note the וְעֵתָהּ. Van der Merwe et al. describe the function of וְעֵתָהּ in several instances as a discourse marker which signals a logical conclusion—as such, it may frequently, as here, coincide with a shift in text-type. Cf. Christo H. J. van der Merwe et al., *A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar* (BLH 3; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), §44.6.

37 13.7.6 could be seen as a return to the predictive text-type in which 13.7.4–5 is embedded (as presented above), or it could be viewed as a part of the hortatory text 13.7.4–5, falling

ויעתר מנוח אל־יהוה	13.8.1
וילמר	13.8.2
בי אדוני איש האלהים	13.8.3
יבוא־נא עוד אלינו ³⁸	
אשר שלחת ³⁹	13.8.4
ויורנו	13.8.5
מה־נעשה לנער היולד:	13.8.6
וישמע האלהים בקול מנוח	13.9.1
ויבא מלאך האלהים עוד אל־האשה	13.9.2
והיא יושבת בשדה	13.9.3
ומנוח אישה אין עמה:	13.9.4
ותמהר האשה	13.10.1
ותרץ	13.10.2
ותגד לאישה	13.10.3
ותאמר אליו	13.10.4
הנה נראה אלי האיש ⁴⁰	13.10.5
אשר־בא ביום אלי:	13.10.6
ויקם	13.11.1
וילך מנוח אחרי אשתו	13.11.2
ויבא אל־האיש	13.11.3
וילמר לו	13.11.4
האנה האיש ⁴¹	13.11.5
אשר־דברת אל־האשה	13.11.6
וילמר	13.11.7
אני ⁴²	13.11.8
וילמר מנוח	13.12.1
עתה יבא דבריך ⁴³	13.12.2
מה־יהיה משפט־הנער ומעשהו:	13.12.3

in band 3. If the latter, I would adjust Longacre's cline to include "Reasons" and (Future) *yiqtol/yiqtol* of היה, perhaps under a new line 3.4. In either case it functions here both as a climactic prediction and as the grounds for the exhortation.

38 13.8.3–6 manifests a hortatory text-type. Note especially the use of נא and בי. On the latter, cf. Paul Joüon and T. Muraoka, *A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew* (SubBi 27; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 2006), 323.

39 Subordinate to האלהים

40 13.10.5–6 manifests a narrative text-type.

41 13.11.5–6 is an expository text-type used to ask an identification question.

42 What text-type is this? Expository? Perhaps it is not useful to attempt to identify the text-type of a single pronoun in discourse.

43 13.12.2–3 appears to be a predictive text-type utilized to ask a question.

	וַיֹּאמֶר מֶלֶאךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי מִנּוּחַ	13.13.1
מכל		13.13.2
תִּשְׁמֹר: 44		13.13.3
אֲשֶׁר־אֶמְרָתִי אֶל־הָאִשָּׁה 45		13.14.1
מכל		13.14.2
אֲשֶׁר־יֵצֵא מִגִּפְּן הַיָּיִן 46		13.14.3
וַיִּזֶן וְשָׁכַר אֶל־תִּשְׁתֶּה		13.14.4
וְכָל־טִמְאָה אֶל־תֹּאכַל		13.14.5
כל		13.14.6
תִּשְׁמֹר:		13.15.1
אֲשֶׁר־צִוִּיתִיהָ 47		13.15.2
	וַיֹּאמֶר מִנּוּחַ אֱלֹהֵי מֶלֶאךָ יְהוָה	13.15.3
נִעְצָרָה־נָּא אוֹתָךְ 48		13.16.1
וְנִעְשֶׂה לְפָנֶיךָ גְּדִי עֲזִים:		13.16.2
	וַיֹּאמֶר מֶלֶאךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי מִנּוּחַ	13.16.3
אִם־תִּעְצָרְנִי 49		13.16.4
לֹא־אֲכַל בְּלֶחֶמְךָ		13.16.5
וְאִם־תִּעְשֶׂה עֲלֵה		13.16.6
לִיהוָה תִּנְעֲלָנָה		13.16.7
	כִּי לֹא־יָדַע מִנּוּחַ	13.17.1
	כִּי־מֶלֶאךָ יְהוָה הוּא:	13.17.2
מִי שָׁמַךְ 50	וַיֹּאמֶר מִנּוּחַ אֱלֹהֵי מֶלֶאךָ יְהוָה	13.17.3
כִּי־יָבֹא דְבָרֶיךָ		13.17.4
וְכַבֵּדְנוּךָ:	וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ מֶלֶאךָ יְהוָה	13.18.1
		13.18.2
לָמָּה זֶה תִּשְׁאֹל לְשִׁמִּי 51		13.18.3
וְהוּא־פָּלֵא: ס	וַיִּקַּח מִנּוּחַ אֶת־גְּדֵי הָעֲזִים וְאֶת־הַמִּנְחָה	13.19.1
	וַיַּעַל עַל־הַצֹּר לִיהוָה וּמִפֹּלֵא לַעֲשׂוֹת	13.19.2
	וּמִנּוּחַ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ רָאִים:	13.19.3
	וַיְהִי בַּעֲלוֹת הַלֵּהב מֵעַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ הַשְּׂמִימָה	13.20.1

44 This section manifests a hortatory text-type.

45 Subordinate to מכל.

46 Subordinate to מכל.

47 Subordinate to כל.

48 13.15.2–3 manifests a hortatory text-type.

49 13.16.2–5 manifests a hortatory text-type.

50 13.17.2–4 is a hortatory text.

51 13.18.2–3 appears to manifest an expository text-type.

וַיַּעַל מִלֶּאֲדָיִה הָיְהוּה בְּלֶהֱבַח הַמִּזְבֵּחַ	13.20.2
וּמִנּוּחַ וְאַשְׁתּוֹ רָאִים	13.20.3
וַיִּפְּלוּ עַל־פְּנֵיהֶם אֶרְצָה:	13.20.4
וְלֹא־יָסַף עוֹד מִלֶּאֲדָיִה הָיְהוּה לְהִרְאֶה אֶל־מִנּוּחַ וְאֶל־אַשְׁתּוֹ	13.21.1
אִזּוֹ יָדַע מִנּוּחַ	13.21.2
כִּי־מִלֶּאֲדָיִה הָיְהוּה הוּא:	13.21.3
וַיֹּאמֶר מִנּוּחַ אֶל־אַשְׁתּוֹ	13.22.1
מֹות נָמוּת ⁵²	13.22.2
כִּי אֱלֹהִים רָאִינוּ: ⁵³	13.22.3
וַתֹּאמֶר לוֹ אֲשַׁתּוֹ	13.23.1
לוֹ חֶפֶץ יְהוּה לְהִמִּיתָנוּ ⁵⁴	13.23.2
לֹא־לָקַח מִיָּדְנוּ עֲלֶה וּמִנְחָה	13.23.3
וְלֹא הִרְאֵנוּ אֶת־כָּל־אֱלֹה	13.23.4
וְכַעַת לֹא הִשְׁמִיעֵנוּ כְּזֹאת:	13.23.5
וַתֵּלֶד הָאִשָּׁה בֶּן	13.24.1
וַתִּקְרָא אֶת־שְׁמוֹ שְׁמִשׁוֹן	13.24.2
וַיִּגְדֵּל הַנַּעַר	13.24.3
וַיִּבְרָכֵהוּ יְהוּה:	13.24.4
וַתַּחַל רוּחַ יְהוּה לִפְעָמוֹ בְּמַחְנֵה־דָן בֵּין צָרְעָה וּבֵין אֲשַׁתָּאֵל: פ	13.25.1

Analysis of Old Greek

In Greek, Judges 13 manifests a narrative text-type whose backbone is the (καί +) aorist verb-form. Other text-types can be seen in embedded speech sections, and are identified below.

13.1.1	Καὶ προσέθεντο οἱ υἱοὶ Ἰσραὴλ ποιῆσαι τὸ πονηρὸν ἐναντίον κυρίου,
13.1.2	καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς κύριος ἐν χειρὶ ἀλλοφύλων τεσσαράκοντα ἔτη.
13.2.1	Καὶ ἐγένετο ἀνὴρ ἐκ Σαραα ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς τοῦ Δαν,
13.2.2	καὶ ὄνομα αὐτῷ Μανωε,
13.2.3	καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ στείρα
13.2.4	καὶ οὐκ ἔτιαιτεν.
13.3.1	καὶ ὤφθη ἄγγελος κυρίου πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα
13.3.2	καὶ εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτήν

⁵² 13.22.2–3 manifests a predictive text-type.

⁵³ The cline for a predictive text-type is inadequate to account for this *qatal* form, which appears to be the ground for the prediction. Alternately, this section could be seen as a hortatory text-type.

⁵⁴ 13.23.2–5 manifests a narrative text-type.

- 13.3.3 Ἴδου δὴ σὺ στεῖρα⁵⁵
 13.3.4 καὶ οὐ τέτοκας·
 13.3.5 καὶ ἐν γαστρὶ ἔξεις
 13.3.6 καὶ τέξῃ υἱόν.
 13.4.1 καὶ νῦν φύλαξαι⁵⁶
 13.4.2 καὶ μὴ πίῃς οἶνον καὶ σικερα
 13.4.3 καὶ μὴ φάγῃς πᾶν ἀκάθαρτον·
 13.5.1 ὅτι ἰδοὺ σὺ ἐν γαστρὶ ἔξεις⁵⁷
 13.5.2 καὶ τέξῃ υἱόν,
 13.5.3 καὶ οὐκ ἀναβήσεται σίδηρος ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ,
 13.5.4 ὅτι ἡγιασμένον ναζιραῖον ἔσται τῷ θεῷ
 τὸ παιδάριον ἐκ τῆς γαστροῦ,
 13.5.5 καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρξεται σῶζειν τὸν Ἰσραὴλ ἐκ χειρὸς
 ἀλλοφύλων.⁵⁸
 13.6.1 καὶ ἦλθεν ἡ γυνὴ
 13.6.2 καὶ εἶπεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς λέγουσα
 13.6.3 ὅτι Ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ ἦλθεν πρὸς με,⁵⁹
 13.6.4 καὶ ἡ ὄρασις αὐτοῦ ὡς ὄρασις ἀγγέλου τοῦ θεοῦ
 ἐπιφανῆς σφόδρα·
 13.6.5 καὶ ἡρώτων,
 13.6.6 πόθεν ἐστίν,
 13.6.7 καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπήγγειλέν μοι.
 13.7.1 καὶ εἶπέν μοι
 13.7.2 Ἴδου σὺ ἐν γαστρὶ ἔξεις⁶⁰
 13.7.3 καὶ τέξῃ υἱόν·

55 13.3.3–6 appears to be a predictive text-type: it is +Agent, +Projection, and +Temporal succession. Clauses 3 and 4 give the background and clauses 5 and 6 give the main line prediction.

56 13.4.1–5.4 appears to be a hortatory text-type. On the use of οὐ + a future form for the prohibition in 13.5.3, see F.C. Conybeare and St. George William Joseph Stock, *A Grammar of Septuagint Greek* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980), §74b.

57 13.5.1–2 provides backgrounded prediction that gives grounds for the exhortation; as such it is a part of the hortatory text-type.

58 This clause appears to finish the predictive text-type begun in 3.3–6.

59 13.6.3–7.6 is a narrative text-type. 7.2–7.6 (in reported speech within the narrative text) is an abbreviated report of the angel of the Lord's predictive/hortatory discourse.

60 Here the translator has likely read the Hebrew adjective in the Vorlage as a “prophetic perfect”; cf. LXX^B ἔχεις and the infamous OG reading of Isa 7:14. See also Joüon and Muraoka, *A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, §112h, 19n; Merwe et al., *A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar*, §19.2.5.

- 13.7.4 και νῦν μὴ πίῃς οἶνον καὶ σικερα
 13.7.5 καὶ μὴ φάγῃς πᾶσαν ἀκαθαρσίαν,
 13.7.6 ὅτι ναζιραῖον θεοῦ ἔσται τὸ παιδάριον
 ἀπὸ τῆς γαστρὸς ἕως ἡμέρας θανάτου
 αὐτοῦ.
- 13.8.1 καὶ ἐδέηθη Μανωε τοῦ κυρίου
 13.8.2 καὶ εἶπεν
 13.8.3 Ἐν ἐμοί, κύριε, ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐλθέτω δὴ
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς⁶¹
 13.8.4 ὃν ἀπέστειλας πρὸς ἡμᾶς,⁶²
 13.8.5 καὶ φωτισάτω ἡμᾶς
 13.8.6 τί ποιήσωμεν τῷ παιδαρίῳ τῷ τικτομένῳ.
- 13.9.1 καὶ ἐπήκουσεν ὁ θεὸς τῆς φωνῆς Μανωε,
 13.9.2 καὶ παρεγένετο ὁ ἄγγελος τοῦ θεοῦ ἔτι πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα
 13.9.3 αὐτῆς **καθημένης** ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ,⁶³
 13.9.4 καὶ Μανωε ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς **οὐκ ἦν** μετ' αὐτῆς.
- 13.10.1 καὶ ἐτάχυνεν ἡ γυνή
 13.10.2 καὶ ἐξέδραμεν
 13.10.3 καὶ ἀπήγγειλεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς
 13.10.4 καὶ εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτόν
 13.10.5 Ἴδου ὥπταί μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ⁶⁴
 13.10.6 ὁ ἐλθὼν⁶⁵ πρὸς με τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ.
- 13.11.1 καὶ ἀνέστη Μανωε
 13.11.2 καὶ ἐπορεύθη ὀπίσω τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἀνδρα⁶⁶
 13.11.3 καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ
 13.11.4 Εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ ἀνὴρ⁶⁷
 13.11.5 ὁ λαλήσας πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα;
 13.11.6 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ ἄγγελος
 13.11.7 Ἐγώ.

61 13.8.3–6 is a hortatory text-type.

62 Subordinate to ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ.

63 I have tentatively assigned the genitive absolute to Band 3 (Backgrounded Activity) of the Narrative cline (cf. the Hebrew).

64 This clause appears to be a narrative text-type. It is +Agent and –Projection. The perfect form does not have a place in Longacre's cline, however.

65 LXX^B has ἦλθεν.

66 Whether for stylistic reasons or because of a *Vorlage* that lacked **ἦν**, LXX^A has rearranged the prepositional phrases vis-à-vis MT (cf. LXX^B: καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἐπορεύθη Μανώε ὀπίσω τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἦλθεν πρὸς τὸν ἀνδρα).

67 13.11.4–5 appears to be an expository text-type used to ask an identification question.

- 13.12.1 καὶ εἶπεν Μανωε
 13.12.2 Νῦν δὴ ἐλθόντος τοῦ ῥήματός σου⁶⁸
 13.12.3 τί ἔσται τὸ κρίμα τοῦ παιδαρίου καὶ τὰ ἔργα
 αὐτοῦ;
 13.13.1 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ ἄγγελος κυρίου πρὸς Μανωε
 13.13.2 Ἄπο πάντων, φυλαξάσθω.⁶⁹
 13.13.3 ὧν εἶπα πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα,⁷⁰
 13.14.1 ἀπο πάντων, οὐ φάγεται
 13.14.2 ὅσα ἐκπορεύεται ἐξ ἀμπέλου,⁷¹
 13.14.3 καὶ οἶνον καὶ σικερα μὴ πιέτω
 13.14.4 καὶ πᾶν ἀκάθαρτον μὴ φαγέτω·
 13.14.5 πάντα, φυλαξάσθω.
 ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην αὐτῇ,⁷²
 13.15.1 καὶ εἶπεν Μανωε πρὸς τὸν ἄγγελον κυρίου
 13.15.2 Βιασώμεθα δὴ σε⁷³
 13.15.3 καὶ ποιήσωμεν⁷⁴ ἐνώπιόν σου ἔριφον αἰγῶν.
 13.16.1 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ ἄγγελος κυρίου πρὸς Μανωε
 13.16.2 Ἐάν βιάσῃ με,⁷⁵
 13.16.3 οὐ φάγομαι τῶν ἄρτων σου,
 13.16.4 καὶ ἐὰν ποιήσῃς ὀλοκαύτωμα,
 13.16.5 κυρίῳ ἀνοίσεις αὐτό·
 13.16.6 ὅτι οὐκ ἔγνων Μανωε
 13.16.7 ὅτι ἄγγελος κυρίου ἐστίν.
 13.17.1 καὶ εἶπεν Μανωε πρὸς τὸν ἄγγελον κυρίου
 13.17.2 Τί ὄνομά σοι,⁷⁶
 13.17.3 ἵνα, ὅταν ἔλθῃ τὸ ῥήμά σου,
 13.17.4 δοξάσωμέν σε;
 13.18.1 καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ ἄγγελος κυρίου
 13.18.2 "Ἴνα τί τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς τὸ ὄνομά μου;⁷⁷
 13.18.3 καὶ αὐτό ἐστιν θαυμαστόν.

68 13.12.2–3 appears to be a predictive text-type utilized for asking a question.

69 13.13.2–14.4 is a hortatory text-type.

70 Subordinate to πάντων.

71 Subordinate to πάντων.

72 Subordinate to πάντα.

73 13.15.2–3 is a hortatory text-type (see next note).

74 Cf. LXX^B ποιήσωμεν.

75 13.16.2–5 is a hortatory text-type (+Agent, +Projection, –Temporal succession).

76 13.17.2–4 is a hortatory text-type (+Agent, +Projection, –Temporal succession).

77 13.18.2–3 appears to be an expository text-type.

- 13.19.1 καὶ ἔλαβεν Μανωε τὸν ἔριφον τῶν αἰγῶν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν
 13.19.2 καὶ ἀνήνεγκεν ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν τῷ κυρίῳ, τῷ θαυμαστᾷ ποιοῦντι κυρίῳ.
 13.19.3 καὶ Μανωε καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ **ἐθεώρουν**.
 13.20.1 καὶ **ἐγένετο** ἐν τῷ ἀναβῆναι τὴν φλόγα ἐπάνωθεν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου εἰς
 τὸν οὐρανὸν
 13.20.2 καὶ ἀνέβη ὁ ἄγγελος κυρίου ἐν τῇ φλογί,
 13.20.3 καὶ Μανωε καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ **ἐθεώρουν**
 13.20.4 καὶ ἔπεσον ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.
 13.21.1 καὶ οὐ προσέθηκεν ἔτι ὁ ἄγγελος κυρίου ὀφθῆναι πρὸς Μανωε καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ.
 13.21.2 τότε ἔγνω Μανωε
 13.21.3 ὅτι ἄγγελος κυρίου **ἐστίν**.
 13.22.1 καὶ εἶπεν Μανωε πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ
 13.22.2 Θανάτῳ ἀποθανούμεθα,⁷⁸
 13.22.3 ὅτι θεὸν ἐωράκαμεν.
 13.23.1 καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ
 13.23.2 Εἰ **ἐβούλετο** κύριος θανατῶσαι ἡμᾶς,⁷⁹
 13.23.3 οὐκ ἂν ἐδέξατο ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ἡμῶν ὀλοκαύτωμα καὶ θυσίαν
 13.23.4 καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐφώτισεν ἡμᾶς πάντα ταῦτα
 13.23.5 καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀκουστὰ **ἐποίησεν** ἡμῖν ταῦτα.
 13.24.1 Καὶ ἔτεκεν ἡ γυνὴ υἱὸν
 13.24.2 καὶ ἐκάλεσεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Σαμψων.
 13.24.3 καὶ ἠυλόγησεν αὐτὸν κύριος,
 13.24.4 καὶ ἠύξηθη τὸ παιδάριον.
 13.25.1 καὶ ἤρξατο πνεῦμα κυρίου συμπορεύεσθαι αὐτῷ ἐν παρεμβολῇ Δαν ἀνὰ
 μέσον Σαραα καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον Εσθαολ.

Comparison and Conclusion(s)

In the following chart I have presented the text-types of the respective texts side-by-side (the floor plans of our two houses, as it were). For each text the leftmost column represents the narrative extending throughout the chapter. The middle column represents embedded texts occurring within the narrative. It is interesting to note that each of these embedded texts is a speech of one of the characters in the narrative. Some of these speeches have embedded texts of their own, which are in the right column. If the embedded text is itself the speech of a character as reported in the speech of another, it is marked (embedded speech) in the chart.

⁷⁸ 13.22.2–3 is a predictive text-type.

⁷⁹ 13.23.2–5 is a narrative text-type.

Judges 13 MT	Judges 13 LXX ^A		
13.1.1—25.1 Narrative	13.3.3—5.5 Predictive 13.4.1—5.4 Hortatory	13.1.1—25.1 Narrative	13.4.1—5.4 Hortatory 13.7.2—3 Predictive (embedded speech)
	13.6.3—7.6 Narrative 13.7.2—3 Predictive (embedded speech)		13.7.4—6 Hortatory (embedded speech)
	13.7.4—6 Hortatory (embedded speech)		
	13.8.3—6 Hortatory		13.8.3—6 Hortatory
	13.10.5—6 Narrative		13.10.5 Narrative
	13.11.5—6 Narrative		13.11.4 Narrative
	13.11.8 Unidentified		13.11.6 Unidentified
	13.12.2—3 Predictive		13.12.2—3 Predictive
	13.13.2—14.6 Hortatory		13.13.2—14.4 Hortatory
	13.15.2—3 Hortatory		13.15.2—3 Hortatory
	13.16.2—5 Hortatory		13.16.2—5 Hortatory
	13.17.2—4 Hortatory		13.17.2—4 Hortatory
	13.18.2—4 Expository		13.18.2—3 Expository
	13.22.2—3 Predictive		13.22.2—3 Predictive
	13.23.2—5 Narrative		13.23.2—5 Narrative

FIGURE 5.9 *Text-type in the Hebrew and Greek texts.*

TABLE 5.1 *Qatal forms represented in Greek*

Clause	Hebrew verb	Text-type	Greek form	Parsing
13.6.3	בָּ	Narrative	ἦλθεν	Aorist indicative
13.8.4	שָׁלַחְתָּ	Hortatory	ἀπέστειλας	Aorist indicative
13.10.5	נִרְאָה	Narrative	ὥπται	Perfect indicative
13.10.6	בָּ	Narrative	ἐλθών	Aorist participle
13.11.6	דִּבַּרְתָּ	Narrative	λαλήσας	Aorist participle
13.13.3	אָמַרְתִּי	Hortatory	εἶπα	Aorist indicative
13.14.6	צִוִּיתִי	Hortatory	ἐνετείλαμην	Aorist indicative
13.21.2	עָדָה	Narrative	ἔγνω	Aorist indicative
13.22.3	רָאִינוּ	Predictive	ἐωράκαμεν	Perfect indicative
13.23.2	פָּקַד	Narrative	ἐβούλετο	Imperf. indic.

I began with the assumption (based on Longacre's work) that languages in general use particular clines of verb forms to structure particular types of texts. With the analogy of building a home with studs and walls, I then asked of Judges 13 whether one would end up with the same house after the text had undergone translation. On this macro level of comparison one can see that we do indeed end up with the same house. The overall shape of the text, with its embedded text-types, remains the same in translation. In retrospect this does not seem an unlikely outcome: these text-types (narrative, predictive, hortatory, and expository) are easily recognized and represented in translation. In the analysis it is sometimes difficult to distinguish where a text-type is predictive and where it is hortatory; this difficulty occurred at the same place in each language. The floor plan remains the same. Perhaps a larger sample of text would produce more interesting data at this level.

But what about a comparison of the texts at the micro level? The Hebrew *qatal* verb form functions as a secondary storyline in narrative (when not negated) but provides setting in a hortatory text. It occurs in both of these text-types in Judges 13. How is it represented in Greek?

As a glance at the chart shows, the representation of *qatal* forms in hortatory text is consistent; however, four different options are utilized in narrative: aorist indicatives, aorist participles, and both perfect and imperfect indicatives. One *qatal* in a predictive text occurs: this is anomalous in terms of what the cline leads us to expect, and it also does not provide enough data for comment. The interior of these rooms in our Judges 13 house look very different in Greek than in Hebrew, and not in a predictable fashion.

Conclusion

Comparative discourse analysis has proven fruitful for revealing and comparing the structure of a text and its translation. I was able to analyze the structure of texts and embedded texts using the proposed model and display them graphically in a way that facilitated comparison. For Judges 13 we do, in fact, end up with the same house.

The model is not well worked out for comparing data on the micro level, unfortunately, though it does provide some of the required tools. I demonstrated, for instance, that the representation of *qatal* forms in Greek translation is not consistent in narrative. Further reflection and investigation may provide a better framework for assessing all of the verbal forms in each text, with a comparison of their distribution.

Comparative discourse analysis needs verb clines for Greek in order to proceed on a more solid footing. This will require extensive work in native Greek prose rather than translated texts to be certain that the features of a source language are not skewing the results. Such work would put the analyst in a better position for future comparative work. In order to facilitate this, I tentatively propose the following verb clines for Greek text-types and invite others to test and refine them.

I have revised Longacre's cline for Greek narrative text-types by including a level for genitive absolutes as backgrounded activity, as I encountered in the data above (cf. the Greek analysis at clause 13.9.3 and its corresponding footnote).

The Greek predictive text-type does not have as clear a delineation between mainline and backgrounded predictions as its Hebrew counterpart—a wider sample is necessary.

The Greek hortatory text-type is subject to the complications discussed above (cf. Table 5.1); however, I offer this cline as a beginning point for further discussion. I did not encounter enough data in my restricted sample to offer even the most tentative cline for an expository text-type in Greek. The above verb clines are in any case most preliminary. Further investigation may evince significant differences between native and translation Greek.

Greek narrative text-type (revised)	
Band 1:	1. Aorist and its consecutives (postposed participles)
Storyline	1.2. Preposed participles dependent on an aorist
Band 2:	2.1. (Historical) present and its consecutives
Secondary	2.2. Preposed participles dependent on the historical present
Band 3:	3.1. The imperfect and its consecutives
Backgrounded	3.2. Preposed participles dependent on the imperfect
Activities	3.3. Genitive absolutes
Band 4:	4.1. εἰμί, γίνομαι and verbless clauses
Setting + terminus	
Band 5	5. Negation of verb clause: irrealis

FIGURE 5.10 *Greek narrative text-type (revised).*

Greek predictive text-type	
Band 1:	1. Καί (+ X) + future indicative
Line of Prediction	
Band 2:	2. Future indicative
Backgrounded Predictions	
Band 3:	3. Genitive absolutes?
Backgrounded Activities	
Band 4:	4.1. Perfect forms
Setting	4.2. Be verbs (εἰμί and γίνομαι) and verbless clauses
Band 5	5. Negation of verb clause: irrealis (any band)

FIGURE 5.11 *Greek predictive text-type.*

Greek hortatory text-type	
Band 1:	1. Aorist imperatives
Primary line of Exhortation	
Band 2:	2.1. (μῆ +) Aorist subjunctives
Secondary line of exhortation	2.2. (καί + [X +] [οὐ(κ) +]) Future forms
Band 3:	3. Ἐάν + aorist subjunctives
Backgrounded Activities	
Band 4:	4.1 Aorist indicatives
Setting (Problem)	4.2 Verbless clauses

FIGURE 5.12 *Greek hortatory text-type.*

Yahweh as Shepherd-King in Ezekiel 34: A Linguistic-Literary Analysis of Metaphors of Shepherding

Beth M. Stovell

Yahweh as shepherd-king is a central metaphor in Ezekiel 34, but little work has been done in developing a linguistic and literary analysis of the blending of metaphors surrounding Yahweh as shepherd-king in this passage and the implications of this blending for understanding the purpose of this passage and its relationship to the rest of the biblical corpus. As one examines the metaphor of 'Shepherd' within the Old Testament, one can trace a common theme that weaves shepherding with kingship and uses the metaphor of shepherd as king with metaphors of human kingship and divine kingship.¹ This theme asserts Yahweh's role as shepherd king in light of the failing human shepherds. In many cases, this theme merges pastoral metaphors with military metaphors or with covenantal metaphors of repentance, judgment, and justice. These metaphors demonstrate the tension between human shepherd figures and the Divine shepherd Yahweh. In Ezekiel 34, these metaphors focus on the right judgment of Yahweh, the liberation of the people, and the re-establishment of Yahweh's position as shepherd king and his restoration of his kingdom through a Davidic figure.

This article will trace the repeated blending of these metaphors in Ezekiel 34 by applying a linguistic-literary approach to metaphor that incorporates elements of the Conceptual Metaphor theory of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner with elements of the Systemic Functional Linguistics of M.A.K. Halliday. This approach allows for the analysis of the metaphors in Ezekiel 34 at both the conceptual level and the pragmatic level within the larger discourse. It uses the analysis produced by these linguistic approaches

¹ Examples of previous scholars who have examined the role of shepherds in Jeremiah and Zechariah include Rosalie Kuyvenhoven, "Jeremiah 23:1–8: Shepherds in Diachronic Perspective," in *Paratext and Megatext as Channels of Jewish and Christian Traditions* (ed. A. den Hollander et al.; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1–36; and Mark J. Boda, "Reading between the Lines: Zechariah 11.4–16 in its Literary Contexts," in *Bringing Out the Treasure* (ed. Mark J. Boda and Michael H. Floyd; London: Sheffield Academic, 2003), 277–91.

to evaluate the literary and theological implications of these metaphors and their interrelationship. Based on these findings, this chapter will assert that the metaphor of 'God as shepherd-king' must be understood in light of the failing shepherds. Thus, the metaphor of 'God as shepherd' is part of our understanding of the metaphor of 'God as king' and of 'shepherd as king' in the Hebrew Bible and it can only fully be understood by developing an understanding of the metaphor of 'the people of Israel as sheep.'

Past Scholarship

My discussion of past scholarship will encompass two main fields: the study of metaphor in the Old Testament generally and the study of the shepherd metaphor in Ezekiel 34 specifically. First, metaphor is a common area of study in the Old Testament. There have been several studies that have focused on the metaphor of Yahweh as king and others on Yahweh as shepherd.² The strength of these studies has been an awareness of the need for overarching analysis of metaphor within the Old Testament, yet a weakness has often been the lack of interaction with the broad range of metaphor study. Only recently has the study of biblical metaphor in general incorporated modern metaphor theories developed in literary, philosophical, and linguistic fields. One such study is the work of D.H. Aaron who points to the importance of ambiguity in the function of metaphor, particularly within biblical metaphor.³ In the study of

-
- 2 For example, Marc Brettler provides a helpful study on the Israelite metaphor of "God is King" in Brettler, *God is King: Understanding an Israelite Metaphor* (JSOTSup 76; Sheffield: JSOT, 1989). Joyce focuses primarily on the description(s) of king and messiah in Ezekiel in Paul Joyce, "King and Messiah in Ezekiel," in *King and Messiah in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (ed. John Day; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), 323–37. Gan explores the metaphor of shepherd in the Hebrew Bible countering the typical assumptions of pastoral theology in their interpretation of this metaphor. See Jonathan Gan, *The Metaphor of Shepherd in the Hebrew Bible: A Historical-Literary Reading* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). In his two-part series, Thomas Golding also provides an examination of shepherding imagery in the Bible. Golding incorporates ancient documents from the ANE with a careful study of elements surrounding shepherding and sheep. See Thomas A. Golding, "The Imagery of Shepherding in the Bible. Part 1," *BibSac* 163.649 (2006): 18–28 and Golding, "The Imagery of Shepherding in the Bible. Part 2," *BibSac* 163.650 (2006): 158–75.
 - 3 David H. Aaron, *Biblical Ambiguities: Metaphor, Semantics, and Divine Imagery* (Leiden: Brill, 2001). Among others working on the use of modern metaphor theory in interpreting the Bible, other scholars include Hyukki Kim, "Daughter Zion: A Metaphor of Israel's Ego" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Boston,

metaphor in Ezekiel, S. Tamar Kamionkowski utilizes modern metaphor theory to analyze Ezekiel 16 and 23 and their presentation of gender.⁴ While Aaron and Kamionkowski represent positive trends within the study of metaphor in the Hebrew Bible, there is much work to be done applying such theories more broadly.⁵ As yet, no such study has been done on the shepherd-king metaphor in Ezekiel 34.⁶ This chapter intends to provide such a study.

Instead of modern metaphor theory analysis, scholars have approached Ezekiel 34 in a variety of other ways.⁷ For example, some scholars have pointed to the socio-economic elements within the text, seeking this as the key to

November 2008); Kurt Feyaerts, ed., *The Bible through Metaphor and Translation: A Cognitive Semantic Perspective* (Religions and Discourse 16; Bern: Peter Lang, 2003); Pierre Van Hecke, ed., *Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible* (BETL 187; Leuven: Peeters, 2005) and other various works of Van Hecke.

- 4 S. Tamar Kamionkowski, *Gender Reversal and Cosmic Chaos: A Study on the Book of Ezekiel* (New York: Sheffield Academic, 2003).
- 5 Recent interest in conceptual metaphor theories and other metaphor theories is demonstrated by the emergence of sessions at the Society of Biblical Literature in metaphor theory. For a more extensive list of recent works using these metaphor theories in the Hebrew Bible, see Beth M. Stovell, *Mapping Metaphorical Discourse in the Fourth Gospel: John's Eternal King* (LBS 5; Leiden, Brill: 2012), 73–134.
- 6 Some work has been done on shepherding using cognitive metaphor theory, but not specifically in Ezekiel 34 and not using my specific interdisciplinary approach. For example, Van Hecke uses cognitive linguistic analysis to examine the metaphor of “the Lord is my shepherd” in Gen 48:15 (see Pierre Van Hecke, “Shepherds and Linguists: A Cognitive-Linguistic Approach to the Metaphor ‘God is shepherd’ in Gen 48,15 and Context,” in *Studies in the Book of Genesis* [ed. A. Wénin; Leuven: Peeters, 2001], 479–93). Van Hecke has also provided cognitive analysis on the lexical structure of the Hebrew root *r’h* (רעה) and a discussion of the pastoral metaphor in light of the Hebrew Bible and ANE contexts. See Van Hecke, *Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible*; Pierre Van Hecke, “To Shepherd, Have Dealings and Desire: On the Lexical Structure of the Hebrew Root *r’h*,” in *Bible Through Metaphor and Translation* (ed. Kurt Feyaerts; New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 37–53; and Pierre Van Hecke, “Pastoral Metaphors in the Hebrew Bible and in its Ancient Near Eastern Context,” in *Hebrew Bible in its World* (ed. Robert P. Gordon and Johannes C. de Moor; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 200–217.
- 7 Articles on Ezekiel 34 include Samuel L. Adams, “Ezekiel 34:11–19,” *Int* 62.3 (2008): 304–6; William H. Brownlee, “Ezekiel’s Poetic Indictment of the Shepherds,” *HTR* 51.4 (1958): 191–203; Bernard F. Batto, “The Covenant of Peace: A Neglected Ancient Near Eastern Motif,” *CBQ* 49.2 (1987): 187–211; Bernard Gosse, “La nouvelle alliance et les promesses d’avenir se référant à David dans les livres de Jérémie, Ezéchiel et Isaïe,” *VT* 41.4 (1991): 419–28; John Keating Wiles, “Shepherds, Flock, and the Shepherd Text: Ezekiel 34:11–24,” *Faith and Mission* 7.1 (1989): 79–82.

interpretation.⁸ While socio-economic elements no doubt play an essential role in the understanding of metaphor, one must also place careful boundaries on what one reads into a metaphor from these elements.

Some Christian scholars have read Ezekiel 34 through the lens of John 10, finding the 'good' shepherd in Ezekiel 34, though such a reading may be problematic.⁹ Others have sought to place Yahweh as shepherd-king alongside Sumerian titles of shepherd-king.¹⁰ Other scholars have argued for the primacy of the title 'king' over the title 'shepherd.'¹¹ A more nuanced approach—with an awareness of the ubiquity of metaphor in all forms of speech including titles—suggests that there is precedent for Yahweh as a

8 Mein is one such scholar and his work includes a helpful survey of other scholars who have included such elements in their work. See Andrew Mein, "Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds: Economic and Theological Perspectives on Ezekiel 34," *JOT* 31.4 (2007): 493–504.

9 Blenkinsopp and Cody are among those who add the concept of "good" to the shepherd in Ezekiel 34, though as Deeley points out, no such usage is present in Ezekiel 34 itself. See Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Ezekiel* (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1990), 155; Aelred Cody, *Ezekiel, with an Excursus on Old Testament Priesthood* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1984); Zimmerli points to the "nobility and dignity of the shepherd," which "reside in the fact that the shepherd works wholeheartedly for his sheep . . . John 10:11 expresses it: the Good Shepherd lays down his life for his sheep." See Walther Zimmerli, *Ezekiel 2: A Commentary on the Prophet Ezekiel, Chapters 25–48* (trans. J.D. Martin; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 214. One might say that scholars like Mary Katherine Deeley attempt to read in the opposite direction. For Deeley this means approaching the use in John 10 by first evaluating the original use in Ezekiel 34 rather than the other way around. Deeley provides a critique of those who read John 10 back into their interpretation of Ezekiel 34. See Mary Katharine Deeley, "Ezekiel's Shepherd and John's Jesus: A Case Study in the Appropriation of Biblical Texts," in *Early Christian Interpretation of the Scriptures of Israel* (ed. Craig A. Evans and James A. Sanders; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 255 n. 8.

10 Though most scholars acknowledge this connection to the titles in Sumerian writings, they usually point to the works of Hallo and Seux who examine the royal Sumerian titles. Brettler has noted the importance of "shepherd" as one of the Israelite metaphors for God as king. See William W. Hallo, *Early Mesopotamian Royal Titles: A Philologic and Historical Analysis* (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1957), 141, 147–49; M.J. Seux, *Epithetes royales akkadiennes et sumériennes* (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1967), 244–520; Brettler, *God is King*, 36.

11 Tanner's work focuses primarily on Psalm 23, but her discussion of the metaphor of Yahweh as shepherd-king is, nonetheless, applicable to our discussion especially as she analyzes Psalm 23 based on Ezekiel 34. See Beth LaNeel Tanner, "King Yahweh as the Good Shepherd: Taking Another Look at the Image of God in Psalm 23," in *David and Zion* (ed. Kathryn L. Roberts and J.J.M. Roberts; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 270.

shepherd blending with the title of king and both the titles 'king' and 'shepherd' are pervasive metaphorical descriptions of Yahweh.

Metaphorical analysis has been so scarce that some scholars like Vawter and Hoppe have even gone as far as to describe the metaphor of shepherd as discontinuous in Ezekiel 34 by not including the sheep metaphor within the larger shepherd metaphor.¹² This chapter will suggest a more nuanced view of the metaphor of shepherd-king in Ezekiel by using an interdisciplinary metaphor theory described below.

Metaphor Theory

Our understanding of biblical metaphor can be enhanced by combining elements of theories of metaphorical analysis in cognitive and functional linguistics as well as literary analysis.¹³ Based originally on the interaction theory of Max Black, this metaphor theory incorporates the Conceptual Metaphor Theory of Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner and its use of metaphorical mapping with the Systemic Functional Linguistics of M.A.K. Halliday among others in analyzing context, co-text, cohesion, and prominence. These linguistic elements provide data for literary interpretation of the metaphors in Ezekiel 34.

Steps 1–3: Hallidayan Linguistics: Context, Co-Text, and Cohesion in Ezekiel 34

The first step in this model is identifying the contextual factors impacting Ezekiel 34.¹⁴ Halliday refers to three interrelated kinds of context. The first kind

12 Seeing the oracle against Judah's leaders as the primary structure in Ezekiel 34, Vawter and Hoppe divide the passage into separate and otherwise unrelated units. There are serious problems with separating the shepherd metaphor from the sheep metaphor as Vawter and Hoppe have done. First, Vawter and Hoppe have utterly side-stepped their entire goal of literary unity and instead emphasized the disunity of the passage. Second, by overlooking the shepherd-sheep metaphor as a metaphorical complex, Vawter and Hoppe are forced to argue that the shepherd metaphor is "abandoned" in vv. 17–22 and 25–31. Bruce Vawter and Leslie J. Hoppe, *A New Heart: A Commentary on the Book of Ezekiel* (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1991), 154. A more helpful understanding of the metaphorical complex of shepherd-sheep allows for a more unified approach to the shepherd metaphor as a whole.

13 A more detailed description of this metaphor theory is found in Stovell, *Mapping Metaphorical Discourse*, 29–71.

14 I would like to thank Colin Toffelmire for sharing with me his unpublished paper, "Stylizing the Day: Linguistic Register and Poetic Language in Ezekiel 13 and 30:1–19."

of context is described as the 'context of situation.' Coined by Malinowski, this term refers to the "environment of the text."¹⁵ As Halliday explains, "it is which kinds of situational factors determine which kinds of selection in the linguistic system."¹⁶ These extra-textual elements can include participants, social relationships, and modes of communication.

Analyzing a text's context of situation is related to studying its register. Halliday explains register by stating, "the social functions of language clearly determine the pattern of language varieties, or 'registers'; the register range, or linguistic repertoire, of a community or of an individual, is derived from the range of uses that language is put to in that particular culture or sub-culture."¹⁷ Register studies analyze context in terms of field, tenor, and mode. "These three semiotic components of the situation (field, tenor, and mode) are systematically related to the functional components of the semantics (ideational, interpersonal, and textual)."¹⁸ The field component is realized in the ideational component, "representing the 'content' of language."¹⁹ Field refers "to the nature of the social action that is taking place" in any given discourse or, put another way, field is the topic or focus of the activity in a text.²⁰ The tenor component is realized in the interpersonal component, representing the relationship between speaker and audience. Tenor describes the role relations between participants in a discourse and is determined by factors like modality, persons, and plurality. The mode is realized in the textual component.²¹ Mode describes the role that language is playing in an interaction or discourse. Following Martin, mode can be understood in terms of two kinds of distance between language and situation: spatial/interpersonal distance (e.g., how immediately one gets feedback from a form of language in a given situation) and experiential distance (e.g., how close language is to the experience of a physical event compared to a reflection on that event).²² Because of metaphor's transformative grammatical nature, it may impact various aspects of register. It may be part of expressing the content, it

15 M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social Semiotic Perspective* (Victoria, Australia: Deakin University Press, 1985), 6.

16 M.A.K. Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning* (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1978), 32.

17 M.A.K. Halliday, *Explorations in the Functions of Language* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 24.

18 Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic*, 112.

19 Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic*, 48.

20 Halliday and Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text*, 12.

21 Halliday, *Language as Social Semiotic*, 123.

22 James R. Martin, "Language, Register and Genre," in *Applied Linguistics Methods: A Reader* (ed. C. Coffin et al.; London: Routledge, 2009), 13–16.

may connect speaker to hearer in some way, or it may function rhetorically or provide cohesion to the discourse. Thus, for this chapter, I will examine the metaphors of Ezekiel 34 by using a Hallidayan approach to register. An awareness of register allows us to relate the metaphors in Ezekiel 34 to the overall topic of the discourse (field), the relative relationship of speakers (tenor), and the movement between narrative and oral modes of communication (mode).

Establishing the register of Ezekiel 34 provides the first step toward examining the second kind of context as defined by Halliday: "context of culture." Context of culture provides an assessment of the "extra-linguistic factors."²³ Leckie-Tarry defines 'context of culture' as "a large and complex knowledge system spread between the various members of a particular culture, and hence consisting of many sets of knowledges, including, in particular, the institutional and ideological."²⁴ Ideally, an analysis of the context of culture would be a part of this chapter, but, for the sake of space, our analysis has focused on the impact of the context of situation and the co-text on the discourse. Future analysis of the context of culture would, no doubt, be fruitful.²⁵

The second step in this model (involving Halliday's third type of context) is identifying the co-textual factors of the metaphorical expression within our passage. The term 'co-text' refers to the connections a text makes with other texts and the elements of cohesion and coherence that make up the structure of any particular text. Thus, co-text refers to both 'intertextual' and 'intratextual' context.²⁶ Establishing the co-text will involve identifying metaphors at their lowest levels of discourse and then building up the rank scale. Each metaphor will be described in terms of target and source and their lexicogrammatical form will be identified. For the purpose of this chapter, we will focus

23 The context of culture "includes such extra-linguistic factors as setting, behavioural environment, language itself, including the category of genre, and extra-situational factors, often referred to as frames or scenarios." Stanley E. Porter, "Dialect and Register in the Greek of the New Testament: Theory," in *Rethinking Contexts, Rereading Texts: Contributions from the Social Sciences to Biblical Interpretation* (ed. M. Daniel Carroll R.; JSOTSup 299; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 198. In this discussion of "extra-situational factors," Porter cites Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin, *Rethinking Contexts: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon* (Studies in the Social and Cultural Foundations of Language 11; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

24 Helen Leckie-Tarry, *Language and Context: A Functional Linguistic Theory of Register* (ed. David Birch; London: Pinter, 1995), 20.

25 See Christopher Butler, "Systemic Models: Unity, Diversity, and Change," *Word* 40 (1989): 13–19 for the discussion of genre and extra-linguistic factors.

26 Leckie-Tarry, *Language and Context*, 18. See also Halliday and Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text*, 47–48.

primarily on the description of Yahweh as shepherd-king in comparison to the description of the human shepherd-kings. This study will look closely at the frequent use of the verb רעה in its various forms throughout the passage and the metaphors surrounding its use.

The third step in my analysis, which involves a move from word group to clause, is to examine the role of metaphor in the cohesion of the discourse. I will determine whether the shepherd metaphor functions on its own or is connected to larger elements of cohesion such as clausal chains, semantic domains, etc. and I will note in what ways these cohesive ties link metaphor to the rest of the text.²⁷ This discussion of cohesion will then help us to interpret the role of metaphor in creating prominence within Ezekiel 34.

Steps 4–5: Cognitive and Literary Analysis of Ezekiel 34

Moving from Hallidayan linguistics to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the role of metaphor in cohesion and prominence provides something of a bridge, since it relates closely to the analysis of metaphorical coherence employed in Lakoff and Johnson's model. In my fourth step, I will examine the types of metaphors used in Ezekiel 34 and their interrelationship. This will involve the study of metaphorical entailment and the highlighting and hiddenness of certain aspects of the metaphorical components and metaphorical blends to identify the new factors that arise from the interaction of source and target. This element will be particularly important for my analysis of the blending of metaphors surrounding shepherding and kingship.

Based on the linguistic data that issue from the first four steps, the final section of this chapter applies literary analysis based on the theories of Valentine Cunningham and Mikhail Bakhtin to examine the rhetorical impact of these metaphors in their current linguistic setting in Ezekiel 34.²⁸ An exploration of these ideas leads to a deepening theological understanding of metaphorical use in our passage.

²⁷ This chapter follows Hasan and Halliday in their model for understanding cohesion. See Halliday and Hasan, *Cohesion in English* (London: Longman, 1976).

²⁸ Valentine Cunningham describes the mutual interpenetration of history and rhetoric in all literary works, which is helpful for metaphorical analysis. See Valentine Cunningham, *In the Reading Gaol: Postmodernity, Texts, and History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 127–51. Bakhtin's dialogical theory of language is also helpful for metaphorical analysis as he argues that each utterance acts as a response to some past utterance and also anticipates some future response. See Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson; University of Texas Press Slavic Series 8; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 76. For a detailed explanation of the literary theories undergirding this section, see Stovell, *Mapping Metaphorical Discourse*, 65–71.

The Context of Ezekiel 34

Context of Situation

In order to assess the context of situation of Ezekiel 34, it is helpful to examine the register of the discourse. Examining the field, tenor, and mode of Ezekiel 34 provides an awareness of the key lexical and thematic elements in the discourse (field), the levels of interpersonal relationship signifying the relative social status of the dialogue partners whether explicit or implicit (tenor), and the shifts between narrative and oral styles of discourse (mode). This assessment of Ezekiel 34 plays an important role in the interpretation of the metaphors within the passage by providing a contextual frame for interpretation.

Field

Halliday describes field in this way: "The nature of the activity—field—is a determinant in the selection of options from experiential systems, including choices related to transitivity structure, or process, participant, circumstance."²⁹ This examination of field in Ezekiel 34 places a spotlight on the processes of shepherding, destruction/restoration, and asserting Yahweh's identity and relationship to his people occurring in the passage; a spotlight on the chief participants of the discourse, depicted in the metaphors of shepherds, Yahweh as shepherd-king, the people as sheep, and the Davidic shepherd; and a spotlight on the circumstances associated with the process, described in the experiences of the wilderness and exile and the promise of security and safety.

Halliday suggests that, typically, processes are realized by verbal groups, participants by nominal groups, and circumstance by adverbial groups and prepositional phrases.³⁰ Halliday describes six different process types: Material, Behavioural, Mental, Verbal, Relational, and Existential.³¹ In Ezekiel 34, out of 134 verbal forms, the process types used are: Material (52%), Behavioural (13%), Mental (7%), Verbal (7%), Relational (11%), and Existential (10%).

Overall, these percentages are not surprising when one notes that the most frequent verbs in the passage are associated with shepherding (31 uses, vv. 2–3, 5, 7–10, 12–16, 18–19, 23) and judging (3 uses, all with Yahweh as the one judging, vv. 17, 20, 22); speaking (7 uses, vv. 1, 10, 11, 17, 20) and prophesying (2 uses, v. 2); knowing (2 uses, vv. 27, 30) and being (15 uses, vv. 1–2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14,

29 M.A.K. Halliday, "Introduction," in *Continuum Companion to Systemic Functional Linguistics* (ed. M.A.K. Halliday and Jonathan J. Webster; London: Continuum International, 2009), 7.

30 Halliday provides a chart detailing this in M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (3rd ed.; London: Hodder Arnold, 2004), 177.

31 Halliday, *Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 170–74.

22–23, 26–29).³² Along with these verbs, there are many verbs associated with scattering and destruction, on the one hand,³³ and with restoration, healing, and safety, on the other.³⁴

There are also specific patterns in the use of these different processes. When the narrative mode is being used, verbal processes like speaking and prophesying are most frequently employed (e.g., vv. 1–2, 10). In passages describing God's judgment against the shepherds and his subsequent restoration of the people, material processes are most frequent. These percentages of processes in Ezekiel 34 demonstrate the high number of action-oriented situations occurring in the discourse, but these actions are framed by the narrative discourse represented in the verbal processes. The discourse of Ezekiel 34 also includes substantial Behavioural, Existential, and Relational processes occurring throughout the passage. These Existential and Relational processes arise most commonly when Yahweh asserts his identity and status in contradiction to the bad shepherds and when Yahweh describes what has become of the

32 Scholars have at times noted the themes of knowing and responding as a common theme in the prophets alongside judgment and restoration. For example, Fishbane argues that the theme of knowing God is essential to the depiction of God as personal divine judge in the book of Ezekiel, particularly in oracles of doom. Fishbane notes that this assertion of God's identity concludes "virtually every oracle of doom in the Book of Ezekiel." Fishbane draws a connection between this theme of the Exodus covenantal themes. See Michael Fishbane, "Sin and Judgment in the Prophecies of Ezekiel," in *Interpreting the Prophets* (ed. James Luther Mayes and Paul J. Achtemeier; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 186–87. While Fishbane is primarily focused on Ezekiel 4–24, Ezekiel 34's closing statement in 34:30 echoes this tradition, but with a positive spin. Yahweh asserts that not only will the people know him, but he will be their ultimate shepherd.

33 These verbs include scattering (5 uses, vv. 5, 12, 21), straying (2 uses, vv. 4 and 16), wandering (1 use, v. 6) and destroying (using 2 related verbs both including destroy in their meaning, 2 uses of **אַבַּד** in vv. 4 and 16, 1 use of **שָׁמַד** also in v. 16).

34 These verbs include healing (1 use, v. 4), strengthening (2 uses, vv. 4, 16), seeking (3 uses, vv. 4, 6, 16), returning (2 uses, vv. 4, 16), gathering (1 use, v. 13), lying down [in safety] (2 uses in vv. 14–15), sleeping [in security] (v. 25), living [in the wilderness with the implication of living in peace] (2 uses in vv. 25, 28), saving (1 use, v. 22), binding [the injured] (2 uses, vv. 4 and 16), breaking bars and rescuing (v. 27) and fearing nothing (v. 28). Several scholars have noted the theme of restoration in contrast the judgment in these passages. Some scholars have argued that this represents two oracles that have been redacted in this passage: an oracle of judgment and an oracle of restoration. Examples include Vawter and Hoppe, *A New Heart*, 155; Daniel Block, *The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 25–48* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 274.

sheep under the care of the bad shepherds and what will occur under his gracious care.³⁵

Based on these processes, it can be reasonably established that one of the most common and dominant topics in Ezekiel 34 is the situation regarding the shepherds and the sheep. The participants in the discourse break down accordingly: prophet, Yahweh, shepherds, sheep (which then become differentiated into two sets of sheep: weak and fat sheep), and a Davidic shepherd. Toffelmire has noted a similar shift in conversation partners in Ezekiel 13. Referring to Ezekiel 13, Toffelmire states:

What make this metaphorical conversation come alive are the abrupt shifts in addressee found in the opening section of the passage. Though this may not be a hallmark of poetic language as such, it is certainly a common feature in the Song of Songs, and here in Ezekiel it has a similar effect on the register, creating the sense of a conversation in progress, with YHWH turning from one recipient to the other and speaking about the various participants in turn.³⁶

Similarly, Ezekiel 34 begins with an indictment against the shepherds in vv. 2–4, continues with a description of what happens due to the shepherds' actions in vv. 5–6 and the affirmation that Yahweh himself will become shepherd to the sheep in vv. 10–16. Yet, the addressee swiftly shifts in v. 17 to the flock who have been relatively passive in their role up to this point in the discourse, witnessing the judgment against the shepherds. Now in v. 17, the flock themselves become judged for their actions. What was one amorphous flock becomes differentiated into two types of sheep who receive different responses from Yahweh. The final section focuses on the positive actions of Yahweh to restore his people by bringing another important participant into the discourse: the one shepherd whom Yahweh will place over them, Yahweh's servant, David. This Davidic figure will take on the role of shepherd, tending and shepherding the sheep, and will be their prince (vv. 23–24).

The circumstances of these processes (i.e. the adverbial groups and prepositional phrases) provide the context for understanding the meaning of the processes and their impact on the participants in the discourse. For example, many of the prepositional phrases focus on particular locations

35 Mein has argued that the frequent "I Am" language is characteristic of Yahweh's desire to assert his name and his power over the shepherds. See Mein, "Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds," 496.

36 Toffelmire, "Linguistic Register and Poetic Language," 16.

where these events occur. When the sheep are scattered and wander because of the bad shepherds, this occurs “in the mountain” (v. 6), but it is also “in the mountain” where these same sheep will be pastured and able to live in peace due to Yahweh (vv. 13–14). Similarly, while the people are scattered “all over the earth,” Yahweh promises that they will live “in the wilderness” and experience safety and plenty (v. 25). Notably, this focus on the wilderness helps to make the passage consistent with the exilic experience of the people of God stuck in the wilderness of Babylon, while potentially echoing the experience of the Exodus as prototype for God’s pattern of redemption.³⁷ When the metaphors (and processes) are focused on restoration, the prepositional phrases often modify the verb by describing situations of safety and security. For example, Yahweh promises to make the sheep lie down “in safety” (vv. 14–15), to sleep “in security” (v. 25), and to dwell “in security” (v. 28). Following the theme of the return from exile as another Exodus, Yahweh also brings them “out from the nations and . . . into their own land” (v. 13) where they will be secure “in their own land” and rescued “from the hands of those who enslaved them” (v. 27).³⁸

Thus, examining the field of Ezekiel 34 provides us with greater insight into the processes that are most prominent in this discourse, the chief participants and their roles, and the circumstances that impact the overall themes of loss and restoration. Each of these elements provides the framework for a better understanding of the metaphors in Ezekiel 34.

Tenor

The language of Ezekiel 34 demonstrates social relationships and differences in social status within the text that are essential for understanding the inner workings of the metaphors present in the discourse. Analysis of tenor is found through examining modality, person, and plurality. As Eggins explains with regard to English,

with tenor . . . we find interpersonal meanings of roles and relationships realized not through the transitivity patterns, but through patterns of

37 Scholars have noted this wilderness theme and seen it as related to the Exodus themes in Ezekiel. See Casey A. Strine, *Sworn Enemies: The Divine Oath, the Book of Ezekiel, and the Polemics of Exile* (BZAW 436; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 255–56.

38 Old Testament and New Testament scholars alike have noted this new exodus theme in Ezekiel 34. See Block, *Ezekiel*, 353; Young Sam Chae, *Jesus as the Eschatological Davidic Shepherd: Studies in the Old Testament, Second Temple Judaism, and the Gospel of Matthew* (WUNT 2.216; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 40.

what we call mood . . . Mood refers to variables such as the types of clause structure (declarative, interrogative), the degree of certainty or obligation expressed (modality), the use of tags, vocatives, attitudinal words which are either positively or negatively loaded . . . expressions of intensification and politeness markers of various kinds.³⁹

Examples of mood in Ezekiel 34 include the use of imperative clauses asking the audience to heed the words of the Lord, the use of vocatives to speak directly to the shepherds and the sheep, the use of the interrogative form to rhetorically establish the validity of the claim against the shepherds and then again against the fat sheep, and the negatively charged attitudinal language to describe the situation of the shepherds and the flock. This negative language includes the language of destruction, abandonment, physical violence against the sheep by the shepherds and the fat sheep against weak sheep. In comparison, language with a positive attitudinal disposition is applied to Yahweh in order to contrast his promised behaviour with the behaviour of the shepherds.

An awareness of these uses of mood helps us to become aware of interpersonal patterns that represent situations of social status. First, there is an emphasis on Yahweh's status superior to his shepherds. When one analyzes the use of person in Ezekiel 34 connected to the metaphors, several elements arise. First, the 2nd person plural is frequently used to create indictments against the shepherds and subsequently against the fat sheep. These 2nd person plural forms stand in contradistinction to the frequent use of the 1st person pronoun to create marked emphasis on Yahweh's identity as righteous and rightful shepherd over his flock. To designate this flock as Yahweh's, the personal pronominal suffix is frequently used to mark Yahweh's ownership of the sheep. Similarly, this personal pronominal suffix is also used to designate the one true shepherd whom Yahweh will raise up to take the place of the bad shepherds. This 'David' is described as "my servant," placing this shepherd at a higher position through his association and approval by Yahweh as deity.⁴⁰

The sociological impact of these interpersonal relationships and the metaphors of shepherd-sheep themselves are better understood when read in light of the ancient Near Eastern context, specifically in light of the practices of animal husbandry. On the one hand, scholars like Andrew Mein have

39 Suzanne Eggins, *An Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics* (2nd ed.; New York: Continuum, 2004), 110.

40 Much work has been done of the designation of King David as "my servant" and its subsequent usage in later Davidic hopes. For more detailed analysis, see my previous discussions on this topic in Stovell, *Mapping Metaphorical Discourse*, 90–91, 105, 114–19, 124–25.

looked to animal husbandry as the source for the description of Yahweh as shepherd in Ezekiel 34. Mein's article is helpful for establishing the probable 'real life' elements of animal husbandry in the world of the ancient Near East, and he makes a good point when he states: "Therefore, taking seriously the recognition that the shepherds are hirelings changes our understanding of the metaphor slightly but significantly, since their care for the flock is not for its own sake but for the sake of its owner Yahweh."⁴¹ Mein provides helpful insight into the owner/hireling relationship between the owner of sheep and his shepherds and the use of the language of "wool," "milk,"⁴² slaughter, and the issue of the scattering of the sheep.⁴³ The weakness of Mein's approach is his lack of understanding of the complexity of metaphor.⁴⁴ Mein cites Brettler's work on metaphor and, through him, adapts an element of Black's theories,⁴⁵ but Mein does not use Black himself as his source. This causes Mein to miss an important aspect of Black's approach. Black correctly acknowledges that metaphor includes elements of both the target and the source, but he also correctly acknowledges that it hides elements of both target and source.⁴⁶ In other words, one cannot assume that because shepherd is used as a metaphor for God that all the aspects of a shepherd would be understood as applicable to God. Though Mein acknowledges that "not all of the [common-place associations] are in play in any one example of the metaphor,"⁴⁷ Mein appears to apply all of the common-place associations to Ezekiel 34, causing Mein to see Yahweh's purpose as self-motivated rather

41 Mein, "Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds," 502.

42 This involves interpreting חֶלֶב in v. 3 as "milk or cheese" rather than "fat." TNIV and NIV translate this word as "curds"; in a similar vein The Message, CEV, and NLT translate the word "milk"; NCV translates this word "milk curds." Many other translations (including NET, KJV, ASV, NASB, ESV, RSV, NRSV) translate this word as "fat."

43 Mein, "Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds," 495–99.

44 Thus I do not agree with his argument in the full. For example, why is it necessary to argue that when Yahweh is concerned with his name and asserts his divine power he necessarily does not also have a concern for his flock? It is more likely that both ideas are present here: Yahweh's desire to be rightly represented by his leaders and Yahweh's desire for his flock to be rightly treated for their continuing health and well-being.

45 Mein uses the work of Marc Brettler. See Marc Zvi Brettler, "The Metaphorical Mapping of God in the Hebrew Bible," in *Metaphor, Canon and Community: Jewish, Christian and Islamic Approaches* (ed. Ralph Bisschops and James Francis; Religions and Discourse 1; Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 219–32.

46 See Max Black, "More on Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought* (ed. A. Ortony; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19–43, and Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

47 Mein, "Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds," 496.

than motivated by a care for his sheep. But this conclusion is by no means the only possible way of understanding Yahweh's motivation based on a metaphor theory following Black.

Van Hecke provides a helpful correction to this analysis of the metaphor of Yahweh as shepherd. As Van Hecke explains,

a conceptual metaphor may now be defined as the interaction between two conceptual domains, an interaction in which one conceptual domain is restructured on the basis of what we know about another conceptual domain. In our metaphor, 'the Lord is my shepherd' the domain of RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD AND MEN is structured on the basis of the domain of PASTORALISM.

Van Hecke explores this metaphor by applying it specifically to Gen 48:15. One helpful insight of Van Hecke is his discussion of the generic level of the domain of PASTORALISM compared to the generic structure of the domain of RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD AND MEN. He states,

we will for example import the generic relation AGENT TAKES CARE OF PATIENT into the metaphor, but not the generic relation AGENT HAS RIGHT TO KILL PATIENT, that corresponds to our more specific knowledge about pastoralism that shepherds usually kill off the young male animals that are not needed for the procreation of the flock. This reason is that the first generic relation does not violate the generic structure of what we think to know about God, whereas the second does.⁴⁸

In other words, Van Hecke is pointing out that establishing the socio-economic parameters of the source domain of shepherding (as Mein does in his work) does not guarantee a one-to-one relationship with the target domain of Yahweh. Mein includes all the generic relations of AGENT to PATIENT and creates a situation where Yahweh relates to his people exactly as a shepherd/owner would relate to his sheep, but this exact equivalency never exists in any metaphor.

Thus, analyzing the metaphors of shepherd/owner to his sheep provides a greater awareness of the sociological relationship of superiority of Yahweh over his hired hands, yet with Van Hecke, this socio-economic relationship is countermanded by a theological relationship with its own sociological implications. A god had a certain role in society as a protector (i.e. shepherd), as the ultimate king, and as the one who designates royal power on the king. In the Hebrew

48 Van Hecke, "Shepherds and Linguists," 482.

Bible, leaders must acknowledge and maintain relationship with Yahweh in order to be considered true rulers. This creates a complicated role between prophets and kings. Israelite kings must maintain relationship with Yahweh to be considered true kings and thus the 'word of the Lord' via the prophet has the power to transfer kingship from one king to another, creating a power in the prophet through the power of Yahweh.⁴⁹

Besides the Yahweh-to-shepherd interpersonal relationship, there is the additional issue of prophet-to-king social dynamics that exists here. While the majority of the discourse is framed as Yahweh speaking, a few interjections on the part of the prophet highlight that it is the prophet's voice that the listeners are hearing. This creates interesting sociological and interpersonal dynamics. In an interesting twist sociologically, while a prophet might otherwise be socially inferior to a king, the prophet, due to his relation to the higher power of Yahweh, is given higher status than the king through his prophecy. In Ezekiel 34, this higher social status is realized in the prophet's use of imperatives to order the kings/shepherds to listen to the Lord. This connects to the cultural expectations around prophetic utterance in terms of socio-political dynamics.⁵⁰

Examining tenor provides a helpful perspective on the social dynamics impacting the discourse in terms of the relative social status of the prophet, Yahweh, the shepherds/kings, and the noted one shepherd appointed by Yahweh. Examining tenor also provides insight into the rhetorical purpose of many of the interpersonal linguistic aspects of the discourse, which assists in a greater understanding not only of the meaning of metaphor, but also of its rhetorical significance. We will return to this issue of rhetorical significance at the close of the chapter.

Mode

Mode is the textual component of context. It describes the role language is playing in a discourse. While the study of mode can include cohesion, cohesion will be dealt with later in this chapter. Here, the focus of my discussion of

49 Several of the essays in Cristiano Grottanelli's volume, *Kings and Prophets*, discuss the sociological dynamics of prophet to Yahweh to king and also gods to prophets/oracles more specifically. See Cristiano Grottanelli, ed., *Kings and Prophets: Monarchic Power, Inspired Leadership, and Sacred Text in Biblical Narrative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

50 For more detailed discussion of the socio-political issues related to prophets in the ancient world, see Robert R. Wilson, *Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Grottanelli, *Kings and Prophets*.

mode will be the interrelation between narrative modes and oral modes in the discourse.

Ezekiel 34 appears to consist of a combination of two different modes: a narrative mode and an oral mode. The first mode of discourse appears to be a narrative discourse mode in vv. 1–2 that describes an oracular moment,⁵¹ while the rest of the discourse primarily points to what “The Lord God says,” suggesting recitation of oral discourse.⁵² Daniel Block has identified some of the linguistic shifts that indicate these two modes. As Block explains,

the aural quality of the passage suggests some correspondence between the written form and the original presentation. The use of the second person of direct address (vv. 3–4, 17–22, 31), the vocative case (vv. 2, 7, 9), the call to hear the word of Yahweh (vv. 7, 9), the redundancy (vv. 7–8 and 9–10; 11–15 and 16; 17–19 and 20–22; 23a and 23b; 30 and 31), the emphasis on the authority of the proclaimed word (reflected in the citation and signatory formulae, as well as in “I am Yahweh, I have spoken,” v. 24), the evocative diction (vv. 2, 8, 10, 17), and the opening rhetorical declaration, all contribute to the oracle’s homiletical flavor.⁵³

These observations by Block provide a helpful way of distinguishing between the narrative and oral forms within the discourse and understanding how they are realized linguistically. However, to more fully understand how these modes of discourse are being used within the text, it is helpful to turn to Martin’s two forms of distance in modes: spatial/interpersonal and experiential.

Because the primary means of discourse in this passage is indirect discourse (i.e. Yahweh speaks through the prophet), the degree of discursive distance is increased in both forms of distance described by Martin. As Hasan explains, “mode of discourse refers to the mode of contact for the actors in the discourse event, since clearly the nature of the message will be different for a co-actor in absentia compared with that for the co-present interactant.”⁵⁴ Hasan’s point

51 Block refers to this initial statement as “the word-event formula.” See Block, *Ezekiel*, 273.

52 Such a statement does not negate the ultimately written nature of the discourse, but may suggest a link to a previous oral stage of development.

53 Block, *Ezekiel*, 274.

54 Ruqaiya Hasan, “The Place of Context in a Systemic Functional Model,” in *Continuum Companion to Systemic Functional Linguistics*, 172.

is well taken as the co-actor of Yahweh is described largely as in absentia and speaking through the vessel of the prophet and the written mode itself creates an additional level of absence.

First, in terms of spatial/interpersonal distance, the use of an intermediary necessitates an increased degree of spatial/interpersonal distance; the message is not heard face-to-face directly from the original speaker (in this case, Yahweh) to the listener (in this case, the leaders and the people). Not only is the message from God through the prophet, but there appears to be a time delay from when the prophet initially receives the word from the Lord to when he shares this word with his listeners.⁵⁵ This can be observed in the narrative mode's use of verbal forms when speaking of reception of the message from the Lord, in the description of the intermediary step itself, and particularly in the repeated use of verbal processes as discussed in the field analysis above: "Son of man, prophesy against the shepherds of Israel; prophesy and say to them..."

Experiential distance (also called 'the action/reflection scale') is also impacted by the indirect means of discourse.⁵⁶ On the one hand, the narrative mode creates distance between the action taking place and reflection on that action. However, within the sections that mimic oral communication (i.e. Yahweh speaking), the use of tense (e.g. predominantly *qal* forms), identification through personal pronouns indicating close proximity (e.g. the use of 1st person pronouns for Yahweh in vv. 8, 11, 15, 17, 20, 24, 27, 30, 31; the 3rd person masculine singular in v. 23; the 3rd person masculine plural in v. 30; and the 2nd person feminine plural in v. 31) and person (e.g. emphatic use of 1st person for Yahweh's speech and use of 2nd person to refer to the leaders/shepherds in vv. 2–4, to the flock/people in vv. 17–24) all push the discourse closer to the action end of the action/reflection spectrum. Martin explains how this shift toward the cline of action occurs using an example in a speech by Desmond Tutu. Martin states, "written discourse can also imitate dialogue, for rhetorical effect, as when Tutu asks a question, then answers it himself"⁵⁷ Similarly in v. 2, Yahweh asks rhetorically, "Should not shepherds take care of the flock?"

55 This approach is focusing on reading the text synchronically and at face value. This statement is not intended to remove the potential for redaction over time as part of the distance implicit in the text. However, the approach of this chapter simply does not focus on such issues.

56 Martin, "Language, Register and Genre," 15.

57 James R. Martin and David Rose. *Working with Discourse: Meaning Beyond the Clause* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 247.

creating the illusion of dialogue for the sake of rhetorical effect. In vv. 18–19, Yahweh asks similar rhetorical questions of the sheep within the flock who have mistreated their fellow sheep. In both cases, the rhetorical questions provide the initial impetus for the just quality of Yahweh's response, as the answers to these questions are meant to be crystal clear to their audience and thereby indictments first against the shepherds and then against the fatted members of the flock.

Thus, a study of mode provides us greater insight into the tension created by the narrative distance of Yahweh speaking through his mediator, the prophet, while highlighting the rhetorical effect created by the mimicry of direct speech. These shifts in mode work alongside the variations in processes, participants, and circumstances found in the discourse when field is examined and highlight the issues of relative social standing exhibited in a study of tenor. As Grottanelli points out in his book on kings and prophets, it is the very tension between oral performance and written text that becomes important to a shift in royal power in relation to the prophet and the written text.⁵⁸ Each of these elements of register provides the context for understanding the metaphors in Ezekiel 34.

Co-Text of Ezekiel 34

With an awareness of the context of situation and register of Ezekiel 34, we can now turn to the co-text of Ezekiel 34. This begins with an identification of the other texts that impact our understanding of Ezekiel 34 and then an examination of the main elements of the metaphor throughout the discourse, defining the range of the metaphor and its companion metaphors.

Examining Related Texts Impacting Ezekiel 34

The literary setting of Ezekiel 34 is an important element of co-text for our interpretation of the metaphor of shepherd-king. First, one must address the question of literary dependence in relation to Psalm 23 and Jeremiah 23. It is the consensus of many scholars that Ezekiel's metaphor of the shepherd builds on a similar metaphor in Jeremiah 23;⁵⁹ less clear, however, is the relationship

⁵⁸ Grottanelli, "Introduction," in his *Kings and Prophets*, 8.

⁵⁹ Scholars that maintain some level of dependence include Mein, "Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds," 499; Block, *Ezekiel*, 275–77; Moshe Greenberg, *Ezekiel 21–37: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 709; contra Brownlee, "Ezekiel's Poetic Indictment of the Shepherds."

between Psalm 23 and Ezekiel 34.⁶⁰ It is perhaps equally helpful to note the common usage of shepherd as leaders in ancient Near Eastern literature and in other parts of the biblical canon.⁶¹

The immediate literary context of Ezekiel 34 is in continuity with the response in Ezekiel 33 to the destruction of Jerusalem. As Seitz notes, “the Book of Ezekiel is remarkably well-organized according to a system of dates, correlated with the exile of Jehoiachin.”⁶² Besides the structure of dating, the text is also divided by a relatively consistent structure of phrases, with “then the Word of the Lord came to me” indicating the beginning of an oracle and “declares the Sovereign Lord” indicating the end of an oracle.⁶³ Although Ezek 34:1 begins an oracle, it is also part of the larger structure connected to Ezekiel 33, beginning at the date of the fall of Jerusalem. This is indicated by the lack of a closing formula in Ezekiel 33 and by several elements of linguistic continuity that will be examined below.

There appears to be a significant parallel between the language of Ezek 33:27 and Ezek 34:8. The Lord promises that those who refuse to turn and repent (33:10–11) will be “devoured by wild animals” as surely as the Lord lives, and they will be destroyed by the sword (33:27). This language is then used to describe what the shepherds have allowed to happen to the sheep. They have become food for wild animals and the plunder of war (Ezek 34:8).

Ezekiel 33:27 further draws on the language of life and death from the preceding vv. 11–16.⁶⁴ In ch. 33, the phrase “as surely as I live” (חַי־אֲנִי) is used twice with LORD GOD. In v. 11, Yahweh asks the people to repent, and, in v. 27, Yahweh states what will occur if they do not repent. This same phrase “as surely as I

60 This issue is related to the dating of Psalm 23. Some scholars attempt to avoid the issue by merely addressing parallels in metaphor. For example, Tanner does not deal with the dating of Psalm 23 directly, but appears to believe that Psalm 23 depends on Ezekiel and Jeremiah and not vice versa (though her discussion of parallels between texts is quite murky). See Tanner, “King Yahweh as the Good Shepherd.”

61 Both Golding and Gan have recently provided such studies. See Golding, “The Imagery of Shepherding in the Bible”; and Gan, *The Metaphor of Shepherd*.

62 Christopher R. Seitz, *Theology in Conflict: Reactions to the Exile in the Book of Jeremiah* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989), 121. Seitz provides a helpful list of the main works on the chronology of Ezekiel in footnote 42.

63 Block describes v. 1 as a “word-event formula” and describes vv. 30–31 as a “modified version of the recognition formula.” Block also notes the complexity of the content and “formal rhetorical signals,” See Block, *Ezekiel*, 273.

64 Deeley notes that Yahweh’s judgment against the flock “echoes one of the themes of 33:10–19, that each person is answerable for his or her actions.” Deeley, “Ezekiel’s Shepherd and John’s Jesus,” 255.

live” also appears in 34:8 (again with LORD GOD) which suggests that now we see the results of what has happened because they did not repent, but this is also apparently because of the bad actions of the shepherds (i.e. the lack of shepherding). This makes one wonder what the role of obedience to Yahweh of the shepherds is here. It appears that the shepherds are required not only to be directly obedient in their own actions, but also to encourage the people themselves to be obedient to Yahweh. Charting the relationship between Ezekiel 33 and 34 in this way challenges the simple assertion that Ezekiel 34 has moved purely to a vision of hope for the future. Instead, Ezekiel 34 is neither a picture purely of hope or of judgment,⁶⁵ nor is it purely a picture of Yahweh’s selflessness and care as a shepherd or a picture of Yahweh as merely a distant sheep-owner upset about the economic predicament his hiring shepherds have created. Instead, Ezekiel 34 provides a more complex picture of the character and actions of Yahweh in relationship to his people in light of the exile through the use of metaphor.

Identifying the Metaphorical Range

To discuss the range of the metaphor ‘Yahweh is shepherd-king’ in Ezekiel 34, one must first identify the two metaphors present in this metaphor. First, in one sense ‘Yahweh is king’ and ‘Yahweh is shepherd’ function as their own metaphors throughout the Old Testament. Second, one cannot assume that once we identify the implications of ‘Yahweh is king’ and ‘Yahweh is shepherd’ we have fully explicated the entire metaphor particularly as ‘shepherd is king.’ Van Hecke provides insight into the help that Conceptual Blending gives in his discussion of ‘God as shepherd’ in Hosea.⁶⁶ He correctly points out that the strength of the Conceptual Blending approach is its awareness that when two elements in a metaphor are combined they create a new complex. Furthermore, Conceptual Blending leaves room for the interfacing of multiple metaphors. In the case of Ezekiel 34, several metaphors are part of a larger metaphorical complex whose development will be traced throughout the passage.

65 This position is contra Vawter and Hoppe who argue that Ezek 34:1–16 “What started out as an oracle of judgment ends as an oracle of salvation that speaks directly about Judah’s future. That prophet no longer refers to Judah’s past and the judgment that it generated. The prophet deals with Judah’s future and the salvation that the exiles will experience.” Vawter and Hoppe, *A New Heart*, 155.

66 Pierre Van Hecke, “Conceptual Blending: A Recent Approach to Metaphor Illustrated with the Pastoral Metaphor in Hos 4:16,” in *Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible* (ed. Pierre Van Hecke; BETL 187; Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 215–32.

Judging the Shepherds and the Reassertion of Yahweh's Position as Shepherd (vv. 1–16)⁶⁷

As the chapter opens, Yahweh tells Ezekiel to speak to the 'shepherds of Israel' concerning the treatment of 'the sheep.' Verses 1–3 provide a detailed indictment against these 'shepherds,' describing their treatment of the 'sheep.' Verses 4–5 shift the focus to the resultant 'scattering of the sheep,' because they have no 'shepherd.' In the verses that follow, the case against the shepherds is described in greater detail, focusing on the selfish nature of the shepherds (vv. 6–9). Thus, it is important to note that the reader's initial introduction to the metaphors of 'shepherd as king' and 'the people of Israel as sheep' is in the context of bad shepherds mistreating the sheep. In this way, the passage introduces us initially to a 'human king as shepherd' metaphor before vv. 11–12 shift to Yahweh taking the title of 'shepherd' for himself. Verse 10 marks an important bridge as it describes the removal of the sheep from the care of the shepherds and the subsequent transfer to Yahweh. As power passes back into Yahweh's hand directly, he also is conferred with the same metaphorical title as the bad rulers: Yahweh becomes shepherd in their stead. In metaphorical terms, then, we have multiple metaphors within the same metaphorical range: the human kings of Israel as shepherds, the people of Israel as sheep, and Yahweh as shepherd-king. All of these metaphors fall into the basic shepherd-sheep metaphorical structure, but one should not miss the difference between Yahweh as shepherd king versus the human kings as shepherds. Yahweh's kingship is a metaphor in itself which functions alongside his metaphorical role as shepherd.

Verses 11–16 move away from the indictment of the shepherds to a profession by Yahweh of his actions towards his 'sheep.' Verse 12 provides the first direct simile between Yahweh and a shepherd. Yahweh describes his actions towards "his sheep" (צאֲנָן) as "like the care of a shepherd" (כְּבִקְרַת רֹעֵה). It is helpful to compare the actions of the shepherds in vv. 2–4 to the actions of Yahweh in vv. 11–16. As Table 6.1 demonstrates, the misdeeds of the shepherds are the inversion of the righteous deeds of Yahweh. The writer of Ezekiel has demonstrated this inversion by creating a parallel structure between vv. 2–6 and vv. 12–16. This parallel structure surrounds vv. 7–11, the section in which Yahweh re-exerts his role as shepherd, announcing judgment against the shepherds. The actions within this parallel structure provide a series of metaphorical

67 Some have seen these verses as the primary oracle with three attachments, though there is no ending formula at this point. See Vawter and Hoppe, *A New Heart*, 154. I make a division here for narrative reasons. Whereas vv. 1–16 speak directly to the shepherds and speak of the sheep in the 3rd person, v. 17 marks a shift to the flock as the recipients of the message of future judgment.

descriptions demonstrating further continuity and discontinuity between the target domain ‘king’ / ‘Yahweh’ and the source domain ‘shepherd.’⁶⁸

TABLE 6.1 *Parallel structure of the actions of the bad shepherds and Yahweh*

	Actions of the shepherds		Actions of Yahweh
v. 2–3	you did not shepherd the sheep (i.e. they cared for themselves instead of the sheep and did not shepherd justly)	v. 16c	shepherd the flock with justice
v. 4a	you did not strengthen the weak or bind the injured	v. 16b	bind up the injured and strengthen the weak, destroy the sleek and strong
v. 4b	you did not bring back the strays or search for the lost	v. 16b	search for the lost and bring back the strays
v. 4c	you have ruled them harshly and brutally	v. 15	shepherd/tend to them, make them lie down
v. 5	they were scattered because there was no shepherd and became food for all the wild animals	v. 14b	feed them in mountain heights of Israel, in ravines
v. 6a	My sheep wandered over all the mountains and on every high hill	v. 14a	pasture them in mountain heights of Israel, in ravines
v. 6b	They were scattered over the whole earth	v. 13	bring them out of the nations into their own land
v. 6c	and no one searched for them or looked for them	v. 12	rescue them from all the scattered places

Judgment of the Sheep (vv. 17–22)

Verse 17 marks a narrative shift that focuses on Yahweh as shepherd speaking directly to his sheep and judging them. Whereas vv. 1–16 speak directly to

68 Van Hecke provides a helpful discussion of the continuity and discontinuity of the shepherd metaphor to Yahweh. See Van Hecke, “Pastoral Metaphors”; Van Hecke, “Shepherds and Linguists.”

the shepherds and speak of the sheep in the 3rd person, vv. 17–21 speak to the sheep in the 2nd person frequently. In vv. 1–16, the actions of the bad shepherds and Yahweh as shepherd help characterize the range of the ‘king as shepherd’ metaphor, in vv. 17–22, the actions of the sheep provide further insight into the ‘people as sheep’ metaphor that exists alongside the ‘king as shepherd’ metaphor. These sheep include those who are faithful to Yahweh and those who are not. This unfaithfulness is depicted through the metaphorical “trampling” and “muddying with feet” of the pasture and water (vv. 18–19), and the “shoving with flanks and shoulders” and “goring with horns” of the weaker “sheep” among them (v. 21). In fact, it is not only the unreliable and cruel shepherds who have caused the sheep to be scattered, but v. 21 informs the reader that the sheep themselves have contributed to their own scattering and that this is the reason that Yahweh is judging the people. As Ezek 33:20 states, these fat sheep—like the shepherds fat on slaughtered sheep—will be judged according to their ways.⁶⁹ Ezekiel 34:20 and 22 provide a linguistic frame for the metaphorical description of the actions of the sheep by the repeated language of “I will judge between sheep and sheep.”⁷⁰ Thus while Ezekiel 34 promises hope for the faithful sheep, the message of judgment remains part of the picture for the unfaithful and unjust among both sheep and shepherds and the exile is seen as the fault of both sheep and shepherds.⁷¹

One Shepherd, David the Prince (vv. 23–24)

Within the metaphorical range of shepherd, I have already identified the negative depiction of human kings as shepherds and the positive depiction of Yahweh as shepherd-king. Verses 23–24 add the metaphor of a positive human king who will be the “one shepherd” over the people, namely David, the servant. On the one hand, this reference to Davidic kingship has caused some scholars to point to the eschatological or messianic implications of Ezekiel 34 as a whole.⁷² On the other hand, some scholars point to the impact

69 Deeley, “Ezekiel’s Shepherd and John’s Jesus,” 255.

70 Verse 22 appears to be a summary of the more detailed phrase in v. 20.

71 As Paul House notes in reference to Ezekiel, “for renewal and perfect peace to emerge, however, the wicked must be removed from the earth, which entails the judgment for all who reject God’s word.” See Paul R. House, *Old Testament Theology* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), 400. On a form critical level many scholars have argued that vv. 2–10 represent an independent woe oracle while the following section (vv. 11–22) points to Yahweh’s “salvific activity with his flock.” Finally in vv. 23–31, Block suggests, “the focus shifts to positively reconstructing the shalom that Yahweh has intended from the beginning.” See Block, *Ezekiel*, 274.

72 For example, Holladay argues that Ezekiel 34 marks the rise in the apocalyptic. See William Lee Holladay, *Long Ago God Spoke: How Christians May Hear the Old Testament*

of the Deuteronomic History on Ezekiel 34.⁷³ Along these lines, Paul House argues that the metaphor of “a Davidic ruler as shepherd” (present in Jer 23:1–8 and Ezekiel 34) demonstrates the view that these books (as well as Isaiah and the Book of the Twelve) “all look to the Davidic dynasty for an ideal king to solve the nation’s sin problem.”⁷⁴ The Davidic king functions as the human representative for Yahweh. This may explain the importance of the word “one” in describing David as shepherd and the use of “prince” (נָשִׂיא) instead of king for David.⁷⁵ House further asserts that “Ezekiel 34:20–24 places the Davidic heir squarely in the center of a coming spiritual renewal of the people of God.”⁷⁶ This Davidic heir is described clearly in the metaphor of shepherd. In fact, v. 23 is replete with the language of shepherd.⁷⁷ One may see v. 24 as the restatement of the figurative statement in v. 23.

The Covenant of Peace and the Hope of Restoration (vv. 25–31)

Though some have deemed the final passage an abandonment of the shepherd and sheep motif,⁷⁸ these verses contain more than simply the reference to the sheep metaphor in v. 31. Moreover, upon close inspection, one can find several resonances of the sheep-shepherd metaphor still ruminating. One example is the repeated descriptions of the purging of wild beasts from the land (vv. 25, 28). While fear of wild animal attack was no doubt a real threat during this

Today (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 193. Block speaks of the eschatological hope of Ezekiel as “beyond a new exodus and a renewal of Yahweh’s covenant with his people; it incorporates all the other promises on which the Israelites had based their security . . .” This includes “Yahweh’s covenant with David.” See Block, *Ezekiel*, 416. As noted above many scholars read elements of the Messianic Good Shepherd of John 10 into Ezekiel 34, whether such reading is warranted.

73 Ackroyd, for example, points to the obvious influence of the D material, but also suggests that Ezekiel moves beyond “the tendency [in D] to moral exhortation.” See Peter R. Ackroyd, *Exile and Restoration: A Study of Hebrew Thought of the Sixth Century BC* (London: SCM, 1968), 109.

74 House, *Old Testament Theology*, 242.

75 As BDB explains, the term נָשִׂיא may be used generally for a human ruler over against God, but in Ezekiel this term is repeatedly used in various contexts: of Zedekiah, the chief men of Judah, the future Davidic king, and the foreign princes. Seitz provides a helpful explanation of Ezekiel’s use of this term. See Seitz, *Theology in Conflict*, 121–63.

76 House, *Old Testament Theology*, 400.

77 There is a substantial spike in the use of words with shepherding roots in Ezekiel relative to other sections of the Hebrew Bible. This spike represents a noticeable increase over other prophetic literature. Ezekiel 34 shows a higher distribution of these words than the rest of Ezekiel. Ezekiel 34:23 represents a tall spike within Ezekiel itself.

78 Vawter and Hoppe, *A New Heart*, 154.

time, this language also echoes the language in v. 5 and v. 8 of the sheep who are food for the wild animals. In a similar vein, the language of “plunder” in v. 28 recalls v. 8. In both cases, it appears that what has been used metaphorically previously in the passage is now being used in a non-figurative way, but no doubt a resonance between the two usages was intended, particularly in light of v. 31.

Cohesion in Ezekiel 34

The metaphor of Yahweh as shepherd-king includes elements of the metaphor ‘human kings as shepherds’ and leaves other elements out. This interweaving of the human and divine aspects of the ‘shepherd as king’ metaphor is joined together in Ezekiel 34 through the careful use of cohesive elements. In this section, I will highlight some of these key cohesive elements as they relate to the metaphor in Ezekiel 34. First, a common means of cohesion is the frequent repetition of words from similar semantic domains.⁷⁹ Some refer to this as “imagery” or “theme,” but whatever term is used, the concept remains the same. In Ezekiel 34, repetition of the root רעה in various grammatical forms dominates the discourse.⁸⁰ Alongside this word are other words within the same pastoral domain. These include: sheep, pasture, goat, lamb, and grazing. Further, as noted above, the actions of the shepherds of tending the sheep through caring for their injuries, seeking the lost sheep, feeding the sheep, etc., while not in the same semantic domain, still pertain to pastoral actions in ‘real life.’

In addition to the use of overlapping semantic domains, the author of Ezekiel uses connectives to create cohesion between the various sections of

79 Cohesion follows logically from an understanding of the linearization of the text, that is, the choice of the author to place one word before another in a particular order. Halliday provides four ways in which cohesion is created in English: reference, ellipsis and substitution, conjunction, and lexical cohesion. Porter argues that within Greek four similar factors contribute to the cohesion of a text. These factors are person reference, verbal aspect, connectives, information structure. Semantic domain may be related to information structure. See Cynthia Long Westfall, *A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews: The Relationship between Form and Meaning* (LNTS 297; New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 29; Halliday, *Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 287–313; Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; BLG 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 304–7. Little work has been done on determining answers to the same questions in poetry and prophetic literature in the Hebrew Bible.

80 The forms that are most frequently used include רהימ used 8 times, רעה used 5 times, and ארעה, רעו, and תרעינה each used 2 times.

the passage and thus between elements of the metaphors themselves. Block comments on the rhetorical complexity of this linguistic patterning.⁸¹ One example of these connectives is the use of לִבֵּן in vv. 7, 9, 20. In v. 7, לִבֵּן provides a conjunctive “therefore” connecting v. 7 to the preceding section (vv. 1–6); in a similar fashion לִבֵּן joins v. 9 to vv. 7–8, and via this connection with v. 7 to vv. 1–6 as well. In v. 20, לִבֵּן also connects this passage to vv. 17–19. In each case, the use of לִבֵּן is directed at the shepherds (as in vv. 7 and 9) or the sheep (v. 20). Thus the metaphor acts as part of the cohesive movement with these connectives.

Another element of cohesion is the inversion of word order. This can also contribute to the markedness of a particular section. Ezekiel 34 provides several examples of direct object fronting. Direct object fronting occurs when a direct object (in this case with its direct object marker) is placed at the front of a sentence. This occurs frequently in poetry and occasionally in prophetic literature, but no doubt there is a purpose to such inversion of the normal Hebrew word order.⁸² In Ezekiel 34, direct object fronting occurs in vv. 3, 4, and 16. In vv. 3–4, the use of direct object fronting foregrounds the victim of the cruel shepherds’ actions, connecting the direct objects to the reference to “the flock” at the end of v. 2. As discussed above, v. 16 is an essential part of the chiasmic structure of Ezekiel 34’s human to divine shepherd inversion. Verse 16 maintains the direct object fronting of its inverted parallel v. 4. This may be to make the parallels between v. 4 and v. 16 more clearly connected, and it may also serve to join v. 16 to the “my sheep” of v. 15. Again, the direct object fronting is directly connected to the cohesion not only of the passage, but of the metaphor as well.

Finally, the use of personal pronouns is an element of both cohesion and prominence. In Hebrew because the use of the personal pronoun is often unnecessary, use of the personal pronoun can often be marked, may serve toward providing cohesion, and may make certain elements of the text more prominent than others. One such outstanding feature of this text is the frequent use of אֲנִי.⁸³ Though scholars like Mein argue that the frequent and obvious use of this pronoun implies a ‘theocentricity’ (describing the 1st person pronouns as “the relentless sequence . . . which dominates 34:11–15”),⁸⁴ it is

81 See Block, *Ezekiel*, 273.

82 This would be an interesting place for expanded study in terms of the importance of word order for prominence and cohesion in Biblical Hebrew poetry and prophetic literature.

83 While it might be possible to argue for the occasional use of the term as a feature of late Hebrew, that is, of course, assuming that one believes that Ezekiel is an example of late Hebrew, it appears unlikely due to the frequency of use within Ezekiel 34.

84 Mein, “Profitable and Unprofitable Shepherds,” 501.

perhaps more consistent to see this constant use of “I myself” as an emphatic rhetorical device: the unreliable and wicked shepherds have hurt the flock of Yahweh, now He himself has to step in and make things right. Such an emphasis is present in the overall tone of the passage and is consistent with the removal of the shepherds and their replacement with Yahweh himself and the Davidic figure as his human representative. Again, this element of prominence and cohesion is intimately linked with the metaphor itself.

This analysis of cohesion (and prominence) points to the centrality and prominence of the shepherd metaphor in this passage. The shepherd-sheep metaphor is essential to the cohesive principles of the discourse, provides important rhetorical and literary connections throughout the text, and allows the text to highlight particular elements through repetition and overlapping semantic domains.

Cognitive Linguistic Analysis of Metaphors in Ezekiel 34

Metaphorical Coherence

The goal of metaphorical coherence analysis is to analyze what each metaphor highlights and hides by the relationship between target and source and the relationship between the other interacting metaphors within the larger complex. In my establishment of the range of metaphor, I have already discussed many of the interactions between negative visions of human shepherds, Yahweh as shepherd-king, and “David” as the human shepherd representing Yahweh. Amidst the many implications of these interactions, I have already noted that the usual expectation for shepherds does not cohere with the Old Testament usage of the metaphor and that, in some ways, the Old Testament subverts the usual use of this metaphor, creating an “anti-metaphor.” In our passage, ‘Yahweh as shepherd’ and ‘Yahweh as king’ overlap in varying degrees to allow for ‘Yahweh as judge’ to emerge as an additional metaphor. As we will discuss below, this metaphor proves important to the overall message of Ezekiel 34.

Though time and space limit a full discussion of the companion metaphors to the kingship/shepherding metaphors that we have already discussed at some length, an important connected set of metaphors should be noted in brief. Blending with the metaphor of Yahweh as shepherd-king is the metaphorical language of Yahweh as judge. As Brettler demonstrates in his work on the metaphor of God as King, one of the royal appellations associated with Yahweh as king is Yahweh as judge.⁸⁵ While one can reasonably argue that

85 Brettler, *God is King*, 44–45.

the action of judging falls within the attributes of either king or shepherd (if one is judging sheep), yet the language of justice and judgment that frequents Ezekiel 34 may suggest that Yahweh as judge provides an additional metaphor. A form of the root *שפ* is used four times between vv. 16–22. This quality of ‘Yahweh as judge’ is particularly important in light of his promises for the future and his authority as king. In this way, we become aware that Yahweh as shepherd must differ from the human shepherd, because he becomes the judge of the human shepherds. Yahweh as a shepherd judges his sheep and as a king judges his kingly representatives to be a failure and provides a new choice. This is demonstrated not only through the language of judgment directly. In our earlier analysis of field, we found that many of the linguistic processes and circumstances focused on the themes of loss and restoration surrounding Yahweh’s actions of judging the shepherds and the fat sheep and Yahweh’s promises of restoring justice through a series of healing and restorative actions. This suggests that the metaphor of ‘Yahweh as judge’ is deeply rooted in the conceptual blending of the text and in the linguistic realization of these themes.

Literary Analysis: Rhetorical and Theological Implications

The shepherd-sheep metaphor of Ezekiel 34 has become not only a prevalent theme in the biblical canon and within pastoral theology, but, as Tanner points out, the concept of God as shepherd, through its association with Jesus, has become “a religious icon.”⁸⁶ In terms of the implications of this analysis, several points can be made. First, scholars who attempt to remove the metaphor ‘Yahweh as shepherd’ tend to miss the larger literary picture created from the complexity of the interweaving of the metaphors of negative human shepherds, Yahweh as shepherd, David as shepherd, and the people of Israel as sheep. Each of these metaphors has significance for the others and this chapter has only waded into the edge of the very deep waters of this complex metaphorical world. To use a simile in an attempt to describe metaphor, metaphors are like stars that exist in constellations. One needs not only to map the star, but to see its interrelationship with its fellow stars in order to gain a sense of direction.

86 Tanner notes that her Google search provided over 2,500 images. My own search on Google provided 3,480,000 images (though one must reduce this number because some were of the movie, “The Good Shepherd,” from 2006 since Tanner’s publication).

Second, the danger of oversimplifying metaphor is akin to the oversimplification of Ezekiel's message. While one might find it easier to think of Ezekiel's message as various forms of woe and hope oracles strung together, to understand the purpose of Ezekiel 34 and its voice for the people in the exile it is more helpful to read the passage as a literary whole. The rhetoric of the prophet builds on the premise that Yahweh's coming brings both positive and negative forms of judgment. Consistent with the message of Ezekiel 1–33, Ezekiel 34 makes its reader aware of the consequences of the misuse and abuse of others: judgment. However, this judgment—this act of shepherding—is one of justice and this promise of justice rings in the safety and security depicted in the last section of Ezekiel 34 with the covenant of peace that Yahweh provides. Thus, the prophet's repeated command to “hear the word of the Lord” acts as both a call for repentance to those under negative judgment and a call to hear the words of comfort that Yahweh gives those who have been scattered, trampled, and abused.

The rhetorical power of the final section of Ezekiel 34 comes from its heightened language of intimacy. Using the relational processes and shifting from the more distancing form “they” to the more intimate form “you,” Yahweh promises his people: “You are my sheep, the sheep of my pasture and I am your God.” Not only are the people described as Yahweh's, but they are the people who have a secure home in Yahweh's own pasture and Yahweh's exodus promise that he will be their God is reaffirmed. These promises link together the major themes of Yahweh as judge, Yahweh as king, and Yahweh as shepherd.

Conclusion

Examining the metaphors of Ezekiel 34 in light of linguistic and literary theories provides new insight into the way metaphors function within the discourse and their relationship with the rest of the text. Analyzing the register of Ezekiel 34 demonstrates the key thematic elements in the discourse by identifying the major processes occurring in the discourse, the chief participants in the discourse, and the circumstances impacting these processes and participants. This analysis of field provides a clearer picture how the metaphors associated with the participants were impacted by the overall themes of loss and restoration. Analyzing tenor provides greater insight into the levels of interpersonal relationships and the relative social status of the prophet, Yahweh, the shepherds/kings, and the one Davidic shepherd appointed by Yahweh, realized in the discourse. Examining tenor also provides insight into the rhetorical purpose of many of the interpersonal linguistic aspects of the discourse,

which assists in a greater understanding not only of the meaning of metaphor, but also of its rhetorical significance. Analyzing mode demonstrates the shifts between narrative and oral styles of discourse, providing greater insight into the tension created by the narrative distance of Yahweh speaking through his mediator, the prophet, while highlighting the rhetorical effect created by the mimicry of direct speech.

Moving from context to co-text, a close linguistic analysis of the co-text demonstrates the parallel structure created throughout Ezekiel 34. This analysis of cohesion (and prominence) points to the centrality and prominence of the shepherd metaphor in this passage, demonstrating that the centrality of the shepherd-sheep metaphor is essential to the cohesive principles of the discourse. This metaphorical complex provides important rhetorical and literary connections throughout the text. The final rhetorical and literary analysis in this chapter demonstrates the value of reading Ezekiel 34's metaphors in relation to one another and reading Ezekiel 34 as an integrated discourse. Reading Ezekiel 34 as an integrated discourse allows us to see that Yahweh's judgment and justice are key components of his shepherd-kingship. Rhetorically, these elements are grounded in Yahweh's call to repentance and promise of restoration. Theologically, the linguistic-literary analysis of this passage provides a richer picture of what it means to describe Yahweh as shepherd and his people as sheep.

PART 3

Modeling the Language of the Greek New Testament



Jesus before Pilate: A Discourse Analysis of John 18:33–38

Christopher D. Land

Introduction

The Fourth Gospel closes with an endorsement of Jesus' beloved disciple: "We know that his testimony is true" (21:24). Historical critics, two thousand years later, are rarely so supportive. Jesus' disciple has been interrogated by a dizzying array of examiners and made to answer a great many questions. In the end, many have chosen to reject his testimony.

Among the points which have been disputed, perhaps none is more sensitive than "Who killed Jesus?" Looking back on the anti-Semitic atrocities of the Second World War, scholars of all persuasions have undertaken to re-examine the events surrounding Jesus' death. How did Jesus, a Jew, end up the victim of a Roman crucifixion? It is indisputable that John's Gospel must be admitted as a vital piece of evidence; as Raymond Brown acknowledges, "With all its drama and its theology, John's account of the trial is the most consistent and intelligible we have."¹ Yet scholars have generally taken a very reserved position concerning John's trustworthiness, and some have forthrightly declared his account tainted and prejudiced. Winter's verdict is particularly blunt: "From John 18,9 onward the Fourth Gospel contains nothing of any value for the assessment of historical facts."²

What is it about John's narrative that evokes such distrust? For one thing, the account is sometimes said to reflect a shift of responsibility whereby the Roman authorities who orchestrated Jesus' death are exonerated and the Jewish people are held accountable for a crime they did not commit.³

1 Raymond E. Brown, *John XIII–XXI* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 861. Similarly, Andreas J. Köstenberger, *John* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 521: "John's account of Jesus' Roman trial is by far the most detailed in the Gospels."

2 Paul Winter, *On the Trial of Jesus* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1961), 89.

3 For instance, C.K. Barrett summarizes John's account of Jesus' Roman trial as follows: "The Jews are constantly malevolent, and seek the blood of Jesus, even at the cost of denying their own faith; Pilate on the other hand declares three times that Jesus is innocent, seeks to release

To some scholars, John's account appears to be "extremely biased in favor of Pilate and against the Jews."⁴ Some would go further and insist that, as regards John's depiction of Pilate, "history has been rewritten to put more blame on 'the Jews.'"⁵

In this essay, I will make no attempt to deny the (obvious) fact that the Fourth Gospel is extremely biased, but I will challenge the suggestion that it is biased in favour of Pontius Pilate. Similarly, I will exert no energy trying to defend the historicity of John's account, but I will propose that Pilate's unsuccessful attempts to resist the demands of "the Jews" are depicted by John as having more to do with his ignorance and impotence than with his innocence.⁶ In keeping with the overall orientation of this volume, I will accomplish these things using concepts and procedures borrowed from the field of linguistics, but my focus is more on the practical than the theoretical. In short, by examining a brief dialogue between Pilate and Jesus (John 18:33–38) using some simple probes derived from the field of discourse analysis, I hope both to clarify what John is doing with his trial scene and to demonstrate that even a very simple and generic linguistic analysis can prove quite useful.⁷

The Projecting Frame

I will begin my analysis of John 18:33–38 by looking at the framework used by the narrator to piece this dialogue together. The following snippets are used to introduce each speaker's turn:

him, and is compelled to crucify him only by the threat of 19:12" (*The Gospel According to St. John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text* [2nd ed.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978], 530).

- 4 These words are from Herman Ridderbos (*The Gospel According to John: A Theological Commentary* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997], 586), although Ridderbos does not himself endorse such an interpretation of the Fourth Gospel.
- 5 Maurice Casey, *Is John's Gospel True?* (London: Routledge, 1996), 186.
- 6 Many issues surround phrases like οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι and English glosses such as *Jew* and *Jewish*, but it is beyond the scope of this essay to engage them. For the sake of simplicity, I will employ the phrase "the Jews" with scare quotes, recognizing that this may obscure some important nuances.
- 7 Informed readers will no doubt perceive that my analysis is indebted to Systemic Functional Linguistics (see especially M.A.K. Halliday, *Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar* (rev. Christian Matthiessen; 4th ed.; London: Routledge, 2014), but the nature of my claims is such that they are not tied to one particular model of language or social interaction.

TABLE 7.1 *The narrative framework*

εἶπεν αὐτῷ [ὁ Πιλάτος]	Pilate said to him . . .
ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς	Jesus replied . . .
ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Πιλάτος	Pilate replied . . .
ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς	Jesus replied . . .
εἶπεν οὖν αὐτῷ ὁ Πιλάτος	Then Pilate said to him . . .
ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς	Jesus replied . . .
λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Πιλάτος	Pilate says to him . . .

The first thing to notice is that there are only two participants mentioned: Jesus and Pilate. Whether other people are present is not clear, but the narrator's consistent movement between ὁ Πιλάτος and [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς makes it quite clear that, beginning in v. 33, these two men enter into an uninterrupted exchange in which they take turns speaking to one another. The narrator's clear signals to this effect enable us to easily recognize who is saying what to whom, and to interpret easily the numerous implicit devices (e.g. pronouns) that are used.

A somewhat more interesting observation concerns the projecting verbs selected by the narrator. In three of the seven clauses, the verb is λέγω 'to say'; in the other four, it is ἀποκρίνομαι 'to reply.' Where there is choice, there is meaning. The question is: What motivates this alternation between λέγω and ἀποκρίνομαι? Anticipating my analysis of the conversational turns taken in 18:33–38, I suggest that this lexical alternation is motivated at each point by the immediately preceding turn. Basically, whenever a question is asked, the next turn is introduced using the verb ἀποκρίνομαι. In all other instances, the verb λέγω is used.⁸ There is also a noteworthy pattern in the narrator's aspectual choices. The first six projecting verbs are all perfective forms (i.e. aorist), whereas the seventh is imperfective (i.e. present). Why is this? Although a fully developed answer to this question would require a broader examination of John's narrative, I suggest that the imperfective form in v. 38a works together with that in v. 38b in order to facilitate the narrative transition that takes place as Pilate concludes his interrogation of Jesus and resumes his dialogue with "the Jews."

My final observation relates to the use of conjunctions. Only once does the narrator choose to conjoin his narration, supplying οὖν in v. 37. Notably, this

8 For the sake of clarity, I should note that I am not proposing this as a general feature of the Greek language, as though these two lexical items are always used in this way. I am making a more modest claim regarding John's use of the two terms in this particular dialogue.

single conjunction appears at precisely the one point in the dialogue where no clear speech role has been assigned by the preceding turn (i.e. for the first time, no question has been asked). The conjunction is, I suggest, a way of framing Pilate's subsequent words as a response to what Jesus has just said.⁹ However, in order to explain how Pilate's words are a relevant response, we must consider what these two men are talking about.¹⁰

The Topics of Discussion

People sometimes discuss more than one topic in a single conversation, but in even the most involved discussions there are signs of topical continuity and development. By looking for patterns in the language used by Pilate and Jesus, we should be able to discern what topics of discussion the two men are interested in.

Unsurprisingly, both men are very preoccupied with Jesus; their dialogue is, after all, a legal examination pertaining to accusations made against him. Specifically, references to Jesus are found in fifteen of the nineteen clauses in 18:33–38. Pilate is also talked about, albeit less frequently. He is mentioned in four clauses.¹¹ Alongside Jesus and Pilate, two additional groups of people are referred to: “the Jews” and the chief priests. These are the groups who in the preceding narrative have made the accusation Pilate is considering.¹² And of course, the process leading up to Jesus’ appearance before Pilate is talked about, too. Jesus speaks about his being handed over to “the Jews” (παράδοθῶ

9 Although no conjunction is necessary, John is particularly fond of using οὖν together with λέγω. In v. 38a, the absence of a conjunction may be related to the fact that Pilate's words abruptly conclude the dialogue and form part of the narrative transition that introduces the Gospel's next scene.

10 There is a close relation between the conjunction οὖν used in the projecting clause and the οὐκοῦν that appears in Pilate's question, but the two serve entirely distinct functions. Whereas οὖν in the former indicates a connection made by the narrator between Jesus' act of speaking and Pilate's subsequent act of speaking, οὐκοῦν in the latter indicates a connection made by Pilate himself between what Jesus has just said (specifically, the phrase ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμὴ) and what he himself is about to say.

11 As we would expect given that the two men are speaking face to face, neither man's name is ever stated.

12 The Jewish people are mentioned twice as οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ‘the Jews’ and once as τὸ ἔθνος τὸ σόν ‘your people’; the chief priests are called οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς ‘the chief priests.’ Jesus' use of ἄλλοι in v. 34 is an indirect reference that might also fall into this category.

τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις), and Pilate speaks about the Jewish people and the chief priests handing Jesus over to him (παρέδωκάν σε ἐμοί).

All of the topics that I have listed so far are entirely unsurprising. In fact, they are unavoidable given the nature of this interaction and the circumstances that have brought Jesus and Pilate together. The three remaining topics are more significant, but in order to discern them, we must shift our perspective a little. Instead of looking at specific participants or events that are referred to, we need to look more generally at the spheres of human experience that are mentioned (i.e. semantic domains).¹³

First, Pilate and Jesus both draw repeatedly from a domain of meanings related to politics. At the most general level, the men speak about kingdoms (βασιλεία) and nations (ἔθνος). The term Ἰουδαίος is also relevant here insofar as the term, in this context, is applied to a socio-political community. Both men also talk about various political stations. The most obvious of these is kingship (βασιλεύς), but Jesus' mention of subordinates (ὑπηρέτης) should not be overlooked.¹⁴ Furthermore, there can be little doubt that the chief priests (ἀρχιερεῖς) represent a political force. The fact that Pilate and Jesus so frequently use words associated with politics is unsurprising. Neither is it surprising that Pilate introduces the topic with his first words. Arguably, his major concern in this dialogue is to determine where to situate Jesus in relation to the familiar political cartography of his world.¹⁵

Second, Jesus repeatedly draws from a domain concerned with transitional movement that has a place of origin and a destination. This is somewhat more difficult to pick out, but it is abundantly clear in his use of the adverb ἐντεῦθεν 'from here' and in his claim to have come into the world (ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον). It is also reasonable, I think, to include here Jesus' talk about a political authority that does not originate in the world (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου [2×]). As readers of John's Gospel, we recognize that this domain of transitional movement has been used to describe Jesus' heavenly origin (e.g. 3:13; 6:38; 12:46; 16:28).¹⁶

13 For an introduction to the notion of semantic domains, see the introduction to J.P. Louw and E.A. Nida, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (2nd ed.; 2 vols.; New York: United Bible Societies, 1989).

14 The term ὑπηρέτης is used in the LXX with reference to a king's officer or even a king himself. For references, see Köstenberger, *John*, 528.

15 Köstenberger writes: "Very likely, the Jewish leaders had implicated Jesus as a political threat to Roman imperial rule in Palestine, and it is this charge that Pilate sets out to investigate" (Köstenberger, "What Is Truth? Pilate's Question in Its Johannine and Larger Biblical Context," *JETS* 48 [2005]: 49).

16 Wayne Meeks asserts that "the phrase οὐκ . . . ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου must be understood first of all as a genitive of origin. Jesus' kingship does not derive from the world, but from

For his part, however, Pilate shows no interest in this second topic. He does not appear to view Jesus' talk of transitional movement as relevant to the political focus of the interrogation.¹⁷

In the final moments of Pilate and Jesus' dialogue, Jesus introduces yet another topic: the truth (ἀλήθεια). Here again, we as readers have a vital insight into what is meant. Andreas Köstenberger observes, "In John's Gospel . . . the notion of truth is inextricably related to God, and to Jesus' relationship with God."¹⁸ Jesus has come into the world in order to testify to the truth; to accept his testimony is to forge a relationship both with him and with his Father (8:43–47). What does Pilate perceive? We cannot be certain, but whatever he understands truth to be, it bears no relation to the truth to which Jesus has come to testify.¹⁹ And at any rate, he has no interest in discussing it, since it has no obvious relevance to politics. "What is truth?" he asks—as he walks away.

In this first interrogation, therefore, we find three main topics of discussion. Two of them are put forward by Jesus and misperceived, ignored, and/or dismissed by Pilate: (1) Jesus' heavenly origin as the source of his authority; and (2) the truth that Jesus has come to testify about. The only topic Pilate seems interested in is the one that he initiates at the very beginning: where Jesus fits into the political dynamics of his world. As far as this topic is concerned, Jesus is preoccupied primarily with denial. He implicitly denies that he has an earthly kingdom, points out that his subordinates did not use violence in order to prevent his arrest, and steadfastly refuses to appropriate the title "King."

The Turns Taken

The title of this section not only invokes the notion of alternation (i.e. "to take turns") but also the custom of dancing (i.e. "to take a turn"). This is because every dialogue is a dance of sorts. Conversational participants are involved in a give-and-take process of negotiation, where every step taken opens up new possibilities for what may follow. Of course, a dialogue may not be graceful.

God. . . . The origin of Jesus' kingship corresponds to his own origin" (*The Prophet-King: Moses Traditions and the Johannine Christology* [NovTSup 14; Leiden: Brill, 1967], 63–64).

17 Of course, this will change very soon. After hearing that Jesus makes himself out to be υἱὸν θεοῦ 'Son of God,' the governor starts the second phase of Jesus' interrogation (19:9) with the pointed question πόθεν εἶ σὺ 'Where are you from?'

18 Köstenberger, "What is Truth?" 34.

19 Notice that Jesus uses the article with ἀλήθεια, whereas Pilate does not.

Just as partners on a dance floor may oppose one another rather than cooperate, so conversation partners may reject one another's contributions and attempt to lead the discussion in their own desired direction. In order to understand Pilate's interrogation of Jesus, we need to notice how the two men create roles for one another. We also need to take into account whether their proffered roles are accepted or rejected. We can do all of this by looking at how each main clause in their conversation possesses a grammatical mood.²⁰





FIGURE 7.1 *Basic mood choices.*

For the sake of simplicity, we can suppose that Hellenistic Greek provides its users with the basic mood choices presented in Figure 7.1. Imperative clauses are typically used to command people, whereas non-imperative clauses are typically used to give or request information, depending on whether they are declarative or interrogative. Obviously, these typical patterns do not always hold true, but they happen to hold true for John 18:33–38. In this little discourse, there are no imperative clauses. Pilate and Jesus use declarative clauses to give information, and they use interrogative clauses to request it.

Figure 7.2 presents a more delicate breakdown of Greek interrogative clauses. With elemental interrogatives, a speaker seeks to know the content of some specific element. In English, this element typically appears as a WH-element (e.g. *who, what, where, when, why, how*, etc.). In Greek, the element is often the pronoun τίς, but I will speak about the relevant items as

20 This is an oversimplified approach, of course, since it fails to distinguish between grammatical mood and the more abstract categories relevant to conversational analysis (e.g. the semantic speech functions employed in SFL or the communicative acts defined by speech act theory and other pragmatic frameworks). I am also consciously ignoring the distinction that is made in SFL between mood (which is a feature of the clause) and mode (which is a feature of the verb).

FIGURE 7.2 *Further mood choices.*

Π-elements on account of the other lexemes that can also be used (e.g. ποῖος, πόσος, etc.).²¹ The expected response to an elemental interrogative supplies the content of the Π-element.²² When using a restricted elemental interrogative, a speaker includes an appositional element at the end of the clause in which he or she presents explicit alternatives from which a respondent may select.²³ This move is restrictive because the respondent must reject the expectation of the questioner if he or she does not wish to affirm one of the supplied answers.

With polar interrogatives, a speaker seeks a commitment for or against some proposition. The force of this construction is: “What stance do you take on this?”²⁴ Here again, the Greek questioner can choose to present his or her respondent(s) with a more restricted role. By means of a biased polar interrogative, he or she can present a proposition (which in certain cases can select for polarity in its own right) along with an expectation concerning the

21 There is an association between elemental interrogatives and indefinites in other language as well, including Chinese and Vietnamese. See Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, “Descriptive Motifs and Generalizations,” in *Language Typology: A Functional Perspective* (ed. Alice Caffarel et al.; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2004), 616.

22 In John 18:7, for example, the question τίνα ζητεῖτε ‘Who are you looking for’ receives the response Ἰησοῦν τὸν Ναζωραῖον ‘Jesus, the Nazarene.’

23 For example, in Matt 27:17 Pilate asks: τίνα θέλετε ἀπολύσω ὑμῖν Ἰησοῦν τὸν Βαραββᾶν ἢ Ἰησοῦν τὸν λεγόμενον χριστόν ‘Who do you want me to release: Jesus Barabbas or Jesus Christ?’

24 A respondent may reply in full, as in Matt 20:22: δύνασθε πιεῖν τὸ ποτήριον ὃ ἐγὼ μέλλω πίνειν; λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· δυνάμεθα. Alternatively, an elliptical response may simply select for polarity, as in John 1:21: ὁ προφήτης εἶ σύ; καὶ ἀπεκρίθη· οὐ.

hearer's reaction to its contents.²⁵ The particle οὐ is used to indicate a positive expectation (i.e. the speaker anticipates that the respondent will confirm the stated proposition). The particle μή is used to indicate a negative expectation (i.e. the speaker anticipates that the respondent will deny the stated proposition).²⁶ Of course, the respondent may contradict the speaker's expectation, but this involves rejecting the role assigned by the interrogative.²⁷

Now then, let us look once again at the text of John 18:33–38. As the initiator of this interrogation, Pilate has the first move. Approaching Jesus, he puts forward a proposition for consideration: Σὺ εἶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων? This proposition comes with a neutral expectation: Jesus may either endorse it (ναί) or reject it (οὐ).

Interestingly, Jesus chooses not to accept the conversational role assigned to him by Pilate. Instead, he puts forward a question of his own. The first part of Jesus' question reads Ἀπὸ σεαυτοῦ σὺ τοῦτο λέγεις 'Are you saying this from yourself?' It has been suggested that this is part of a sincere inquiry by means of which Jesus hopes to learn the basis of Pilate's question. Is the governor asking about kingship on his own accord as a Roman official (in which case a political kingship is presumably meant), or is he asking at the prompting of people like Caiaphas (in which case a messianic kingship is meant)?²⁸ But this is unlikely. The Greek prepositional phrase here (ἀπὸ + reflexive pronoun) occurs repeatedly in John's Gospel in connection with Jesus' obedient subordination to his Father and the authority he possesses by virtue of that subordination (e.g. 5:19, 30; 7:17–18, 28; 8:28, 42; 10:18; 14:10). It occurs in connection with other people

25 This explains why biased polar interrogatives sometimes contain two negative particles: unlike unbiased interrogatives, at least some biased interrogatives can select for polarity. Halliday and McDonald's description of Chinese suggests that it is somewhat similar to Greek in this respect: "Systemically, the difference between the two types of polar interrogative [i.e., biased and unbiased] lies in the fact that the 'biased' type selects for polarity: the speaker makes a statement, either positive or negative, and asks for it to be checked (hence confirmed or denied)" (M.A.K. Halliday and Edward McDonald, "Metafunctional Profile of the Grammar of Chinese," in *Language Typology*, 335).

26 For instance, in John 21:5 Jesus asks his disciples to verify that they have no fish, which they then do. The text reads: Παιδιά, μή τι προσφάγιον ἔχετε; ἀπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ, οὐ. In Mark 15:4, Pilate asks his prisoner to confirm that he will not defend himself. The text reads: ὁ δὲ Πιλάτος πάλιν ἐπηρώτα αὐτὸν λέγων, οὐκ ἀποκρίνη οὐδέν;

27 As Robertson says, "any answer may be actually given. It is only the expectation that is presented by οὐ or μή" (A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* [4th ed.; Nashville: Broadman, 1934], 917). An example may be found in Plato, *Republic* 334b.

28 E.g., Barrett, *John*, 536.

as well, but submission is always in view (10:18; 11:51; 15:4; 16:13). From this it can be seen that to speak or act “from oneself” means to do so freely—not in submission to some other interested party. Jesus is wondering, in other words, whether Pilate is carrying out his interrogation independently or whether he is following orders. The import of this rather unusual inquiry becomes downright perilous as Jesus alludes to Pilate’s consultation outside with “the Jews.” Has Pilate perhaps been speaking with the Jewish authorities who are pushing aggressively for Jesus’ conviction? By juxtaposing these two propositions using the conjunction ἥ, Jesus indicates that Pilate is expected to affirm one of them and thereby implicitly deny the other. The resulting situation is both amusing and significant: Pilate cannot deny that he has just consulted with “the Jews,” but the only other option with which he has been presented is to concede that he is operating in submission to them. As Duke astutely observes, there is little sense in thinking that Jesus is attempting to obtain information. To the contrary, “Jesus deftly turns the trial on Pilate from the outset.”²⁹ He frames his own interrogation as an act of submission on Pilate’s part.

Unsurprisingly, Pilate does not answer Jesus’ question. How could he? Instead, he takes a rhetorical swing of his own. Using what I have called a biased polar interrogative, Pilate puts forward the question “Am I a Jew?” with a strongly negative bias. Notice that the topic of the interrogation has subtly shifted. Whereas Pilate’s opening question has Jesus as its fronted grammatical subject, here the fronted subject is the governor himself. The tables have turned such that the interrogator has been made the topic of the interrogation.³⁰ Notice also that Pilate uses μήτι rather than the simple negative particle μή. Eugene Peterson’s *The Message* brings across the resulting contempt remarkably well by having the Roman Pilate demand of his Jewish prisoner, “Do I look like a Jew?” Like Jesus’ question, therefore, this is not a sincere request for information; it is an insult to the Jewish people, encompassing both Jesus and the other Jews outside.³¹ It has the effect of dismissing out of hand

29 Paul D. Duke, *Irony in the Fourth Gospel* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985), 129.

30 R.A. Culpepper, *The Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 95: “It is [Pilate] who is on trial, and his judgment will be a verdict on himself as much as it is on Jesus.” See also Duke, *Irony*, 129: “It is quite clear who is judging whom.”

31 Some have suggested that Pilate’s mentor, Sejanus, was overtly anti-Semitic and that the governor’s question here should be interpreted accordingly. See Charles Giblin, “John’s Narration of the Hearing before Pilate: John 18,28–19,16a,” *Bib* 67 (1986): 227; Helen K. Bond, *Pontius Pilate in History and Interpretation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 177. Historically, this is possible, but from a linguistic perspective the question can be interpreted as disdainful simply on the basis of its discourse context.

the subordination that Jesus has inferred while simultaneously drawing attention to Rome's subjection of the Jewish people. It is an attempt to save face.³²

Pilate continues to re-establish himself as the superior party in this dialogue by conveying his own framing of events leading up to the interrogation. "Your people and the chief priests have handed you over to me," he says. By referring to the Jews as "your people" (τὸ ἔθνος τὸ σόν), Pilate goes out of his way to underscore the rather obvious fact that his prisoner is Jewish and therefore among the subjected people he has just insulted. What is more, by pointing out that the chief priests have handed Jesus over, he draws attention to the fact that his conversation partner is his captive.³³ On another level, of course, Pilate's words are also designed to assert his authority over the Jerusalem elite waiting outside. As Warren Carter remarks, "They might be allies, but [Pilate] has the upper hand as the representative of the occupying power."³⁴ The governor wants to make it abundantly clear to Jesus—and to anyone else who might be listening to this interrogation—that he is not serving "the Jews"; to the contrary, they are a subject people asking for his help.

With this, of course, the interrogation comes back to the heart of the matter. Moving on from the now irritatingly obvious fact that he is examining Jesus at the instigation of others and hence serving their interests, Pilate asks simply, "What did you do?" Some commentators interpret this as a sincere question. Morris, for example, writes:

[Pilate] is not prepared to accept the accusation of the chief priests at its face value. But something lies behind all this. What is it? Jesus has done something to arouse the hostility of the chief priests. Pilate wishes to drag this out into the open in order to see whether it is something that offends against Roman law or not.³⁵

At the far extreme, other scholars view Pilate's verdict as a foregone conclusion. Carter in particular stresses that "the involvement of Pilate's troops and temple police in Jesus' arrest attests their common commitment to remove Jesus. The elite's impatient response to Pilate's question about a charge assumes such an agreement. Pilate has already signed off on it."³⁶ It is difficult to satisfactorily

32 Contra Leon Morris (*The Gospel According to John* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971], 769), who suggests that Pilate is denying any knowledge of a messianic kingship.

33 Presumably, Jesus is still bound as he stands before Pilate (see 18:12, 24).

34 Warren Carter, *John and Empire: Initial Explorations* (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 301.

35 Morris, *John*, 769.

36 Carter, *Empire*, 302.

weigh these competing positions without wandering too far afield of my immediate concerns. I will point out, however, that Carter's interpretation of Jesus' Roman trial does not account for Pilate's question here in 18:35.³⁷ If Pilate's words are not a frank inquiry into the legal matter currently under investigation, what are they? The governor has just been on the receiving end of this audacious peasant's rhetoric, but he nevertheless affords him an opportunity to state his case. At the very least we must say Pilate wishes to maintain the appearance of justice. He is in one sense serving the interests of "the Jews," but in another very real sense he is serving the interests of Rome and his prisoner should behave accordingly.

Oddly, Jesus deflects Pilate's question. But why does he do this? One factor may be that he does not wish to surrender himself to Roman justice. Pilate has just insulted Jesus and drawn attention to his rather humbling chains. He has framed the interrogation as a power hierarchy, and has done so in such a way that Jesus cannot answer without implicitly accepting that hierarchy. If at this point in the conversation Jesus chooses to defend himself, he also implicitly agrees to play the role Pilate has given him, the role of a pathetic Jewish prisoner in the hands of a powerful justice system. This, I suggest, is a role that Jesus will not play.³⁸ Instead of pursuing his release from Roman custody, he challenges Pilate's interpretation of the immediate situation. Laying claim to a sphere of personal authority—notice his repeated use of the phrase ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμὴ 'my kingdom'—Jesus asserts that his personal authority is not worldly. Given the immediate context, this claim is hardly neutral. Like Pilate's question "Am I a Jew?" it establishes an interpersonal distance. Pilate has distanced himself from the Jewish people and thereby asserted his superiority over both "the Jews" outside and the annoying peasant before him. Jesus in turn distances himself from the human politics entailed by the ongoing interrogation, thereby asserting his superiority over worldly powers—including both "the Jews" and Pilate. True authority, Jesus implies, is something vastly different from (and superior to) the political posturing of both Pilate and the chief priests.

The next move in this dialogue belongs to the governor, and Jesus is undoubtedly getting on his nerves by this point. Perhaps Jesus has no violent propensities, but he does not seem to acknowledge Roman power and authority. And if he speaks about his kingdom, does this not make him a king? Pilate inserts this crucial inference into the dialogue using the Greek particle οὐχοῦν, which

37 Significantly, Pilate's question here is not mentioned anywhere in Carter's discussion.

38 Interestingly, this is not merely a characteristic of John's Gospel. Jesus refuses to participate in legal proceedings in the Synoptics as well.

introduces a small measure of ambiguity into the text inasmuch as scholars debate whether it should perhaps be accentuated as οὐκ οὐν.³⁹ In a discourse context such as this, however, the distinction is almost inconsequential, since on either reading Pilate's clause should probably be read as a polar interrogative uttered with a tone of impatience: "So then, are you or are you not a king?" or perhaps "Well then, you are a king, aren't you?" The alternative possibility, if οὐκ οὐν is read, is to interpret Pilate's clause as a simple declarative meaning something like "You are indeed a king, then!" But the declarative interpretation is somewhat less likely in view of the way John has constructed the projecting frame of the narrative (see above), and in any case, even a declarative in the present context would assign to Jesus the role of respondent, since he would be expected to react positively or negatively to Pilate's inference. This move in the dialogue, therefore, is yet another attempt on Pilate's part to steer the conversation back to his own concerns and to obtain an explicit answer from Jesus concerning the charge laid by "the Jews" outside (see 18:33–34, 39; 19:12, 21). Are the charges valid? Does Jesus see himself as King of the Jews?

This is now the third time Jesus has been asked a direct question, and for the third time, he refuses to provide a direct answer. "You say that I am a king," Jesus states, before shifting to a discussion of his true testimony. Scholars have long debated whether or not this statement is intended as an explicit affirmation. Carson claims that "the evidence is very strong that the expression is unambiguously affirmative."⁴⁰ The NASB seems to agree, translating the verse as "You say correctly that I am a king." Yet this reading is out of step with the whole tenor of the dialogue, throughout which Jesus refuses to treat Pilate as the embodiment of true power and justice. Indeed, the first time that Pilate asks whether Jesus is a king (v. 33), Jesus challenges the implicit idea that Pilate wants to learn the truth and insinuates that Pilate is only doing the bidding of others (v. 34). Why should Jesus' response in this second instance be any different?⁴¹ More likely, the two fronted pronouns in v. 37 are

39 Robertson, for example, writes: "In Jo. 18:37 we have οὐκ οὐν, according to W. H., which has lost its negative force, but οὐκ οὐν would preserve it" (*Grammar*, 1175).

40 D.A. Carson, *The Gospel According to John* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 594. See also Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to St John* (trans. Kevin Smyth et al.; 3 vols.; New York: Crossroad, 1980–82), 3:249: "Jesus speaks the words . . . here, doubtless, in an affirmative sense."

41 It also important to ask why, if Jesus' words are an open admission of kingly pretensions, Pilate proceeds to reject the charges against him as false, given that the opening of the interrogation scene implies charges from "the Jews" related to kingly pretensions. Carson writes: "[Pilate's] statement 'I find no basis for a charge against him' shows that he understood Jesus' answer well enough to grasp that the formal 'Yes, I am a king' really meant

contrastive, the repetition of σὺ λέγεις ‘you say’ is meant to evoke the awkward opening exchange in vv. 33–34, and the response as a whole is yet another subversive interpretation of the interrogation.⁴² Pilate (σύ) keeps applying the term ‘king’ to Jesus in his questions, but it is unclear whether or not he is really seeking the truth—or indeed, whether he is even able to perceive the truth. As for Jesus (ἐγώ), who keeps evading the questions of his interrogator, his whole purpose in life is to testify truthfully and those who are able to perceive the truth will understand the true nature of his kingdom.⁴³

As readers of John’s Gospel, we understand that Jesus views his own death as both imminent and inevitable and that Pilate will play an important role in the ironic drama that is about to be played out. Indeed, Jesus seems reconciled to the fact that he cannot escape the title ‘King of the Jews’ and, by implication, a Roman execution. Pilate, however, does not perceive any of this, because he is too caught up in his worldly politics to be interested in anything deeper. He understands only that he is being pressured by “the Jews” to execute someone, and that the man in question persists in calling into question his power and his knowledge of the truth.⁴⁴ Now, given Pilate’s previous response to this interpretation of events (v. 35), it is likely that he will want to save face and eliminate the insinuated impotence and ignorance. And so the dialogue ends with another dismissive line from the governor, who walks away asking “What

‘No, I am not a king in any merely political sense, a king who might endanger the Empire’” (*John*, 595). Yet the whole thrust of the dialogue in 18:33–38 is that Pilate is worldly and uninterested in deeper truths, making it questionable to suppose that his character is able to perceive such distinctions as Carson alleges.

42 Within this larger dialogic framework, Jesus’ words are a rather coy way of distancing himself from kingship without entirely rejecting it. E.g. Barrett, *John*, 537: “Jesus himself will neither affirm nor deny his kingship. If it is to be spoken of it must be on the lips of others.” See also Morris, *John*, 770: “Jesus is not receiving the suggestion warmly, but refraining from denying it outright.”

43 Carter claims that “by declaring that his mission is to witness to ‘the truth,’ Jesus tells Pilate that he witnesses to God’s faithfulness in saving the people” (*Empire*, 303). But of course, it is unlikely that Pilate would have interpreted ἀλήθεια in the light of Johannine theology, and even less likely that he would have understood Jesus to be talking about a divine empire positioned to overthrow Rome! More likely, Pilate hears the words of an idealist, a man whose words have stung the elite in Jerusalem—even as they have stung the Roman governor himself.

44 Thus Köstenberger is likely correct to suggest that “Pilate’s comment may reflect disillusionment (if not bitterness) from a political, pragmatic point of view. In his seven years as governor of Judea, he had frequently clashed with the Jewish population. And recently, his position with the Roman emperor had become increasingly tenuous” (*John*, 529).

is truth?"⁴⁵ Perhaps, given the ensuing events in the narrative, Pilate is thinking to himself that he will disprove this annoying prisoner's assessment of the situation by having him released.

Conclusion

I began this essay by raising some historical questions. Did John tamper with historical evidence so as to absolve Pilate and falsely accuse the Jewish people? Is he biased in favour of Pilate and against "the Jews"? Instead of examining historical evidence, however, I have analyzed the language of John 18:33–38. Using some simple techniques derived from discourse analysis, I have assessed the conversational character of Pilate's interrogation of Jesus.

Let me recap two essential facts that have emerged from my analysis. First, although Pilate repeatedly asks direct questions of Jesus in order to obtain important information, Jesus continually rejects the conversational roles that are offered to him. He does not seem at all concerned to prevent his being executed as a political insurrectionist, even though it is clear that he does not view himself as such. Simply put, he refuses to participate in the political process. Second, although Jesus repeatedly introduces elevated ideas into his conversation with Pilate (e.g. heaven, truth), Pilate continually ignores these and returns to the political topic with which he began the interrogation (i.e. the charge, laid by "the Jews," that Jesus claims to be a king). Thus Jesus wastes no energy trying to escape his political fate, and Pilate shows no real interest in Jesus' true testimony. In typical Johannine fashion, Jesus manifests a level of awareness that exceeds that of his conversation partner. The two men have very different perspectives on the events that are unfolding around them, because only Jesus is able to see how they appear "from above."

How, specifically, does Jesus' perspective differ from that of Pilate? It differs primarily in its evaluation of the different powers at play. Indeed, it is fair to say that the main preoccupation of the dialogue is to explore how Jesus and Pilate relate to the various external powers that are at work in Jesus' arrest, trial, and execution. For his part, Pilate perceives only his own power, with the result that he badly misjudges his situation and fails to see that he must declare Jesus "King of the Jews." Jesus, however, is able to perceive that Pilate is being

45 Alfred Plummer correctly describes Pilate's casually tossed remark as "the half-pitying, half-impatient, question of a practical man of the world, whose experience of life has convinced him that truth is a dream of enthusiasts" (*The Gospel According to St. John* [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981], 319).

manipulated by outside forces and that these forces will eventually have their way.⁴⁶ Analogously, Pilate regards Jesus as a pathetic captive whose very life he holds in his hands, whereas Jesus stands secure in the knowledge that his life is about to culminate in a divinely ordained event that will manifest his true heavenly glory. The primary accomplishment of John 18:33–38, therefore, is to show that Jesus is both knowledgeable and powerful, whereas Pilate is not. Or, to put things more generally, Pilate's interrogation of Jesus reminds John's readers that heavenly powers supervene over earthly powers. In this way the text provides an apocalyptic interpretation of Jesus' trial and execution that not only contradicts an obvious explanation of those historical events (namely, that Jesus was a violent insurrectionist who deserved to be executed) but also situates them within a theological framework that is relevant to John's readers at their own time in history.

Given this theological framework, I suggest, it makes no sense to speak about John shifting blame away from Pilate and onto "the Jews." Pilate is regarded as a self-important figure who fails to perceive the true heavenly authority of Jesus. He places a great deal of confidence in his ability to understand and control earthly affairs, but he ends up participating unwittingly in the glorification of a heavenly Christ whose teachings he has rejected. He is, in other words, characterized in the same manner as his Jewish counterpart Caiaphas (11:49–53). This does not eliminate the possibility that John's account is historically unreliable, nor does it eliminate the possibility that it is anti-Jewish. But it does render implausible the idea that John is concerned to vindicate Pilate by reassigning blame.⁴⁷ Even if John is putting words in Jesus' mouth when Jesus suggests that "the Jews" are manipulating Pilate, his purpose can hardly be to blame "the Jews" and render Pilate innocent. Rather, by having Jesus insult Pilate in this way, John is highlighting the fact that Pilate is ignorant and impotent. Pilate

46 The outside force to which Jesus draws Pilate's attention is, in the most immediate sense, "the Jews" who are literally outside. Within the broader Johannine framework, however, there are other, even more powerful outside forces at work in Jesus' arrest, trial, and execution, and it is Pilate's failure to perceive these additional higher powers that renders him truly ignorant (19:11).

47 Thus Ridderbos, *John*, 586: "Pilate does not come out that much more favorably than the Jews in this account. He does say more than once that, as judge, he thinks Jesus is innocent. But the repetition of this finding takes nothing from the unprincipled character and above all the injustice of his condemnation of Jesus to the cross, but rather emphasizes it. Accordingly, it is hard to see how the assignment of roles could exonerate or placate the Romans at the expense of the Jews. On the contrary, one may well ask whether more damage could be done to the majesty of Roman justice than by Pilate's representation of it in the trial of Jesus."

thinks himself superior to “the Jews” simply because he is a Roman. He imagines that he will mock “the Jews” by crowning Jesus. In thinking these things, however, Pilate completely fails to see that his authority comes ‘from above’ and that his words and actions are part of a divinely superintended plan that has already been set in motion and that must soon complete its course.⁴⁸

The real alternatives that John is presenting in John 18:33–38 are not Jewish blame and Roman blame, but earthly power and heavenly power. His message is not that Jesus was a tragic victim of Jewish animosity whom Pilate was unable to save. His message is that victims are not always as they appear to be.⁴⁹ To the modern reader looking back on two thousand years of subsequent history, this idea may appear naïve, much as Jesus appears naïve to Pilate. But it becomes dangerous only when the believer ceases to resemble Jesus, who responds non-violently when persecuted, and the believing community becomes instead an earthly power capable of exercising authority and inflicting violence. I suspect that John, in composing his Gospel, did not foresee this possibility.

48 Although the heavenly origin of Pilate's earthly authority is made explicit in 19:11, its precise source is left unstated. Irrespective of whether a divine or satanic origin is in view, my general point stands.

49 Duke (*Irony*, 149–55) suggests that the irony in John's Gospel serves to: (1) create a sense of satisfaction in the reader who moves beyond the surface meaning and finds an even higher estimation of Jesus; (2) instil a sense of belonging in the reader, who has been granted access to a privileged perspective, which reveals the blindness of others; and (3) invite the reader to engage by making a decision concerning the identity of Jesus. But the reader who correctly identifies Jesus will presumably also identify with Jesus. Thus the apocalyptic irony in John's trial narrative is intended to help readers respond non-violently when they are denounced, rejected, and persecuted.

Towards a Model of Functional Monosemy: A Study of Creation Language in Romans

Gregory P. Fewster

Introduction

Textual interpretation inevitably involves analyses of lexical meaning. New Testament hermeneutics has tended toward the assumption that words are polysemous: words may possess multiple, discrete meanings. This may not be so, according to the theory of monosemy. Operating from a monosemic bias, I inquire into the function of creation language in the book of Romans. Though this question has received significant treatment in the past, particularly with reference to Paul's use of *κτίσις* in Rom 8:18–23, creation language in Romans continues to trouble interpreters and has, as yet, not received a rigorous linguistic treatment.¹ By employing a functional variation of the cognitively-based theory of monosemy, this essay provides fresh insights and new ways forward in the *κτίσις* discussion and in lexical study in general. A functional monosemic bias effectively describes how functional variation can occur across all of the occurrences of *κτίσις* in Romans: abstract meaning is grounded in the form itself, while functional variability is a product of interaction with co-textual features. Attested lexicogrammatical patterns are especially helpful in identifying meaningful instances in the text. Therefore, I propose that a monosemic approach to lexical study can account for the functional variation of *κτίσις* found in Romans.

Creation Language in Romans: A Survey

The noun *κτίσις* is used seven times in the book of Romans, each in slightly different contexts. Most of these occurrences do not figure prominently in any commentary on the passages. On the other hand, in Rom 8:19–23, the lexeme occurs four times and has consistently troubled commentators. Rather

¹ Notwithstanding my own work on the subject, *Creation Language in Romans 8: A Study in Monosemy* (LBS 8; Leiden: Brill, 2013).

than engaging in an in-depth discussion of the various interpretive positions, it should suffice to identify here the three major views:² (1) κτίσις should be understood as sub-human creation or nature;³ (2) κτίσις encompasses the entire created order;⁴ or (3) κτίσις should be understood in an anthropological sense.⁵ The first of these views remains the majority position, to the extent that

- 2 For a good history of research, see Olle Christoffersson, *The Earnest Expectation of the Creature: The Flood-Tradition as Matrix of Romans 8:18–27* (Coniectanea Biblica New Testament Series 23; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1990), 19–45. Note that there are several other nuanced positions that have been put forward. For example, Origen seems to appreciate a reference to angels (Origen, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Book 6–10* [trans. Thomas P. Scheck; The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation; Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002], 68); and more recently, Eastman includes unbelieving humanity along with nature, particularly unbelieving Israel (Susan Grove Eastman, “Whose Apocalypse? The Identity of the Sons of God in Romans 8:19,” *JBL* 121.2 [2002]: 276).
- 3 Cranfield is probably the most frequently referenced modern author who champions this view (see C.E.B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* [ICC; 2 vols.; London: T&T Clark, 1975, 1979], 1:411). See also, Edward Adams, *Constructing the World: A Study in Paul’s Cosmological Language* (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 177–78; James D.G. Dunn, *Romans 1–8* (WBC 38a; Waco, TX: Word, 1988), 469–70; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1992), 505–507; Harry Alan Hahne, *The Corruption and Redemption of Creation: Nature in Romans 8.19–22 and Jewish Apocalyptic Literature* (LNTS 336; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 176–81; T. Ryan Jackson, *New Creation in Paul’s Letters* (WUNT 2.272; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 151–52; Robert Jewett, “The Corruption and Redemption of Creation: Reading Rom 8:18–23 within the Imperial Context,” in *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order* (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2004), 34–36; Sylvia C. Keesmaat, *Paul and His Story: (Re)Interpreting the Exodus Tradition* (JSNTSup 181; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 102–10; Douglas J. Moo, “Nature in the New Creation: New Testament Eschatology and the Environment,” *JETS* 49.3 (2006): 459–63, among many others.
- 4 This position, though it does not make up the majority, seems to be gaining support. See Beverly Roberts Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 53–54; Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans* (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 232–36; Arland J. Hultgren, *Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 321; Luke Timothy Johnson, *Reading Romans: A Literary and Theological Commentary* (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 137; Uwe Gerber, “Röm 8:18ff als exegetisches Problem der Dogmatik,” *NovT* 8.1 (1966): 64.
- 5 Augustine is probably the oldest and most famous proponent (see Augustine, *Augustine on Romans: Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* [trans. Paula Fredriksen Landes; Texts and Translations 23; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982], 22–25). See more recently J. Ramsey Michaels, “The Redemption of Our Body: The Riddle of Romans 8:19–22,” in *Romans and the People of God: Essays in Honor of Gordon D. Fee on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday* (ed. Sven K. Soderlund and N.T. Wright; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 92–97, 104–14; William Fitzhugh Whitehouse, *The Redemption of*

it is often assumed in discussions of the passage.⁶ It is interesting that such rampant discussion has occurred over the meaning of κτίσις in Rom 8:18–23, yet in treatments of other verses in Romans that contain the lexeme, comparatively less attention is given. Romans 1 and the latter part of Romans 8 are no less vibrant with respect to broader discussions of Pauline theology, but apparently in those discussions creation language does not figure as prominently.

In places where the meaning or function of creation language is engaged, fairly typical practices ensue. Two patterns can be identified. First, authors tend to provide a list of traditional views and proceed to eliminate them one at a time based on particular contextual (and occasionally theological) inferences. This practice may have been initiated by Cranfield, but has caught on in several commentaries. For example, Ben Witherington suggests:

V. 19 has prompted major debate about the meaning of *ktisis*, “creation.” Basically, there are eight possibilities: all humanity, unbelieving humanity alone, believing humanity alone, angels alone, subhuman nature (both creature and creation), subhuman nature plus angels, unbelievers and nature, and subhuman nature plus humanity in general. V. 23 clearly enough contrasts believers with creation, and this seems to rule out inclusion of believers here. V. 20 seems to rule out non-believers as well, or even humanity in general, since at least Adam was not subject to such futility or suffering without a choice. So *ktisis* here probably refers to subhuman creation and nature. Paul does not appear to think that angels in general or in toto have been subjected to the sort of decay and futility spoken of here.⁷

the Body: An Examination of Romans VIII: 18–23 (London: Elliot Stock, 1892), 26–34; William G. Williams, *An Exposition of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye, 1902), 253; F.F. Zyro, “Neue Erklärung von Röm. 8,18–25,” *TSK* 18.1 (1845): 403–16; F.F. Zyro, “Neue Erörterung der Stelle Röm. 8,18–25,” *TSK* 24.2 (1851): 645–66.

- 6 Such studies include Sylvia C. Keesmaat, “Exodus and the Intertextual Transformation of Tradition in Romans 8.14–30,” *JSNT* 54 (1994): 43–47; Jae Hyun Lee, *Paul’s Gospel in Romans: A Discourse Analysis of Rom 1:16–8:39* (LBS 3; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 406–407, 410; Jan Lambrecht, “Ecocentric or Anthropocentric? A Reading of Romans 8:18–25,” in *Celebrating Paul: Festschrift in Honor of Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, O.P., and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.* (ed. Peter Spitaler; Washington, D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2011), 169–71; Thomas Vollmer, “A Theocentric Reading of Romans 8,18–30,” in *The Letter to the Romans* (ed. Udo Schnelle; BETL 226; Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 791–94.
- 7 See Ben Witherington, *Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 222–23. There are more options than Witherington suggests. Cranfield gives eight options as well but includes the whole creation (which includes

Some more specialized studies engage in similar practices, yet a select few attempt to situate Pauline usage within the broader context of Jewish and Greco-Roman usage.⁸ The best example of this can be found in Edward Adams's monograph *Constructing the World*, where he devotes several pages to documenting the "linguistic background of κτίσις."⁹ Both of these approaches reveal some positive features of lexical study, particularly with reference to the issue at hand. Authors recognize that lexical meaning is, to some degree, context-dependent, i.e., the meaning of a word cannot be divorced from the meaning of the larger discourse unit. Alternatively, other authors suggest that lexical meaning cannot be separated from its history of use; language users employ linguistic resources based upon how they have experienced them before. Even so, these sensitivities have not yet resulted in a fully explicit and rigorous *linguistic* treatment of the meaning of κτίσις in Romans. In light of the dynamic between history of use and particular contextual nuance, there remains an especially important question: how might New Testament scholars discern the functional variability of a lexeme (in this case κτίσις) given its repetition in different locations within a single discourse? Paul's use of creation language throughout the book of Romans provides an excellent opportunity to explore this question.

Lexical Semantic Theory

The Monosemic Bias

I propose that the lexical semantic theory of monosemy is well suited to account for semantic variation associated with a single word. This approach has been championed by cognitive linguist Charles Ruhl in his book *On Monosemy*. Despite its lack of use in biblical studies, and even linguistics in general, this approach has some promising features. Ruhl offers two general hypotheses: (1) "a word has a single meaning," and (2) "if a word has more than

humankind, nature, and the angels) and provides proponents of each view. Cranfield, *Romans*, 1:411; see also William J. Dumbrell, *Romans: A New Covenant Commentary* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005), 90–91; Leon Morris, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 320.

8 See Hahne, *Corruption and Redemption*, 176–81. His treatment is much more detailed than Cranfield's.

9 Adams, *Constructing the World*, 77–81.

one meaning, its meanings are usually related by general rules.”¹⁰ The meaning of a word is highly abstract and remote from reality and practical usefulness.¹¹ It is only when these abstracted values are applied in a specific context by the language user that they are, as he says, imbibed with a particular sense; that is to say, meaning is constrained by certain contextual features. Monosemy implies that the primary assumption of a linguist is that words will abide by these two hypotheses rather than possess multiple discrete meanings—thus, the so-called monosemic bias. From the outset, then, monosemy asserts a priority of investigation that counters traditional lexical study.

*Polysemic Approaches*¹²

In primary opposition to a monosemic bias is the theory of polysemy. Polysemy positions lexical meaning as composed of a single form with multiple discrete senses, although an important caveat is that these senses must somehow relate to one another. Polysemy is a generic theoretical framework with various manifestations, what I will delineate as dictionary and encyclopedic approaches.

In general, dictionary approaches limit a lexeme's inherent meaning (they reflect a minimalistic approach) and appreciate a large degree of contextual interference. Nerlich and Clarke hypothesize the relation of senses by way of a prototype.¹³ Alternatively, a componential approach divides lexical meaning into minute components.¹⁴ Discrete lexical meanings may relate by way

10 Charles Ruhl, *On Monosemy: A Study in Linguistic Semantics* (SUNY Series in Linguistics; New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 4. Ruhl notes on p. 5 that this is not a definitive thesis but rather a general description of words. That is, Ruhl does not rule out polysemy altogether. Rather, monosemy should be the expected paradigm. Even then, words that may appear polysemous should probably be considered as two separate words, i.e., they are homonyms.

11 Ruhl, *On Monosemy*, 7.

12 A more detailed treatment of alternative semantic theories can be found in Fewster, *Creation Language*, 18–36.

13 Brigitte Nerlich and David D. Clarke, “Polysemy and Flexibility: Introduction and Overview,” in *Polysemy: Flexible Patterns of Meaning in Mind and Language* (ed. Brigitte Nerlich et al.; TiLSM 142; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 8.

14 See Eugene A. Nida, *Componential Analysis of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Structures* (Approaches to Semiotics 57; The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 174–93. This has also proved useful with respect to translation theory, especially in Nida's dynamic equivalence model. For discussions of Nida's views on translation theory, see Eugene A. Nida, *Language Structure and Translation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), 24–46, 71–101; Eugene A. Nida, *Exploring Semantic Structures* (International Library of General Linguistics; Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1975), 66–78, 136–49, 179–85. Lexemes are, therefore, often related through synonymy and antonymy. Synonyms will share components both

of a conceptual core or as peripheral extension.¹⁵ Louw's emphasis on related peripheral meanings contrasts Thiselton's and Silva's appreciation of a central semantic core.¹⁶ Polysemy appears a foregone conclusion, especially among biblical semanticists. Louw's statements that polysemy is one of the "basic semantic notions found in all languages" and "to award one meaning to one word is incorrect since it denies the basic fact of polysemy" are programmatic.¹⁷ Given that biblical studies has incorrectly tended toward theological lexicography, the current emphasis on context as a delimiter of meaning is a helpful corrective. Barr and Silva admit that meaning exists in the combination of words into sentences, while Louw notes that "a word does not have meaning without a context, it only has possibilities of meaning."¹⁸ However, the emphasis on context in determining lexical meaning has perhaps been overdone, and

marked positively [+], while antonyms will be distinguished by a positive [+] and negative [-]. Cf. John Lyons, *Semantics* (2 vols.; London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1:317–35; Nick Riemer, *Introducing Semantics* (Cambridge Introductions to Language and Linguistics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 154–59, for description and critique of this perspective.

- 15 For example, Fischer describes polysemy in terms of "abstract kernel meaning" that "relates to observable functional interpretations" (Kerstin Fischer, *From Cognitive Semantics to Lexical Pragmatics: The Functional Polysemy of Discourse Particles* [Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000], 4). On the other hand, biblical linguist J.P. Louw (as will be seen) relates senses in terms of peripheral meaning (J.P. Louw, *Semantics of New Testament Greek* [Semeia; Atlanta: SBL, 1982], 33, 40).
- 16 Thiselton suggests that "the meaning of a word depends not on what it is in itself, but on its relation to other words and to other sentences which form its context" to the extent that he will speak of lexemes possessing a "stable core of meaning" (Anthony C. Thiselton, "Semantics and New Testament Interpretation," in *New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Principles and Methods* [ed. I. Howard Marshall; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977], 78). Silva's terminology is quite similar to Thiselton's, referring to a "stable semantic core" (Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning* [rev. and exp. ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986] 103). See also Stanley E. Porter, "Linguistic Issues in New Testament Lexicography," in his *Studies in the Greek New Testament* (SBL 6; New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 54–55, who acknowledges this phenomenon, specifically indicating that core or conventional meaning is what allows metaphors to 'work.'
- 17 Louw, *Semantics*, 37, 40. Similar statements are made by Nerlich and Clark. Note these examples: "polysemy has become central to modern cognitive semantics of the synchronic and diachronic type as well as to computational semantics and AI"; "it has become clear that the study of polysemy is of fundamental importance for any semantic study of language and cognition"; and "polysemy bridges the gap between various approaches developed over the past few decades" (Nerlich and Clarke, "Polysemy and Flexibility," 3–4).
- 18 Barr's statement is insightful, that meaning "has its characteristic expression not in the word individually but in the word-combination or sentence" (James Barr, *The Semantics*

under-appreciates the complex relationship between lexical and grammatical forms in construing meaning. The two most important Greek–English lexica of our day—BDAG and Louw–Nida—bear this out. BDAG follows a traditional alphabetic layout by including brief lexical glosses and adding more comprehensive definitions and accompanying examples. Oftentimes, the lexicon will differentiate senses that seem only to reflect the influence of grammar or other nearby lexemes.¹⁹ I am not sure that this truly constitutes a difference in *lexical* meaning.

The Louw–Nida lexicon differs from traditional lexica because of its reliance upon componential analysis, enabling the division of semantic domains into which specific lexical senses fit.²⁰ It is common to see a single lexeme placed into multiple domains. So, for example, κτίσις is placed in domains 1.4 (Universe, Creation), 37.43 (Exercise Authority), and 42.35, 42.38, 42.39, and 42.40 (Make, Create).²¹ The crucial question for both BDAG and Louw–Nida is whether this apparent semantic variation is a product of the word itself or the context (however defined) within which the lexeme occurs. Such polysemic approaches are lacking in their ability to theorize effectively the relationship between context and lexeme in the production of variant senses.

In the history of biblical lexicography, the *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (*TDNT*) best represents an encyclopedic approach, yet it too is reflective of the assumption of polysemy. *TDNT* values lexical etymology, and especially posits a close relationship between Greek and Hebrew.²² The most serious concern related to *TDNT*, however, lies in its tendency to engender

of *Biblical Language* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961], 233). See also Silva, *Biblical Words*, 28; Louw, *Semantics*, 40.

19 For example, the entry for πείθω distinguishes two meanings wherein the only difference is grammatical voice. See BDAG, 791–92.

20 See Eugene A. Nida and Johannes P. Louw, *Lexical Semantics of the Greek New Testament* (SBLRBS; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), for a more robust theoretical justification for the lexicon.

21 Louw–Nida, 2:148.

22 Early critiques of the *TWNT* (the German original of *TDNT*) were quickly met with rejoinders defending the close affinities of New Testament Greek and Hebrew. See primarily David Hill, *Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings: Studies in the Semantics of Soteriological Terms* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 1–22, for some basic theoretical and methodological assumptions of this approach. See also Leon Crouch, “Greek Word Studies,” in *Biblical Interpretation: Principles and Practice: Studies in Honor of Jack Pearl Lewis* (ed. F. Furman Kearley et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 227–28, as an example of one who cites Hill and seems to adopt a similar position, applying it to a basic rubric for Greek word study.

theological lexicography. Herein an encyclopedic approach to word meaning is most fully represented. Word-meaning exists within a tradition of use and these traditions *in their entirety* are brought to bear on subsequent instances of use. In a biblical tradition, then, the traditions are highly theological—thus theological lexicography. Texts soon become a string of theologies mediated through individual words. Barr calls this lexical fallacy “Illegitimate Totality Transfer” (ITT).²³ In spite of the fact that Barr’s critique occurred over fifty years ago, ITT and related fallacies continue to be committed. This is a serious concern for the field of New Testament lexicography.

A more recent manifestation of an encyclopedic approach can be seen in Ellen van Wolde’s *Reframing Biblical Studies*. Her approach is summarized by her assertion that “Cognitive Grammar cannot accept a dictionary view of meaning but takes an essentially encyclopedic view of meaning in which even the meaning of everyday terms is seen as being supported by a vast network of interrelated knowledge.”²⁴ This is an appropriate statement except that it remains unclear how such networks are manifest in specific utterances. While dictionary approaches seem to place an inordinate amount of emphasis on the role of context in delimiting meaning, encyclopedic approaches neglect the role that context plays in restricting meaning. In both cases, the relationship between lexis and the context of utterance in the production of meaning is under-theorized. How exactly do contextual factors limit or constrain meaning? One tactic is to resort to ‘sense selection,’ i.e., selecting a predetermined ‘sense’ from a list based on which sense seems to fit best.²⁵ This does not amount to rigorous scholarship. Given these factors, monosemy is a good candidate for further development and application.

23 Barr, *Semantics*, 218. See also Silva, *Biblical Words*, 25; and D.A. Carson, *Exegetical Fallacies* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 60–63. See also David Alan Black, *Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 125. Interestingly Black cites polysemy as the cure for ITT. See also Porter, “Linguistic Issues,” 59–63, for an extended discussion of theological lexicography and its persistence in contemporary lexical study.

24 Ellen van Wolde, *Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and Context* (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 55.

25 In fact this is essentially what Moo does in his treatment of *κρίσις* in Romans 8 (see Douglas J. Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans* [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996], 513). This strategy amounts to a ‘look it up in BDAG’ mentality (see John H. Elliott, “Look it Up. It’s in BDAG,” in *Biblical Greek Language and Lexicography: Essays in Honor of Frederick W. Danker* [ed. Bernard A. Taylor et al.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 48–53). For a critique of the ‘sense selection’ approach, see Gene L. Green, “Lexical Pragmatics and Biblical Interpretation,” *JETS* 50.4 (2007): 808–9.

Developing a Functional Model of Monosemy

Monosemy is comprised of two significant features: (1) an abstract and general semantic value, which is (2) constrained via contextual features. Both features must hold up to scrutiny if they are to be accepted. Ruhl provides an example of an abstracted single meaning through a series of six clauses that involve the verb ‘to take’ (inflected as *took*) to express slightly different actions.

- (a) The thief took the jewels
- (b) The thief took his own jewels
- (c) The jeweler took his jewels
- (d) The jeweler took his hat
- (e) John took his hat
- (f) The king took his jewels²⁶

Variance in meaning of the six clauses is apparent; a common thread holds each use of ‘took’ together, while there are other lexical and grammatical features of the clause that specify the meaning. Both (a) and (b) involve a thief as the subject and jewels as the object. (a) implies that ‘took’ is synonymous with stealing (Ruhl calls it a hyponym), whereas (b) removes the implication of stealing by the modifier ‘his own.’ Despite the marked difference in meaning (legal vs. illegal activities) there is still a central feature to the use of ‘took’: that of removing an object from where it had previously been. (c) pushes this distinction further with a different subject that expressly identifies the subject as the owner of the jewels. These examples highlight that from each of the contextually variable meanings, a single semantic value—removing an object from where it had previously been—can be abstracted.

I have observed a similar phenomenon in Louw–Nida, which can be identified as ‘semantic clustering.’²⁷ A few examples are warranted. The word *διαλογισμός* has four entries in Louw–Nida, two in the sub-domain To Think, Thought (30.10, glossed ‘reasoning’ and 30.16, glossed ‘what is reasoned’), one in the sub-domain Believe to Be True (31.37 and glossed ‘doubt’), and one in the sub-domain Argue, Quarrel (33.446 and glossed ‘dispute’).²⁸ In this case, three of the entries have clustered into the larger domain 30 Think, while one entry is an outlier in domain 33 Communication. Another lexeme, *πατήρ*, has

²⁶ See Ruhl, *On Monosemy*, 6.

²⁷ This can be seen in Louw–Nida vol. 2 which contains an index useful for locating the various domains into which a lexeme falls.

²⁸ Louw–Nida, 1:59.

eight entries, three in the sub-domain Kinship Relations Involving Successive Generations (10.14, glossed 'father'; 10.18, glossed 'parents'; and 10.20, glossed 'ancestors'), one in the sub-domain Socio-Religious²⁹ (11.26 and glossed 'elder'), one in the sub-domain Supernatural Beings (12.12 and glossed 'Father [title for God]'), one in the sub-domain Guide, Lead (36.8 and glossed 'leader'), one in the sub-domain Archetype, Corresponding Type (58.64 and glossed 'archetype'), and one in the sub-domain High Status or Rank (87.48 and glossed 'father [title for person]').³⁰ Evidently πατήρ has a greater dispersion of senses as compared to διαλογισός. Even so, there is a noticeable cluster of senses in domain 10 Kinship Terms. Beyond that cluster, many of these senses imply occurrences of metaphorical extension (in the case of 12.12), extra-linguistic social implicature (in the case of 87.48), and other sorts of meaningful extensions. The phenomenon of clustering seems to imply a generic semantic value that holds variant senses together. On the other hand, there are often outliers that appear to represent discrete senses. However, while it may be argued that these are, at times, discrete senses, it is probably better to view them as metaphorical extensions or characteristics of particular social scenarios. Semantic clustering is best explained by monosemy.

As noted above, Ruhl posits that "word meanings are highly abstract and remote from practical usefulness." In other words, each lexical item possesses an abstract semantic value that language users employ in specific contexts through concrete, metaphorical, and metonymic extensions. This implies a semantic perspective that is fundamentally minimalistic, that is to say, that lexemes possess minimal (but not zero) inherent meaning. Meaning, therefore, is a product of interaction among a lexeme, its immediate co-text, and its broader linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts. Contextualized meaning can be explained in terms of two important concepts: saturation and modulation.³¹ Pagin and Pelletier define saturation as "the process of adding semantic values to various parameters associated with simple expressions, so as to get a full proposition."³² Thus, a sentence comprised of the most basic constituents (e.g.,

29 This sub-domain is given this title in relation to the larger domain Groups and Classes of Persons and Members of Such Groups and Classes; hence, the reason it is an adjective.

30 Louw-Nida, 1:190.

31 Peter Pagin and Francis Jeffry Pelletier, "Content, Context, and Composition," in *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics* (ed. Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 38. While 'modulation' is a term used by Ruhl, 'saturation' is not. Even so, the notion of saturation is present in Ruhl's hypothesis, even if it is not stated in so many words.

32 Pagin and Pelletier, "Content, Context, and Composition," 38. Francois Recanati defines saturation similarly as "the process whereby the meaning of a sentence is completed

subject-verb-object) requires additional lexicogrammatical detail, making an utterance specific and explicit. Saturation can be fulfilled by any number of forms such as pronominal referents, genitives, and parametric predicates.³³

Regarding the notion of modulation, Recanati highlights its importance, calling it “essential to speech, because we (more or less) use a fixed stock of lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of things, situations and experiences.”³⁴ Modulation implies that an exhaustive stock of linguistic resources can be used to communicate inexhaustive semantic content within inexhaustive social contexts. Recanati notes further that “through the interaction between context-independent meanings of our words and the particulars of the situation talked about, contextualized, modulated senses emerge, appropriate to the situation at hand.”³⁵ From a monosemic bias, this describes the interaction between an abstracted semantic value and co-textual and contextual features.

Both Ruhl and Recanati articulate classes of modulation. Ruhl outlines three main ‘pragmatic’ variations: pragmatic generalization, pragmatic specialization, and pragmatic metonymy.³⁶ Similarly, Recanati hypothesizes ‘free enrichment,’ ‘loosening,’ and ‘semantic transfer.’³⁷ I wish to move past these elements of Ruhl’s monosemy and, instead, re-frame monosemy within functional linguistics. Functional linguistics emphasizes the investigation of real language, that is, language in use, and synchronic inquiry. I suggest, therefore, that monosemy can be best articulated and applied through investigation of a lexeme in terms of its use within a sizable literary corpus. Such analysis provides a reasonable sample size from which a monoseme or general semantic value can be abstracted, while also allowing the investigator to view typical lexicogrammatical patterns of use that account for co-textual variation.

Using a corpus in one’s linguistic description is virtually assumed among contemporary functional linguists inasmuch as it provides a reliable founda-

and made propositional through contextual assignment of semantic values to the constituents of the sentence whose interpretation is context-dependent” (Francois Recanati, *Literal Meaning* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 7).

33 Recanati, *Literal Meaning*, 7. An example of an unsaturated sentence is found in the sample sentence: *He wears a shirt*. The pronoun *he* is relatively meaningless without a referent. This semantic information can be added in verbal discourse by a gesture, or in textual discourse by an earlier sentence that includes the name of the referent. This feature of the discourse saturates the sentence and gives meaning to the proposition.

34 Recanati, *Literal Meaning*, 131.

35 Recanati, *Literal Meaning*, 131.

36 Ruhl, *On Monosemy*, 7, 60–62, 85–95.

37 Recanati, *Literal Meaning*, 24–26. Pagin and Pelletier also call this loosening extension (Pagin and Pelletier, “Content, Context, and Composition,” 42). It may be better to call all of these classes ‘extensions.’

tion for linguistic generalization.³⁸ Corpus techniques have been employed to some degree by New Testament scholars,³⁹ while the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (TLG) has proven useful for a much larger contingent. For the purposes of this article, I will not articulate an overly detailed corpus theory in an effort to maintain focus on the utility of monosemy; however, some basic suppositions should be noted.⁴⁰ First, a diverse and balanced corpus supplies a microcosm of Hellenistic Greek from which to make linguistic generalizations.⁴¹ Second, a corpus does not simply illustrate semantic range or offer examples of a specific sense, but it allows the researcher to make note of the patterns of linguistic interaction that constrain meaning.⁴² Third, a corpus allows the researcher to note the consistent semantic value of a lexeme that is present across all instances of use. From a monosemous perspective, this is the lexeme's abstract semantic value (monoseme), which is constrained by contextual features in a particular utterance. Corpus analysis provides the criteria and data for the two fundamental features of functional monosemy: the abstracted semantic value and the constraining linguistic features.

Thus far I have assumed that monosemy has value for textual analysis. At this point I wish to provide explicit description of how functional monosemy can be applied to the analysis of lexical meaning in a text. First, the researcher must select a balanced corpus and make note of each instance of the lexeme

38 For example, in the third edition of Halliday's *Introduction to Functional Grammar*, he incorporates insights from corpus analyses to further articulate and defend his linguistic theory (M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* [3rd ed.; rev. and ed. Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; London: Hodder Education, 2004], 33–35).

39 See especially Matthew Brook O'Donnell, *Corpus Linguistics and the Greek New Testament* (NTM 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2005).

40 For a more comprehensive description and use of corpus theory, see Fewster, *Creation Language*, ch. 3. See also Stanley E. Porter and Matthew Brook O'Donnell, "Theoretical Issues for Corpus Linguistics and the Study of Ancient Languages," in *Corpus Linguistics by the Lune: A Festschrift for Geoffrey Leech* (ed. Andrew Wilson et al.; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2001), 119–37.

41 For a meticulous overview of compiling a balanced corpus for the study of the Greek of the New Testament, see Matthew Brook O'Donnell, "Designing and Compiling a Register-Balanced Corpus of Hellenistic Greek for the Purpose of Linguistic Description and Investigation," in *Diglossia and Other Topics in New Testament Linguistics* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; JSNTSup 193; SNTG 6; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 255–97.

42 There is a tendency for New Testament scholars to seek out examples in Greek literature (or simply within the New Testament) that represent a particular use of a lexeme. The implication (or even explicit assertion) is that these examples provide positive proof for the author's hypothesis. In fact, such examples only offer possibilities of meaning and not definitive proof. For example, Adams defends his reading of *κρίσις* in Romans 8 by appealing to examples in Wisdom of Solomon (Adams, *Constructing the World*, 177).

in question (in our case, *κτίσις*). An analysis of these examples may make note of collocation patterns (i.e., co-occurring words, grammatical structures, connotations, etc.), genre and style of literature, literary heritage (i.e., is the author Greek, Jewish, Roman, etc.?), and other constraining features that can elucidate the lexeme's abstract semantic value. This catalogue of linguistic patterns can be brought to bear on the portion(s) of text under investigation. In the current case, I will be able to draw a comparison between Paul's use of *κτίσις*, together with its attendant contextual patterns, and the catalogue of lexical and grammatical patterns.

Linguistic Patterns Surrounding *κτίσις*

A search of *κτίσις* in the TLG reveals 10,163 occurrences in Greek literature across several centuries. For the purpose of this article, I have selected over 80 occurrences of the lexeme from Jewish, Christian, Greek, and Roman writings within the Hellenistic period. These examples illustrate the functional diversity of *κτίσις* and the lexical and grammatical structures that enable such diversity. Furthermore, the articulation of these patterns will be indicative of how I go about the process of semantic abstraction. From these examples, I will suggest that the abstract semantic value of *κτίσις* is *something that has been brought into existence*. Consequently, it is this abstracted semantic value that is constrained in specific instances of use. What follows is a catalogue of some prominent patterns.

Patterns According to Literary Heritage

The first constraining factor for the sense of *κτίσις* is extra-linguistic. It seems that the most basic way that authors use the word comes as a result of their cultural heritage. There is a fairly clear distinction between Greco-Roman and Jewish/Christian authors with regard to their fundamental understanding or use of *κτίσις*. For Jewish and Christian authors, *κτίσις* is primarily grounded in the concept of a God who creates. In such instances, *κτίσις* is almost always employed relative to terms denoting deity, such as *θεός* or *κύριος*. For Greco-Roman authors, there is no such relation of *κτίσις* to the Judaeo-Christian God or to gods; rather, it is tied to human 'creators.' There is conceptual dissonance between these two variations in sense (or modulations), both of which betray a distinct literary heritage.⁴³

43 Some exceptions occur, as will be seen below. Interestingly, however, the exceptions may make significant comment upon the author's literary heritage.

Linguistic saturation provides ample data that points toward one literary heritage versus another. In Jewish and Christian literature, *κτίσις* often collocates with words relating to God. Possessive pronouns also link *κτίσις* with God. Consider, for example, Hermas, *Pastor* 3.4:

Ἰδοὺ ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ ἀοράτῳ δυνάμει καὶ κραταιᾷ καὶ τῇ μεγάλῃ συνέσει αὐτοῦ κτίσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ τῇ ἐνδόξῳ βουλῇ περιθείς τὴν εὐπρέπειαν τῇ κτίσει αὐτοῦ (Look, the God of powers, who, by his invisible power and strength and great wisdom, created the world and, by his glorious purposes, made beautiful his creation).

In this passage *τῇ κτίσει* is located in proximity to ὁ θεός, the antecedent of αὐτοῦ. While ὁ θεός is not, strictly speaking, a collocate, its role as subject of the sentence provides a certain level of constraint. The participle *κτίσας* provides further lexicogrammatical relation between ὁ θεός and *τῇ κτίσει*. Notably, the parallelism between the phrases *κτίσας τὸν κόσμον* and *περιθείς τὴν εὐπρέπειαν τῇ κτίσει αὐτοῦ* suggest that *κόσμον* and *κτίσει* share the same referent. Similarly, the writer of 3 Macc 2:2 records the phrase:

κύριε κύριε βασιλεῦ τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ δέσποτα πάσης κτίσεως (Lord, Lord, king of the heavens and master of all creation).

In this instance, *κτίσις* collocates with the vocative *κύριε*, a word here associated with deity. These Jewish and Christian authors provide representative examples of the inference of *κτίσις* as it relates to words for God, and, due to particular lexicogrammatical features, these examples betray the authors' literary heritage.

For Greco-Roman authors, *κτίσις* was used in a more reserved sense as simply something that was made or built, often in connection with people. In the work of several Greek and Roman writers, *κτίσις* is consistently used in relation to the building, or more properly, the inception, of a city. There is no divine component. *Κτίσις* frequently collocates with either the name of a city or with the term *πόλις* (city).⁴⁴ Strabo and Dionysius of Halicarnassus are two writers who employ these patterns (some exhibit both):

44 This occurs either in the immediate co-text such as in Strabo, *Geogr.* 5.3.3, where *κτίσιν* is modified by *τῆς Ῥώμης*, or in the larger context, where *κτίσις* remains unmodified but the name of a city will be a more distant antecedent (see Plutarch, *Rom.* 10–120).

Strabo, *Geogr.* 11.5.4

κτίσεις γοῦν πόλεων καὶ ἐπωνυμίας λέγονται, καθάπερ Ἐφέσου καὶ Σμύρνης . . .
(at least the foundings of cities and the saying of names, just as Ephesus
and Smyrna . . .).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 1.73.3

ὥστε διττὰς εἶναι τῆς Ῥώμης τὰς κτίσεις· τὴν μὲν ὀλίγον ὕστερον τῶν Τρωικῶν
γενομένην (so that there were two accounts of the foundings of Rome,
which happened a little after the Trojans).

An interesting exception to this stark divide is seen in Josephus. In a few instances Josephus, though ethnically Judean, writes according to the Greco-Roman literary heritage; namely, he occasionally uses *κτίσις* in relation to the founding of a city. Thus, Josephus is able to employ this particular sense in accordance with his audience's traditional use of the word. For example, in *Ant.* 15.1, he writes: *κτίσεις πόλεων Ἑλληνίδων ἃς Ἡρώδης ἐποίησατο* (the foundings of a Greek city that Herod made). Josephus likely writes this way in accordance with the traditions of Greek historiography, as we saw with Strabo and Dionysius.

Based on these observations it seems of primary importance to take into account an author's literary heritage and how this is evidenced by the available linguistic data. As simple and straightforward as this step may be, it provides a basis for all other modulations in sense. In these examples, particular collocations such as city names and divine names provide important semantic specificity. Inherent in each use is the notion of something coming into existence that was not there before.

Creation and Cosmos

The lexeme *κόσμος*, or more properly its inflected form *κόσμου*, occasionally collocates with *κτίσις*. This collocation seems to indicate that the natural order is in view; however, it does so as it contributes to a larger idiomatic structure. Consider the following examples:⁴⁵

45 There are more examples in the corpus; however, they all are in *Ad Autolycum* as well. In addition, this pattern appears in connection with related lexemes. For example, in 2 Macc 7:23, reference is made to the *ὁ τοῦ κόσμου κτίστης* (the creator of the world). Here *τοῦ κόσμου* constrains the content of the creative action.

Hermas, *Pastor* 3.4

Ἰδοὺ ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ ἀοράτῳ δυνάμει καὶ κραταιᾷ καὶ τῇ μεγάλῃ συνέσει αὐτοῦ κτίσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ τῇ ἐνδόξῳ βουλῇ περιθεὶς τὴν εὐπρέπειαν τῇ κτίσει αὐτοῦ (Look, the God of powers, who, by his invisible power and strength and great wisdom, created the world and, by his glorious purposes, made beautiful his creation).

Theophilus, *Autol.* 2.9

δι' ἧς σοφίας εἶπον καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πάντων (through which wisdom they spoke, both concerning the creation of the world and all other things).

This is a linguistic pattern that seems to be limited to post-New Testament writings; it especially appears to have caught on in early Christian literature outside of my chosen corpus.⁴⁶ The first example, strictly speaking, is a collocation between τὸν κόσμον and the participle κτίσας; however, quickly following is the noun τῇ κτίσει, the meaning of which is constrained by the earlier collocation. In the second example, τῆς κτίσεως is modified by τοῦ κόσμου. The abstracted value of κτίσις is very clearly constrained by 'the world'; otherwise, a very general notion of 'created entity' is left over. This pattern, therefore, makes an explicit identification between creation and 'the world.' When κτίσις collocates with κόσμου, the 'natural order' is unambiguously in view, lending itself to what might be termed a cosmological reading of κτίσις.

Κτίσις as a Spatial/Temporal Marker

As can be seen already in some of these examples, κτίσις often serves, along with other lexicogrammatical features, as some sort of temporal or spatial marker. This is primarily accomplished by means of accompanying prepositions such as πρό and ἀπό, but it can include other lexemes such as ἀρχή, which provides further temporal constraint. Consider below some examples of the temporal and spatial uses of κτίσις:

46 Not including the numerous quotations of Rom 1:20 by the early Fathers. See, for example, Origen, *Hom. Jer.* 1.10; Origen, *Comm. Jo.* 19.22.149; Hippolytus, *Haer.* 6.33.1; *Haer.* 7.23.5; Pseudo-Justin Martyr, *Quaest. Gen. ad Christ.* 210.A; Gregorius Nysenus, *Contra Eunomium* 2.1.223; Eusebius, *Comm. Pss.* 23.1133; Athanasius, *Synopsis Scripturae Sacrae* 28.381.

Pss. Sol. 8.7

Ἀνελογισάμην τὰ κρίματα τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς (I considered the judgments of God since the creation of heaven and earth).

Plutarch, *Rom.* 12.2

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῆς κτίσεως βοτηρική τις ἦν αὐτοῖς ἑορτὴ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν (but even before the creation they had a pastoral festival on that day).

Sir 16:17

μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι ἀπὸ κυρίου κρυβήσομαι καὶ ἐξ ὕψους τίς μου μνησθήσεται ἐν λαῶ πλείονι οὐ μὴ γνωσθῶ τίς γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐν ἀμετρήτῳ κτίσει (Do not say, "I will be hidden from the Lord" and "who from on high will remember me?" Among many people I am unknown, for what is my life in a boundless creation?)

Col 1:23

εἴ γε ἐπιμένετε τῇ πίστει τεθεμελιωμένοι καὶ ἐδραῖοι καὶ μὴ μετακινούμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου οὗ ἠκούσατε, τοῦ κηρυχθέντος ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν, οὗ ἐγενόμην ἐγὼ Παῦλος διάκονος (if indeed you continue in faith, being stable and steadfast and not shifted from the hope of the good news that you heard, being preached in all creation under heaven, of which I, Paul, became a servant).

Dionysius, *Ant. rom.* 1.67.1

Ἐν δὲ τῇ κτίσει τῆς πόλεως θαῦμα μέγιστον λέγεται γενέσθαι (but in the creation of the city, a great wonder is said to have happened).⁴⁷

In these examples, κτίσις is co-selected with particular prepositions to indicate the time or space of a particular event, such as a 'pastoral festival' in Plutarch, *Rom.* 12.2. These constructions provide little in terms of 'content meaning' but

47 This last example is slightly ambiguous and, admittedly, could imply a spatial or temporal reference. However, given the frequency of the spatial meaning in other examples of this construction, the spatial option is more likely.

are useful as deictic indicators. In these cases, the meaning of κτίσις remains abstract, and any sort of temporal or spatial meaning that can be understood is a result of the addition of a preposition.

“All Creation”

The adjective πᾶς (and its various inflections) is the most frequent collocate of κτίσις. Its primary function is to provide specificity.⁴⁸ That is, it helps to answer the question, “which creation?” On the other hand, πᾶς is a resource that signifies that the entirety of κτίσις (whatever it may be) is in view, as opposed to only a portion.⁴⁹ Further modifiers and other constraining features are usually present to provide specificity in addition to πᾶς, which indicates that πᾶς simply grammaticalizes [+QUANTITY]. Consider some examples:

Tob 8:5

εὐλογησάτωσάν σε οἱ οὐρανοὶ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ κτίσεις σου (Let the heavens and all your creations bless you).

T. Naph. 2.3

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λείπον ἐν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς τρίτον τριχός· σταθμῶ γὰρ καὶ μέτρῳ καὶ κανόνι πᾶσα κτίσις ὑψίστου (and the one is not behind the other from the third of a hair; for by weight, by measure, and by rule is every creature of the Most High).⁵⁰

This pattern is highly significant for two reasons. First, it is the most common pattern particular to this lexeme; and second, it is a pattern that appears in one of the four occurrences of κτίσις in Rom 8:18–23. As these two examples illustrate, the variability in meaning is quite distinct. The example from the book of Tobit remains general, and seems to encompass everything that is created, whereas the example from *T. Naph. 2* is more specifically concerned with

48 For now, this is a basic assumption. Πᾶς is a significant word in Romans 8 and will be dealt with later on in this essay.

49 An additional collocate, ὅλη, though not nearly as frequent as πᾶς, seems to perform a similar function. See, for example, Wis 19:6.

50 I have chosen the gloss ‘every creature,’ rather than ‘all creation,’ since, the surrounding co-text (i.e., vv. 2–6) indicates strongly that κτίσις is being used here as a synonym for people or even the human body. The author here identifies God’s care for people (his creation) as a potter does the clay.

people. Thus, *πᾶς* can modify (and contribute to) both modulations. Notably, it is other co-textual features that suggest this reading and not the lexeme itself. When these features (including *πᾶς*) are removed, what remains is an abstracted notion of something that was brought into being.

Κτίσις and the Creation of ad hoc Domains

A final pattern worth discussing at this juncture is the inclusion of *κτίσις* in *ad hoc* domains. *Ad hoc* domains are domains of meaning that may not necessarily have any inherent lexical or semantic relation. However, the language user creates a temporary semantic domain by including such items in a list together. Westfall identifies the list of overseer qualifications in 1 Tim 3:2–7 as an example of this phenomenon.⁵¹ Further examples may include *κτίσις* with a number of other lexical items. Grouped together they say something about the particular subject or head term. In these cases, *κτίσις* remains abstract; the author is more concerned about the head term than the individual constituents. Note some examples:

Polybius, *Hist.* 9.1.4–5

τὸν μὲν γὰρ φιλήκοον ὁ γενεαλογικὸς τρόπος ἐπισπᾶται, τὸν δὲ πολυπράγμονα καὶ περιττὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεις καὶ συγγενείας, καθά που καὶ παρ' Ἐφόρῳ λέγεται, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν (for the genealogical style is indeed attractive to the eager, and to the inquisitive and extraordinary concerning colonizations and creations and kinships, even as it is said in Ephorus, and to the political, concerning deeds of the people and the city and the dynasty).

3 Macc 2:2

κύριε κύριε βασιλεῦ τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ δέσποτα πάσης κτίσεως ἅγιε ἐν ἁγίοις μόναρχε παντοκράτωρ πρόσχες ἡμῖν καταπονουμένοις ὑπὸ ἀνοσίου καὶ βεβήλου θράσει καὶ σθένει πεφρυαγμένου (Lord, Lord, king of the heavens and master of all creation, holy among the holy ones, only ruler, almighty, attend to us who are greatly suffering from an impious and profane man and very puffed up).

⁵¹ See Cynthia Long Westfall, *A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews: The Relationship between Form and Meaning* (LNTS 297; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 50.

In the first example, Polybius describes the particular topics of discussion common to many historians, thus creating the *ad hoc* domain ‘concerns of historians.’ The lexeme κτίσις is thus semantically related (at least in this particular juncture) to such other words as ἀποικίας (colonization), συγγενείας (kinship), πράξεις τῶν ἔθνων (deeds of the people), etc.⁵² The second example consists of the beginning of a prayer directed to God. Here, the prayer is introduced by a series of declarations about the characteristics of God, which includes the notion that God is the δέσποτα πάσης κτίσεως. This list of characteristics creates the *ad hoc* domain ‘things that God is.’ As with the other example, κτίσις is relatively semantically empty, since the emphasis is upon the receiver of the prayer.

Summary of Patterns

The patterns noted above are only a few of those that can be identified in a corpus analysis. Many insights are not novel; however, my analysis has identified particular formal features that factor into the making of these patterns.⁵³ It is notable that these distinct patterns account for much of the semantic variation of which κτίσις is capable. Furthermore, these patterns are not mutually exclusive. Several can be present in the same passage, which creates increased specificity. In spite of the functional variability generated by these patterns, there remains a stable, though general, meaning that can be attributed to the lexeme itself. Regardless of function (e.g., deictic marker), there remains an abstract value: *something that has been brought into existence*.

Exploring Creation Language in Romans

There are three major locations in the book of Romans in which the lexeme κτίσις appears: Rom 1:20, 25; 8:19–22; and 8:39. In Romans, Paul uses the lexeme to perform a variety of functions in a variety of contexts, all of which are grounded in an abstract semantic value associated with the lexeme. Creation language provides an interesting test-case to apply the monosemic bias, as each of the instances reflects widely variant co-textual features and, as a result,

52 I would suggest that κτίσις is being used to mean the founding of cities. In this passage, κτίσις is put in parallel with πόλεων, which reflects a larger parallel structure. This is also consistent with Polybius’s typical usage.

53 For example, Adams readily acknowledges the overwhelming use by Greco-Roman writers with reference to city building (Adams, *Constructing the World*, 77).

widely variant functions are performed. This is evident when the specific instances in Romans are compared to the patterns identified in the corpus.

Creation Language in Romans 1

Two occurrences of *κτίσις* appear very early on in Romans. While these occurrences appear in relatively close proximity to one another, they exhibit some interesting functional variability. The latter half of this first chapter reflects Paul's attitudes toward the guilt of humanity, in particular the Gentiles. In Rom 1:18, Paul explicates why God's wrath has been levelled against humankind, suggesting that God's invisible qualities have been clearly perceived in that which has been made *ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου*. Paul develops this thought further and describes humankind's descent into idolatry, which resulted in the rejection of the divine image. A summary statement draws this first argument to a conclusion, noting that humanity served *τῇ κτίσει* instead of *τὸν κτίσαντα*. The primary question that I wish to ask with regard to this passage concerns the function of *κτίσις*, particularly in these two verses. It is evident that each verse exhibits a slightly different nuance, but the question is how and why?

Since the approach I take in this essay is from a monosemic bias, my starting point is the lexeme's highly abstract semantic value, taking into account the immediate linguistic co-text, which is informed by documented patterns identified within the corpus. For both occurrences, *κτίσις* contributes to the co-text the notion of dependent or contingent existence. However, there are some marked formal differences in the respective co-texts that elicit important functional variability. In Rom 1:20, *κτίσις* collocates with the preposition *ἀπὸ*, which is modified by the genitive *κτίσεως*. This pattern conforms to two noted collocational patterns that I identified above. First, the collocation of *κτίσις* + preposition tends to function as a deictic marker, which indicates a spatial or temporal reference point. As such, Paul seems to employ the phrase *ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου* as a temporal marker, one that expresses the extent to which God's invisible attributes have been perceived.⁵⁴ The addition of *κόσμου* to this construction adds further specification;⁵⁵ that is, there is a particular creation

54 Sanday and Headlam accurately refer to other similar constructions in the New Testament, which also figured prominently in my own corpus research (see William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans* [ICC; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896], 42; also, Cranfield, *Romans*, 1:114).

55 See Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, "Πίστις with Preposition and Genitive Modifier: Lexical, Semantic, and Syntactic Considerations in the *πίστις Χριστοῦ* Discussion," in *The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies* (ed. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2009), 44, for a discussion of the function of the genitive being to provide specification.

in view—the ‘of the world’ creation.⁵⁶ This use of creation language maintains an abstract quality to it. Paul’s concern is not to further define what ‘created things’ he has in view.⁵⁷ This is supported by the use of the substantive τοῖς ποιήμασιν, a paradigmatic variant of κτίσις, which is also generic.

A similar approach should be taken in the analysis of the second verse, Rom 1:25. As before, the lexeme exhibits its monoseme. However, none of the typical corpus patterns that I noted earlier seems to be present in this instance. This implies that Paul has not used κτίσις here as a deictic marker, but rather to indicate that a functional shift is taking place. Most interesting is the contrast between κτίσις and the substantive participle τὸν κτίσαντα. Throughout these verses, Paul has described humanity’s descent (including God’s rejection of them) in terms of binary categories. Thus, instead of being wise, they became fools, and instead of choosing truth, they chose a lie. Paul concludes these pairs by contrasting humankind’s decision to worship and serve τῇ κτίσει instead of τὸν κτίσαντα. This choice appears to be inclusive of the others. While none of the typical collocational patterns occur in connection with κτίσις, these contrasting relationships do much to indicate the function of the lexeme in this pericope. Paul draws a stark distinction between the Creator (i.e., God) and that which has been created by him. The significance and functional value of his use of κτίσις is found in its formal contrast to the substantive participle τὸν κτίσαντα. That is, its significance lies in what it is not rather than what it is.⁵⁸ For Paul, God’s rejection and giving over of humanity is on the basis of the absurdity of their own rejection of God.

Creation Language in Rom 8:18–22

Romans 8 contains the most controversial and disputed uses of κτίσις in Romans, and perhaps in the entire New Testament. From a linguistic perspective, the use of this lexeme in this pericope is striking given its repetition, since, according to my corpus analysis, κτίσις is not ordinarily repeated more than twice. Similar to Rom 1:25, three out of the four occurrences do not follow standard collocational patterns. Only Rom 8:22 employs the pattern πᾶς

56 This is a significant modification in that the deictic function of κτίσις often occurs in the context of the founding of a city. By adding κόσμου, Paul is very clear about what sort of creation he has in mind. Jewett notes that viewing the creation of the world as a referenceable point in time is characteristically Jewish Christian (Robert Jewett, *Romans* [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007], 155). He is correct inasmuch as the inclusion of κόσμου rather than πόλις is a means of differentiation.

57 Some authors pose the question anyways (see especially Jewett, *Romans*, 171).

58 Adams suggests that “The reference is probably intentionally broad, since Paul is expressing here a general truth (as he sees it) about the nature of idolatry—that it consists in an essential confusion of creator and created things” (Adams, *Constructing the World*, 157).

+ κτίσις. This raises the question—one that is implicitly dealt with by most commentators—can κτίσις mean something different in each of these verses? From a functional perspective, it is better to ask, what kind of functional variability does κτίσις exhibit across these four verses? Witherington exemplifies the opinion that κτίσις should mean the same thing in this pericope as it does in Romans 1, as his treatment of the meaning of κτίσις occurs prior to an analysis of the passage itself. Continuity in the sense of the lexeme seems to be assumed.⁵⁹ On the other hand, some writers, such as Dunn and Michaels, see a disjunction in the meaning between the uses of κτίσις in Rom 8:19–21 and the use of πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις in Rom 8:22.⁶⁰ This is best reflected in the translational shift from ‘creature’ to ‘all creation,’ which is seen in the κβν.⁶¹ This latter distinction creates a false disjunction between the structure of 8:22 and 8:19–21. Upon an evaluation of the immediate linguistic environment in all four verses, it becomes evident that there is no truly consistent use of the lexeme, contrary to the impression given by Michaels and Dunn. Romans 8:19 uses the genitive, Rom 8:20 uses the nominative, and Rom 8:21 uses the nominative and the intensifying pronoun αὐτή. Thus, none of the occurrences of creation language in Rom 8:19–22 are identical. From this standpoint it becomes problematic to draw a distinction in sense between the ἡ κτίσις in 8:20 and πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις in 8:22 simply on the basis of πᾶσα.

Even so, a monosemic bias assumes that there is some semantic value that is consistent across all utterances. This is an important point to make regarding this pericope of Romans, as it aids in the development of a topic, i.e., that the repetition of semantic information can establish the topic of the discourse.⁶² Collocational patterns—or lack thereof—do not aid in the disambiguation of meaning in this pericope and, as a result, I propose that the meaning of κτίσις

59 See Witherington, *Romans*, 222. Also note Dunn, *Romans 1–8*, 469–70; Cranfield, *Romans*, 1:411–12; Hahne, *The Corruption and Redemption of Creation*, 176–81; Brendan Byrne, *Romans* (Sacra Pagina 6; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2007), 255.

60 In fact Michaels distances himself from Whitehouse and Williams (two early commentators on whom he relies), suggesting that their attempt to maintain this position is not as successful (Michaels, “The Redemption of Our Body,” 110; cf. Whitehouse, *The Redemption of the Body*, 49; Williams, *Romans*, 206). Michaels takes his cue from Dunn, who writes: “However widely encompassing was Paul’s earlier use of κτίσις (see on 8.19), here certainly it is nonhuman, and, as we would say, inanimate creation which is primarily in view” (Dunn, *Romans 1–8*, 472). Jonathan Moo, “Romans 8.18–22 and Isaiah’s Cosmic Covenant,” *NTS* 54.1 (2008) 76, disputes this reading.

61 A similar shift is seen in Schlier’s translation, as he shifts from ‘Kreatur’ to ‘Schöpfung’ in 8.22 (Heinrich Schlier, *Der Römerbrief* [HTKNT; Freiburg: Herder, 1977], 256).

62 See Westfall, *Discourse Analysis of Hebrews*, 47.

remains fairly abstract. Functional variation occurs based on the shifting contextual influences as the discussion develops. Thus, there is a tension between the consistent semantic information repeated throughout the passage by means of the lexeme *κτίσις* and functional variation engendered by the different co-texts. The variation with which *κτίσις* is involved can be fundamentally described in terms of its interaction with other domains of meaning.

Besides Creation, three important semantic domains occur in this passage: Expectation, Slavery–Freedom, and Adoption.⁶³ Notions of adoption permeate the discourse, describing the relationship of believers to Christ and broaching the topic of persecution. Perhaps the most important proposition regarding adoption can be seen in 8:21, where Paul anticipates that *κτίσις* will achieve the glory of the children of God—virtually the same description given to believers. The slavery–freedom contrast also permeates the paragraph as well. *Κτίσις* has been subjected and placed in bondage, but it can look forward to release as well. Note that this release is characterized by adoption. Expectation is also an important intersecting domain, which characterizes the contemporary state of *κτίσις* and describes its relationship to freedom and adoption. As hinted at in my comments regarding adoption, the relationship of *κτίσις* to these domains (Expectation, Adoption, and Slavery–Freedom) is very similar to the relationship of these domains to believers, leading some writers to suggest some degree of solidarity between believers and creation.⁶⁴ This relationship is made even more striking in 8:23, when the believer's expectation of adoption is cast in terms of the body's redemption. Given the ambiguity of *κτίσις* up until this point, the collusion of domains with 'body' may suggest an equation of *κτίσις* and *σῶμα* along the lines of metaphor, i.e., creation language is used here as a metaphor for the body.⁶⁵

63 Trevor Burke argues that adoption remains the controlling metaphor in this entire section. See Trevor J. Burke, "Adopted as Sons (υἱοθεσία): The Missing Piece in Pauline Soteriology," in *Paul: Jew, Greek, and Roman* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; PAST 6; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 280.

64 See, for example, Lambrecht, "Ecocentric or Anthropocentric?" 184; Vollmer, "Theocentric Reading," 791–92; Herman C. Waetjen, *The Letter to the Romans: Salvation as Justice and the Deconstruction of Law* (NTM 32; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2011), 215. Some writers describe this in terms of an "inextricable link" (see Michael A. Bullmore, "The Four Most Important Passages for a Christian Environmentalism," *TrinJ* 19.2 [1998]: 161; J. Mark Lawson, "Romans 8:18–25:—The Hope of Creation," *Review and Expositor* 91.4 [1994]: 561).

65 See especially recently, Fewster, *Creation Language*, 130–32, 145, 161–66; Michaels, "The Redemption of Our Body," 92–97, 104–14; and Whitehouse, *Redemption of the Body*, 26–34; Williams, *Romans*, 253; Zyro, "Neue Erklärung," 403–16; Zyro, "Neue Erörterung," 645–66, for comments along these lines.

Creation Language in Rom 8:38–39

Romans 8:38–39 occurs at the end of a major section in the book of Romans (i.e., chs. 5–8), which includes the apocalyptic dimensions of Pauline eschatology and the assuredness of that vision. Paul seems to address, or at least anticipate, dissension regarding the eschatological and soteriological proposals—especially the adoption and redemption of believers—that he has been developing over the course of several chapters. An appeal is made on the basis of Christology, namely, Christ’s death, resurrection, and intercession. This defense culminates in a list of items that Paul deems unable to separate believers from the love of Christ. Concluding this list is the item *τις κτίσις ἐτέρα*. English translations alone reveal the diversity in the understanding of this phrase. For example, the KJV renders the phrase ‘any other creature,’ while the ESV renders the phrase ‘anything else in all creation.’ Other translations seem to follow this divide and reflect similar interpretive decisions made in Rom 8:22.⁶⁶ One exception may be the NASB, which glosses the phrase ‘any other created thing.’⁶⁷ As in the earlier discussion, there is an implicit divide between interpreters over whether *κτίσις* maintains a cosmological or anthropological nuance.⁶⁸

While this translational issue is an interesting one, a monosemic approach takes the discussion in a different direction. As I have demonstrated in the examples above, a monosemic approach begins from the standpoint that a lexeme exhibits its abstract semantic value, in the case of *κτίσις*, the notion of *something brought into existence that previously was not*. This value is specified and constrained by the immediate linguistic features of the discourse, our understanding of which is informed by the earlier corpus analysis. I suggest that the fundamental functional extension that is occurring here is the inclusion of *κτίσις* in the construction of an *ad hoc* semantic domain, particularly the domain ‘things that will not separate us from the love of God.’⁶⁹ Thus, *τις κτίσις ἐτέρα* is one member of a class of such items. The primary question that the text answers, then, is not, *What does κτίσις mean?* but

66 Several modern commentators seem to prefer the gloss ‘any other creature.’ See Hultgren, *Romans*, 341; F.F. Bruce, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), 181.

67 See also, Moo, *Romans*, 546.

68 Hultgren argues for a cosmological nuance in this entire section. Together, the elements in the list are seen to describe ‘cosmological forces’ that may be seen to have greater strength than God (Hultgren, *Romans*, 339–42).

69 This title is borrowed from Westfall, *A Discourse Analysis of Hebrews*, 50, who actually uses this passage as an example of this category.

rather, *What sort of items are unable to separate us from the love of God?* In using κτίσις in such a way, Paul adopts a particular pattern of usage that is attested in both Jewish and Greco-Roman writings. The secondary question of the specific sense of κτίσις in this instance is not uncalled for; however, I think that this point it is more an issue of translation. Many modern translations that gloss the phrase τις κτίσις ἐτέρα as ‘anything else in all creation’ have taken some liberties. The phrase ‘all creation’ may be borrowed from Rom 8:22, where Paul speaks of πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις—a collocation that is not present here. Thus, this common translation is inappropriate. I am inclined to accept the NASB’s ‘any other created thing’ as the most neutral and accurate rendering. Most important to this phrase is the relationship of κτίσις to the other items in the list that is generated by τις . . . ἐτέρα; it indicates that all the other items are creations as well.⁷⁰ Thus, τις κτίσις ἐτέρα rounds out the list of ‘things that will not separate us from the love of God’ as a sort of catch-all phrase.⁷¹ This list, therefore, seems to recapture the Creator–creature dynamic that has already been identified in Romans 1.⁷²

Conclusion

Contra popular notions of polysemy as a viable theory of lexical meaning, a functional model of monosemy is both more methodologically robust and exegetically promising. While distancing itself from the maximalist tendencies of theological/encyclopedic approaches, monosemy appreciates co-textually driven functional variation. However, unlike the more common polysemic and dictionary approaches, the monosemic bias begins with the abstract meaning of the lexeme itself and investigates how more functional specificity is created through its interaction with other immediate discourse features. A monosemic bias is an effective theoretical starting point when analyzing repeated words in a discourse that seem to exhibit functional variability. This has been evident in my analysis of Paul’s use of κτίσις throughout Romans. Several times, Paul employs patterns that are well attested in the corpus of Hellenistic Greek. For

70 Cf. Dunn, *Romans* 1–8, 508 (also followed by Jewett, *Romans*, 554) who suggests that this reference performs a relativizing function with regard to the other items in the list.

71 See also Moo, *Romans*, 546, who uses the term ‘catch-all.’

72 Wright seems to pick up on this dynamic as well, though he frames it in terms of his narrative substructure (N.T. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflection,” in *The New Interpreter’s Bible: A Commentary in Twelve Volumes* [ed. Leander E. Keck; vol. 12; Nashville: Abingdon, 2002], 615).

example, Paul is able to use *κτίσις* as a temporal deictic marker (Rom 1:20) and in the midst of an *ad hoc* semantic domain (Rom 8:39). At other points, such attested patterns are not present and thus the function of *κτίσις* is less defined and more abstract. Even in these cases, the discourse is still meaningful as it interacts with other repeated semantic domains (as in Rom 8:19–23) and with its verbal cognate (as in Rom 1:25).

An Intertextual Discourse Analysis of Romans 9:30–10:13

Xiuxia E. Xue

Introduction

There are a number of divergent scholarly opinions on how Paul views Judaism in Romans 9–11. For instance, some argue that Paul writes against Judaism,¹ but others argue that Paul is concerned about the Jews and their salvation.² I believe that most controversies arise and continue due to a lack of appropriate methodological control in scholars' analyses of the passage. In contrast, this article will employ a linguistically-informed model of intertextuality, influenced by Jay Lemke, for analyzing this text and its intertexts. Application of this model will illustrate that what Paul wrote should represent his identity and his value-orientations toward Judaism. I will focus particularly on Rom 9:30–10:13 (the central sub-section of Romans 9–11) and argue that as a Christ-follower and an apostle to the Gentiles, Paul's viewpoints toward some core concepts with regard to Judaism (e.g., righteousness, law, faith) are radically different from his Jewish contemporaries, even though he insists upon his brotherhood with Israel.

-
- 1 Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 105–107. According to Ruether, Paul's struggle to explain the role of Israel in the history of salvation produces anti-Jewish statements. Cf. Mary Ann Getty, "Paul and the Salvation of Israel: A Perspective on Romans 9–11," *CBQ* 50 (1988): 457–58 n. 6. Robert Badenas, *Christ the End of the Law: Romans 10.4 in Pauline Perspective* (JSNTSup 10; Sheffield: JSOT, 1985), 84; Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Works, His Epistles and Teachings* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2003), 349.
 - 2 Getty, "Paul and the Salvation of Israel," 467–69; F. Scott Spencer, "Metaphor, Mystery and the Salvation of Israel in Romans 9–11: Paul's Appeal to Humility and Doxology," *Review & Expositor* 103 (2006): 116; Badenas, *Christ*, 85.

Methodology: An Analysis of Intertextual Thematic Systems

Many biblical scholars employ the term *intertextuality* to describe the relationship created when an Old Testament text is used in a New Testament text. Such interconnectedness has been explored with tradition-historical methods.³ However, this diachronic approach has been fiercely challenged by those scholars who insist upon the poststructuralist roots of intertextuality.⁴ From this perspective, intertextuality should not be seen as “a linear adaptation of another text but as a complex of relationships.”⁵ This understanding of intertextuality derives from a particular view of *text*. That is, a text is never wholly one’s own, for it is always permeated by traces of other texts and discourses.⁶ Bakhtin identified the dialogic, heteroglossic quality of language so as to argue against any unitary, authoritarian, and hierarchical conception of society, art, and life.⁷ Under this vision of human society and communication, Kristeva was able to coin the term intertextuality as part of her account of Bakhtin’s work.⁸

Under influence of the poststructuralist notion of intertextuality, some biblical scholars have been able to identify certain literary connections between biblical texts. However, this study of biblical intertextuality is still in its infancy,

3 Mark Boda, “Quotation and Allusion,” in *Dictionary of Biblical Criticism and Interpretation* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; London: Routledge, 2007), 296.

4 In the poststructuralist view of intertextuality, “Intertextuality is an ‘anonymous’ and ‘impersonal’ process of blending, clashing, and intersecting; and texts ‘blend and clash,’ so there is no first text, no original text” (see Susan Stanford Friedman, “Weavings: Intertextuality and the (re)Birth of the Author,” in *Influence and Intertextuality in Literary History* [ed. Jay Clayton and Eric Rothstein; Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991], 149; and George Aichele, “Canon as Intertext: Restraint or Liberation?,” in *Reading the Bible Intertextually* [ed. Richard B. Hays et al.; Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009], 142).

5 Ellen Van Wolde, “Trendy Intertextuality?” in *Intertextuality in Biblical Writings: Essays in Honour of Bas van Ierse* (ed. Sipke Draisma; Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij J.H. Kok, 1989), 47.

6 Graham Allen, *Intertextuality* (The New Critical Idiom; London: Routledge, 2000), 28. According to Barthes, “any text is an intertext; other texts are present in it, at varying levels . . . Any text is a new tissue of past citations. Bits of code, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of social languages, etc., pass into the text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language before and around the text.” See Roland Barthes, “Theory of the Text,” in *Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist Reader* (ed. Robert Young; London: Routledge, 1981), 39.

7 Allen, *Intertextuality*, 29.

8 Allen, *Intertextuality*, 29–30.

though major strides have been made in recent research.⁹ However, I suggest that poststructuralist intertextuality is much more a literary concept than an interpretive tool. Therefore, this study will attempt to develop its interpretive possibilities by following Lemke's intertextual thematic analysis, influenced by Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics (henceforth SFL) and postmodern critical theory.

Lemke's Concept of Intertextuality

Traditionally, when speaking of biblical intertextual relationships, the focus is upon the wording found within the texts, and the treatment of textual adaptation involves the analysis of phenomena such as verbatim copying, near-verbatim copying, explicit or near-explicit reference, paraphrase, or allusion to previous texts in the host text.¹⁰ Lemke, however, considers intertextual relations in an alternative way. As he has stated, two texts that "share only one or a few key words is not enough, and may be quite irrelevant if those words are being used with different thematic meanings in the different texts."¹¹ On the other hand, "the texts may not share words, but use thematically equivalent synonyms or even figurative expressions. It is semantic patterns that the texts must share."¹²

As a social semiotician, Lemke has a complex and profound understanding of intertextuality. He places intertextuality on the level of a system of social meaning-making practices that are characteristic of a particular community.¹³ Lemke indicates that intertextual relations transcend the context of situation and depend on the context of culture.¹⁴ This is a significant contribution to the relationship between text and context. For Lemke, a complete account of textual meaning does not only depend on the grammatical and situational context, but on the systems of the intertextual contexts in which they were placed.¹⁵ Lemke writes:

9 Thomas L. Brodie et al., "Conclusion: Problems of Method," in *The Intertextuality of the Epistles: Explorations of Theory and Practice* (ed. Thomas L. Brodie et al.; NTM 10; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2006), 296.

10 See Brodie et al., "Conclusion," 288–90.

11 Jay L. Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," in *Discourse in Society: Systemic Functional Perspectives: Meaning and Choice: Studies for Michael Halliday* (ed. Peter H. Fries and Michael Gregory; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1995), 91.

12 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 91.

13 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 85.

14 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 86.

15 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 85.

We make meanings from text to text through the relations of their discourse structures and rhetorical devices, through the conventional social relations of the actions and events constituted in part by the texts, and through the systems of relations of the thematic-ideational fields of the “contents” of the texts.¹⁶

When Lemke speaks of intertextuality, he sets it in the context of social discourse or viewpoints.¹⁷ Intertextuality is thus a principle or system, one that is at home in the context of social semiotics, which holds that all meanings are made within communities and that the analysis of meaning should not be separated from the social, historical, cultural, and political dimensions of such communities.¹⁸ Lemke defines the system of intertextuality as social dynamics: “diverse social interests and points-of-view speak with distinct voices that proclaim different thematic propositions, assign differing valuations, and may even make use of different characteristic genres and speech-activities.”¹⁹ Applied to a biblical text, in order to understand the meaning of Paul’s discourse on God’s righteousness in Romans, we need to know the other dimensions and viewpoints of talking about God’s righteousness and the recurrent forms of argument about God’s righteousness spoken by Paul’s fellow Jews in each of their own communities. We can then construct intertextual relationships among these particular texts to locate Paul’s viewpoint in the diverse textual data.

Intertextual Relations

For Lemke, “the study of intertextuality is concerned with the recurrent discourse and activity patterns of the community and how they are constituted by, instanced in, and interconnected or disjoined through particular texts.”²⁰

16 Jay L. Lemke, “Thematic Analysis: Systems, Structures, and Strategies,” *Semiotic Inquiry* 3 (1983): 159.

17 According to Lemke, “each community and every subcommunity within it has its own system of intertextuality: its own set of important or valued texts, its own preferred discourses, and particularly its own habits of deciding which texts should be read in the context of which others, and why, and how.” See Jay L. Lemke, *Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics* (Critical Perspectives on Literacy and Education; London: Taylor & Francis, 1995), 9.

18 Lemke, *Textual Politics*, 8.

19 Jay L. Lemke, “Discourses in Conflict: Heteroglossia and Text Semantics,” in *Systemic Functional Approaches to Discourse: Selected Papers from the 12th International Systemic Workshop* (ed. James D. Benson and William S. Greaves; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1988), 30.

20 Lemke, “Intertextuality and Text Semantics,” 86.

Since Lemke's conception of intertextuality differs from those more familiar to biblical scholars, I will explain some of the key concepts that shape his approach to intertextuality. First, a *thematic formation* is defined as "a recurrent pattern of semantic relations used in talking about a specific topic from text to text."²¹ To put this another way, "patterns of semantic relations among the same or closely related words and phrases are regularly repeated over and over again in many texts in a given community. These patterns are called thematic formations."²² A second related term is *intertextual thematic formation* (ITF).²³ An ITF "abstract[s] from a set of thematically related texts their common semantic patterns insofar as these [matter] to a particular community for a particular set of social purposes."²⁴ For example, as Lemke suggests, if a discourse includes discussion about pro-life arguments against abortion, then all texts or discourses that share this view or provide supporting evidence against abortion become potentially relevant to making sense of this discourse.²⁵ Those texts or discourses would belong to the same ITF. But if other texts contain arguments supporting abortion, then they would belong to a different ITF. It is worth noting that "ITFs are not socially neutral when they are deployed in a particular text. They correspond to distinct social points-of-view: not only beliefs, but value-orientations, toward which the text—implicitly or explicitly—takes a stance regarding their rightness and appropriateness."²⁶

Bakhtin defines heteroglossia as the diversity of social languages—that is, socially defined discourse types—in a community.²⁷ Building upon this

21 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 91.

22 Jay L. Lemke, "Text Structure and Text Semantics," in *Pragmatics, Discourse and Text* (ed. Erich H. Steiner; London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 165. Lemke provides an example to explain what he refers to as a "pattern of semantic relations": "If... we come across the lexical item 'electron,' and also 'atom,' 'orbital,' and 'valence,' then we can construct semantic relations among these items, according to a pattern we have encountered in many other texts." See Lemke, "Text Structure and Text Semantics," 165.

23 In this essay I will use [] to indicate a thematic formation or ITF.

24 Jay L. Lemke, "Intertextuality and the Project of Text Linguistics: A Response to de Beaugrande," *TEXT* 20.2 (2000): 223. In another place, Lemke describes *Intertextual thematic Formations* (ITFs) as follows: "Co-thematic texts, or portions of texts, construct the same semantic relations among the same or equivalent thematic objects. These abstracted, common systems of semantic relations may be represented using the resources of systemic-functional grammar as intertextual thematic formations in the same way those specific to a single text may be." See Lemke, "Discourses in Conflict," 30–31.

25 See Lemke, "Discourses in Conflict," 34.

26 Lemke, "Discourses in Conflict," 31.

27 Lemke, *Textual Politics*, 32.

concept, Lemke shows that these different discourse voices are not only different, but also systematically related to one another.²⁸ As he indicates, “all the diverse social voices (classes, genders, movements, epochs, viewpoints) of a community form an intertextual system within which each is necessarily heard.”²⁹ What Lemke tries to do with an intertextual analysis of a text is to find its different voices: those of different classes, professions, age groups, philosophical and religious views, political opinions, and so on.³⁰

Heteroglossic analysis discerns how the global semantic and rhetorical coherence of a text is achieved, and it provides the essential link between the grammatical semantics of the clause and clause-complex and textual cohesive resources on the one hand and the wider social functions of discourse achieved by rhetorical and genre devices on the other . . . It provides a framework in which we may analyze the actual social construction of ideological oppositions, alliances, and co-optations. It foregrounds the mechanisms of semantic neogenesis whereby new thematic formations, new ways of speaking, and new discursive objects are produced, rendered intelligible and perhaps palatable, policed and fought over, and in time rejected, neutralized, co-opted, or accepted.³¹

Establishing Intertextual Relations

There are two main kinds of heteroglossic relations: *OPPOSITION* and *ALLIANCE*. In *OPPOSITION*, texts posit a common discursive object shared between two intertextual thematic formations, but they construct opposite value-orientations, posing them as being in conflict (incompatible, contradictory, or mutually inconsistent); in *ALLIANCE*, the texts construct similar value-orientations toward their respective themes.³² There are three subtypes of *ALLIANCE*: (1) *complementarity*, where the intertextual thematic formations are construed as talking about “different aspects of the same thing”; (2) *affiliation* of the intertextual thematic formations, within which there are subtypes depending on whether the affiliated ITFs are used as if one included the other, as if one is merely semantically linked as an extension of the other, or as if there were an indirect relation enabling the same portion of a text to mean polysemically through both ITFs at once; and (3) a distinct *dialectical* relation

28 Lemke, *Textual Politics*, 32.

29 Lemke, “Semantic & Social Values,” 39.

30 Lemke, “Discourses in Conflict,” 30.

31 Lemke, “Discourses in Conflict,” 31.

32 Lemke, “Intertextuality and Text Semantics,” 99; Lemke, “Discourses in Conflict,” 48.

of ITFs, involving mutually metadiscursive relations.³³ In a word, the defining feature of ALLIANCE relations is as follows: in all of these three subtypes, there is a common value-orientation toward the related formations; they are presented as compatible, consistent, and mutually supportive.³⁴

The Usefulness of Lemke's Intertextual Thematic Model

It seems worthwhile to analyze the letter to Romans with the Intertextual Thematic Model, since Paul lived in a complex social world, replete with different communities with conflicting viewpoints. As a Jew of the first century, Paul lived during an age dominated by Greek culture and Roman power.³⁵ Paul's world was constituted by multiple worlds and thus different overlapping cultures.³⁶ Recent research has presented arguments for reading Romans against the background of Roman political rhetoric in a broad sense, while at the same time, other studies of Paul have recognized that Paul's words and message belong to Jewish culture to an even greater extent.³⁷ Moreover, Paul himself experienced movement from one community to another, from one Jewish group to a group within the Jesus movement, which was itself divided into subgroups. What Paul spoke and wrote should represent his social identity and his value-orientations toward different cultures, religions, and groups.³⁸

33 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 99.

34 Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 99.

35 Neil Elliott, *The Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire* (Paul in Critical Contexts; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), x.

36 Wright has described the world of Paul in terms of its multiple overlapping and competing narratives: "The story of God and Israel from the Jewish side; the pagan stories about their gods and the world, and the implicit narratives around which individual pagans constructed their identities, from the Greco-Roman sides; and particularly the great narratives of empire, both the large-scale ones we find in Virgil and Livy and elsewhere and the smaller, implicit ones of local culture. Likewise, this world could be described in terms of its symbols: within Judaism, Temple, Torah, Land and family identity; within paganism, the multiple symbols of nation, kingship, religion and culture; in Rome in particular, the symbols which spoke of the single great world empire." See N.T. Wright, *Paul: In Fresh Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 6–9.

37 Ekkehard W. Stegemann, "Coexistence and Transformation: Reading the Politics of Identity in Romans in an Imperial Context," in *Reading Paul in Context: Explorations in Identity Formation: Essays in Honour of William S. Campbell* (ed. Kathy Ehrensperger and J. Brian Tucker; LNTS 428; London: T&T Clark, 2010), 5–6.

38 According to Lemke, "distinct social groups (classes, genders, religious sects, etc.) often speak distinct discourses which they take, metadiscursively, to be allied with or opposed to the discourses of other groups. Social identity, the relations among social positions and roles, and social alliances and conflicts are maintained and in part constituted by the

In this sense, Lemke's intertextual thematic analysis is sound and holds promise for handling Paul's views toward different issues (e.g., law, righteousness, election, salvation etc.) by comparing him with other Jewish writers in a Hellenized world.

The intertextual thematic model is helpful in three specific ways. First, it provides methodological control to the analysis and interpretation of intertextual relations within biblical texts. Second, it establishes criteria for comparative studies. Third, it is useful in locating Paul's viewpoints toward important topics relative to wider Judaism, which will help in controversial discussions regarding Paul's relationships with Judaism.

In the following, I will undertake an intertextual analysis of Rom 9:30–10:13, which is divided into two sections: Rom 9:30–10:4 and 10:5–13. In each section, I will analyze the text semantics through establishing intertextual thematic relations, and then I will focus on heteroglossic voices by taking a comparative reading of the literature of Paul's Jewish contemporaries so as to represent their viewpoints/voices on the topics that Paul has presented in Rom 9:30–10:13.

An Intertextual Analysis of Romans 9:30–10:13

An Introduction to Romans 9–11

Before I investigate Rom 9:30–10:13, it is necessary to look at some introductory issues related to Romans 9–11. First, the role of Romans 9–11 has been the subject of heated theological disputes. These three chapters have been seen as an excursus or addendum to chs. 1–8.³⁹ This view was proposed because scholars assumed that the topic of chs. 1–8 was justification by faith—i.e., Jesus Christ inaugurated a new age to save all through faith—and chs. 9–11 seem to depart from this trajectory. However, most recent commentators reject this view, seeing chs. 9–11 as the climax of Paul's argument, or even of the letter as a whole.⁴⁰ This study joins with more recent studies, concurring that these

relations construed between usual ways of speaking about various subjects." See Lemke, "Intertextuality and Text Semantics," 97.

39 C.H. Dodd treats it as an appendix: "It has been suggested that the three chapters were originally a separate treatise which Paul had by him, and which he used for his present purpose." C.H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (The Moffatt New Testament Commentary; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 148; see also Andrew H. Wakefield, "Romans 9–11: The Sovereignty of God and the Status of Israel," *Review & Expositor* 100 (2003): 66; James D.G. Dunn, *Romans 9–16* (WBC 38b; Dallas: Word, 1988), 519.

40 Hays indicates that they are not some excursus or appendix peripheral to the letter's theme, but are the heart of the matter (Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters*

three chapters play a significant role in understanding the themes of the entire letter. Traditionally, the theme of this section has been viewed as a perplexing theodicy or elucidating a doctrine of predestination.⁴¹ In recent times, most scholars appropriately interpret this section in its own right. The most persuasive understanding of the theme is about relations between God, Israel, and the Gentiles.⁴²

A second introductory issue concerns structure. Most scholars agree that the overall structure of Romans 9–11 consists of an introduction in 9:1–5, a main body from 9:6–11:32 that is further divided into three sub-parts,⁴³ and a conclusion in 11:33–36. In other words, there is wide agreement among scholars

of Paul [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], 63). For Wright, “Romans 9–11 functions as the climax of the theological argument” (N.T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992], 234). J.C. O’Neill, K. Stendahl and a few others regard Romans 9–11 as the climax of Romans (see Shiu-Lun Shum, *Paul’s Use of Isaiah in Romans: A Comparative Study of Paul’s Letter to the Romans and the Sibylline and Qumran Sectarian Texts* [WUNT 2.156; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002], 203, see also Wakefield, “Romans 9–11,” 65).

41 This type of theological approach was very popular between the time of Augustine and the Reformation. Calvin read the doctrine of double predestination into the section. See Badenas, *Christ*, 229 n. 33. Munck challenges the predestinarian interpretation of Romans 9–11 and prefers the theme of election. See Johannes Munck, *Christ & Israel: An Interpretation of Romans 9–11* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), 75.

42 Badenas points out that “it makes . . . evident that God is faithful to his promises. For, on the one hand, the righteousness of God is creating the new people of God in which there is no distinction between Jews and Gentiles (10:8–12), as intended in the Scripture (9:24–26; 10:19–20); and on the other hand the fidelity of God to his election plan is being manifested in the remnant (9:27–29; 11:5–7).” Badenas, *Christ*, 85–86. See also Thomas R. Schreiner, *Romans* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 469–77; Dunn, *Romans 9–16*, 518–20; C.E.B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC; 2 vols. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975, 1979), 2:473.

43 Abasciano argues for a tripartite structure of the main body: (A) The Israel God made promises to is not ethnic Israel, but the Israel of God’s call, fulfilled now in the Church of Jews and Gentiles, the eschatological messianic community (9:6–29); (B) Israel has failed the promises while God has been faithful to bring them to fruition in the gospel, giving Israel every opportunity to participate in the fulfilled promises (9:30–10:21); (C) God has not rejected ethnic Israel per se from potential inclusion in the community of promise, but is at work to bring them to salvation as he works for the salvation of the true Israel of Jews and Gentiles (11:1–32). See Brian J. Abasciano, *Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in Romans 9:1–9: An Intertextual and Theological Exegesis* (LNTS 301; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 36–37.

that these three chapters can be demarcated into five parts.⁴⁴ Through drawing parallels with the structure of the lament Psalms, Hays offers an overall structure of Romans 9–11 as follows:⁴⁵

9:1–5: Lament over Israel.

9:6–29: Has God's word failed? Defend God's elective purpose.

9:30–10:21: Paradox: Israel failed to grasp the word of faith attested by God in Scripture.

11:1–32: Has God abandoned his people? No, all Israel will be saved.

11:33–36: Doxological conclusion.

The central sub-section (9:30–10:21), which discusses Israel's failure (the exclusion of Israel in the people of God),⁴⁶ is the most controversial part within the main argument. This sub-section invokes the primary thematic items of the letter—righteousness, law, and faith⁴⁷—which appear in Rom 9:30–10:13.⁴⁸ The key vocabulary and topics of the section recall Paul's earlier argument in Romans 1–8. As Moo has appropriately stated, “the words ‘righteousness’ and ‘faith’/‘believe’ are central to the argument of 9:30–10:21.”⁴⁹ There is need for a method that offers some explanation of this material. Here, an intertextual analysis of this sub-section would contribute greatly to a clarification of Paul's views on righteousness, law, and faith. Romans 9:30–10:4 focuses especially on righteousness in connection to God, the law and Christ, and it is this section that I will focus on in my subsequent analysis.

44 Cf. Brendan Byrne, *Romans* (Sacra Pagina 6; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1996), 281–361; Cranfield, *Romans*, 2:445–592; Wright, *Climax*, 237–51.

45 Hays, *Echoes*, 64.

46 Moo rightly indicates that in both 9:30–32 and 10:20–21 Paul contrasts the surprising inclusion of Gentiles in the people of God with the exclusion of Israel. See Douglas J. Moo, *Romans* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 617.

47 Dunn, *Romans* 9–16, 576–77.

48 For the sake of brevity, this article will not deal with the whole sub-section but will focus on Rom 9:30–10:13.

49 Moo, *Romans*, 616–7. See also Heikki Räisänen, “Paul, God, and Israel: Romans 9–11 in Recent Research,” in *The Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism* (ed. Jacob Neusner et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 184–85.

Intertextual Analysis of Romans 9:30–10:4

Israel's Failure to Attain Righteousness

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν	1A
ὅτι ἔθνη τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην	1Ba
κατέλαβεν δικαιοσύνην	1Bb
δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ πίστεως	1Bc
Ἰσραὴλ δὲ διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης	2A
εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασεν.	2B
διὰ τί	3A
ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως	3Ba
ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ ἔργων	3Bb
προσέκοψαν τῷ λίθῳ τοῦ προσκόμματος,	3C
καθὼς γέγραπται·	4A
ἰδοὺ τίθημι ἐν Σιών	4Ba
λίθον προσκόμματος	4Bb ^①
καὶ πέτραν σκανδάλου,	4Bb ^②
καὶ ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ καταίσχυθήσεται.	4C
Ἀδελφοί,	5A
ἡ μὲν εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας	5Ba
καὶ ἡ δέησις πρὸς τὸν θεόν	5Bb
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν.	5C
μαρτυρῶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὅτι	6A
ζήλον θεοῦ ἔχουσιν	6B
ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν·	6C
ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην	7Aa
καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν [δικαιοσύνην] ζητοῦντες στήσαι,	7Ab
τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν.	7B
τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην	8A
παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι.	8B

Above is a display of Rom 9:30–10:4. Notice that the τ-interrogative question τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν (What shall we say?) focuses our attention on a transition to a new topic—the relationship of law and faith in terms of righteousness.⁵⁰ The conjunction ὅτι brings in the projected clauses, which orient our attention to two groups of people (the Gentiles and Israel) in regard to faith and

50 It is Paul's patterned use of οὖν together with rhetorical questions that produces paragraph boundaries. See Cynthia Long Westfall, *A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews* (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 47.

law.⁵¹ The contrasting pair of lexical items, ἔθνη vs. Ἰσραήλ (1Ba, 2A), is realized by the same process pattern (material: action [Actor-Process-Goal]). The Gentiles are described as those who did not pursue righteousness (i.e., that of law) by the device of hypotactic elaboration, since τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην (“who did not pursue righteousness”) (1Ba) elaborates on ἔθνη.⁵² Similarly, the clause διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης (“who pursue the righteousness from the law”) (2A) elaborates on Ἰσραήλ. Therefore, the text states that, instead of Israel, the Gentiles are those who attained (καταλαμβάνομαι) righteousness; Israel did not attain (φθάνω) the (righteousness) of law (v. 31, 2B). In other words, two contrasting formations of righteousness are represented in vv. 30–31 (1A~2B).

Similar to the pattern of 1A~2B, 3A~3Bb comprise a τ-interrogative (3A) question (διὰ τί; 3A, v. 32a) with an answer (3Ba~b, v. 32b), and the conjunction ὅτι brings in two contrasting projected clauses οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως (3Ba) and ὡς ἐξ ἔργων (3Bb). The conjunctive particle ἀλλά retains an adversative sense. In other words, the semantics of the prepositional phrases ἐκ πίστεως and ἐξ ἔργων lie in OPPOSITION with each other in Rom 9:30–32b. Paul begins to explain why the people of Israel cannot obtain true righteousness. Regarding the relationships of 1A~1B and 3A~3B, they are structurally parallel to each

51 There are numerous discussions about Paul's view of the law. In Romans, Paul's statements concerning the law are diverse, and some even seem contradictory. For instance, Paul sometimes speaks positively about the law: Christians uphold the law through faith (Rom 3:31); the law is holy and the commandment is holy and just and good (Rom 7:12); the law is spiritual (Rom 7:14); the law is good (Rom 7:16); I serve the law of God with my mind (7:25); the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk according to the Spirit (Rom 8:4); the one who loves another has fulfilled the law (Rom 13:8), etc. At other times, Paul makes negative statements about the law: no human being will be justified in God's sight by deeds prescribed by the law, for through the law comes the knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20); the promise to Abraham was not through the law (Rom 4:13); the law brings wrath (Rom 4:15); the law came in, with the result that the trespass multiplied (Rom 5:20); our sinful passions aroused by the law (Rom 7:5), etc. For detailed discussions, see E.P. Sanders, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983); James D.G. Dunn, *Paul and the Mosaic Law* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); Heikki Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (2nd ed.; WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr, 1987); A. Andrew Das, *Paul, the Law, and the Covenant* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001). This paper understands the law that Paul is talking about in Romans 9–11 to be the Mosaic Torah.

52 See M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (3rd ed.; revised and updated by Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; London: Arnold, 2004), 399–400. Hypotactic elaboration is a strategy for introducing into a discourse background information, a characterization, an interpretation of some aspect of the dominant clause, or some form of evaluation.

other, and they are semantically related to each other. So far, the text indicates that obedience to the law and belief in faith are both ways to attain righteousness—let us call these two ways of righteousness the two thematic formations [Law-Righteousness] and [Faith-Righteousness]—but the textual voice suggests that the right way to attain righteousness is from faith. Therefore, Rom 9:30–32b sets these two thematic formations against each other: [Faith-Righteousness] vs. [Law-Righteousness]. The text holds a negative value toward [Law-Righteousness] in some sense.⁵³ In the following part (3C~4C; vv. 32c–33), the text brings forward a new thematic topic—let us call it [Stumbling Stone]—to strengthen the contention for [Faith-Righteousness] in the text.

The meaning in this portion (3C~4C; vv. 32c–33) is different from the previous righteousness discourse. The lexical items *δικαιοσύνην*, *νόμος*, and *ἔργον* are totally absent in vv. 32c–33, and the rhetorical structure changes from a question-answer pattern to a correspondence between quotation and antecedent.⁵⁴ The antecedent describes Israel's stumbling over the stone (3C, v. 32c), which is supported by a combined scriptural text (Isa 8:14, 28:16; 4Ba~4C).⁵⁵ In other words, the scriptural voice provides support for the statement in v. 32c (3C) that Israel stumbled over the stumbling stone. The “stone” has been understood messianically with respect to Jesus (Matt 21:42,

53 In what sense does Paul view law-righteousness negatively? Does Paul consider law as a bad thing *per se*? If not, then under what conditions does Paul oppose law-righteousness? I will come back to this point later in my analysis. Here we should note that in the Jewish orthodoxy of the Pharisaic community, obedience to the law is the right way of fulfilling what God demands. The phrase *νόμον δικαιοσύνης* appears to depict the essence of Jewish piety (Wis 2:10–11): “Let us overpower the poor righteous man, let us not spare a widow, nor reverence the old grey hairs of the aged. Let our strength be a law of righteousness, for that which is weak proves useless.” According to Jewett, “The expression ‘law of righteousness’ appears to be employed in this passage to depict what a propagandist would understand to be the essence of Jewish piety, which the rulers planned to replace by brute strength.” Robert Jewett, *Romans: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 610. Moreover, in Wis 1:16 and 4:20, the expression is used to state that ungodly men's lawless deeds will convict them to their face.

54 This correspondence entails a degree of repetition, which occurs at both the lexical and semantic levels.

55 In Isa 28:16, Isaiah calls for faith in Yahweh at the time of the Assyrian crisis, but he has warned that Israel will find Yahweh to be “a stone which causes stumbling, a rock which brings about a fall” (Isa 8:14), see Dunn, *Romans 9–16*, 593. However, Paul may be drawing upon an early Christian apologetic tradition, given that the same two texts from Isaiah also appear together in 1 Pet 2:6–8 (see Byrne, *Romans*, 314; Dunn, *Romans 9–16*, 583–84; Moo, *Romans*, 629).

Mark 12:10–11 and Luke 20:17–18; Acts 4:11; *Barn* 6:2–4).⁵⁶ In 4C, a significant thematic node is the phrase ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (“one who believes in him”), which also belongs to the preceding formation of [Faith-Righteousness]. The pronoun αὐτῷ refers to the stone, which has been understood as Jesus Christ.⁵⁷ In other words, this “stone” text would be recognizable as a formation of [Stumbling Stone] to the first Christian groups. The text ALLIES the formation of [Faith-Righteousness] with [Stumbling Stone] so as to support the negative evaluation of Israel’s law-righteousness. In sum, Rom 9:30–33 sets [Faith-Righteousness] against [Law-Righteousness], and the reason for this OPPOSITION is conveyed in the thematic formation [Stumbling Stone].

The nominative of address ἀδελφοί shifts us from an argumentative tone to an intimate personal call. The personal tone is enhanced by the semantic domains of emotions and psychological faculties (εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας) in 5Ba (v. 1) and the lexical items δέησις and θεόν in 5Bb (v. 1), which indicate a personal religious intercessory expression. This sort of intercessory discourse pattern (Relational: identifying) occurs in Rom 9:1–3 when Paul portrays himself as a Mosaic figure interceding for Israel,⁵⁸ and in some other prophetic Jewish texts as well.⁵⁹ Through this intercessory discourse formation, Paul identifies with non-Christian Jewish people through a sense of brotherhood.

After relating a personal prayer for Israel, which demonstrates Paul’s concern for his kinsfolk, the negative evaluation of Israel follows (6A~7B, vv. 2–3). Verse 3 (7Aa~7B) clarifies further the statement in v. 2 (6A~6C) that Israel’s zeal for God is not according to knowledge. The projecting clause μαρτυρῶ . . . αὐτοῖς (6A) places us in the realm of meta-discourse. With the projected clause ζῆλον θεοῦ ἔχουσιν (6B; Relational: attribution), we may orient ourselves to the discourse of Israel’s religious zeal, a feature that has been attributed to Israel in

56 See Byrne, *Romans*, 314; Dunn, *Romans* 9–16, 583–84. It is worth noting that some Jews before Paul’s day were already apparently identifying the stone with the Messiah (1QH 6:26–27; 1QS 8:7, etc.) See Moo, *Romans*, 629.

57 1 Cor 1:23 (“we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews”) makes clear that the “stone” refers to Christ. See also 1 Cor 10:4.

58 Moses prayed to God because of Israel’s betrayal of God in favor of idol worship, in order to save the Israelites from God’s wrath; otherwise, God would have consumed all the people (Exod 32:9–14; Deut 9:18–20).

59 One example is Samuel’s prayer to save the people of Israel from the hand of the Philistines after they turned away from the Baals and the Astartes (1 Sam 7:5–11). The other case is Jeremiah’s prayer to God for the remnant of Israel, so that God could save them from the king of Babylon, when the remnant promises to obey the voice of God (Jer 42:2–4, 19–22). See also Ps 99:6; Ezek 11:13, etc.

the text. So far, the text seems to confirm Jewish religious piety.⁶⁰ However, the textual meaning makes a very important move with an adversative conjunction ἀλλά in 6C (6B and 6C in a relation of adversative). The text comments that Israel's zeal for God is οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν ("not according to knowledge"). In other words, Israel is criticized for their inappropriate zeal for God. With an inferential conjunctive γάρ in 7Aa, the text lists the reasons for this negative evaluation. One key reason lies in the main sentence in 7B (v. 3), that is, Israelites have not submitted to the righteousness of God (τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν). The two participle clauses, ἀγνοοῦντες . . . τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην (c7Aa) and τὴν ἰδίαν [δικαιοσύνην] ζητοῦντες στήσαι (c7Ab), expand to elaborate why Israel did not subject themselves to God's righteousness.⁶¹ Here again, righteousness language appears, as in Rom 9:30–32ab. The lexical item δικαιοσύνην now links with—instead of faith and law—θεοῦ and ἰδίαν, which constructs a pair of OPPOSING contrasts: τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην vs. τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην. So, the text directly contrasts God's righteousness with Israel's own righteousness. An intertextual comparison to another Pauline text (Phil 3:6–9) evinces Paul's contrast of "God's righteousness" to a righteousness of "one's own."⁶² Let us set these as two OPPOSITIONAL thematic formations: [God's Righteousness] vs. [One's Own Righteousness].

In sum, the righteousness-language pairs in 10:1–3 (c5~c7) parallel with the previous contrast of faith-righteousness and law-righteousness in 9:30–32b (c1~c3). That is, God's righteousness has a similar meaning as faith-righteousness, and Israel's own righteousness as law-righteousness.⁶³ Through the contrast of these pairs of righteousness language, Paul points out Israel's failure in attaining faith-righteousness, God's righteousness.

A relational-identifying statement is introduced in 8A (10:4a). With the prepositional phrase εἰς δικαιοσύνην and the dative phrase παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι ("for everyone who believes"), righteousness, faith/belief, law, and Christ have been brought together. In 8A, two lexical items—νόμος and Χριστός⁶⁴—are in a relationship in which each interprets the other: Χριστός is identified as the

60 The phrase 'zeal for God' in classical Jewish tradition refers to zeal for the law, the ordinances, and the good deeds that please God. See Num 25:1–13; Sir 45:23–24, 48: 2; 4 Macc 18:12; 1 Kgs 19:10; 1 Macc 2:26, 27, 50, 54, 58; 2 Macc 4:2; 1QS 4.4; 9.23; 1QH 14.14; *T. Ash.* 4.5.

61 Schreiner, *Romans*, 543.

62 Moo, *Romans*, 635. Phil 3:9 reads μὴ ἔχων ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει.

63 Campbell has a similar opinion. See Douglas A. Campbell, *The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 784.

64 Χριστός has appeared in Rom 9:4. This is the second time the term appears in Rom 9–11. However, in this section (Rom 9:30–10:21) it is the first time it appears.

τέλος of law. It must have been innovative to connect νόμος with Χριστός in first-century Jewish communities. Therefore, it can be labeled as a text-specific thematic formation [Christ and Law].⁶⁵ The clause not only carries the concept of a relationship between Christ and the law, but also explains why pursuing righteousness through the law did not work: it is because Christ is the τέλος of the law. The interpretation of τέλος in v. 4 has been very controversial.⁶⁶ The two dominant views are to translate it either as “goal” or “end.”⁶⁷ However, there is not much difference between the two. In this co-text, based on vv. 5–8, the term τέλος can be understood as “goal” or “end” (cf. Rom 6:21–22; 2 Cor 3:13; 1 Tim 1:5).⁶⁸ For the sake of brevity, I will refer to it as “goal.” However, what does “Christ is the goal of the law” mean? For Paul, the goal of the commandments was to promise life (Rom 7:10b); however, it resulted in death (Rom 7:10c). We should keep in mind that Romans 7 already indicates tension in Paul’s view of law: “The very commandment that promised life proved to be death to me” (7:10).⁶⁹ Romans 7:7–25 has affirmed that the law is “holy,” “just,” and “good” (7:12), but the power of sin made it impossible for human beings to fulfill the

65 A text-specific thematic formation is different from intertextual thematic formation: the former is specific to a text, and the latter is shared with some set of other texts. See Lemke, “Thematic Analysis,” 160.

66 For the history of interpretation, see Badenas, *Christ*, 7–37; Thomas R. Schreiner, “Paul’s View of the Law in Romans 10:4–5,” *WTJ* 55 (1993): 113–35; Schreiner, *Romans*, 544–48; Dunn, *Romans* 9–16, 589–91, etc.

67 Most current scholars interpret τέλος as “end.” Alternatively, it could mean that Christ has replaced Torah as the mark of community membership. See Terence L. Donaldson, *Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle’s Convictional World* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 215. Kim argues that “it is no longer Torah but Christ” and refers to the fact that Christ has superseded the Torah as the revelation of God. See Seyoon Kim, *The Origin of Paul’s Gospel* (WUNT 4; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1984), 274. Bell states that “the law comes to an end not because of its failure but rather because the law has a time-limited function to condemn until the revelation of Christ (Gal 3.15–4.7).” See Richard H. Bell, *The Irrevocable Call of God: An Inquiry into Paul’s Theology of Israel* (WUNT 184; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 42. Bell goes on to state that the condemning function of the law still applies to those who do not believe in Christ, but it does not apply for the people who have faith in Christ. Finally, Dunn argues that Christ is the end of “the law as a means to righteousness.” See Dunn, “Righteousness,” 222. See also Schreiner, “Paul’s View of the Law in Romans 10:4–5,” 121–23.

68 Schreiner, “Paul’s View of the Law in Romans 10:4–5,” 117. See also Badenas, *Christ*.

69 Watson suggests that there is a direct allusion to Lev 18:5 here: “In speaking of the law as being ‘unto life’ (Rom. 7:10), he alludes in the first instance to Lev. 18:5.” See, Francis Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2004), 506.

law and so attain the promised life.⁷⁰ When the law ALLIES with the power of sin, its purpose for the promise of life cannot become a reality. Eventually, this promise has been accomplished by Jesus Christ (8:3).⁷¹ In other words, the goal of the law to promise life did not work out until Jesus Christ came. Therefore, it is Jesus Christ who will bring life to all the believers (Rom 6:5–11: “We will certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his . . . so you must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus”), and Christ is the goal to which the law pointed.⁷²

In conclusion, Rom 9:30–10:4 sets an OPPOSITION of law-righteousness with faith-righteousness, and argues that Israel was failing in regard to faith/God’s righteousness, because they pursued righteousness according to their own works and they did not see that Christ was the goal of the law.

Summary of Intertextual Thematic Relations in Rom 9:30–10:4

From the above analysis, it can be seen that Rom 9:30–10:4 repeatedly sets [Faith-Righteousness] against [Law-Righteousness], and other thematic formations support this OPPOSITION. The relationship of the law and Christ represented in v. 4 (8A–8B) provides the basis for the other two parts regarding the issue of righteousness (1A~3Bb [9:30–32b] and 6A~7B [10:2–3]). In Rom 9:30–33, the text contrasts [Faith-Righteousness] with [Law-Righteousness] and points out that Israel fails to attain [Faith-Righteousness]. It employs the stumbling-stone text as a reason in support of this argument, and Christ is implicitly referred to here.

Paul’s prayer for the salvation of Israel (10:1) provides the circumstance for his negative evaluation of the Israelites, which displays his concern for his

70 According to Schreiner, “Sin subverts the Torah to advance its purposes and actually stimulates and provokes the desire to sin through the Torah! This is not to deny that the law promises life to those who keep it, nor does it lead to the conclusion that the law is evil. The law and the commandments are good and a revelation of God’s will” (Schreiner, *Romans*, 359; see also Moo, *Romans*, 439).

71 As Schreiner has observed, “Christ’s work on the cross provides the basis for the deliverance of believers from condemnation, while the Holy Spirit supplies the power for conquering sin so that the law can now be kept (8:1–4).” See Schreiner, *Romans*, 395.

72 Schreiner, *Romans*, 545. According to Badenas, Paul’s hermeneutics of the Scripture or Torah is different from that of his contemporaries since it is based upon a new fact that traditional Judaism and the OT itself did not recognize: the Christ event. Now Paul reads the Torah in the light of Christ. Badenas, *Christ*, 149.




FIGURE 9.1 *Intertextual relations among thematic formations.*

Jewish kinsfolk.⁷³ Romans 10:2–4, again, sets the thematic formation [God's Righteousness] against [One's Own Righteousness]. There exist correspondences to the righteousness formations in Rom 9:30–33 and 10:2–4. That is, God's righteousness has a similar meaning to faith-righteousness, and Israel's own righteousness to law-righteousness. Also, [Stumbling Stone] and the text-specific formation of [Christ and Law] in 10:4 are in a relation of ALLIANCE, since parts of them correspond with each other: ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται ("He who believes in him will not be put to shame") vs. εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι ("That everyone who believes *shall attain* righteousness"). Also, these two formations are used to explain the reasons for the choice of faith/God's righteousness over law/Israel's righteousness. Thus, the reasons focus on Christ, because Christ is the τέλος of the law. This focus will be elaborated in the following verses (vv. 5–13).

Based on the above analysis, the chart in Figure 9.1 demonstrates the intertextual relations among these thematic formations.⁷⁴

Heteroglossic Voice

There are many voices in any text, as Lemke says, and this is true for Romans. Now that we have heard Paul's voice, let us hear the voice of his Jewish interlocutors to see how they understood God's righteousness and its relationship with obedience to the law. In the following, some representative Jewish writings related to the theme of God's righteousness will be examined.

73 Specifically, the Israelites are said to be ignorant of God's righteousness (10:2–3), and thus their zeal for God is pursued without knowledge.

74 "R" stands for "Righteousness"; "Opp" stands for "Opposition."

We have seen the two contrasting types of righteousness that Paul constructs. This contrast shows that Paul's text sees an incompatibility between faith-righteousness and law-righteousness (i.e., OPPOSITION). However, a Qumran pesherist would rather align "law observance" with "faithfulness" (i.e., ALLIANCE). In 1Qp Hab viii.1–3,⁷⁵ "the righteous" is identified with "all those who observe the law among the Jews," whereas "by faith" refers to "their faith in the Teacher of Righteousness."⁷⁶ Therefore, their righteousness (that is, law observance) is parallel with faithfulness.⁷⁷ However, Paul disconnects the bonds of "righteousness" and "law observance" and ALLIES "righteousness" with "faith" in Rom 9:30–32ab. It is obvious that Paul holds negative opinions about law-righteousness and distinguishes it from God's righteousness. However, connectedness among righteousness, law, and God is quite common in some Jewish literature. For instance, Ezek 18:5–9, 21–22 finds that one who follows the decrees and faithfully keeps the laws is righteous. It states,

If a man is *righteous* and does what is *lawful and right* . . . walks in my statutes, and is careful to observe my ordinances, he is righteous, he shall surely live, says the Lord GOD. . . . But if a wicked man turns away from all his sins which he has committed and keeps all my statutes and does *righteousness and mercy*, he shall surely live; he shall not die. None of the transgressions which he has committed shall be remembered against him; for the *righteousness* which he has done he shall live.

Apparently, the author of Ezekiel ALLIES righteousness, which is from God, with lawfully obedient behaviors, and a righteous person is one who keeps God's ordinances and statutes and does righteousness, which will lead him/

75 The book of Habakkuk was composed in the sixth century BC, when Israel was threatened by two forces, the Babylonians (under Nebuchadnezzar) and internal religious strife between the pious worshipers of the Lord and the ungodly. The Qumran commentary on Habakkuk was written around the first century BC, when Israel was again threatened by a foreign power, probably the Romans, and Israel was suffering from "internal strife between the wicked and the pious, exemplified by the conflict between the Teacher of Righteousness and his opponents, the Man of the Lie and the Wicked Priest." See Michael O. Wise et al., *Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation* (2nd ed.; London: HarperCollins, 2005), 80.

76 Wise et al., *Dead Sea Scrolls*, 85; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 159.

77 Contra Watson, who sees a distinction between righteousness and faith here. See Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 159. Cf. Wise et al., *Dead Sea Scrolls*, 84–85.

her into life.⁷⁸ As a matter of fact, it is not uncommon in Jewish tradition to ALLY righteousness with commandments or law.⁷⁹ In the Pharisaic community, obedience to the law was the right way of fulfilling what God demanded; the righteousness of law (νόμον δικαιοσύνης) appears to depict the essence of Jewish piety. Paul disconnects the bond between law-righteousness and God's righteousness, and replaces the latter with faith righteousness.

In sum, Paul's discourse pattern of righteousness is to set law-righteousness and faith-righteousness in an incompatible contrast. He disconnects the relations of law with faith, and law-righteousness with God-righteousness, holding a different view of righteousness than contemporary non-Christian Jewish communities.

An Intertextual Analysis of Romans 10:5–13

Salvation and Its Scope: Rom 10:5–13

Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει	9A
τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ [τοῦ] νόμου	9B
ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.	9C
ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει·	10A
μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου·	10B
τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν;	10 Ca
τοῦτ' ἔστιν Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν·	10Cb
ἢ τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον;	10Da
τοῦτ' ἔστιν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν.	10Db
ἀλλὰ τί λέγει;	11A
ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν	11Ba
ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου,	11Bb
τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν.	11C

78 Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 159.

79 It is common that "righteousness" is paralleled with "law." For instance, Prov 3:16 (LXX): ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτῆς ἐκπορεύεται δικαιοσύνη νόμον δὲ καὶ ἔλεον ἐπὶ γλώσσης φορεῖ (out of her mouth proceeds righteousness and she carries law and mercy upon her tongue; Pss. Sol 14:1–2: πιστὸς κύριος τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν παιδείαν αὐτοῦ, τοῖς πορευομένοις ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ προσταγμάτων αὐτοῦ ἐν νόμῳ ᾧ ἐνετείλατο ἡμῖν εἰς ζωὴν ἡμῶν (The Lord is faithful to those who love him in truth, to those who endure his discipline; to those who live in the righteousness of his commandments, in the law, which he has commanded to us for our life [LXE]); Sus 1:3: καὶ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτῆς δίκαιοι καὶ ἐδίδαξαν τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν νόμον Μωϋσῆ (Her parents were righteous, and had taught their daughter according to the law of Moses [RSV])). Wis 2:10–11 reads, "Let us overpower the poor righteous man, let us not spare a widow, nor reverence the old grey hairs of the aged. Let our strength be a law of righteousness, for that which is weak proves useless."

ὅτι ἐὰν ὁμολογήσῃς ἐν τῷ στόματί σου κύριον Ἰησοῦν	12A
καὶ πιστεύσῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου	12Ba
ὅτι ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν,	12Bb
σωθήσῃ·	12C
καρδίᾳ γὰρ πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην,	13A
στόματι δὲ ὁμολογεῖται εἰς σωτηρίαν.	13B
λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή·	14A
πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ	14Ba
οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται.	14Bb
οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν διαστολὴ Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ Ἑλλήνος,	15A
ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος πάντων,	15Ba
πλουτῶν εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους αὐτόν·	15Bb
πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου	16A
σωθήσεται.	16B

Romans 10:5–13 involves a number of important issues. Of special note is the use of the two texts Lev 18:5 (v. 5) and Deut 30:11–14 (vv. 6–8). One key problem involving these quotations is that the text seems to set these two quoted texts (both from the Pentateuch) antithetically against one another. In the following, I will show how the two quotations are complementary through intertextual analysis, and will illustrate how the Deuteronomic text is married with Christological interpretation.

Μωϋσῆς ... γράφει (9A) is again a projecting clause, which directs us to a quotation (Lev 18:5) presenting one traditional view of righteousness (9B). According to Dunn, "Lev. 18:5 is the first statement in the Jewish scriptures of what was evidently a typical expression of Israel's sense of obligation under the covenant—'do and thus live.'"⁸⁰ The ὅτι clause (9C) marks the content of the cited utterance: The person who does these things will live by them.⁸¹ Leviticus 18:1–5 emphasizes that the Lord is Israel's God, and Israel's obedience

80 See Dunn, "Righteousness," 223. Leviticus 18:5 is often quoted in the Hebrew Scriptures: Ezek 20:11, 13, 21; and Neh 9:29. In Ezekiel, Israel rebels against God, but God responds with Grace, giving them the law to observe so that everyone shall live. Badenas indicates that the law is God's great gift of life to Israel, observing that in Neh 9:29, "Lev. 18:5 is quoted as a reference to the covenant relationship of Yahweh with his people, and the promise of life which he gives to his children" (Badenas, *Christ*, 120). For more quotations of Lev 18:5 in Jewish writings, see Preston M. Sprinkle, *Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 in Early Judaism and in Paul* (WUNT 2.241; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 25–130.

81 For comments on the text-critical issues in Rom 10:5, see Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 166–7 n. 2.

to God's commandments shall lead to life.⁸² Therefore, the purpose of obedience is to gain life.⁸³

Careful investigation of Rom 10:6–8 shows that the text has deleted all the expressions of Deut 30:12–14 that refer directly to the observance of the law, replacing them with the phrases related to “believing/trusting in what God has done in Christ.”⁸⁴ Wagner has appropriately observed that, by doing so, Paul demonstrates exegetically that the “doing” that leads to “life” is none other than “believing/trusting what God has done in Christ.”⁸⁵ Let us examine Rom 10:6–8 in detail.

Ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει is an introductory projecting clause, and clauses 10B to 10Db are projected. The projection does not directly quote from Deut 30:12–14, but interweaves the scriptural voice and Paul's interpretation.

It is worth noting that Rom 10:6 replaces the clause ὅτι ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτῇ ἣν ἐγὼ ἐντέλλομαι σοι (Deut 30:11) with μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου (Deut 8:17 & 9:4). The theme around the literary context of these two passages is that “the people of Israel are warned against viewing Yahweh's mighty acts of deliverance as an affirmation of their own righteous conduct.”⁸⁶ The projection brings in the scriptures, relating to God's salvific actions from start to finish, that make the voice of Paul's viewpoint of faith-righteousness stand out. Moreover, the text eliminates everything about observing the commandments of God and replaces it with expressions referring to Christ's exaltation and resurrection.⁸⁷

82 From the typical viewpoint of Israel, God's righteous saving action requires Israel's religious piety toward God by their conformity to law, and through this means of obedience, Israel can be rescued from suppression by foreign powers (e.g., Egypt, Canaan).

83 I have discussed the meaning of the term τέλος in 10:4 above: Christ is the goal of the law—the promise of life. In other words, the goal/purpose of the law is fulfilled by Christ.

84 J. Ross Wagner, *Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul "In Concert" in the Letter to the Romans* (NovTSup 101; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 162; Badenas, *Christ*, 125.

85 Wagner, *Heralds*, 164.

86 Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature* (SNTSMS 74; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 130.

87 Stanley has written, “Paul has eliminated everything that pertains to the original subject of the passage, the Mosaic law. On one level, the reason for the omissions is obvious: the idea voiced in the original passage—that the law can and should be fulfilled—is clearly at odds with Paul's own efforts to wean his Gentile converts from the notion that they need to accept the yoke of Torah in order to assure their participation in the covenant of Yahweh. On another level, the changes give voice to a far-reaching hermeneutical judgment: the same ‘word’ (τὸ ῥῆμα, Rom 10:8 = Deut 30:14) that Moses described as being ‘near’ in the law has now come to full expression and become available to all in Christ. The numerous omissions that mark Paul's handling of Deut 30:11–14 are thus firmly grounded in his own Christian theology.” Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture*, 130.

TABLE 9.1 *Comparison of Rom 10:6–8 and Deut 30:12–14*

Romans 10:6–8	Deuteronomy 30:12–14 (LXX)	Notes
ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει (10A)		Paul refers to faith- righteousness
μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου (10B)	μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου	Deut 8:17; 9:4
τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; (10Ca)	οὐκ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἄνω ἐστὶν λέγων τίς ἀναβήσεται ἡμῖν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν καὶ	Deut 30:12
τοῦτ' ἔστιν Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν (10Cb)	λήμψεται αὐτὴν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀκούσαντες αὐτὴν ποιήσομεν	Paul's interpretive note
ἢ τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον; (10Da)	οὐδὲ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης ἐστὶν λέγων τίς διαπεράσει ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ	Deut 30:13
τοῦτ' ἔστιν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν (10Db)	πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ λήμψεται ἡμῖν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκουστὴν ἡμῖν ποιήσῃ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιήσομεν	A further Pauline note
ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; (11A)		Projecting verb phrase
ἐγγὺς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου (11Ba, 11Bb)	ἔστιν σου ἐγγὺς τὸ ῥῆμα σφόδρα ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν σου αὐτὸ	Deut 30:14
τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν (11C)	ποιεῖν	Another Pauline note

It deftly replaces Deuteronomy's reference to "doing the commandment" and substitutes its αὐτὴν (referring to the commandment) with Christ;⁸⁸ the two questions in vv. 6–7 (10Ca, 10Da) are said to involve "bringing Christ down from heaven or up from among the dead" (cf. 10Cb, 10Db);⁸⁹ and the word (referring to the law, the commandment) in Deuteronomy has been identified

88 Some scholars have similar ideas. See J. Ross Wagner, "The Heralds of Isaiah and the Mission of Paul: An Investigation of Paul's Use of Isaiah 51–55 in Romans," in *Jesus and the Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins* (ed. W.H. Bellinger and William Reuben Farmer; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998), 164; Badenas, *Christ*, 130; E. Elizabeth Johnson, *The Function of Apocalyptic and Wisdom Traditions in Romans 9–11* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1989), 158.

89 Wagner, *Heralds*, 164.

with the word of faith that Paul's community proclaims (v. 8; 11C). Interestingly, the phrase τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως does not appear in Deuteronomy. Instead, the phrases τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ νόμου τούτου and τοὺς λόγους τοῦ νόμου τούτου appear repeatedly (Deut 27:3, 26; 28:58; 29:28; 31:24, etc.). This confirms that Paul's text (Rom 10:6–8) identifies the word(s) of the law with the word of faith, and “doing the law” with “a relationship with Christ.” By doing so, the text demonstrates that Christ is the goal to which the law has pointed, “a matter of what God has done in the resurrection and exaltation of Christ.”⁹⁰ Therefore, the text reformulates Deut 30:11–14 in Christological perspective, which shows that the law points towards the life, the manifestation of God's righteousness in Christ.⁹¹ Therefore, it is evident that Rom 10:5–8 does not place Lev 18:5 against Deut 30:12–14, but it makes the connection that the “doing” that leads to “life” is finally fulfilled in Jesus Christ.⁹² Grammatically, it makes sense as well. The conjunctive word δέ (Rom 10:6, 10A), can function as adversative and connective.⁹³ In Paul's text, it is more fitting to be understood as connective. Paul connects Deut 30:11–14 with Christological understanding, which shows that the law points towards life—i.e., God's righteousness in Christ.⁹⁴ Therefore, the Christ-event fulfills the goal of the law—to promise a new life, which Paul has illustrated in vv. 6–8 by his way of formulating Deut 30:11–14.

Now let us turn to the early Christian proclamation in vv. 9–10. The discourse pattern of vv. 9–10 is different from vv. 5–8, and its subject matter changes from the previous contrast of law/faith-righteousness to an early Christian proclamation. Verse 9 consists of two conditional protases (“if you confess...” and “if you believe...”) and one apodosis (“you will be saved”). Verse 10, with two paratactic clauses, then confirms the proclamation. If we read v. 9 and v. 10 as

90 Wagner, *Heralds*, 164.

91 Badenas, *Christ*, 131.

92 Paul's use of Lev 18:5 (v. 5) and Deut 30:11–14 (vv. 6–8) has been the subject of considerable debate. In this passage one sees Paul's understanding of the relationships between Christ and the Mosaic law and also his basic approach to the scriptural texts. Paul seems to set these two quoted texts (both from the Pentateuch) antithetically against each other, and the way he uses Deut 30:11–14 seems to disregard the deuteronomic context. In order to solve this problem, some scholars deny any contrast between the two quoted texts. Other scholars argue for a positive salvation-historical contrast. Still others scholars perceive the contrast in terms of the tension between literacy (the written Torah) and orality (the oral gospel). This article, however, explains that Paul treats the two quotations as complementary.

93 Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; BLG 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 208.

94 Badenas, *Christ*, 131.

interweaving, then it can be seen that the confession “God raised Jesus from the dead” will bring us into righteousness (Rom 4:25), and that the belief “Jesus as Lord” will bring us into salvation. Let us identify this formation as [Salvation in Christ]. Here, no difference should be supposed between the meaning of “righteousness” and “salvation.”⁹⁵ “Each expresses in a general way the new relationship with God that is the result of believing ‘with the heart’ and confessing ‘with the mouth.’”⁹⁶

How does Paul relate the proclamation of [Salvation in Christ] with his voice of the Deuteronomic text? Paul constructs them in a harmonious relation. The conjunctive ὅτι in v. 9 can denote a causal clause.⁹⁷ This ὅτι clause is in a causal relation to the assertion ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμα (“the word is near you”). The nearness of the word is suggested in the manner that one may become saved: by confessing with your lips and believing in your heart the proclamation. In this sense, Paul ALLIES the formation [Salvation in Christ] with his voice of Deut 30:12–14.

The other relation of these two parts of the text is displayed in a lexical chain involving mouth and heart. Verses 9–10 use the words “mouth” and “heart”⁹⁸ to link with Deut 30:14 (or Rom 10:8) to express the significance of the confession of Jesus’ lordship and belief in his resurrection in terms of righteousness and salvation. Dunn has rightly observed that “to talk of the ‘heart’ is to talk of faith; faith operates at and from the level of the heart. To talk of the ‘mouth’ is to talk of confession. Confession is the primary and essential

95 Moo, *Romans*, 659.

96 Moo, *Romans*, 659.

97 It could also denote a content clause, that is, this ὅτι clause is a clarification of τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν (“the word of faith that we proclaim”). It is said that the content of this proclamation is ‘Jesus as Lord’ (v. 9a, c12A) and ‘God raised Jesus from the dead’ (v. 9b, c12B), a subject which is common in early Christian literature (see Rom 4:24–25; 8:11; Gal 1:1; 1 Cor 6:14; 15:4, 12, 20; 2 Cor 4:14; 1 Thess 1:10; Col 2:12; Eph 1:20; Acts 3:15; 4:10; 10:40; 1 Pet 1:21. Cf. Moo, *Romans*, 658 n. 59).

98 In Paul’s use of Deut 30:12–14, we can see that he focuses on the “heart” text in this passage. One of the reasons that Paul merges Deut 8:17 and 9:4 with Deut 30:11–12 may be because of its intertextual thematic node καρδιά (“heart”), which repeatedly appears in Paul’s illustration of his view of righteousness (Rom 10:8–10). Paul’s repeated reference to “heart” texts can hardly be accidental. Paul has repeated this point earlier. As Dunn rightly observes, “Paul underlines the fact that faith operates from the level of the heart. In view of his repeated emphasis earlier that the real business of the law is ‘in the heart’ (2:15), that the circumcision God wants is ‘of the heart’ (2:29), that the obedience God calls for is ‘from the heart’ (6:17).” See Dunn, *Romans* 9–16, 614.

outward manifestation corresponding to faith.”⁹⁹ Therefore, Paul continues to emphasize faith in one’s heart as the way to be righteous (πιστεύσης ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, καρδίᾳ . . . πιστεύεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην). The implied participant references become the unspecified individual reference “you” (v. 9) and “he” (v. 10). This type of reference leads to the following theme of the universal scope of salvation (vv. 11–13).

With the projecting clause “the Scripture says” (v. 11, c14A), Paul reintroduces a universal note by returning to part of the thematic formation of the “stone-text” (Isa 28:16; cf. 9:33). It can be noted that Paul does not invoke the voice of Isaiah here; instead he uses the whole scripture to speak for the prophetic voice, which makes the quoted prophetic texts generalized or normative.¹⁰⁰ The addition of πᾶς in v. 11 enables it to parallel v. 13, which is a quotation from Joel 3:5 (LXX). It is very likely that the scriptural introductory formula in v. 11 is valid for the quotation of v. 13 as well. The clausal patterns of the two quotations resemble each other: the subject πᾶς has been elaborated by a verbal clause.

TABLE 9.2 Comparison of Rom 10:11 and 13

πᾶς	ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ	οὐ κατασχυνηθήσεται	v. 11
πᾶς	ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου	σωθήσεται	v. 13
a	=b (expansion: hypotactic elaboration) ¹⁰¹		

In Table 9.2, the two main verbs (οὐ κατασχυνηθήσεται and σωθήσεται) are both in the future form and semantically both are oriented in the direction of salvation. Similarly, ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (“whoever believes in him”) resembles ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου (“whoever calls on the name of the Lord”). This parallel pattern has appeared in v. 10, the second part of [Salvation in Christ]:

99 Dunn, *Romans* 9–16, 616.

100 According to Watson, “If attribution to a specific author highlights the text’s individuality and distinctiveness, anonymous citation [the standard formula] emphasizes its representative character” (*Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 45). Watson also states, “The standard formula presents a citation as a completed utterance that is definitive and permanently valid” (p. 45). Therefore, Rom 10:11–13 establish a generalized or normative voice of prophetic texts by non-employment of the specific voice of the prophet Joel.

101 There are three types of expansion: elaborating, extending and enhancing. For elaboration, it can be divided into paratactic elaboration and hypotactic elaboration. See Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 395–99.

πιστεύεται καρδίᾳ εἰς δικαιοσύνην vs. ὁμολογεῖται στόματι εἰς σωτηρίαν. If we read these two formations as interweaving, then not only do they both proclaim the need to believe in him (or to believe in one's heart), but also to “confess in one's mouth” says something similar to “call on the name of Lord” (both actions lead toward the result of salvation). In this sense, the formation [Salvation in Christ] and the prophetic scripture (Isa 28:16 and Joel 3:5) say the same thing about salvation but with different emphases: the former stresses the way of salvation, the latter the scope of salvation. If we label the prophetic scripture regarding the scope of salvation in Rom 10:11–13 as [Unification of Jews and Nations: Paul], then [Salvation in Christ] is in a Dialogical relation with [Unification].

The scope of salvation has been emphasized in [Unification]. First, the key lexical term *πᾶς* runs through vv. 11–13 (c14Ba, c15Ba, c15Bb, c16A) and denotes the universal scope of salvation. Second, the parallel structure of vv. 11 and 13 frames v. 12 in the middle, which explains what *πᾶς* means here. That is, it includes Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ Ἑλλήνος (Jew and Gentile). However, we should notice that *πᾶς* in Joel 3:5 is exclusively regarded as the Jewish people, those who adhere to the Jewish religion. As Belli has noted,

This [*πᾶς* as all the Jewish people] is confirmed by the second part of Joel 3:5, where the place of salvation is specified as Zion and Jerusalem, and even more so by chapter 4 that follows, which describes, in parallel with the return of the survivors of Judah and Jerusalem, the judgment of the nations in the terrible valley of Jehoshaphat (4:1–2).¹⁰²

In other words, there is no universal announcement of salvation for all (that is, both the Jews and the Gentiles) in Isa 28:16 and Joel 3:5; instead, the two prophetic passages focus on exclusive salvation for the Jewish people.¹⁰³ Paul, however, ALLIES the scriptural voice of the scope of salvation with early Christian proclamation [Salvation in Christ]. He sees that “one who confesses with his mouth (Jesus is Lord) will be saved” (v. 10) has a similar meaning to the prophetic saying, “everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved” (v. 13). The thematic item “call upon the Lord” is quite common in the LXX and Jewish literature, and is used to ask God for help or intervention.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Fillippo Belli, *Argumentation and Use of Scripture in Romans 9–11* (AnBib; Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2010), 287.

¹⁰³ Belli responds that the new hermeneutical principle comes to Paul from the experience of the event of grace in Christ Jesus. Cf. Belli, *Argumentation*, 288.

¹⁰⁴ E.g., Deut 4:7; Isa 55:6; 2 Macc 3:22; Judg 16:2. See also Moo, *Romans*, 660.

“Call upon the Lord” was also used by the early Christians with reference both to God the Father and to Christ.¹⁰⁵ Paul takes “the Lord” as Jesus Christ here in order to indicate that one is righteous by having faith in Jesus Christ/calling upon his name. In his citation of Joel 3:5 in 10:13, Paul brings together two crucial terms, “everyone” (cf. vv. 4, 11, 12) and “salvation” (cf. vv. 1, 9, 10). Again, in the Jewish Scriptures, the one on whom people called for salvation was YHWH; Paul identifies this one with Jesus Christ, the Lord, as does the early church.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, Paul’s voice in this final passage brings a universal scale to salvation, instead of limiting it to Israel, which demonstrates his stance as an apostle to the Gentiles.

Summary of Intertextual Thematic Relations in Rom 10:5–13

From the above analysis, we can see that the statement in v. 4 is further demonstrated in vv. 5–13. The clause τέλος . . . νόμου Χριστός has been explained in vv. 5–10: the goal of the Mosaic law is fulfilled in Christ, who will bring salvation to all that have faith in him. The clause εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι has been illustrated in vv. 11–13. The early Christians’ proclamation [Salvation in Christ] is in a *dialogical* relation with [Unification of Jews and Nations: Paul]; they speak of the same thing in different ways. Moses’ voice in Leviticus witnesses that the purpose of the law is for the promise of life. Paul then makes Moses’ voice normative in reinterpreting Deut 30:12–14 to mean that the purpose of law for life is fulfilled in Christ. Therefore, Paul ALLIES Moses’ voice in Deuteronomy 30 with the early Christian proclamation of [Salvation in Christ]. This demonstrates his stance as a Christ follower.

With the generalized voice of the prophets Isaiah and Joel, Paul brings in another significant Christian element: the scope of salvation. Blending with the prophetic voice, Paul’s own viewpoint on the universal scope of salvation (i.e., including the Gentiles in the scope of the salvation) has been manifested in Rom 10:11–13. Again, it can be seen that his stance derives from his identity as an apostle to the Gentiles.

Heteroglossic Voices

I have demonstrated Paul’s voice of salvation and its scope, and how he ALLIES related Jewish scriptures. The book of Baruch shares similar viewpoints concerning the understanding of law (cf. Deut 30:11–14) and the scope of

105 E.g., Acts 9:14; 22:16; 2 Tim 2:22; 1 Pet 1:17; and 1 Cor 1:2. See also Moo, *Romans*, 660.

106 Moo, *Romans*, 660.

salvation.¹⁰⁷ Their ideas on similar topics can be considered within an intertextual reading in order to demonstrate social heteroglossic voices. Therefore, the book of Baruch can shed light on Paul's view of salvation and the scope of salvation in Rom 10:5–13.

Baruch is composed of three main sections. After an introduction (1:1–14), a confession of Israel's guilt and an acknowledgment of God's righteousness are described in the first main part (1:15–3:8). The second part, a poem, praises wisdom as God's special gift to Israel, and denies that other nations have found the key to wisdom (3:9–4:4). The last section is a prophetic consolation, an assurance of Israel's restoration, and deliverance oracles (4:5–5:9).¹⁰⁸ It is known that these three parts were composed at different times, during the Second Temple Period, after the second century BC but before AD 70.¹⁰⁹ My concern, however, is with the book's final form, which was completed about the time of Paul.

The thematic structure of the first main part of Bar 1:15–3:8, which deals with confession of sin, shares the Deuteronomic sin-exile-repentance-return pattern.¹¹⁰ It starts by contrasting God's righteousness with the shame of Israel's dispersion (1:15). It then gives the reason for Israel's failure: they sin against God in their disobedience to the voice of God and his commandments (1:17–21). The curse then comes upon them as Moses has declared (cf. Deut 27:26; 29:20–28; 30:15–20). Interestingly, the author later on ALLIES the voice of God with the prophet's command to serve the king of Babylon (cf. 2:21, 24).¹¹¹ From Baruch's standpoint, Israel's failure relies not only on their ancestors' disobedience to the commandment of Moses in the times past, but also on their present disobedience to God's voice through the prophets. The final speech in the first section (Bar 2:27–35) expresses hope for a future beyond the curse, a passage which is like a pastiche of biblical citations from Deuteronomy, Leviticus, Ezekiel, and Jeremiah:¹¹² (1) the renewed relationship with God

107 See Table 9.3.

108 David A. DeSilva, *Introducing the Apocrypha: Message, Context, and Significance* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 198–99; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 454–73.

109 Alison Salvesen, "Baruch," in *The Apocrypha* (ed. Martin Goodman et al.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 112–17.

110 Per Jarle Bekken, *The Word Is Near You: A Study of Deuteronomy 30:12–14 in Paul's Letter to the Romans in a Jewish Context* (BZNW 144; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 171.

111 The first part is set against the background of the exiles in Babylon.

112 See Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 461–62.

(Deut 30:1–2, 6; Lev 26:40–41; Ezek 36:11);¹¹³ (2) the return to the promised land according to the promise to the patriarchs (Lev 26:42–43; Jer 30:3);¹¹⁴ (3) an increase in numbers of people (Deut 30:5);¹¹⁵ and (4) an everlasting covenant (Jer 31:33; Ezek 36:28).¹¹⁶ This feature of Baruch's usage of Scripture is similar to Paul's style: both of them use prophetic material to reinforce "what has already been said through Moses" (cf. Rom 3:9–20; 10:5–21).¹¹⁷

The second section of Baruch (3:9–4:5) is a wisdom poem, which identifies the law with personalized Wisdom. For instance, when employing Deut 30:12–13 in Bar 3:29–30, law language is replaced by wisdom language, as Paul does with Christ in Rom 10:6–8. In this section, the reason that Israel is exiled to the nations is because they have forsaken the fountain of wisdom (3:12). "Walking in the way of God" refers to "learning where there is wisdom, where there is strength, where there is understanding." It is this wisdom and understanding that can lead one into length of days and life (3:13–14). In other words, according to Baruch, the life that God promised through obedience to the Mosaic Torah can be fulfilled by holding to wisdom. As Baruch indicates, "She is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that endures forever. All who hold her fast will live, and those who forsake her will die" (4:1–2). Therefore, the second feature shared between Baruch and Paul is that both of them identify the Mosaic law with something else: one with wisdom, one with Jesus Christ.

The later part of the second section of Baruch (3:36–4:4) continues with the theme of wisdom, focusing on the scope of the availability of wisdom. It states that wisdom is given to "Jacob his servant and to Israel, whom he loved" (3:37–38), and exhorts Israel to seize wisdom—"do not give your glory to another, or your advantage to an alien people (ἔθνεϊ)"—in 4:2–4. Therefore, in Baruch, wisdom is given to Israel alone, not to the other nations. Regarding the scope of salvation (or wisdom), the viewpoints of Baruch and Paul OPPOSE each other.

113 Baruch 2:31–33: "They will know that I am the Lord their God. I will give them a heart that obeys and ears that hear; and they will praise me in the land of their exile, and will remember my name, and will turn from their stubbornness and their wicked deeds; for they will remember the ways of their fathers, who sinned before the Lord."

114 Baruch 2:34a: "I will bring them again into the land which I swore to give to their fathers, to Abraham and to Isaac and to Jacob, and they will rule over it." Cf. Lev 26:42–43.

115 Baruch 2:34b: "I will increase them, and they will not be diminished."

116 Baruch 2:35: "I will make an everlasting covenant with them to be their God and they shall be my people; and I will never again remove my people Israel from the land which I have given them."

117 Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 462.

Now let us do a comparative reading between Bar 1:15–4:4 and Rom 10:5–13. On the one hand, the two texts share similar thematic patterns. First, both of them ALLY law with a personalized figure (Wisdom vs. Christ). Second, both texts affirm the Deuteronomic tradition of the goal of the law which points to life. Third, both texts use the prophetic material to reinforce their view of the Mosaic text. Fourth, they both use a mediator to explain the law so as to show the scope of God's people. However, Paul indicates that the Christ event will bring the Gentiles into the scope of God's people, while on the contrary, in Baruch, Wisdom is uniquely for Israel, "on the basis of the law which was given to Israel alone unlike the other nations."¹¹⁸

Therefore, Paul's opinion as to the understanding of the Mosaic law and who are God's people is divergent from this example of his Jewish contemporaries' views, based on his understanding of the Christ-event (Gal 1:16: Christ revealed him to be an apostle to the Gentiles) and his identity as the apostle to the Gentiles.

Conclusion

From the above intertextual thematic analysis of Rom 9:30–10:4, it can be seen that two different systems of viewpoints emerge on righteousness, faith, law, salvation, and the scope of salvation. First, Paul's discourse pattern of righteousness is to set law-righteousness and faith-righteousness in an incompatible contrast. He disconnects the relations of law with faith, and law-righteousness with God-righteousness, holding a different view of righteousness than contemporary non-Christian Jewish communities. Second, Paul ALLIES [Salvation in Christ] with [Unification of Jews and Nations], based on his reading of the related Jewish Scriptures. Paul recontextualizes Moses' voice of law with the Christological perspective, and then ALLIES it with his viewpoint of the prophetic voices. In doing so, not only does Paul point out that the gospel he and his community proclaimed was announced beforehand in the Scriptures,¹¹⁹ but he also implies a critique of his Jewish contemporaries' not accepting God's words in the Jewish Scriptures.

However, Paul's Jewish contemporaries OPPOSE Paul's voices on righteousness, faith, law and the scope of salvation. They view faithfulness to the law and faithfulness to God as consistent with one another, and they limit the scope

¹¹⁸ Bekken, *The Word Is Near You*, 171.

¹¹⁹ Wagner, *Heralds*, 180.

of salvation to Israel based on their way of reading the Scriptures. Therefore, Paul's viewpoints of some core understandings within Judaism (e.g., righteousness, law, salvation and its scope) are radically different from his Jewish contemporaries. His viewpoints represent his identity as a Christ follower and an apostle to the Gentiles.

Reconsidering the Meaning and Translation of Πνευματικός and Πνεῦμα in the Discourse Context of 1 Corinthians 12–14

Hughson T. Ong

Introduction

First Corinthians 12–14 is commonly understood to be a pericope about “spiritual gifts.” This nomenclature appears as the typical title ascribed to this pericope and includes the common translation provided for πνευματικός (i.e., ‘spiritual’ [12:1; 14:1]) and πνεῦμα (i.e., ‘Spirit/spirit’ [14:12]).¹ They are so titled and translated by virtue of the notion that Paul, based on the catalogue of items in 12:8–10 and 12:28–31, was dealing with spiritual gifts at this particular point in his letter. This notion is most obvious when the familiar topic sentence in 1 Corinthians “Now concerning (Περὶ δέ) spiritual *gifts*” introduces this pericope. I argue, however, that Paul may not be talking about spiritual gifts at all; therefore, “spiritual gifts” is a mistaken title for this pericope and an inaccurate translation for the Greek lexemes πνευματικός and πνεῦμα. Rather, Paul’s overarching concern was for the maintenance of order in the church (14:33), since that concern serves as the Corinthian believers’ ultimate proof for whether they actually “know God” (12:2–3; 14:36–38). At most, the notion of spiritual gifts, if it in fact was in Paul’s mind, could only refer to (some) activities or ministries practiced by the church in Corinth. Thus, my objective in this essay is to

1 At least five versions, the NASB, NIV, NRSV, TNIV, and LEB, including the UBS⁴, have given the title and provided the translation “spiritual gift(s)” for these three verses, with the exception of 1 Cor 14:12, where πνεῦμα is translated either as “spiritual gifts” or as “spiritual manifestations.” Many commentaries (e.g., Gordon Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987], 23; Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* [NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], x; Paul Ellingworth and Howard Hatton, *A Handbook on Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians* [UBS Handbook Series; New York: UBS, 1995], 270) have demarcated this pericope under very similar headings. Others have variously titled it as “the gifts of the Spirit for service in love,” “spiritual gifts and spiritual people,” “abuse of spiritual gifts,” or “abuse of community, divine service, and the Spirit.” See Ronald Trail, *An Exegetical Summary of 1 Corinthians 10–16* (2nd ed.; Dallas, TX: SIL, 2008), 113.

determine the more plausible authorial meaning of 1 Corinthians 12–14, so as to demonstrate that spiritual gifting is a theologically-loaded English concept (i.e., the concept was foreign to Paul himself) that has been used to translate πνευματικός and πνεῦμα, and subsequently, to provide an alternate title for the pericope and translation for the Greek lexemes πνευματικός at 12:1 and 14:1, and πνεῦμα at 14:12.²

The result of this study suggests the abandonment of the traditional notion of spiritual gifts as a technical term that refers to identifiable catalogues of gifts, ministries, or items (notably in Rom 12:6–8, 1 Cor 12–14, Eph 4:11, and 1 Pet 4:10–11) that God bestows on individuals for their exercise in the church. Specifically, my proposal, in addition to these sets of items, is that the term spiritual gifts should be seen more broadly and generally as simply gifts of/from the Holy Spirit, without having any technical or conceptual meaning. To be sure, any of these “gifts,” such as eternal life (*free* gift [Rom 5:15, 16; 6:23]), Israel’s covenantal benefits (God’s gifts [Rom 11:29]), ministerial gift (gift of God [2 Tim 1:6]), spiritual gift (1 Cor 1:7), the ability to remain chaste (gift from God [1 Cor 7:7]), gracious favour (2 Cor 1:11), among other examples, can all be seen as gifts of/from the Holy Spirit. In what follows, I first survey some of the main problems of previous studies of spiritual gifts. My goal is to highlight the need for a more rigorous approach to analyze the oft-assumed “spiritual gifts” pericope of 1 Corinthians 12–14. Thus, I present in the next section my approach, which is a type of discourse analysis, using theories of modern linguistics. Thereafter, I provide an exegesis of each of the chapters in our unit of interest, followed by my concluding remarks.

A Brief Survey of Problems from Previous Studies

The literature on spiritual gifts (especially theological ones) is vast.³ I will therefore only address those issues that are pertinent to this study. For my pur-

2 The “lexeme” in traditional grammar is defined as the basic unit of syntax and semantics. Lyons defines lexemes more narrowly as merely words relating to a lexicon; therefore, a lexical unit or a unit of a lexicon. See John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 403; John Lyons, *Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 47. I use lexeme here as a unit of semantic content. Cf. Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 112 n. 34, 219.

3 I refer readers to the select bibliography section of Max Turner, *The Holy Spirit and Spiritual Gifts* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998), 361–68.

poses, it is helpful to begin with the important work of Max Turner, particularly his *The Holy Spirit and Spiritual Gifts*.⁴ In some ways, Turner's linguistic arguments (though not his analyses and conclusions) are similar to the ones I make in this study. The difference, perhaps, is in the purpose and foci of our studies, as well as in our approaches to the topic of spiritual gifts.⁵ Turner states the heart of the problem well:

Are we then to assume that for Paul *pneumatika* and *charismata* are semi-technical terms for what Pentecostalism and the Charismatic movement has called 'supernatural spiritual gifts' (however problematic it might be to define the borders of the extension of such an expression)? May we simply give as a stereotype of 'spiritual gifts' that they be immediately-perceived workings of God, events in which the Spirit is made manifest, and given by Christ to enable the service of his body for the common good?⁶

There are at least three problems surrounding the term spiritual gifts: (1) Paul's conceptualization of the terms χάρισμα and πνευματικός because of his flexibility in using the terms interchangeably; (2) what Spirit activities might constitute spiritual gifts; and (3) the nature of the various gifts mentioned in the New Testament.⁷ These three problems seem to have been engendered primarily by a flawed assumption (among most interpreters) that the Greek lexemes translated by spiritual gifts, notably χάρισμα, are technical terms. Turner points out that spiritual gifts were mainly used as a technical term to categorize certain phenomena.⁸ Whereas some interpreters broadly

4 See Turner, *The Holy Spirit*, esp. 261–85; Max Turner, "Modern Linguistics and Word Study in the New Testament," in *Hearing the New Testament: Strategies for Interpretation* (ed. Joel B. Green; 2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 136–74, 198–209; Max Turner, "Spiritual Gifts," in *New Dictionary of Biblical Theology* (ed. Desmond T. Alexander et al.; Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2000), 789–96.

5 Turner, "Modern Linguistics," 199, seeks to determine the meaning of χάρισμα by studying its morphology, its synonyms (δόμα, δόσις, δώρον, δωρεά, δώρημα, διαίρεσεις, κορβάν, προσφορά, and χάρις), and its usage in the Pauline letters. Cf. Turner, *The Holy Spirit*, 262.

6 Turner, *The Holy Spirit*, 262.

7 Gordon D. Fee, "Gifts of the Spirit," in *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters* (ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne et al.; Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1993), 339. See also Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 576.

8 According to Max Turner, Siegfried Schatzmann, *A Pauline Theology of Charismata* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1987), 4–5, 15–52, effectively speaks for a majority of scholarship when he maintains that the term χάρισμα (gift) is used in a technical sense to denote manifestations

associate ‘spiritual gifts’ with any kind of activity empowered by God, others understand the term narrowly to refer to the manifestations of the Spirit named, for instance, in 1 Cor 12:8–10.⁹ Overall, however, the generally assumed technical meaning of spiritual gifts is its reference to a catalogue of gifts (or abilities, ministries, offices), such as those found in Rom 12:6–8, 1 Corinthians 12–14, Eph 4:11, and 1 Pet 4:10–11.¹⁰ This view takes the technical term ‘spiritual gifts’ as referring to believers possessing gifts endowed by the Spirit. Kenneth Berding aptly states this “conventional” view:

I refer to it as the conventional approach because it seems that most Christians—at least at this point in history—work within this paradigm when they think about the subject often referred to as “spiritual gifts.” This approach says that the spiritual gifts are abilities, or enablements, given by the Holy Spirit to individual believers to help them serve others. There are three main components in any conventional definition of a spiritual gift: (1) the entity itself is an ability or an enablement; (2) it is given by the Holy Spirit; (3) it is to be used in building up the community of believers.¹¹

Claiming that he “was struck with the realization that the Greek word *charisma* does not carry the theological weight” of this conventional view,¹² he proposes (what he wants to call) the (alternative) biblical view:

of grace within the community (Rom 11:29; 12:6–8; 1 Cor 12–14; cf. Rom 1:11; 1 Cor 1:7). But most semanticists, Turner points out, would doubt that Paul had any special meaning attached to the term; on the contrary, the term should have a minimal content, and therefore, would only convey a general meaning. Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 203–4.

9 Turner, “Spiritual Gifts,” 789; cf. Turner, *The Holy Spirit*, 265–67; Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 204–6.

10 This kind of notion is pervasive among scholars and pastors. See, for example (*inter alia*), John Polhill, “Toward a Biblical View of Call,” in *Preparing for Christian Ministry: An Evangelical Approach* (ed. David P. Gushee and Walter C. Jackson; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 70–2; Vern S. Poythress, *What are Spiritual Gifts?* (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 2010), esp. 5–7; Cornelis Pronk, *No Other Foundation than Jesus Christ: Pastoral, Historical, and Contemporary Essays* (Mitchell, ON, Canada: Free Reformed, 2008); 59–62; William McRae, *The Dynamics of Spiritual Gifts* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), 43–81. Cf. Kenneth Berding, *What Are Spiritual Gifts? Rethinking the Conventional View* (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2006), 7, 15.

11 Berding, *What Are Spiritual Gifts*, 25.

12 Berding, *What Are Spiritual Gifts*, 8.

In this alternative approach, the so-called spiritual gifts are not special abilities; they're spirit-given ministries. According to the contextual evidence in the letters of Paul, the so-called spiritual gifts should not be viewed as special abilities to do ministry; rather, they should be viewed as the ministries themselves. Every believer has been assigned by the Holy Spirit to specific positions and activities of service, small and large, short-term and long-term. These ministry assignments have been given by the Holy Spirit to the individual believers and, in turn, these individuals in their ministries have been given as gifts to the church.¹³

This alternate view apparently takes the technical term spiritual ministries as referring to church functions through the workings of the Spirit.¹⁴ I can see that this alternate view might better explain the relationship between these four putative 'spiritual gifts/ministries' passages in the New Testament, although I am unsure whether Paul really had this concept in mind given that there is no single Greek term that can account for the translation of this 'spiritual gifts' concept, with the notable exception of Rom 1:11.¹⁵

13 Berding, *What Are Spiritual Gifts*, 32. Cf. Kenneth Berding, "Confusing Word and Concept in 'Spiritual Gifts': Have We Forgotten James Barr's Exhortations?" *JETS* 43 (2000): 39.

14 Cf. James D.G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1975), 253.

15 But χάρισμα πνευματικόν may not necessarily mean spiritual gift (or something that has to do with giftedness) in the context of Rom 1:11. For a summative list of the various interpretations of the phrase χάρισμα πνευματικόν by commentators, see David Abernathy, *An Exegetical Summary of Romans 1–8* (2nd ed.; Dallas: SIL, 2008), 38–39. The following interpretations are most common: (1) as some kind of insight or ability that Paul hopes to share with the Romans for the purpose of strengthening their faith (Douglas J. Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans* [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996], 59–60); (2) as an insight or gift Paul received from the Spirit and wished to impart to the Romans, but different from those spiritual gifts listed in 1 Cor 12 (Robert H. Mounce, *Romans* [NAC; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1995], 67); (3) as the equivalent expression of "spiritual blessings from God's Spirit" or "the goodness that God gives by means of his Spirit" (Barclay M. Newman and Eugene A. Nida, *A Handbook on Paul's Letter to the Romans* [UBS Handbook Series; New York: UBS, 1992], 16); (4) as the "spiritual blessings" that Paul hopes will result from his ministry in Rome (C.E.B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* [ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975, 1979], 1:78–79; also Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993]); and (5) as some "acts of ministry" that are both of the Spirit and a means of grace (James D.G. Dunn, *Romans 1–8* [WBC 38a; Dallas: Word, 1988], 30; cf. 387).

This assumption that these Greek words are technical terms carrying a conceptual meaning equivalent to the English translation spiritual gifts corroborates Berding's argument that "systematic and popular theology (almost entirely) and Biblical scholarship (to a lesser degree) are still influenced by a pre-James Barr conception of the word χάρισμα [and certainly πνευματικός as well]."¹⁶ However, Berding's main contention that the concept that links together these list-passages (i.e., 1 Cor 12, Rom 12:3–8, Eph 4:11–13, and 1 Pet 4:10–11) is not Spirit-given abilities, but rather Spirit-given ministries (in a general sense),¹⁷ seems to contradict his own argument for a post-James Barr understanding of χάρισμα.¹⁸ Positing 'spiritual ministries' as the underlying concept behind the so-called spiritual gifts mentioned in these passages still confuses the word–concept distinction and perhaps misconstrues Barr's argument.¹⁹ Barr states that

the attempt to relate the individual word directly to the theological thought leads to the distortion of the semantic contribution made by words in contexts; the value of the context comes to be seen as something contributed by the word, and then it is read into the word as its contribution where the context is in fact different. Thus, the word becomes loaded with interpretative suggestion.²⁰

One does not need to bank on this so-called spiritual gifts concept to make a connection between these four passages. Aside from the fact that there are other ways to relate these spiritual gifts passages (e.g., body-spirit-gift metaphor), there are also many other passages that may speak about the Pauline concept of spiritual ministries (e.g., Gal 5:13–15; 6:10; 1 Tim 4:13–14; 2 Tim 1:6; 4:2, 5).²¹

¹⁶ Berding, "Confusing Word and Concept," 37.

¹⁷ For his definition of technical sense and general sense, see Berding, "Confusing Word and Concept," 40–44.

¹⁸ Berding, "Confusing Word and Concept," 37–51, esp. 38–39, 46, 49.

¹⁹ Berding, "Confusing Word and Concept," 37.

²⁰ James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 233–34.

²¹ Gregory Fewster argues for the "body-spirit-gift" metaphor as the linguistic element that links 1 Cor 12:27–31, Rom 12:3–8, and Eph 4:11–16 together ("Pauline Authorship and the Body of Christ: Comparing Historical, Canonical, and Literary Perspectives" [paper presented at the Theological Research Seminar, McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, ON, 3 April 2012; and the Congress of the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies, Waterloo, ON, 28 May 2012]).

Consequently, because these four New Testament passages, especially Rom 12:6–8 and 1 Corinthians 12–14, contain similar lexical items that somehow relate to giftedness or ministries endowed by the Spirit,²² some have concluded that Paul uses χάρισμα and πνευματικός interchangeably to refer to spiritual gifts.²³ But this kind of argument is groundless, since the argument is based on the English translation or notion of ‘spiritual gifts’ in these passages. One also wonders why Paul would qualify χάρισμα with πνευματικός in Rom 1:11, if he indeed did use these terms interchangeably.²⁴ From these broader problems of interpretation on this topic of spiritual gifts, there are narrower problems that also need to be addressed.

The first concerns the most commonly assumed meaning attached to the term χάρισμα, which is, that it refers to a class (or sub-class) of spirit-given abilities.²⁵ This assumption apparently arises from failing to distinguish the English *charisma* (a compelling attractiveness or charm that can inspire devotion)²⁶ from the Greek χάρισμα (gift).²⁷ Consequently, the spiritual gifts that are mentioned in the New Testament (e.g., 1 Cor 12:8–10) have been

22 See Schatzmann, *A Pauline Theology of Charismata*, 4–5, 15–52.

23 E.g., E. Earle Ellis, “Spiritual Gifts in the Pauline Community,” *NTS* 20 (1974): 129; Gordon D. Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 33–34; Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 576; Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols.; New York: Scribner, 1951), 1:156; Hans Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (11th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 245; see also Fee, “Gifts of the Spirit,” 341. Even Dunn seems to agree with Reitzenstein in saying that Paul used both terms “elsewhere in somewhat parallel fashion.” Dunn, *Romans 1–8*, 30; Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 207; cf. Richard Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: Nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen* (repr. ed.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1927), 311, 319.

24 A lexical study of these Greek lexemes can be found in Hughson T. Ong, “Is ‘Spiritual Gift(s)’ a Linguistically Fallacious Term? A Lexical Study of Χάρισμα, Πνευματικός, and Πνεῦμα,” *The Expository Times* 125 (2014): 583–92.

25 See, for example, Richard B. Gaffin and Wayne A. Grudem, *Are Miraculous Gifts for Today? Four Views* (Counterpoints Series; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996); Clark H. Pinnock, *Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1996); John Koenig, *Charismata: God’s Gifts for God’s People* (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox, 1978); David A. Hubbard, *Unwrapping Your Spiritual Gifts* (Waco, TX: Word, 1985); and Craig S. Keener, *3 Crucial Questions About the Holy Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996).

26 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th ed.).

27 For instance, Ellis, “Spiritual Gifts in the Pauline Community,” 128–44, esp. 128, 130–31, after describing πνευματικά and χαρίσματα as “charisms or empowerments, given to the church from God,” translates Rom 1:11 as spiritual charism, and suggests that the substantive is “applied to charismatic persons with gifts of inspired speech.” For a similar

associated with some kind of spiritual phenomena. For example, John Koenig, while recognizing *χαρίσματα* as gifts, still claims that Paul refers to *charismata* as a phenomenon that was rampant in the early church.²⁸ The second one is the proposed criterion for the close association of *χαρίσματα* (gifts) and *πνευματικά* (spiritual) in 1 Corinthians 12–14. This is argued based on a mistaken notion that *χαρίσματα* comes from the root *χάρις* and that “spiritual gift(s)” actually translates *χάρις* in the New Testament,²⁹ since *χάρις* has always been understood as a divine (hence, spiritual) outworking of the Spirit.³⁰ For instance, Dunn, quoting Wetter and Bultmann, claims that *χάρις* for Paul denotes “an otherly power at work in and through the believer’s life, the experience of God’s Spirit”; therefore, “*charisma is the inevitable outworking of charis*” or “*charisma can only be understood as a particular expression of charis*.”³¹ Yet such an understanding of the semantic relationship between *χαρίσματα* and *χάρις* fails to recognize the fact that for many English speakers the translation “grace” for *χάρις* “has little or no religious content.”³² In fact, Turner points out that the general tendency to render *χάρις* as “grace” fails to make a distinction between the four main but different senses of the term.³³ Louw and Nida, for example, provide four translational equivalents (or senses) for the word *χάρις*: kindness, gift, thanks, and goodwill.³⁴

Thus far, we have seen that there still needs to be some critical clarification of the English term spiritual gifts, in order for us not only to gain a proper and better understanding of the term, but also to see spiritual gifts as a broader concept that encompasses every gift that comes from God, Christ, and the Spirit (see 1 Cor 12:4–6). A good way to move forward is to examine the discourse context of 1 Corinthians 12–14, a passage commonly understood to be about spiritual gifts. The discourse meaning of 1 Corinthians 12–14 may represent the authorial meaning of the passage. This relationship between discourse meaning and

argument that suggests a “charismatic community” in the early church, including the “charismatic Corinthian believers,” see Koenig, *Charismata*, 167–69.

28 Koenig, *Charismata*, 95–96.

29 The lexeme *χάρισμα* is derived from *χαρίζομαι*. Cf. Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 156–59; Turner, *The Holy Spirit*, 264–65.

30 E.g. Schatzmann, *A Pauline Theology of Charismata*, 1–2; cf. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 195–256, who seems to take a similar position. For a more detailed critique of this etymological misconception by Schatzmann and Dunn, see Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 199–202.

31 Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 202–3, 253–54; cf. Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 200.

32 Eugene A. Nida and Johannes P. Louw, *Lexical Semantics of the Greek New Testament* (SBLRBS 25; Atlanta: Scholars, 1992), 66; cf. Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 208.

33 Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 208.

34 Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, *Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (2nd ed.; 2 vols.; New York: UBS, 1989), 2:262.

authorial meaning can be comprehended via two theories. The first is the notion of text as a means of communication between speaker and audience. This theory implies that a text contains the information that a speaker wishes to convey to his or her audience. Consequently, the second theory is that discourse is related to human cognition, semantics, and pragmatics. People produce texts to create meaning and to perform or achieve social functions, which arise out of their internal will and intention (cf. the concept of coherence below).³⁵

By determining the authorial meaning of the text or Paul's intended message in this pericope, we then can account for the purpose or reason for his inclusion of the catalogue of items in 12:8–10 and 12:28–31, which, in turn, can allow us to translate more appropriately the Greek lexemes πνευματικός (12:1; 14:1) and πνεῦμα (14:12). Most importantly, additionally, knowing the authorial meaning of this pericope will not only correct this typical notion of spiritual gifts and the translation of these Greek lexemes in these three critical verses of 1 Corinthians 12–14, but it will also lead us to question whether the other parallel pericopes in Rom 12:6–8, Eph 4:11, and 1 Pet 4:10–11 are actually “parallel pericopes” about spiritual gifts.

A Discourse Analysis of 1 Corinthians 12–14

The ambiguity in the translation of πνευματικῶν (12:1), πνευματικά (14:1), and πνεύματων (14:12) as spiritual gifts can be resolved if we are able to determine the discourse meaning (or authorial meaning) of Paul in 1 Corinthians 12–14. Stanley Porter points out that “Translation should reflect meaning, not determine it, and should come after the meaning is decided, not before it.”³⁶ Accuracy of translation, therefore, is contingent upon discourse meaning. To determine this discourse meaning, both the content and the structure of 1 Corinthians 12–14, as well as its unity as a discourse unit, require analysis. I first deal with its general structure, and from there, I discuss my methodological approach to discourse analysis and subsequently apply it to our unit of interest.

35 As Ellen van Wolde, *Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition and Context* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 2, states: “Because language is the connective tissue between the world and the people living in it . . . language lies at the heart of its mental processing.”

36 Stanley E. Porter, “Greek Linguistics and Lexicography,” in *Understanding the Times: New Testament Studies in the 21st Century* (ed. Andreas J. Köstenberger and Robert W. Yarbrough; Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2011), 46–47, cf. 56. Here Porter follows Henry A. Gleason Jr., *An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics* (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

The Structure of 1 Corinthians 12–14

As I show below, the discourse unit of 1 Corinthians 12–14 can be divided into three major sections that roughly correspond to the chapter divisions of the GNT or any English Bible. This entire unit is clearly demarcated by the topic marker *Περὶ δέ* (Now concerning) at 12:1 and *Γνωρίζω δέ* (Now I make known) at 15:1.³⁷ Broadly speaking, ch. 12 can be seen as Paul's introduction to his topic *περὶ τῶν πνευματικῶν*, where he underscores the various gifts, ministries, and manifestations of the Spirit in the church (as one body with many members), ch. 13 as the main body (and peak) of the discourse, where he explains the necessity and prerequisite of love in all church services and ministries, and ch. 14 as his closing remarks, where he gives his specific practical instructions in response to the third and final problem at hand regarding the believers' public meetings.³⁸ The first two issues, it should be recalled, concern head coverings for women (11:2–16) and the abuses at the Lord's Supper (11:17–34). Keeping in mind that Paul was dealing with three problems concerning the worship situation in Corinth, and here specifically with the abuse of tongues, I now turn to examine how Paul structures his arguments and progresses with them using a theory of discourse analysis.

37 The phrase *περὶ δέ* is generally recognized as "the key to the structure and composition of the letter" and serves as a discourse boundary marker (or discourse deixis) to indicate a shift of topic in the letter (cf. 7:1, 25; 8:1, 4; 12:1; 16:1, 12). Other types of boundary markers are also evident in 1 Corinthians: conditional clauses (1 Cor 7:17; 13:1; 15:12), a knowledge formula (10:1), a strong adversative (15:35), and an emphatic cataphoric pronoun (11:17; 15:50). But the typical boundary marker is the adversative conjunction *δέ*. See Margaret M. Mitchell, "Concerning Peri De in 1 Corinthians," *NovT* 31 (1989): 229–56, esp. 233–34; and Lee Martin McDonald and Stanley E. Porter, *Early Christianity and Its Sacred Literature* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2000), 437, 506 n. 77. For the use of the conjunction *δέ* as the writer's or speaker's signal for the 'next step' in the discourse or as a sentence cue for the audience, indicating some sort of disjunction at a particular point in the discourse, see Stephanie L. Black, *Sentence Conjunctions in the Gospel of Matthew: καί, δέ, τότε, γάρ, οὖν and Asyndeton in Narrative Discourse* (JSNTSup 216; SNTG 9; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2002), esp. 144; and Kathleen Callow, "The Disappearing Dé in 1 Corinthians," in David Alan Black et al., eds., *Linguistics and New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis* (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1992), 185.

38 Cf. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 15–16, 51; John J. Collins, "Chiasmus, the 'ABA' Pattern and the Text of Paul," in *Studia Paulinorum Congressus Internationalis Catholicus* (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963), 575–83, for seeing an "A-B-A" pattern as the basic form of argumentation in this letter (e.g., [A] 1:10–2:5, [B] 2:6–16, [A] 3:1–23; [A] 7:15–28, [B] 7:29–35, [A] 7:36–40; [A] 8:1–13, [B] 9:1–27, [A] 10:1–22; [A] 12:1–31, [B] 13:1–13, [A] 14:1–40).

Methodological Approach to Discourse Analysis

In my approach, I have integrated the discourse concepts of staging and peaking,³⁹ coherence, cohesion, and prominence in determining the authorial meaning and main topic of 1 Corinthians 12–14. My approach is grounded on three key features of a discourse: (1) that it has a structure; (2) that it progresses in a linear fashion (i.e., is comprised of various stages and peaks); and (3) that it is a coherent unit.⁴⁰ On the basis of these three key features, there are three important things that I want to note regarding my approach to discourse analysis. The first concerns my use of the concept of staging and peaking that I have tried to conflate with the concept of prominence, coherence, and cohesion.⁴¹ Some practitioners of discourse analysis may object to the use of a conglomeration of approaches, pointing out that such an approach is either conclusion-oriented or *ad hoc*. There could be some merit to this claim, but only if it is proven to be so, or if the discourse analyst does not explain the rationale behind their theory. For this reason, the second important thing that I want to note is that one's goal of investigation must be the primary determining factor for the selection of the methodological approach to the subject matter of study. In my case, for instance, I have used both deductive (staging and peaking) and inductive (prominence, coherence, cohesion) approaches to the study of the structure of 1 Corinthians 12–14.⁴² The use of these approaches provides two different means for verifying the accuracy of my findings, and it

39 The concept of discourse staging and peaking is applied to the New Testament by Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, *Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1989), 241–53, who, in turn, adopted their model from Robert E. Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse* (2nd ed.; New York: Plenum, 1996), esp. 33–50.

40 Discourse analysis as an investigative tool is always guided by a set of tenets. Jeffrey Reed, “Discourse Analysis,” in *Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; NTTS 25; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 189–217, for instance, identifies four guiding tenets: (1) “Analysis of the production and interpretation of discourse”; (2) “Analysis beyond the sentence”; (3) “Analysis of social functions of language use”; and (4) “Analysis of cohesiveness.”

41 The former belonging to the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) and the latter belonging to Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL).

42 The concept of staging and peaking draws from the general principle that a discourse is organized, containing some identified elements or components that make it a discourse, and progresses linearly in a specific manner. Thus, it is a deductive (or top-to-bottom) approach. By contrast, prominence, cohesion, and coherence begin with the analysis of particular features of the text, showing how a discourse is organized and coheres as a distinct unit, from which hypotheses are formulated to explain how discourse features relate to each other and to the entire discourse. Thus, it is an inductive (or bottom-to-top) approach.

serves as a check and balance for the results gleaned from the investigation, especially when these approaches can be logically integrated and applied to the text. Third and last, the use of an eclectic approach, particularly when it is aimed at searching for a more accurate interpretation of text, and, depending on how one attempts to amalgamate various approaches, may actually be a better approach, as it provides different perspectives for the investigation of the subject matter. In sum, as long as one can demonstrate that their eclectic approach is logical and applicable to the text, then that approach should be considered as a legitimate tool for discourse analysis. I now turn to discuss the concepts of staging and peaking (and prominence), followed by the theory of coherence and cohesion.

Staging and Peaking (Prominence)

There exists a “close tie” between discourse meaning and discourse structure. Without a clear structure, a discourse will be unintelligible. At the basic level, a discourse has a beginning, a middle, and an end; these parts cannot be randomly interchanged.⁴³ A. Georgakopoulou and D. Goutsos say that an obvious feature of a text is that it has “a progression of segments with a certain directionality”; that is, beginning and end points.⁴⁴ At the more complex level, a discourse can be characterized by different stages. These stages progress linearly; each stage serves as a “point of departure” for the next one, which, in turn, is constrained by the preceding stage(s).⁴⁵ As Brown and Yule appositely put it,

What the speaker or writer puts first will influence the interpretation of everything that follows. Thus a title will influence the interpretation of the text that follows it. The first sentence of the first paragraph will con-

43 Cf. Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation*, 230, 247.

44 A. Georgakopoulou and D. Goutsos, *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 69.

45 For instance, in the sentence, “I want a hamburger,” we observe a *linear* ordering of the words in the sentence from “I” → “hamburger.” “I” is the starting point, and “hamburger” is the end point; one cannot utter those four words, “I,” “want,” “a,” “hamburger,” in chorus. The beginning point “I” will affect the hearer’s interpretation of everything that follows in the sentence, as the hearer is already expecting that the speaker who uttered “I” was referring to or is about to say something about him/herself. This orderly, linear progression of an utterance also applies at the phrase, sentence, paragraph, and discourse levels, such that the communication process will lead to some kind of peak (or culmination). So to use again the sentence, “I want a hamburger,” as an illustration, “hamburger” would serve as the peak of the sentence, since that is what the speaker really wants or aims for his listener to hear (perhaps to his wife who restricts him from eating one!).

strain the interpretation not only of the paragraph, but also of the rest of the text. That is, we assume that every sentence forms part of a developing, cumulative instruction which tells us how to construct coherent representation.⁴⁶

Whereas Brown and Yule call this discourse concept “thematization,” Joseph Grimes describes it as the “staging” process: “Every clause, sentence, paragraph, episode, and discourse is organized around a particular element that is taken as its point of departure. It is though the speaker presents what he wants to say from a particular perspective.”⁴⁷ These stages will lead to a peak—the most important point (or solution, resolution, highlight, etc.) that the author or speaker wants to convey. Cotterell and Turner identify six typical stages in a narrative discourse (see below), and the prominence and significance of a particular stage are contingent upon the particular discourse.⁴⁸ We may also apply this to non-narrative discourses, since they also progress linearly, though only with the use of arguments or propositions instead of dramatic events or stories. Longacre notes that non-narrative discourses progress chronologically according to “topics or logical relations.”⁴⁹ These six typical stages of a discourse can be applied to the non-narrative and expository-hortatory discourse of 1 Corinthians 12–14, in order to determine its structure and progression. Plotting these six typical stages on the text of 1 Corinthians 12–14 requires the discourse analyst to make some logical judgment based not only on the description of each of the six stages of a discourse, which, in turn, is gleaned from the general nature of how discourses are organized, but also on the linkage between the “notional” and “surface” structures of a discourse.⁵⁰ The concept of cohesion is also useful in establishing this linkage between notional and surface structures, as it not only exposes the linkages between texts in a discourse unit but also highlights the formation of topics within a particular unit, linking these topics to the

46 Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 133–34.

47 Joseph E. Grimes, *The Thread of Discourse* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 323.

48 Cotterell and Turner, *Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation*, 247–48.

49 Specifically, Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*, 48–50, refers to such non-narrative discourses as “procedural discourses” (or expository or hortatory discourses), where there is, on the part of the writer or speaker, “a struggle to accomplish the goal of discourse, to carry through an activity, or to produce a product.” Cf. Jae Hyun Lee, *Paul’s Gospel in Romans: A Discourse Analysis of Rom. 1:16–8:39* (LBS 4; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 32.

50 See Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*, 34–36, for his discussion and diagram on the correlation between surface and notional structures, from which the above description for each of the six stages is derived.

various stages of a discourse. In other words, the identification of a particular stage in the discourse is in one way or another supported and defined by the topics of (a) particular discourse unit(s). Additionally, one or more topics, depending on how they are interrelated, may combine to represent a particular stage in the discourse.

Six Typical Stages of a Discourse

- (1) Title: a formula which introduces a subject or identifies a genre
- (2) Stage: the problem, conflict, or the question, which may be stated propositionally or in dramatic form
- (3) Pre-peak episodes: an intermediate text used to explicate the issue, highlight the significance of the issue, or to delay the peak, in order to increase the tension
- (4) Peak: followed by an explanatory or confirmatory post-peak episode
- (5) Post-peak episodes: to move the participants to where they are next needed, or to tie up loose ends
- (6) Closure: a formula which concludes the subject matter or pronounces a closing remark

The discourse peak, which I equate with the idea or concept of prominence, refers to the most salient topic, theme, or point of a discourse.⁵¹ It is based on the assumption that a writer or speaker normally draws the attention of his readers or listeners to the salient points or parts of his or her discourse.⁵² These salient points or parts of the discourse are elements that are expected to reappear again in the discourse after being introduced.⁵³ They constitute the topic, theme, or information central to the author's intended message,⁵⁴ underlining the emphasis of the discourse.⁵⁵ This emphasis may also serve as a link between discourse units; thus, it also functions as a cohesive device within

51 Prominence may refer "to the use of devices that languages have which enable a speaker to highlight material and make some part of the text stand out in some way . . . An element that is prominent stands out as distinct from its context" (Cynthia Long Westfall, *A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews: The Relationship between Form and Meaning* [New York: T&T Clark, 2005], 31).

52 Jeffrey T. Reed, "Identifying Theme in the New Testament," in *Discourse Analysis and Other Topics in Biblical Greek* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson; JSNTSup 113; SNTG 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 75.

53 Reed, "Identifying Theme in the New Testament," 78.

54 Reed, "Identifying Theme in the New Testament," 77.

55 Westfall, *Hebrews*, 32.

a discourse.⁵⁶ Longacre points out that the peak of a discourse, which he calls a “zone of turbulence,” can be marked by, among others, a “heightened vividness” through a shift in verbal tense/aspect or person (e.g., 1 Cor 13:1, 11), a concentration of participants (e.g., 1 Cor 13:1–3), a change of discourse pace, style, or structure (digression) for rhetorical underlining (e.g., 1 Cor 13:1–13), or a change of vantage point (e.g., 1 Cor 13:1–3, 11).⁵⁷ According to Porter’s verbal aspect theory, the perfect tense-form is often used to mark the most prominent features in a discourse in comparison with the aorist and the present tense-forms.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Reed points out that verbal mood marks the distinction between background and thematic prominence. The imperative mood “plays a thematic role, probably because of its forceful pragmatic function.”⁵⁹ As will be seen clearly in our discourse unit, the imperative ζήλοῦτε not only delineates the peak of the discourse, it also serves as a transition marker between the main sections of the discourse at 12:31, 14:1, 14:12, and 14:39, introducing the new topic or subject of discussion in view.

Coherence and Cohesion

A discourse is not only structured and linearized, but is also coherent. Coherence is the element or feature that makes the texts in a discourse “hang together.” Coherence involves the meaningful relationship of sentences (grammatical structure) and topics or themes (semantic structure). It is a mental phenomenon, which means that coherence exists in the mind of the writer and reader.⁶⁰ Although such mental phenomena cannot be realistically identified, the meaningful relationship of topics and themes can be determined or quantified by a discourse feature called cohesion, which is a property of the text of a language. Specifically, it is the “set of linguistic resources that every language has for linking one part of the text to another.”⁶¹ Such a relationship is called a cohesive tie. Cohesive ties perform two functions: (1) to link “texts”;

56 Brown and Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, 133; cf. Cynthia Long Westfall, “Blessed Be the Ties That Bind: Semantic Domains and Cohesive Chains in Hebrews 1.1–2.4 and 12.5–8,” *JGRChJ* 6 (2009): 207.

57 See Longacre, *The Grammar of Discourse*, 33–50.

58 Porter, *Idioms*, 302; cf. Stanley E. Porter, *Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood* (SBG 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 92–93.

59 Reed, “Identifying Theme in the New Testament,” 86.

60 Geoff Thompson, *Introducing Functional Grammar* (2nd ed.; London: Hodder, 2004), 179.

61 M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social-Semiotic Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 48. “Cohesion is part of the system of a language” (M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Cohesion in English* [London: Longman, 1976], 5). Michael Hoey, *Patterns of Lexis in Text* (Oxford: Oxford

and (2) to identify process and identity chains that characterize a unit. Cynthia Westfall claims that “the links and bonds formed by cohesive ties create texture in the discourse and contribute to the formation of units and sub-units.”⁶² Each sub-unit(s) and/or unit(s) corresponds to a particular topic or theme; cohesive ties that have high levels of interaction are likely to determine the topic of a sub-unit and/or unit.

There are at least five types of cohesive ties/chains: (1) lexical chains: formed by the repetition of the same word or its derivatives; (2) semantic chains: formed by words that share a common semantic domain; (3) participant chains: formed by noun phrases, pronouns, and verbs that refer to the same entity; (4) “brand new entities” anchored by a semantic domain: a lexical entity that has not been previously introduced but is recognizable by a reader, since the entities are “anchored” to a familiar entity, and an author may leverage semantic domains to anchor brand-new entities through inferables (e.g., 1 Cor 12:14–15; cf. Matt 7:16–20); and (5) *ad hoc* semantic domains: lexical categories that an author creates by grouping together several lexical items and naming the group with the same name, even if the items do not actually belong to the same semantic domain (e.g., the “catalogue” of items in 1 Cor 12:8–10, 28–30; 13:1–3, 8–9; 14:6, 26).

With these discourse features in mind, I now turn to identify the different stages of the discourse, based on the different sub-units or groups formed by the various cohesive chains/ties that expose the individual topics of each of these sub-units. I also simultaneously analyze the logical relationship between these sub-units or groups according to the definition indicated by each of the six typical stages of a discourse. This first step involves a complex procedure of identifying lexical, semantic, and participant chains, including *ad hoc* semantic chains and brand-new entities chains. These steps are further supplemented by the theories of verbal aspect and verbal mood as markers of prominence. The identification of the discourse meaning will be gleaned from an evaluation of the peak of the discourse (or the prominent stage) and the various sub-topics within the entire discourse.

1 Corinthians 12

As shown in Table 10.1 below, three elements, a title, a problem statement, and five pre-peak expository arguments make up the first seven stages of Paul’s argument. These early stages establish the foundation of the core issue Paul

University Press, 1991), 13–14, on the other hand, makes a strict distinction between coherence and cohesion.

62 Westfall, *Discourse Analysis*, 82; Westfall, “Blessed Be the Ties That Bind,” 204.

is going to address in ch. 14, and at the same time, set the stage for the peak of his overall argument in ch. 13. The title, which we can tentatively name “Concerning Spiritual *Matters*,” is introduced at v. 1a, followed by the problem statement at v. 1b. Here, Paul seems to implicate the Corinthians with being ignorant about the things that are genuinely of the Spirit, when he declares that he wants them not to be ignorant (ἀγνοεῖν).⁶³ Thereafter, the five pre-peak expositions in the rest of the chapter consist of: (1) an introduction to the problem of speech in vv. 2–3; (2) a theoretical proposition in vv. 4–6 that underscores πνεῦμα, κύριος, and θεός as the sources of various gifts, ministries, and activities;⁶⁴ (3) the first argument in vv. 7–11 that the various visible gifts, ministries, and activities are carried out through the Holy Spirit; (4) the second argument in vv. 12–26 that the church is one body but with many members serving one another with diverse gifts, functions, and responsibilities; and (5) an exhortation to strive for the “greater gifts” in vv. 27–31a, that is, those that are carried out through the Holy Spirit (based on Argument 1) and those that are for the benefit of the church (based on Argument 2). As I note below, Paul will ultimately elucidate this exhortation “strive for the greater gifts” (ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα [12:31a]) based on these two arguments more clearly in ch. 13. This culminates in the injunction “strive for the gifts or things (that are truly) of the Spirit” (ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά [14:1a]), and in ch. 14, with the repeated mention of “for the edification of the church” (πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας [cf. 14:3, 4, 5, 12, 17, 26]).

These seven stages can be grouped into four sub-topics. Sub-topic 1 (12:1–3) covers the first three stages and can be titled “Knowledge of God (i.e., θεός, Κύριος Ἰησοῦς, and πνεύματι ἁγίῳ) as the Source of All Spiritual Matters in the Church.” Sub-topic 2 (12:4–6) can be called ‘The Various Gifts, Ministries, and Works in the Church under This One God.’ Sub-topic 3 (12:7–11) and sub-topic 4 (12:12–30) can be titled “The Various Gifts, Manifestations, and Works of the One Spirit to Each Individual,” and “The Various Offices, Functions, and Ministries under the One Body of Christ,” respectively.

63 It is arguable that θέλω ὑμᾶς is a familiar Pauline disclosure formula often found in the opening of his letters (cf. Rom 1:13; 2 Cor 1:8; Phil 1:12; 1 Thess 2:1). But this formula is also precisely a way of construing how Paul introduces the problem or concern that he wishes to address in his letters.

64 Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 587, suggests that these “three nouns probably do reflect what for Paul would be a primary aspect of the three divine Persons.” Further, it can be observed that Paul also links these three nouns in a triadic pattern in Gal 4:4–6; Rom 1:1–4; Eph 1:3–11; 4:4–6; and 2 Cor 13:13.

TABLE 10.1 *1 Corinthians 12: The foundation of the core issue Paul will address in ch. 14 and the preparation for the discourse peak in ch. 13*

Ref.	Discourse Stages		Sub-topics
v. 1 a	Title	Concerning Spiritual <i>Matters</i>	(1) “Knowledge of God as the Source of All Spiritual <i>Matters</i> in the Church”
v. 1 b	Problem Statement	Paul’s concern for their “ignorance” (ἄγνοεῖν); repeated at 14:38	
vv. 2–3	Pre-peak exposition 1	An introduction to the problem of speech	
vv. 4–6	Pre-peak exposition 2	A theoretical proposition underlining θεοῦ, Ἰησοῦς, and πνεύματι as sources of various gifts, ministries, and activities	(2) “The Various Gifts, Ministries, and Works in the Church under this One God”
vv. 7–11	Pre-peak exposition 3	A first argument that these various gifts, ministries, and activities are carried out through the Holy Spirit	(3) “The Various Gifts, Manifestations, and Works of the One Spirit to Each Individual”
vv. 12–26	Pre-peak exposition 4	A second argument that the church is one body but with many members with diverse gifts, functions, etc.	(4) “The Various Offices, Functions, and Ministries under the (One) Body of Christ”
vv. 27–31 a	Pre-peak exposition 5	An exhortation to strive for the “greater gifts,” i.e., those that are carried out by the Holy Spirit (based on Argument 1) & those that are for the benefit of the church (based on Argument 2)	
v. 31	Transitional verse (repeated at 14:1) using the imperative ζηλοῦτε (cf. the identical phrases ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα here and ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά at 14:1)		

Each sub-topic derives from a distinct sub-unit(s) in ch. 12. The first sub-unit (12:1a–3) hangs together through a semantic chain using three verbal lexical items ἀγνοεῖν, οἶδατε, and γνωρίζω that belong to the semantic domain “Know.”⁶⁵ Verses 2–3, which introduce the problem of tongues, are connected by a semantic chain with lexical items (λαλέω, λέγω, ἄφρωνος) that are categorized under the semantic sub-domain “Speak/Talk.”⁶⁶ And the entire section is marked off by πνευματικῶν (12:1) and πνεύματι (12:3), both of which fall under the sub-domain “Supernatural Beings.”⁶⁷

The second sub-unit (12:4–6) is linked to the preceding sub-unit by a participant chain that refers to θεοῦ, Ἰησοῦς, and πνεύματι. In addition, the sequence θεοῦ → Ἰησοῦς → πνεύματι and the repetition of πνεύματι preceding θεοῦ and πνεύματι at 12:3, reinforce the cohesion of these two units. The repetition of the emphatic αὐτός (the same) and διαίρεσεις (varieties) that accompany πνεῦμα, κύριος, and θεός are lexical chains that bind this sub-unit together.

The third sub-unit (12:7–11) is linked to the preceding sub-section by the lexical chain αὐτό/ἐνὶ πνεῦμα and its related cognates. Governed by the lexical chain πνεῦμα, κύριος, and θεός in the preceding section (vv. 4–6), Paul creates an *ad hoc* semantic-domain chain in vv. 8–10 that spells out the manifestations (φανέρωσις [v. 7]), bestowing acts (δίδωμι [vv. 7–8]), and workings (ἐνεργέω [v. 11]) of the Holy Spirit for every individual within the church. This *ad hoc* catalogue of items is the most noticeable cohesive tie that weaves chs. 12–14 together (so 12:8–10, 28–30; 13:1–3, 8; 14:6, 26).⁶⁸ Lastly, these three sub-units

65 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:333, 335, 336.

66 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:396.

67 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:136.

68 Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 585–86, also makes the same observation on the *ad hoc* nature of this catalogue of items, although he tends to lump these manifestations, gifts, and workings of the Spirit together, and suggests that there is flexibility in Paul’s use of language about these matters both in 1 Cor 12–14 and in the rest of the New Testament passages. The narrowing down to an almost exclusive discussion of ‘tongues and prophecy’ in ch. 14 out of an extensive list of items in 12:28–30, however, mitigates this possibility and instead suggests that it is the style and structure of Paul’s argumentation from a more general discussion to a specific one, as Fee himself has already pointed out in his observation of the ‘A-B-A’ argument pattern of Paul in 1 Corinthians. Further, to suggest that what applies here in 1 Corinthians also applies to other Pauline passages is perhaps arbitrary and inconclusive because of the difference in their contexts. Cf. Lars Hartman, “1 Cor 14:1–25: Argument and Some Problems,” in his *Text-Centered New Testament Studies: Text-Theoretical Essays on Early Jewish and Early Christian Literature* (WUNT 102; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 212, who takes a similar general structure of 1 Cor 12–14.

(12:1–11) hang together through the lexical repetition of the cognates of πνεῦμα (in nine out of the eleven verses).

Aside from the *ad hoc* semantic-domain chain that links the third and fourth sub-units together, the fourth sub-unit (12:12–30) is also related to the previous unit by a participant chain, Χριστός (which represents “one body”) and ἐν πνεύματι (cf. αὐτὸ πνεῦμα in 12:7–11 *passim*), in vv. 12–13. This entire sub-unit, which highlights the various offices and functions (vv. 28–29) and gifts and ministries (v. 30) within the body of Christ, is bounded by another participant chain involving Χριστός and θεός in vv. 27–28. The sub-unit itself is tightly joined together by the lexical items ἐν σῶμα (one body) and πολλὸς μέλος (many parts/members). As Paul shifts his emphasis on the Spirit from the preceding sub-unit to his emphasis on Christ here, he creates a “brand-new entities” semantic-domain chain, that is, the various parts of the physical body (e.g., eye, ear, head, hand, foot),⁶⁹ to elucidate his analogy of the church (or Christ’s body) as one body with many members serving one another. This sub-unit ends with an exhortation to seek for the “greater gifts,” with a new instruction and topic in view, which Paul begins by saying at 12:31b, “And I will show you an even more excellent way.”

The chapter also ends with a transitional verse at 12:31 using the imperative ζηλοῦτε in the identical phrases ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα here and ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά at 14:1. These identically repeated phrases define the unity of ch. 13 and highlight its prominence within 1 Corinthians 12–14. Paul reveals that these “greater gifts” (τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα [12:31]) are “gifts (that are truly) of the Spirit” (τὰ πνευματικά [14:1]), after pointing out that love should be the motivating factor in the exercise of gifts, offices, and ministries in the church in 13:1–13, which serves as the peak of the discourse. In addition, Paul marks the prominence of this section with the first-person perfect tense verb γέγονα.⁷⁰

69 These parts of the body are also classified under the semantic domain “Sensory Events and States for Seeing and Hearing” in Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:276.

70 It could be argued that the present tense is Paul’s ‘default’ tense in 1 Cor 12–14. In ch. 12, the present tense occurs fifty-two times, the aorist eleven times (vv. 3, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 20, 24, 28), the imperfect two times (vv. 2, 19), and the perfect once (v. 2). In ch. 13, the present tense occurs thirty-three times, the aorist five times (vv. 3, 9, 12), the future five times (vv. 8, 9, 12), the imperfect four times (v. 11), and the perfect four times (vv. 1, 2, 11). In ch. 14, the present tense occurs 105 times, the aorist seventeen times (vv. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18, 23, 24, 25, 30, 35, 36), the future fifteen times (vv. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 20, 23, 25), and the perfect three times (vv. 11, 16, 21). This may indicate salience in the use of the first-person perfect γέγονα at 13:1 and 11 after a series of present tense verbs in ch. 12. The first appearances of the perfect tense οἶδα at 12:2 and 13:2 (arguably a perfect tense form but functions

The introduction at 13:1 reads, “without love I have only become a resounding gong or clanging cymbal.” Similarly, after describing the various qualities of love and pointing to its permanent reality (13:4–10), Paul concludes by saying “when I have become a man, I have put childish ways behind me” at 13:11. From this, it could be argued that there is a sudden shift of Paul’s vantage point in these two verses, possibly underlining one of Longacre’s criteria for determining the “zone of turbulence” or the peak of the discourse. Most noticeable is the highest concentration of the “catalogue of items,” with the inclusion of faith, charitable works, and acts of penitence at 13:1–3. For these reasons, many have seen ch. 13 as a kind of digression or an obvious change in style, such as a heightened poetic hymn of love⁷¹ or a paranetic exhortation.⁷² Fee is right to suggest that “it is fully relevant to the context, and without it the succeeding argument would lose much of its force.”⁷³ This kind of digression or change of style or pace, with the use of the first-person perfect tense verbs and the presence of the highest concentration of the “catalogue of items,” can be seen as being used for rhetorical underlining in plotting discourse peaks.⁷⁴

1 *Corinthians* 13

As shown in Table 10.2, ch. 13 continues with the next four stages that serve as the peak of Paul’s argument.⁷⁵ Four peak expositions characterize the

as if it were a present, or at least, is historically a derivative of the obsolete present tense-form εἶδω) only reappears at 14:11 and then at 14:16. See Stanley E. Porter, Jeffrey T. Reed, and Matthew Brook O’Donnell, *Fundamentals of New Testament Greek* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 321 n. 7; William D. Mounce, *Basics of Biblical Greek Grammar* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 144 n. 14. The only other perfect tense used in our unit of interest apart from γέγονα and οἶδα καταργέω, which occurs at 13:11 in conjunction with the use of γέγονα, and γέγραπται, which occurs at 14:21 and is rather a standard formula commonly used in ancient writing.

71 E.g., Jean Héring, *The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians* (London: Epworth, 1962), 135.

72 Ceslas Spicq, *Agapé* (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1955), 59.

73 Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 626.

74 Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1032, points out that “the use of μή rather than οὐ, coupled with ἐάν rather than εἰ, establishes that Paul uses the subjunctive” instead of the indicative for λαλῶ and ἔχω at 13:1, and thus emphasizes the uselessness of all gifts without love.

75 Some may argue that ch. 13 is too long for it to serve as the peak of the discourse. There are two ways, I think, to see it otherwise. First, as I already have noted above, it is arguable that Paul’s progression of his argument begins with a general introduction of his concern in ch. 12, followed by the solution to his concern in ch. 13, and ends with a clear

prominence of this chapter. The first peak in vv. 1–3 points to the importance of love as the supreme motivation for the various ministries and activities in the church. The second peak in vv. 3–8a describes the qualities of love and exposes its greatness over other virtues and evil. The third peak in vv. 8b–13 admonishes the Corinthians to be spiritually mature by putting their childish things away (i.e., their boasting of their “spiritual” practice of tongues). The fourth and final peak gives the command to follow the way of love and to strive for “gifts/practices (that are truly) of/from the Spirit.”

These four stages can be classified into three sub-topics. Sub-topic 1 (13:1–3) can be titled “The Uselessness of Spiritual Practices and Church Ministries without Love as Their Goal.” Sub-topic 2 (13:4–13) can be named “The Greatness of Love in Contrast to the Imperfection of Prophecy, Tongues, and Knowledge.” Sub-topic 3 (14:1a) can be titled “Follow the Way of Love” both concluding and linking ch. 13 to the next chapter.

The concluding injunction “Follow the way of love” at 14:1a, however, is tentative. The use of *χαρίσματα* in the parallel injunction *ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα* at 12:31 demonstrates the general and broader nature of the discussion at the early stages of the discourse. At 14:1, Paul gives this exact parallel injunction but only after downplaying the three items knowledge, prophecy, and tongues in ch. 13. He also uses the term *πνευματικά* instead of *χαρίσματα*. It appears that the point of Paul’s argument is that all of these ‘gifts’ are only considered ‘spiritual,’ if they are carried out in love.⁷⁶ At 14:12, Paul uses yet another new term *πνευμάτων* in this consistently similar injunction. Hartman points out that Paul further advances his argument at 14:12 to make his practical instructions even more precise: “Since you are men who strive for spirits, be eager to be rich for the edification of the church.”⁷⁷ In other words, the exercise of tongues, which is perhaps a practice that the Corinthians considered to be of/from the Spirit, is only so if done in love and aimed at the edification of the church (cf. 14:3–5, 12, 17, 26).

explication of what he truly wants the Corinthian believers to do in ch. 14. Second, and more importantly, each of the sub-units in ch. 13 seems to contribute to its heightened vividness as the peak of the discourse, such that any sub-unit cannot be isolated and be regarded as the discourse peak; any sub-unit in the chapter by itself is “incomplete” to serve as the discourse peak.

76 The addition of *μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε* to this injunction here in 14:1b serves to introduce the more specific and focused injunction *ἐπεὶ ζηλωταὶ ἐστε πνευμάτων, πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ζητεῖτε* at 14:12, and the concluding injunction “Ὡστε, ἀδελφοί [μου], ζηλοῦτε τὸ προφητεύειν καὶ τὸ λαλεῖν μὴ κωλύετε γλώσσαις at 14:39.

77 Hartman, “1 Cor 14:1–25,” 214.

TABLE 10.2 1 Corinthians 13: The discourse peak (i.e., love as the motivation and basis for all spiritual matters)

Ref.	Discourse Stages		Sub-topics
v. 1	Use of the first-person perfect tense γέγονα for prominence (“Without love I have only become a resounding gong or a clanging cymbal”)		(1) “The Uselessness of Spiritual Practices and Church Ministries without Love as Their Goal”
vv. 1–3	Peak 1	The importance of love as the supreme motivation for various ministries and activities in the church	
vv. 4–8a	Peak 2	The qualities of love and its greatness over other virtues and evil	
v. 11	Use of the first-person perfect tense γέγονα for prominence (“When I have become a man, I have put childish ways behind me”)		(2) “The Greatness of Love in Contrast to the Imperfection of Prophecy, Tongues, and Knowledge”
vv. 8b–13	Peak 3	An admonition to be spiritually mature by putting childish things away	
14:1	Peak 4	Διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην, ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε	(3) “Follow the Way of Love”
14:1	Transitional verse (first appeared at 12:31) concluding and linking ch. 13 to ch. 14		

Each sub-topic derives from a sub-unit(s) in 1 Corinthians 13, which is bounded by the imperative ζηλοῦτε and the identical/parallel phrase ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα/πνευματικά at 12:31 and 14:1. Sub-unit 1 (13:1–3) is linked to the preceding sub-unit (12:27–30) by the distinctive *ad hoc* semantic-domain chain. But, here the list of items is expanded to include faith, works of charity, and acts of penitence (v. 3). This progressively expanding catalogue of items from 12:8–10 to 12:28–30 and 13:1–3, which will later collapse into tongues and prophecy in ch. 14 (although cf. 14:6, 26), undermines the idea that spiritual gifts are in view in 1 Corinthians 12–14. Rather, “love in service of one another” (ch. 13) for the “maintenance of order in worship meetings” (ch. 14) is most likely the crux of the passage. The *ad hoc* nature of this list of items is perhaps used to point to the various spiritual activities that are going on in the Corinthian church. On the other hand, this sub-unit itself is stitched together by three semantic chains.

The first semantic chain contains lexical items that belong to the semantic domain “Communication,”⁷⁸ under the following sub-domains. Both γλῶσσα and λαλέω are lexical items that belong to the sub-domain “Speak, Talk,”⁷⁹ whereas ἄγγελος belongs to the sub-domain “Inform, Announce.”⁸⁰ Similarly, both προφητεία and πίστις are categorized under the sub-domain “Inspired Utterance.”⁸¹ The second semantic chain that is found in v. 2 consists of the lexical items οἶδα, μυστήριον, and γνῶσις, each of which belongs to the semantic domain “Know.”⁸² Lastly, the third semantic chain in v. 3 is formed by the lexical items ψωμίζω, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, and παραδίδωμι, which all fit into the semantic domain “Possess, Transfer, Exchange.”⁸³ The second sub-unit (13:4–8a) is linked together by a ‘brand new entities’ semantic domain chain that is comprised of both positive and negative abstract qualities or virtues that contrast with ἀγάπη, which is the obvious lexical chain that tightly knits ch. 13 together.

The third sub-unit (13:8b–13) hangs together by the same semantic chains found in vv. 1–3 (see above). As Paul introduces the uselessness of prophecy, tongues, and knowledge in vv. 1–3, he now exposes, not only the imperfection of these spiritual gifts or the impermanence and instability of these spiritual exercises, but the importance of spiritual maturity. While he only gives an explanatory discussion (indicative mood) at 13:11—ὅτε ἡμην νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐλογιζόμεν ὡς νήπιος· ὅτε γέγονα ἀνὴρ, κατήργη κατὰ τοῦ νηπίου—about the exercise of these gifts from a first-person perspective, he will in the end reiterate this important point with a firm command (imperative mood) at 14:20—Ἀδελφοί, μὴ παιδία γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσὶν ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ νηπιάζετε, ταῖς δὲ φρεσίν τε λειοὶ γίνεσθε.

The fourth sub-unit (14:1a) hangs together with the preceding and entire discourse unit through the prominent lexical chain in ch. 13 that uses the lexical item ἀγάπη. This sub-unit serves as the climax of Paul’s discussion of the topic of love in ch. 13. Its juxtaposition with the transitional marker and imperatival phrase ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικὰ at 14:1b (cf. 12:31a), with the addition of μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε, both concludes and links Paul’s injunction of love in ch. 13 to the next chapter, where Paul will explain the value and priority of prophecy over tongues.

78 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:387.

79 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:396.

80 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:409.

81 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:439.

82 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:333.

83 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:557.

1 Corinthians 14

As shown in Table 10.3, in ch. 14 Paul zeroes in to the actual issue at hand in Corinth. Prophecy instead of tongues seems to be suggested, *when* the latter is done in a disorderly way. But the concluding injunction at 14:40 is explicit: that whether it is tongues or prophecy, what truly matters is that ‘all things should be done decently and according to proper procedure.’

This chapter can be generally divided into two parts. The first part in vv. 1–26, which constitutes the next four post-peak stages of the discourse, establishes the fact that both tongues and prophecy can be done for the edification of the church. These stages prepare Paul’s arguments for the second part of the chapter, where he will bring to bear his specific response to the problem. Post-peak 1 (vv. 1–5) explains why the Corinthian believers should seek to prophesy rather than to speak in tongues. Post-peak 2 (vv. 6–12) explains further the priority of prophecy based on Paul’s own example and an analogy from inanimate things. Post-peak 3 (vv. 13–19) and post-peak 4 (vv. 20–26) give an injunction for those who speak in tongues to pray for their interpretation both for the benefit of believers and as a sign for unbelievers respectively.

The second part in vv. 27–40 begins with the fifth post-peak stage (vv. 27–35) by way of a triple injunction concerning the practice of tongues and prophecy, and concerning how women/wives are to behave in public meetings. This is followed by a reiteration of the problem statement of 12:1b in vv. 36–38; here the lexical items *πνευματικός* and *ἀγνοεῖν* (twice) found in 12:1–2 reappear before the closure and form a strong cohesive link with 12:1–2. The closure in vv. 39–40 emphasizes the key point that what truly matters is order in the church.

These seven stages can be grouped into four sub-topics. Sub-topic 1 (14:1–12), comprising stages 1 and 2, can be titled “The Edification of the Church Based on the Practice of Prophecy.” Sub-topic 2 (14:13–26), comprising stages 3 and 4, can be titled “The Edification of the Church and Unbelievers based on the Interpretation of Tongues.” Sub-topic 3 (14:27–35) narrows down the preceding two sub-topics to focus on the main issue in Corinth. We can title this section “Maintenance of Order in the Church Based on Silence and the Interpretation of Tongues.” Finally, sub-topic 4 (14:36–40) can be titled “The True Spiritual Person Knows God by Maintaining Order in the Church.”

Each of these sub-topics derives from each of the seven sub-unit(s) in 1 Corinthians 14. Sub-unit 1 (14:1–12) is joined together (vv. 1–6, 9, 11) and is linked to the preceding sub-unit by the similar semantic chain found in the preceding sub-unit (13:8b–13; cf. 13:1–3). This semantic chain consists of the lexical items “prophecy,” “tongue,” and verbs of speech (which are categorized under the

TABLE 10.3 *1 Corinthians 14: The actual issue at hand in Corinth (i.e., whether it be tongues or prophecy, what truly matters is that “all things be done decently and orderly”)*

Ref.	Discourse Stages		Sub-topics
vv. 1–5	Post-peak 1	Explains why the Corinthians should seek to prophesy rather than to speak in tongues	(1) “The Edification of the Church Based on the Practice of Prophecy”
vv. 6–12	Post-peak 2	Explains further the priority of prophecy based on Paul’s analogy from inanimate things	
v. 12	οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἐπεὶ ζηλωταὶ ἐστε πνευμάτων, πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ζητεῖτε ἵνα περισσεύητε		
vv. 13–19	Post-peak 3	Commands those who speak in tongues to pray for their interpretation for the benefit of believers	(2) “The Edification of the Church and Unbelievers Based on the Practice of Tongues”
vv. 20–26	Post-peak 4	Commands those who speak in tongues to pray for their interpretation as a sign for unbelievers	
vv. 27–35	Post-peak 5	A triple injunction using a series of imperatives concerning the practice of tongues and prophecy and how women/wives are to behave in public meetings.	(3) “Maintenance of Order in the Church Based on Silence and the Interpretation of Tongues”
vv. 36–38	Reiteration of the Problem Statement of 12:1b	Reappearance of the lexical items πνευματικός and ἀγνοεῖν (twice), which were first introduced in 12:1–2	(4) “The True Spiritual Person Knows God by Maintaining Order in the Church”
vv. 39–40	Closure	Emphasizes and summarizes the key point of the passage—order in the church	

semantic domain “Communication”). In addition, this sub-unit hangs together via a lexical chain that employs the lexical item οἰκοδομή and its cognates (edification or to edify; vv. 3–5, 12),⁸⁴ and a second lexical chain that uses the lexical item φωνή (vv. 7–11), which, in turn, creates a “brand-new entities” semantic-domain chain that contains the lexical items αὐλός, κιθάρα, σάλπιγξ (vv. 7–8) that belong to the semantic sub-domain “Musical Instruments.”⁸⁵ Hartman points out that this sub-unit is held together by the ‘understanding’ motif (γνώσις, διδασχὴ [v. 6], γινώσκειν [vv. 7–9], εἰδέναι [v. 11]) and by lexical items that refer to ‘clearness or its contrast’ (ἀποκάλυψις [v. 6], διαστολή [v. 7], ἄδηλος [v. 8], εὐσημος [v. 9], δύναμις [v. 11], βάρβαρος [v. 11]).⁸⁶ The entire sub-unit is also demarcated by the second-person plural imperatives ζηλοῦτε and ζητεῖτε at 14:1 and 14:12 respectively.

Sub-unit 2 (14:13–26) is also tied together with the same semantic chain of lexical items that belong to the domain “Communication,” both to the preceding sub-unit (14:1–12) and within the unit itself (vv. 13, 18–19, 21–26). However, the two distinct discussions regarding the proper procedure in speaking with tongues (i.e., by praying to God) and its purpose in the church (i.e., a sign for unbelievers) demarcate the two distinct sections within this sub-unit. The first section (vv. 13–19) is chained together by the lexical items προσεύχομαι, εὐχαριστέω, ψάλλω, and εὐλογέω, all of which belong to the domain ‘Communication.’⁸⁷ Although Louw and Nida broadly classify these lexical items under the domain ‘Communication’ (which may be too general a classification to show the inter-semantic relationship of these terms), it is probably fair to assume that these items can be categorized as “acts of communication between two parties.” The second section (vv. 20–26) is weaved together by a semantic chain that contains the lexical items πιστεύω (to believe) and ἄπιστος (lacking in trust/unbelieving).⁸⁸

Sub-unit 3 (14:27–35), similarly, is linked to the preceding sub-unit (14:13–26) by the semantic chain that contains lexical items of “Communication.” The terms διερμηνεύω, σιγάω, and ἐπερωτάω all belong to the same semantic domain with γλῶσσα, λαλέω, and προφητεύω, which further reinforce the cohesion of this unit. What is most distinctive in this section, however, is that Paul fires a triple injunction by piling up a series of imperatives from these lexical items

84 Hartman suggests that οἰκοδομή is an important concept that binds vv. 1–19 together as a discourse unit.

85 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:63.

86 Hartman, “1 Cor 14:1–25,” 220.

87 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:387.

88 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:369.

to emphasize the point that there must be order in the church's worship meetings. The gist of this section is found in v. 33 where he provides the rationale 'God is not a God of disorder but of peace,' which also serves as an essential basis for his final injunction at 14:40.

Sub-unit 4 (14:36–40) is linked to the preceding sub-unit (14:27–35) through the same semantic chain of "Communication," but here only two lexical items, *προφητεύω* and *γλώσσα*, remain (vv. 37, 39). Nevertheless, several other cohesive ties are significantly evident in this sub-unit that makes it cohere as a discourse unit with other sub-units in this section. First, the imperative *γινέσθω* at 14:40 connects with sub-unit 2 (14:13–26), where we find the same imperative *γινέσθω* at 14:20 and 14:26. Second, the second-person imperative *ζηλοῦτε* at 14:39 identifies the sub-unit with the distinctive imperatives *ζηλοῦτε* and *ζητεῖτε* that mark the critical junctions of 1 Corinthians 12–14 (i.e., 12:31; 14:1; 14:12; 14:39). Third, this sub-unit hangs together with ch. 12 through the participant chain *θεός* and *κύριος* in 14:36–37 (cf. 12:3, 4–6, 7–11, 12–13, 27–28; 14:2, 18, 25, 33, 36–37). Finally, and most importantly, the lexical items *ἐπιγινώσκω* (to know/recognize) and *ἀγνοέω* (to be ignorant) are resumed from 12:1b–3.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is therefore apposite to conclude that perhaps the key to understanding Paul's intended meaning in 1 Corinthians 12–14 lies in his problem statement (12:1b) and introduction to the problem of speech in Corinth (12:2–3), as well as in his reiteration of the problem statement (14:36–38) and closing injunction (14:39–40).⁸⁹ It is very likely that what Paul is actually driving at in this Corinthian correspondence is whether the Corinthian believers actually 'know God.' And he looks forward to see this fact realized when order in the church is restored and maintained. The inclusion of the catalogues of items, the analogy of the church with the physical body parts, and the discussion of the importance of love, among others, are aimed toward this ultimate concern. This underscores the fact that perhaps spiritual gifts or the exercise of them is far from the subject matter Paul intends to communicate in 1 Corinthians 12–14. Moreover, the awkward inclusion of the exhortation for women to behave well in public meetings suggests against the idea that spiritual gifts are in view, but instead corroborates the idea that Paul's main concern is the maintenance of order in the church. Additionally, the critical

89 See also Turner, *The Holy Spirit*, 267–85, for his discussion of Paul's uses of *charisma/ta* in 1 Cor 12–14 and Rom 12.

injunctions (12:31, 14:1, 12, 39), which are linked together by the second-person plural imperatives ζητεῖτε and ζηλοῦτε,⁹⁰ seem to be progressing in their degree of importance until the end of the discourse unit (14:39–40), where Paul explicitly states that both tongues and prophecy are to be sought as long as order in worship is duly maintained.⁹¹ This ascending degree of importance of Paul's injunctions precludes the idea that spiritual gifts is the topic in view in 1 Corinthians 12–14.

The strategic positions of these injunctions in their respective co-texts and contexts within 1 Corinthians 12–14 suggests that Paul does not use the terms πνευματικά and πνευμάτων (incl. χαρίσματα) haphazardly and interchangeably as many scholars have assumed. The term χαρίσματα at 12:31 was used to refer anaphorically to the general catalogue of items mentioned in 12:28–30. The term πνευματικά at 14:1 was used to refer to the three more restricted items of knowledge, prophecy, and tongues that are to be carried out in love (13:8b–14:1b). Finally, the term πνευμάτων was only used to refer to tongues and prophecy that should be carried out in love and for the purpose of the church's edification (14:6–12).⁹² If Paul were at all interested in this notion of “spiritual gifts,” it would have come only in second order to his interest in the maintenance of an orderly meeting in Corinth (14:33, 40; cf. 11:2–16, 17–34).⁹³

The term “spiritual gift(s),” which is a technical term that is usually used to refer to a catalogue of “gifts,” “ministries,” or “manifestations of the Spirit,” therefore, is an English concept that is used to translate these Greek words indistinctively. But such a concept is perhaps alien to the author himself.⁹⁴

90 Louw and Nida, *Lexicon*, 1:289–90, classify both terms as belonging to the semantic sub-domain ‘Desire, Want, Wish,’ although ζηλόω appears to be a stronger word (i.e., to desire strongly) of the two.

91 Hartman, “1 Cor 14:1–25,” 214, does not think that both prophecy and tongues are to be sought after, which is perhaps based on the evidence at 14:39, where Paul enjoins the church to desire to prophesy but also not to prevent speaking in tongues. He posits that Paul wants to correct the practice of tongues at the expense of the promotion of prophecy. But this argument is perhaps too stringent. What Paul says about tongues and prophecy at 14:39 should be taken to mean that they are both potential practices that should be carried out in the church, especially considering Paul's recognition of the diverse ‘gifts’ and ‘ministries’ in the church.

92 Hartman, “1 Cor 14:1–25,” 220, in fact, points out that the notion or motivation of the injunction “to follow the way of love” carries with it the idea of edification.

93 Cf. Hartman, “1 Cor 14:1–25,” 211–12, although Hartman still thinks or assumes that somehow spiritual gifts are in view as shown in his study.

94 Cf. Turner, “Spiritual Gifts,” 790; Turner, “Modern Linguistics,” 163; Berding, “Confusing Word and Concept,” 37.

Paul probably uses each of these Greek words for a very specific purpose as he progresses in his Corinthian discourse. These Greek lexemes, as my discourse analysis has shown, cannot be explained using the English translation, which is perhaps the common error made by many previous studies. Perhaps, πνευματικῶν at 12:1 can be generally translated as “spiritual *matters*” or “things that pertain to the Spirit”;⁹⁵ πνευματικά at 14:1 can be translated as “spiritual gifts” or “spiritual practices,” or better, “gifts (that are truly) of/from the Spirit”; and πνευμάτων at 14:12 can be translated as the “spiritual practice of tongues.”⁹⁶ Finally, we may give 1 Corinthians 12–14 the title: “Maintenance of Order in the Church through the Proper Exercise of Tongues.”

95 It is also very likely that, since Paul was addressing the problem of the abuse of tongues, he could have addressed the abusers directly. Thus, πνευματικῶν at 12:1 could be translated as “those who consider themselves to be spiritual.” Cf. John David Ekem, “Spiritual Gifts’ or ‘Spiritual Persons’? 1 Corinthians 12:1a Revisited,” *Neot* 38 (2004): 54–74, who argues that the interpretation and translation of 1 Cor 12:1a as a reference to spiritual gifts needs “serious rethinking,” for the genitive τῶν πνευματικῶν in 1 Cor 12:1 must have referred unequivocally to “spiritual people.”

96 This translation at 14:12 is appropriate and most likely correct. The text reads, οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἐπεὶ ζηλωταὶ ἐστε πνευμάτων, πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ζητεῖτε ἵνα περισσεύητε. Many translations have, in my opinion, mistranslated this verse. For example, English versions read: “So it is with you. Since you are eager for gifts of the Spirit, try to excel in those that build up the church” (TNIV); “So also you, since you are zealous of spiritual *gifts*, seek to abound for the edification of the church” (NASB); “So with yourselves; since you are eager for spiritual gifts, strive to excel in them for building up the church” (NRSV). But the proper translation should appropriately be “And thus so with you, since you are eager to ‘speak in tongues’ [based on the context of its immediate co-text], seek them *in order that you may abound* [ἵνα περισσεύητε] in (toward) the edification of the church.”

Metaphor Analysis with Some Help from Corpus Linguistics: Contextualizing “Root” Metaphors in Ephesians and Colossians

Gregory P. Fewster

Introduction

Standard metaphor theory recognizes that the redistribution of linguistic resources in a text has the potential to construct, for readers, an alternative experience of the world. By necessity, these theories must appreciate how textual interpretation occurs in relation to other instances of language use. Systemic linguistic theory attempts to organize such instances into abstract meta-systems of meaning that are available to language users, such that the instance is comprehensible in relation to rejected systemic choices. Lemke has pushed this perspective further by investigating how communities enact linguistic (and thus social) identities through the typical semiotic formations they select or do not select.¹ Metaphor, in the broadest of senses, relies on such intertextual contrast for its integration into human social activity. However, the semiotic formations, immediate within the social contexts of the ancient readers, are less obvious for modern interpreters. In that case, corpus linguistic techniques present themselves as an optimal means to clarify the linguistic environment in which the sender and receiver communicated.

In this essay, I will explore how contemporary interpreters of ancient texts can better understand how metaphor functions when a corpus linguistic analysis illuminates the historic intertextual environment of the text. To do this, I will narrow my focus significantly to the use of the metaphor of “being rooted,” found in Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17, and the effect of this mode of communication. These are obvious examples of lexical metaphor, where the participle ἐρριζωμένοι contributes to a description of certain moral actions. This lexical choice coordinates with a larger scale redistribution of linguistic resources, including verbalization, adding contour and detail to the readers’ experiences of the letters. A corpus analysis of the ῥίζα family, utilizing lexical priming

¹ See, for example, J.L. Lemke, “Discourse, Dynamics, and Social Change,” *Cultural Dynamics* 6 (1993): 246.

theory, reveals how these words are congruently and metaphorically deployed in discourse.

“Root” Metaphors in Colossians and Ephesians

Scholarly discussion of the “root” metaphor in Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17 has not been overly detailed, nor has it warranted any sort of controversial readings. However, the lack of in-depth treatment leaves space for fresh insights into these passages, in light of developments in metaphor theory. Discussion of the use of the “root” metaphor is occasionally present, but other issues often take precedence. For example, Best notes the apparently enigmatic presence of the nominative participial form rather than a genitive or dative.² Even so, the metaphorical character of both passages is widely recognized. Of further interest among commentators is the literary relationship between Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17. The primary point of comparison is that the nominative participle ῥριζωμένοι appears in some sort of metaphorical sense in both contexts. Discussion revolves around the use of botanical imagery, but this is not the only point of comparison.³ It appears as though the Pauline author “mixes” his metaphors in a similar way in Colossians and Ephesians. Other metaphorical domains occur as well, such as the ‘walking’ metaphor in Colossians.⁴ At

2 Ernest Best, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 342. Barth, on the other hand, sees the nominative clashing with the genitive and dative pronouns. See Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, *Colossians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (trans. Astrid B. Beck; AB 34B; New York: Doubleday, 1994), 371. For O'Brien, the function of the participial clause itself is in question. See Peter T. O'Brien, *The Letter to the Ephesians* (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 259.

3 Diverse terminology is used by commentators, including ‘organic,’ ‘biological,’ ‘agricultural,’ ‘language of horticulture,’ or at times more explicit reference to a tree. See Best, *Ephesians*, 343; Robert G. Bratcher and Eugene Nida, *A Handbook on Paul's Letter to the Ephesians* (UBS Handbook Series; New York: UBS, 1982), 86; Harold W. Hoehner, *Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 484; John Muddiman, *The Epistle to the Ephesians* (BNTC; London: Continuum, 2001) 169; J.B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon* (6th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1882), 176; Barth and Blanke, *Colossians*, 303; Margaret Y. MacDonald, *Colossians and Ephesians* (Sacra Pagina 17; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2000), 88; F.F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 94, 327; Peter T. O'Brien, *Colossians, Philemon* (WBC 44; Waco, TX: Word, 1982), 107.

4 O'Brien, *Colossians, Philemon*, 106. Whether or not Paul is truly mixing his metaphors is a contentious issue. Several authors use the language of mixed metaphor, such as Markus Barth, *Ephesians: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary on Chapters 1–3* (AB 34; New

any rate, in both letters the author accompanies ἐρριζωμένοι with a principle that is seemingly associated with architecture. This is unsurprising given that, as Pokorný points out, this type of language is well-attested in the New Testament.⁵ Though the (architectural) lexemes are different, the semantic relation between the phrases is curious.

Commentators tend to value the imagery that metaphor brings to the passages. For example, Barth refers to the modifying phrase ἐν ἀργάπῃ as the “soil upon which the seedling can grow.”⁶ Commentators also tend to raise additional questions regarding the relationship of the two lexical metaphors. Best’s statement that the two metaphors are “two distinct but allied images” seems to reflect the common opinion.⁷ On the other hand, Lohse advocates that the metaphor (in Colossians) has lost “most of its original meaning” due to its position next to ἐποικοδομούμενοι.⁸ He follows this by suggesting that ἐρριζωμένοι is used in connection with buildings in ancient literature.

The effect of metaphor in the text of Colossians and Ephesians is contested and, as such, it is difficult to imagine how it would have contributed to the activities and behaviours of the letters’ recipients. Consequently, questions

York: Doubleday, 1974), 371; Robert L. Foster, “A Temple in the Lord Filled to the Fullness of God’: Context and Intertextuality (Eph 3:19),” *NovT* 49 (2007): 92; MacDonald, *Colossians and Ephesians*, 88; James D.G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Colossians and to Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 141 (where he speaks of a “sequence of forceful metaphors”). Others, namely Best, seem resistant to this idea (Best, *Ephesians*, 343).

5 Petr Pokorný, *Colossians: A Commentary* (trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), 111. See also Eduard Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 93; Dunn, *Colossians and Philemon*, 142; Barth and Blanke, *Colossians*, 303.

6 Barth, *Ephesians* 1–3, 371; cf. Andrew T. Lincoln, *Ephesians* (WBC 42; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990), 207; O’Brien, *Ephesians*, 260. Similarly with reference to Col 2:7, Calvin notes: “for as a tree that has struck its roots deep and has sufficiency of support for withstanding all the assaults of winds and storms, so, if anyone is deeply and thoroughly fixed in Christ, as in a firm root, it will not be possible for him to be thrown down from his proper position by any machine of Satan” (John Calvin, *Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Philippians, Colossians, and Thessalonians* [trans. John Pringle; Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1851], 8).

7 Ernest Best, *Ephesians: A Shorter Commentary* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003), 166.

8 Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 93. It is interesting to compare this statement to the Louw–Nida lexicon, which places ριζώ only in the semantic domain “Able, Capable”—which seems to be a figurative or metaphorical sense (Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, *Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* [vol. 1; New York: United Bible Societies, 1988]).

should be raised with respect to the abstract meaning of the lexeme, its contextual relations, the rhetorical impact of the metaphor, and its mixing with architectural language.

In light of these comments, consider some initial observations with respect to Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17.

Ὡς οὖν παρελάβετε τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον, ἐν αὐτῷ περιπατεῖτε, ἔρριζωμένοι καὶ ἐποικοδομούμενοι ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ βεβαιούμενοι τῇ πίστει καθὼς ἐδιδάχθητε, περισσεύοντες ἐν εὐχαριστίᾳ (Col 2:6–7).

Three points can be made upon an initial observation of this passage. First, the “root” metaphor is relatively minor in terms of the flow of the passage’s argument, mentioned almost in passing and with no elaboration. Second, Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν appears to be the controlling feature of this clause complex, indicated by the pronominal repetition. Third, ἔρριζωμένοι is one of several lexical items that contributes to the metaphorical expression, resulting in a multifaceted description of how the believer is to relate to Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν. Finally, the preposition ἐν followed by αὐτῷ (acting as a spatial modifier) is critical in appreciating the metaphor and how it specifically relates to Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν.⁹

κατοικῆσαι τὸν Χριστὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν, ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἔρριζωμένοι καὶ τεθεμελιωμένοι, ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε καταλαβέσθαι σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἁγίοις τί τὸ πλάτος καὶ μήκος καὶ ὕψος καὶ βάθος (Eph 3:17–18).

Ephesians 3:17 is very similar to Col 2:7, to the extent that many of the observations made for that passage can be repeated here. The metaphor is relatively insignificant, serving as a minor modifier of the notion of Christ’s dwelling in the hearts of believers. Here also the “root” metaphor operates in conjunction with an additional lexical metaphor.¹⁰ Another similarity is the modification with the preposition ἐν, again denoting a spatial relationship. The object

9 See Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; BLG 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1992), 156–58, for a discussion of the function of the preposition ἐν. Porter suggests that the programmatic Pauline phrase ἐν Χριστῷ (in Christ) should be understood in the spatial category (159). It may be that ἐν αὐτῷ operates in the same way, perhaps serving as shorthand for this concept.

10 In fact, the combination itself is very similar to Col 2:7 inasmuch as the second lexeme seems to have architectural connotations. However, different lexemes are used in each passage.

of the preposition is different in this instance—ἀγάπη rather than αὐτῷ (which refers back to Christ). The prepositional phrase is located as a pre-modifier in this passage whereas it is positionally anterior in Col 2:7.

Despite the relative insignificance of the metaphors within their respective co-texts, they seem to have powerful implications with respect to how the larger passage is to be understood, thus raising several interesting questions regarding interpretive method and the content of the passages. (1) Though the typical semantic value of ἐρριζωμένοι is generally agreed upon, there is some discussion with respect to its marked viability.¹¹ Does its presence in a non-organic context imply marked usage or had the present formation become systematized? (2) Does the metaphor affect how the text is organized (especially in light of the participial forms and their relationship to the spatial modifier ἐν + dative noun construction)? (3) Is ῥίζα accurately understood within a botanical domain?¹² (4) How are these expressions internally coherent, and how do the individual metaphors impact one another in their co-text? And (5) how are the specific metaphorical formations constructive of community behaviours?

The Functionality of Metaphor

While conceptual and lexical approaches to metaphor tend to dominate general and biblical linguistics, systemic functional approaches broaden their view of metaphor to include the hybridization of domains at a variety of linguistic

11 Westfall notes that markedness “is concerned with the hierarchical nature of lexical and grammatical categories” (Cynthia Long Westfall, *A Discourse Analysis of the Letter to the Hebrews* [LNTS 297; London: T&T Clark, 2005], 33) and thus differentiates between marked and unmarked or more or less marked. Markedness adds texture to discourse and prominence to certain lexemes or phrases, etc., based on expectation (Westfall, *Hebrews*, 57). In this context, markedness is a feature dependent upon typicality or expectation. In terms of metaphorical analysis, metaphors are usually deemed to be marked based on their atypicality. However, when metaphors become normalized they lose their markedness value (Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberg, “Lexical Metaphor and Interpersonal Meaning,” in *Grammatical Metaphor: Views from Systemic Functional Linguistics* [ed. Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberg; CILT 236; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2003], 226). Descriptions of metaphor as marked or unmarked must therefore be sensitive to usage in diachronic perspective. Such sensitivity will play out in the forthcoming analysis.

12 Especially considering the fact that Louw–Nida does not include such a reference, at least with respect to the verbal form.

levels.¹³ Halliday's theorization of 'grammatical metaphor' has proven to be a useful way to understand the complex redeployment of linguistic resources. Nominalization is a particularly transparent example of the hybridization of grammatical categories.¹⁴ Unfortunately, the emphasis upon grammatical reconstructions has diverted attention from the assortment of ways in which language users combine domains in their communication. For example, Simon-Vandenberg has observed a penchant among functionalists for ignoring lexical metaphor altogether, rather than reincorporating it into the rubric of 'grammatical metaphor'.¹⁵

The terms 'literal' and 'metaphorical' frequently describe points on a spectrum that explain the relationship between lexemes (and the abstract concepts they represent) and co-texts in which they are deployed.¹⁶ Literalness

13 Note Halliday's use of the term 'semantic junction' and elsewhere 'semantic hybrid' (M.A.K. Halliday, "On Language in Relation to the Evolution of Human Consciousness," in *On Language and Linguistics* [ed. Jonathan J. Webster; London: Continuum, 2003] 419; M.A.K. Halliday, "Introduction: On the 'Architecture' of Human Language," in *On Language and Linguistics*, 22). Thus, junction is the primary quality of metaphor so that it can extend "from the lexis into the grammar, so that what is being 'shifted' is not a specific word—a lexical item—but a word class" (Halliday, "Introduction," 22). At least on that occasion, Halliday is unaware of the limits to which metaphor can extend. See Paul J. Thibault, *Agency and Consciousness in Discourse: Self-Other Dynamics as a Complex System* (London: Continuum, 2004), 149–52, on sound metaphor, and my own work on graphological metaphor (Gregory P. Fewster, "Nomina Sacra and Multimodal Semiosis in Early Christian Material Culture," paper presented at the Congress of the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies, Brock University, St Catharines, ON, 25 May 2014).

14 Nominalization occurs when one expresses a process meaning as a noun rather than a verb (the typical means of doing so). As a result, a certain amount of 'thing-ness' is added to the experience of the process. See Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 656–57; Geoff Thompson, *Introducing Functional Grammar* (2nd ed.; London: Hodder Education, 2004) 231–35; L.J. Ravelli, "Grammatical Metaphor: An Initial Analysis," in *Pragmatics, Discourse and Text* (ed. Erich H. Steiner and Robert Veltman; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1988), 134; and Liesbet Heyvaert, "Nominalization as Grammatical Metaphor: On the Need for a Radically Systemic and Metafunctional Approach," in *Grammatical Metaphor*, 65–100; Thibault, *Agency*, 260–64.

15 Simon-Vandenberg, "Lexical Metaphor and Interpersonal Meaning," 224.

16 See Francois Recanati, *Literal Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 68–77; Miriam Taverniers, "Grammatical Metaphor in SFL: A Historiography of the Introduction and Initial Study of the Concept," in *Grammatical Metaphor*, 7. Consider use of the lexeme "swallow" in the phrase "the pop machine just swallowed my coin." The word here does not conform to typical usage and thus is deemed metaphorical. (That is, referring to a physical process of transferring chewed food from the mouth to the stom-

assumes a certain degree of naturalness and typicality of expression, while metaphoricality reflects a disjunction of domains. sFL positions language as a dialectic of concrete expressions embedded within and organized into more abstract patterns of social activity. From this perspective we can see that the usual way of talking about metaphor is on the basis of how concepts can be deployed in different linguistic environments. On the other hand, discussions of grammatical metaphor attend to how ‘meanings’ can be arranged according to various grammatical abstracta.¹⁷ ‘Congruence’ thus describes the more common (i.e., evolutionarily prior) arrangements of ‘meaning’ in distinction to the label ‘literal.’¹⁸ In both cases, the result is a text that produces hybrid complexes of meaning through overlapping domains.

These descriptions, unfortunately, lend themselves to fairly isolated views of ‘meaning’ and metaphorical construals, in contrast to Taverniers’ observation that “it is hard to find alternative expressions of a given meaning which only differ from one another in one lexeme.”¹⁹ Therefore, I will emphasize two important correctives. (1) Metaphor must be organized at least at the level of the clause or clause-complex vis-à-vis the interaction of lower-ranking linguistic resources. (2) Metaphor problematizes a straightforward form–meaning relationship internal to discourse (even a polysemous one), since metaphor

ach. This description highlights a lexical metaphorical perspective inasmuch as the comparison is between the instantial variation of the lexeme ‘swallow.’)

17 Taverniers calls this the ‘view from below’ and the ‘view from above’ (Taverniers, “Grammatical Metaphor in sFL,” 6; cf. M.A.K. Halliday and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, *Construing Experience through Meaning: A Language-based Approach to Cognition* [Open Linguistics Series; London: Continuum, 1999], 232).

18 As Thibault emphatically states, congruent and literal are not the same thing (Thibault, *Agency*, 264). Literalness assumes some sort of fixed (and maximal) lexical meaning which is “extended” by new contextual mappings. Congruency does not assume such fixity in form–meaning relationships but refers to a more basic and straightforward relationship between form and meaning (cf. Halliday, “Introduction,” 21; Taverniers, “Grammatical Metaphor in sFL,” 13). This is seen as a ‘soft’ coupling, capable of redistribution. In *Creation Language*, 85, my taxonomy of lexicogrammatical metaphor utilizes the terminology of congruent (and not literal), potentially giving the impression that ‘congruent’ and ‘literal’ do essentially the same thing. In spite of any previous confusion, I wish to emphasize ‘congruent vs. metaphorical’ as a better model than ‘literal vs. metaphorical’. While the notion of evolutionary priority is difficult to sustain, especially with respect to purely epigraphic languages (i.e., Hellenistic Greek), the soft coupling implied by congruence is important.

19 Taverniers, “Grammatical Metaphor in sFL,” 6.

implies a renegotiation of the organization of linguistic resources.²⁰ Such renegotiation only occurs insofar as texts are materially embedded within social activities—meaning-making occurs as an interactive process of language *use* (hence the dialectic of text in context). This process view of semiosis is what enables social agents to manipulate and be manipulated by discourse. To bring this back to metaphor itself, a discursive formation that involves the junction of domains (a metaphor) is comprehensible because of potential formations that lie behind that particular instance of text. A metaphorical expression is an emerging pattern of creative linguistic organization.²¹

Lexicogrammatical Realizations of Domain Junction

Regarding the first “corrective” that I mentioned, it is helpful to exemplify how metaphor might be organized in discourse. First, consider the clause *Jim is a rock*. This same expression could be more ‘congruently’ expressed as *Jim is reliable*. Lexical metaphor compares the nominal *rock* plus the indefinite article *a* in contrast to the word *reliable*, such that Jim’s reliability has been reconstrued in terms of a more concrete real-world object. Grammatical metaphor observes additional features of this junction beyond lexical shift, extending to the grammar of the clause. The congruent phrase *Jim is reliable* realizes the value [+QUALITY]. The metaphorical expression, however, construes this [QUALITY] in terms of [+THING] and thus realizes [QUALITY+THING]. Yet even this description still focuses on domain junction organized at the word or word-group. The only reason why [+QUALITY] is superimposed onto [+THING] is because of the larger clausal structure. To associate a person, realized in the lexical grammar by the proper noun *Jim*, with the lexeme *rock* does not accord with the typical co-textual environment of the lexeme *rock*. Further, metaphor enables different syntactic relationships viz. new process–participant configurations.

That metaphor operates at the clause or clause-complex is demonstrable for the Greek language as well as English. A straightforward grammatical metaphor in Col 1:15, followed by its congruent agnate in the following verse provides a good example.²² In what is arguably an embedded hymn to Christ, the writer includes the relative clause ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου,

20 See Thibault, *Agency*, 255.

21 See Thibault, *Agency*, 312–13.

22 Taverniers, “Grammatical Metaphor in SFL,” 8. See also Thompson, *Functional Grammar*, 224, who suggests that comparing agnate lexicogrammatical construals is worthwhile for clarifying the effect of metaphor on an utterance. It is most helpful when this comparison is available in real instances of language use.

πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως ('who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every created thing'), followed by ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς . . . ('since in him everything was created in the heavens and upon the earth . . .'). In v. 16 the process of creation is congruently realized in the verbal group ἐκτίσθη, enabling the content of that which was created to be realized as the subject. However, in v. 14, the process of creation is nominalized with the effect that it no longer is realized as a predicator—it functions as part of the complement along with several other modifiers. In fact, v. 15 uses two nouns to qualify what or who Christ is: image and firstborn, each of which is given further definition by nominal groups. Πάσης κτίσεως defines the kind of “firstborn” that Christ is. The lexicogrammatical reconfiguration of the “creation” in Col 1:15 and 16 enables the reader to experience Christ’s relationship to creation first as an attributed characteristic and subsequently with additional participant roles, i.e., things in heavens and on the earth. Domain junction and clausal structure work together to enable language users to contextualize a particular reality in the “real world.”

Metaphor and the Functional Diversity of Language

A more precise interpretation of the effects of domain junction at the clause level is enabled by attending to how the different functions of language are activated in the alternative lexicogrammatical construals. By now, the functionality of language is commonly described by SFL in terms of three overarching functions of language—the ideational, interpersonal, and textual metafunctions—the two former being commonly invoked.²³ Ideational metaphors are often understood in terms of transitivity,²⁴ and allow the language user to “transform [one’s] experience of the world.”²⁵ Halliday suggests that ideational metaphor tends to “downgrade” an expression in the sense that it simplifies how the reader experiences the message.²⁶ In particular, ideational metaphor enables the reconstrual of participant–process relationships (cf. the above comments on Col 1:15–16). Interpersonal metaphor involves the

23 Thompson suggests the presence of textual metaphor as well. However, he notes that it is questionable, and that it differs from Halliday’s understanding (Thompson, *Functional Grammar*, 235). Even so, the textual-organizational element may be a significant motivation for employing lexicogrammatical metaphor, for example, in terms of the ability to modify a particular lexeme (see below).

24 Taverniers, “Grammatical Metaphor in SFL,” 8; Thompson, *Functional Grammar*, 224.

25 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 646.

26 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 646. Halliday notes that this is a rank-shift, for example, a move from clause-nexus to clause, or phrase to word, etc.

reconstruction of participant engagement through mood shifting or the use of attitudinal lexemes. While interpersonal metaphor is interesting and a significant resource in communication, it is not directly relevant for “root” metaphors in Colossians and Ephesians and must be left for now.²⁷ More relevant for the present study is how metaphors, both ideational and interpersonal, have repercussions for how a discourse is organized and structured. This invokes the textual metafunction, implying that metaphor may be used to enable the thematization of a particular clausal constituent or contribute to cohesion at the discourse level.²⁸

Novel Metaphor and its Systematization

Halliday notes that “all grammatical metaphors begin as instantial, created in response to the needs of the unfolding discourse.”²⁹ The reconfiguration of lexicogrammatical resources in discourse stimulates emergent levels of discursive organization. These result from experimentation and play relative to the material embeddedness of communication in its ecosocial environment. While initially emergent, these configurations become normalized in human interactions and are included into the systemized meaning-potential of a language. Many theorists understand such ‘dead’ or ‘systemized’ metaphors to lose their markedness value or rhetorical force.³⁰ It is true that novel metaphor is initially powerful for a language user’s conceptualization of a real world process or event. However, the terminology of ‘dead’ metaphor too strongly attributes a lack of enduring utility to metaphor. By constructing domain junction, more competent language users—as opposed to learners—enact their

27 Further discussion on interpersonal metaphor can be found in Simon-Vandenberg, “Lexical Metaphor and Interpersonal Meaning”; Thibault, *Agency*, 273–78; Fewster, *Creation Language*, 80–81; and Zachary K. Dawson, “Language as Negotiation: Toward a Systemic Functional Model for Ideological Criticism with Application to James 2:1–13,” in this volume.

28 See, Halliday and Matthiessen, *Construing Experience*, 238–42; Thibault, *Agency*, 282–83.

29 M.A.K. Halliday, “Language and Knowledge: The ‘Unpacking’ of Text,” in *Text in Education and Society* (ed. Lionel Desmond Allison et al.; Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1998), 169. These can be called ‘dynamic’ metaphors.

30 Halliday, “Language and Knowledge,” 169; Ravelli, “Grammatical Metaphor,” 142; D.A. Cruse, *Lexical Semantics* (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 41–44. It appears as though this is especially the case within scientific discourse. Metaphorical expressions become technical terms. At this point they die or become frozen and can no longer be unpacked. Note, however, that normalcy does not necessarily determine congruency. It follows that congruent expressions can become the less-expected mode of expression over time.

ability to creatively construe their experience of the world and negotiate interpersonal relationships. Linguistic ability of this sort creatively incorporates domain junction (even junction that has become systemized) into a clause with other linguistic resources, constructing new and emerging ways of symbolizing the world.³¹

Corpus Linguistics and the Interpretation of Domain Junction

I mentioned above that domain junction is intertextually interpreted by language users in relation to alternative discursive formations. Especially with respect to metaphor that relies primarily on lexical semantic junction, readers interpret in light of what Lemke calls “pattern matching” in situational activity.³² Parallel to Lemke’s suggestion is the more general observation, made by corpus linguists, that keywords are embedded in fairly typical linguistic patterns, ranging in complexity and significance. Teubert’s definition of intertextuality as “the recurrence of selected keywords,”³³ may be overly simplistic. However, we should attend to the fact that the use and interpretation of a word in a text operates in relation to previous linguistic behaviour and the typically-employed patterns therein.³⁴ If domain junction helps construct emerging levels of discursive organization in contrast to previous linguistic behaviour, then the interpretation of this junction could be aided by a model designed to classify instances of language in use. This is precisely what corpus linguistics is designed to do.

In corpus studies, collocation typically has been the most widely recognized feature of lexis. In an effort to explain collocation, corpus theorists have identified several related (and equally meaningful) phenomena.³⁵ Collocation

31 This is a relevant observation with respect to the emergent nature of ‘Christian’ ideologies that developed in part from their sacred texts and communities’ reception of those texts. See Gregory P. Fewster, “Symbolizing Identity and the Role of Texts: Proposals, Prospects, and Some Comments on the Eucharistic Meal,” *BAGL* 2 (2013): 81–108.

32 Jay L. Lemke, “Intertextuality and Text Semantics,” in *Discourse in Society: Systemic Functional Perspectives: Meaning and Choice: Studies for Michael Halliday* (ed. Peter H. Fries and Michael Gregory; Advances in Discourse Processes; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1995), 88–91 (89).

33 Wolfgang Teubert, “Parole-Linguistics and the Diachronic Dimension of the Discourse,” in *Text, Discourse and Corpora: Theory and Analysis* (ed. Michael Hoey et al.; Studies in Corpus and Discourse; London: Continuum, 2007), 80.

34 For more discussion on this point, see Gregory P. Fewster, “Testing the Intertextuality of ματαιότης in the New Testament,” *BAGL* 1 (2012): 40–42.

35 See Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 38–39, 576–78, who notes collocation especially in terms of its textual function; Thompson, *Functional Grammar*, 40; Matthew Brook

can also be broadened to include semantic relationships that are not necessarily realized by the same lexeme all the time. Sinclair refers to this as “semantic preference,” while Hoey prefers the term “semantic association.”³⁶ An example of a semantic association in the Hellenistic Greek is the common co-occurrence of βαπτίζω (I baptize, immerse) with lexemes relating to water, such as ποταμός, κλύδων, and ὕδωρ. Colligation describes the patterning of a keyword with certain grammatical structures, rather than identifying the co-occurrence of lexeme with lexeme.³⁷ For example, the Greek word ὑπακοή (obedience) is typically followed by a genitive.

Hoey proposes that language users unconsciously create associations between particular words and other words, domains, grammatical constructions, etc. in their social activities and exposure to linguistic formations.³⁸ These patterns (and there are several more not mentioned here)³⁹ center around a particular lexeme and become systematized within a language.⁴⁰

O'Donnell, *Corpus Linguistics and the Greek New Testament* (NTM 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2005), 315, 332; Hoey, *Lexical Priming: A New Theory of Words and Language* (London: Routledge, 2005), 1–15, in which collocation is foundational to his entire theory (see below); Michael Hoey, “Corpus-driven Approaches to Grammar: The Search for Common Ground,” in *Exploring the Lexis-Grammar Interface* (ed. Ute Römer and Rainer Schultze; SCL 35; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009), 33–47, who seeks to find common ground between various theories wishing to explain the phenomenon of collocation.

36 John Sinclair, *Trust the Text: Language, Corpus and Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2004), 142. Cf. Hoey, *Lexical Priming*, 13, 24; and Lemke, “Intertextuality and Text Semantics,” 89.

37 Hoey, *Lexical Priming*, 13, 38–62; Sinclair, *Trust the Text*, 142.

38 In *Creation Language*, 61, I was hesitant to fully adopt the “psychological component” of Hoey’s priming theory. However, psychological association of this type still seems to be mediated by language as a means of social (inter)action. The cognitive associations between lexical items and other larger-scale linguistic items form due to the embeddedness of text in human behaviour and is thus ecosocially constructed. Thus, priming theory adheres closely to some of the social semiotic trajectories set in Paul J. Thibault, *Brain, Mind and the Signifying Body: An Ecosocial Semiotic Theory* (Open Linguistics Series; London: Continuum, 2004) and developed further in Thibault, *Agency*.

39 See discussion of the various types of linguistic patterning that are observable in a corpus in Fewster, *Creation Language*, 58–68.

40 Hoey, *Lexical Priming*, 8. Sinclair also notes that “a word becomes associated with a meaning through its repeated occurrence in a similar context,” and further that “what happens in everyday language is that the meaning of the word and parts of its immediate context become inseparable” (Sinclair, *Trust the Text*, 161). The stereotyping of patterns can be accomplished in a number of ways. Standardized education, common significant texts (religious or otherwise), particular media (popular television show, news channel), etc., provide some examples. See Hoey, *Lexical Priming*, 48.

Corpus observations aim to produce linguistic generalizations to which specific instantiations in a discourse can be compared.

With this in mind, I will proceed to outline the findings of a corpus linguistic analysis of the *ρίζα* word family in Greek literature. Attention will be given to the types of patterns I have briefly outlined, which will demonstrate the types of patterns with which Greek writers typically utilized the word.

Corpus Observations

This section reflects the compilation and classification of data from a diachronic corpus of over a hundred occurrences, which reveals typical and thus predictable lexicogrammatical patterns associated with the key word. The following notation will be used in relevant examples, mainly included in footnotes. Bold type face will indicate the keyword and its collocates, SMALL CAPS indicate categories of semantic association, while *italics* will specify lexemes that make up a particular semantic association.

Diachronic analysis quickly reveals the predominant manner of usage for the *ρίζα* word family. Both noun (*ρίζα*) and verb (*ρίζω*) forms are typically deployed when the writer is writing about concrete, organic roots or actions pertaining to roots.⁴¹ These co-texts are characterized by the semantic association ORGANIC GROWTH.⁴² Lexemes denoting trees, branches, earth, crops, etc., frequently appear in the appropriate co-textual range. ORGANIC GROWTH is realized by a number of collocates, the most prominent ones being the noun *γῆ* ('earth,' often denoting the location of the roots),⁴³ and the noun *δένδρον*.⁴⁴ The patterned usage of the *ρίζα* word family alongside other organic lexemes is suggestive of its congruent pattern of realization.

41 In broad strokes, the patterns of use of both forms are fairly consistent with each other. As will be shown below, the grammatical category of each lexeme has implications for its ability to participate in domain junction.

42 See for example, Homer, *Od.* 7.121, *ἔνθα δὲ οἱ πολύκαρπος ἄλωγῃ ἐρρίζωται*; Plato, *Soph.* 265c, *καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ρίζων φύεται*; Diodorus Siculus 4.45.3, *ἐκτραπέσαν ἐξευρεῖν ρίζων παντοίας φύσεις*.

43 See, for example, Isa 40:24 (LXX): *οὐδὲ μὴ ρίζωθῇ εἰς τὴν γῆν ἢ ρίζα*.

44 See, for example, Dan 4:26 (Th.): *ἑάσατε τὴν τῶν ρίζων τοῦ δένδρου*. More specific trees also collocate with *ρίζα/ρίζω*, such as *φηγός* (see Apollonius Rhodius, *Argon.* 1.1122), *πτελέην* (see Homer, *Il.* 21.243), and *συκή* (see Mark 11:20). These specific types of trees are too random and variable to be true collocates and are better included under the umbrella of the semantic association ORGANIC GROWTH.

Genre plays an important part in the lexicogrammatical patterning of the ῥίζα word family.⁴⁵ The first genre of note (though primarily limited to the writings of Theophrastus) is a botanical genre, that is to say, literature devoted to botanical description.⁴⁶ The TLG database contains over 500 occurrences of the nominal form as well as 34 occurrences of verbal forms.⁴⁷ Some of these seem to maintain the typical semantic associations and collocates mentioned above.

Perhaps more interesting is the medical genre. Numerous Greek authors write in this register from Hippocrates (fifth century BCE) into, at least, the late Koine period. Though the verb form does not frequent this register, the noun form is abundant. Three writers alone make up over 3000 occurrences in the TLG.⁴⁸ It seems as though ῥίζα functions congruently, signifying roots in use for their medicinal properties.⁴⁹ Furthermore, occurrences often appear in close proximity with the collocate φάρμακον.⁵⁰ The overwhelming use of the ῥίζα family in both botanical and medical genres, and especially across a large span of time, demonstrates how the ῥίζα family is congruently deployed in discourse—to designate an organic root or process of rooting. The diachronic extent of this usage is significant. It appears in texts as far back

45 Genre is a highly debated category among systemic linguists and here is not the place to enter this discussion. For the present purposes, Lemke's description of genre as patterned language use at the context of culture is sufficient: "A literary genre of a period is a semiotic formation; so also is an architectural style and type of building, a religious ritual, a typical holiday meal, the making of a particular type of costume. All these formations are defined in terms of the regular patterning of *actions*, of *social meaningful practices*, that members of a community are engaged in when producing them" (Lemke, "Discourse, Dynamics, and Social Change," 245).

46 Theophrastus wrote around the third or fourth century BCE.

47 These numbers will vary depending on how one parses the form ῥιζών. It could either be a nominative masculine singular present active participle or genitive plural feminine noun. It appears as though most occurrences should be parsed as the latter, and thus I have included this form in the noun category. This will remain consistent in my description unless stated otherwise.

48 This is out of 12,151 total occurrences. Dioscorides Pedanius (writing in the first century CE) comes in at 1155 uses of the noun, Galen (writing in the second century CE) comes in at 1015 uses of the noun (not including the numerous occurrences in pseudo-Galen), and Oribasius (writing in the fourth century CE) comes in at 1209 uses of the noun. I should also note that Hippocrates uses the noun form over 200 times.

49 See, for example, Soranus, *Gynaecorium* 2.53.1, where it is suggested to bathe with τῶν ῥιζῶν τῆς ἀγρίας μολόκης.

50 The collocation pattern also occurs outside this genre (though still in description of medical practices). For example Strabo, *Geogr.* 15.1.70, describes the Pramnae people of the mountains who carry ῥιζῶν καὶ φαρμάκων in pouches.

as Homer and continues consistently through the Hellenistic period and into the late Koine period.⁵¹ The fact that this congruent patterning is consistent in the literature implies that any new lexicogrammatical patterns that emerged would have added complexity to the system of choices and enabled domain junction.

Atypical patterns of use can be seen very early on in the literature, even contemporary with what I have designated as typical.⁵² Notably, the *ρίζα* family still seems to be used primarily in concrete terms or with reference to physical objects. For example, authors write concerning the roots of hair or the roots of mountains.⁵³ One interesting pattern is the description of the removal of kingdoms by their ‘roots.’⁵⁴ This data suggests that, very early on, Greek language users were able to creatively deploy words in the *ρίζα* family in a variety of contexts and to describe a variety of real-world events. Hoey’s principle that alternate senses will avoid each other’s primings seems to hold true here.⁵⁵ Collocates such as *γῆ* and *δένδρον*, as well as lexemes of the domain ORGANIC GROWTH, avoid co-texts in which a junction of domains occurs.⁵⁶

51 It may be longer but my diachronic analysis did not stretch that far ahead. Consider this selection of examples (listed from oldest to most recent) and note the collocates or semantic associations: Homer, *Il.* 21.243 ὁ δὲ πτελέην ἔλε χερσὶν εὐφυνά μεγάλην ἢ δ’ ἐκ ριζῶν ἐριποῦσα κρημνὸν ἅπαντα διώσεν; Homer, *Od.* 7.122, ἔνθα δὲ οἱ πολύκαρος ἀλῶν ἑρρίζωται; Plato, *Soph.* 265c, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ’ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ριζῶν φύεται; Apollonius Rhodius, *Argon.* 1.1121–22, φηγοῖσιν ἐτηρεφὲς ἀκροποτάτησιν αἱ ῥά τε πασάνων πανυπέρταται ἑρρίζωνται; Wis 7:20, διαφοράς φυτῶν καὶ δυνάμεις ριζῶν; Diodorus Siculus 1.80.5, καὶ τῶν ριζῶν καὶ τῶν καυλῶν ἐλείων; 17.99.2, προβαλλόμενος δ’ ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν δένδρον τι παρ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος ἐρριζομένον; Strabo, *Geogr.* 15.4.19, ἔπειτα κατὰ γῆς διαδοθέντες ριζοῦσθαι; Plutarch, Sandbach fragment 104, τὸ δὲ φυτὸν ριζώθεν βλαστήσαι.

52 See Homer, *Od.* 13.61–64 as a prime example.

53 For a description of the roots of hair see Hippocrates, *Nat. puer.* 21.2, καὶ αἱ τρίχες ἐρρίζωθησαν. For descriptions of the roots of mountains, see Job 28:9, ἐν ἀκροτόμῳ ἐξέτεινεν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ, κατέστρεψεν δὲ ἐκ ριζῶν ὄρη.

54 For descriptions of uprooted kingdoms see Polybius, *Historiae* 36.9.7, βασιλεύσαντος ἐκ ριζῶν τὴν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν; Josephus, *Ant.* 9.181, ἀφεις ἐκ ριζῶν ἀν τὴν τῶν Σύρων βασιλείαν ἐξεῖλες. Lohse questions the botanical connotation of the *ρίζα* family, as he notes that there are some occurrences (particularly Sophocles, *Oed. col.* 1591) where the verb is used with reference to buildings (cf. Barth and Blanke, *Colossians*, 303 n. 17). He would therefore suggest that the “root” metaphor in Colossians next to an architectural metaphor is consistent with that trend (Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 93). My corpus research has revealed that the botanical sense is both typical and congruent.

55 See Hoey, *Lexical Priming*, 81–113; cf. Fewster, *Creation Language*, 69–70.

56 A notable exception can be seen in Philo, *Plant.* 3, γῆν μὲν καὶ ὕδωρ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἑρρίζου, τὰ δὲ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς δένδρα. . . . Two things should be noted. First, γῆν may be too far away from the key word to be considered a true collocate. Second, the close occurrence of τὰ

Interestingly, verbal and participial forms appear to have greater capability for variation, that is to say, the nominal form tends to function in typical contexts more often than the verb form (though not exclusively).

Metaphorical or figurative uses of the nominal form take place primarily within extended metaphors. The linguistic context thus forms two levels: the immediate co-text is consistent with typical use, while the peripheral linguistic environment implies atypicality. We find this pattern especially in the LXX,⁵⁷ New Testament, and the writings of Philo (primarily in his allegorical interpretation of Old Testament texts).⁵⁸ An interesting example of this pattern can be seen in the parable of the Sower in Matthew 13.⁵⁹ The first portion of the parable (vv. 1–9) describes a sower who casts seeds onto a variety of soils. Jesus is recorded as saying the seeds that fall upon rocky soil, though they grew quickly, were inevitably scorched by the sun and withered διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ῥίζαν. Later on in the pericope (vv. 18–23), Jesus proceeds to explain the parable, noting that the rocky soil represents the one who receives the word yet οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The latter expression is markedly metaphorical, as the alternate paradigmatic choices are realized in close syntagmatic proximity; a person—not a plant—is said to have no root.⁶⁰ Extended metaphors like these form an interesting class of expression, where a scene is depicted according to congruent patterns of realization and set in comparison with non-congruent patterns of realization. A better description of this larger-scale pattern is to view the parable and other modes of extended metaphor as an internally consistent unit (i.e., consistent with typical lexical usage, including typical primings), though distinguished as a metaphor by features in the larger linguistic context (such as

δένδρα seems too random. Even so, Hoey's principle does not claim to hold true 100% of the time (Fanie Tsiamita, "Polysemy and Lexical Priming," in *Exploring the Lexis-Grammar Interface* [ed. Ute Römer and Rainer Schultze; SCL 35; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009], 248; Hoey, *Lexical Priming*, 82).

57 See Ezek 17:9, Dan 4:15 (Th.), Jer 12:2, and Pss. Sol. 14.4.

58 See Philo's allegorical exegesis of Gen 21:33 in *Plant.* 74, of Gen 2:8 in *Mos.* 2.285, and of Gen 25:27 in *Plant.* 46.

59 Note that this example uses the noun form ῥίζα rather than the verb form. See also the parallel passages in Mark 4:1–9, 13–20, and Luke 8:4–15 (though Luke omits the use of ῥίζα in the initial parable).

60 Collins is probably right in describing this parable as an extended metaphor—though she discusses the Markan rendition (Adela Yarbro Collins, *Mark: A Commentary* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 2007], 245). The parable maintains a certain amount of metaphorical integrity inasmuch as its expression is consistent and does not digress into alternative descriptions of events or things.

an introduction or later explication).⁶¹ Analysis of these extended metaphors demands a breadth of attention when undertaking such corpus research. It is insufficient simply to analyze instances with no awareness of their function in the larger discourse unit. Proximate primed patterns are certainly important, yet they will always be contextualized in relation to unfolding discourse.

My brief study of the ῥιζα family reveals that these words are congruently deployed in botanical contexts, which is revealed by the semantic association ORGANIC GROWTH (and the relevant collocates), especially within the medical genre. In Greek literature, metaphorical usage of the ῥιζα family is contemporaneous to the earliest congruent instances of use. That roots provide stability for their organism was a particularly useful characteristic to apply to other things and concepts. In these cases, the nominal form seems to be preferred by writers when deployed congruently, whereas the verbal form is more likely to be used when domains are put in junction. These observations are useful in the analysis of the “root” metaphors found in Eph 3:17 and Col 2:7.

“Root” Metaphors in Colossians 2:7 and Ephesians 3:17

I now turn to an analysis of the specific instances of the “root” metaphor in Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17. As I have noted above, there are many similar features in both passages, features that will be treated together. On the other hand, there are enough differences that they deserve some level of separate analysis; it is with these differences that I will begin.

“Root” Metaphor in Colossians 2

Colossians 2:6–7 marks the beginning of what might be called the epistle’s paraenetic section, especially as regards defense against false teaching.⁶² The author begins to express certain behaviours that he desires his audience to embrace and to act upon. The letter’s intended recipients are represented in the 2nd person imperative and indicative verbs that appear throughout.

61 These patterns seem to be consistent with Philo’s allegories, in which he initially describes the Old Testament pattern to be explicated, as well as extended metaphors in older Jewish writings. For example, Nebuchadnezzar’s dream in Daniel 4 begins as a unit that seems to be internally consistent. However, Daniel’s later explanation reveals that certain elements have alternate, non-literal, referents.

62 See O’Brien, *Colossians, Philemon*, 195; Dunn, *Colossians and Philemon*, 136; Barth and Blanke, *Colossians*, 299.

A secondary participant, Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, functions as the complement of the first verb (παρελάβετε) and as a relator for subsequent processes through the phrase ἐν αὐτῷ. The use of the 2nd person plurals, and especially the imperative form περιπατεῖτε, is a rather direct means of encouraging particular actions, mitigated somewhat by the comparative construction ὡς οὖν παρελάβετε. As is pointed out by many authors, the ideational metafunction is realized primarily by the verbal structure of discourse.⁶³ There are several verbal forms in this clause complex. These verbs (and participles) grammaticalize [PROCESS] meanings as well as verbal aspect. An interesting texture is created by these forms, a point that Lightfoot picks up as he draws attention to what he views as expressive tense-shifting.⁶⁴ Three tense-forms occur within this clause complex: aorist, present, and perfect. The two aorist indicatives παρελάβετε and ἐδιδάχθητε provide background material—two underlying processes that provide the foundation for the others. The present περιπατεῖτε, also marked with the imperative mood, is thus fore-grounded, together with three participles. Surprisingly, it is the participle ἐρριζωμένοι in the embedded clause modifying ἐν αὐτῷ περιπατεῖτε that appears in the perfect tense-form and is thus front-grounded. Some commentators offer brief remarks regarding the choice of the perfect tense. For example, Sumney writes that the perfect tense implies that the “previous implanting in Christ continues to sustain them.”⁶⁵ A better explanation may be that the participle articulates a state of “being rooted” in which the Colossians are to “walk in him.”⁶⁶ There is clear aspectual contrast between ἐρριζωμένοι and ἐποικοδομοῦμενοι, which may suggest that the “root” metaphor takes precedence over the ‘building’ metaphor in the mind of the author; one must be rooted before they can be built up. This

63 See Thompson, *Functional Grammar*, 87; Ravelli, “Grammatical Metaphor,” 134; cf. Jeffrey T. Reed, *A Discourse Analysis of Philippians: Method and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity* (JSNTSup 136; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 62–63.

64 J.B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon: A Revised Text with Introduction, Notes, and Dissertations* (5th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1880), 176. Here I adopt Porter's basic grounding scheme for the Greek tense-forms (see esp. Porter, *Idioms*, 23).

65 Jerry L. Sumney, *Colossians: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 128. A similar assertion is made by Best with reference to Ephesians. He notes that “the perfect tense of the participle implies a condition which came into existence in the past and still continues” (Best, *Ephesians*, 342). See related comments in O'Brien, *Colossians, Philemon*, 107; Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 93; Barth and Blanke, *Colossians*, 303; T.K. Abbott, *Epistle to the Ephesians and to the Colossians* (1CC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897), 244.

66 I assume here, along with MacDonald (*Colossians and Ephesians*, 88), that the participles function adverbially.

‘mixed’ metaphor is pronounced in relation to other nearby verbal features, which suggests that it adds important detail to the author’s paraenesis.

“Root” Metaphor in *Ephesians* 3

The location of the “root” metaphor in *Ephesians* differs somewhat from *Colossians*. *Ephesians* 3:14–19 consists of a brief prayer offered to the Father (πρὸς τὸν πατέρα) by the author on behalf of his audience prior to the paraenesis of the letter. The divisions of this “long unwieldy sentence” are marked by three hortatory ἵνα + subjunctive constructs—the author prays in order that a certain outcome may be accomplished.⁶⁷ The participant structure here is more complicated than in *Colossians*, mediated through first, second, and third person verbs, signifying a mesh of interpersonal relationships. The verb κάμπτω contains the only first person reference, appearing at the introduction of the prayer. From that point on, the participant structure is clearly partitioned. Τὸν πατέρα becomes the subject of the first ἵνα + subjunctive construct (ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε) and is then carried on by pronouns throughout the clause. The rest of the prayer then shifts the person references to the second person—the benefactors of the prayer. It is in the first ἵνα + subjunctive clause complex that the “root” metaphor occurs. Here, the subjunctive δῶ initiates a catenative construction, requiring further specification from the two infinitives.⁶⁸ Thus, the author has two sub-requests in this first request, depending on how one takes the syntactical relationship of the participles. More than in *Col* 2:7, the case (and the resulting syntax) of the participles is brought into question. If these participles are truly modifying the indicative–infinitive request(s), one might expect a genitive or dative (adding [+RESTRICTION] or [+RELATION]). However, the nominative case breaks any syntactical relation to the preceding clause.⁶⁹ As a result, it has been suggested that this clause

67 Best, *Ephesians*, 345. The constructs are ἵνα δῶ (3:16), ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε (3:18), and ἵνα πληρωθῇτε (3:19). Foster provides a helpful diagram in this regard (Foster, “A Temple,” 88). He makes the interesting argument that this entire prayer employs very articulate Temple-imagery that envisions the building up of the Ephesian church into God’s temple. The “mixed metaphor” (see above) therefore would act as one feature of this larger metaphor.

68 See Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 197, 205–207, though Lincoln sees the participial construct as a third request almost at the same level as the infinitives. The following ἵνα + subjunctive construct (vv. 18–19) employs a similar structure, i.e., a semantically empty verb followed by two complementary infinitives.

69 See Barth, *Ephesians* 1–3, 371–72; Frank Thielman, *Ephesians* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 231. For a comprehensive evaluation of various positions on this issue see Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 483–84.

modifies or leads into the subsequent ἵνα + subjunctive construct.⁷⁰ As Porter points out, this construction is not uncommon, though it continues to cause some difficulty in its explanation.⁷¹ One suggestion is that it may “serve as a topic marker or shifter which does not become grammatically entangled in the main construction.”⁷² If this holds here, ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἐρριζωμένοι καὶ τεθεμελιωμένοι may indeed relate to/modify what follows rather than what precedes. On the other hand, the construction may “draw attention to an item in the main clause which would otherwise be overlooked.”⁷³ Thus, the clause may function adverbially, adding [+MANNER] to the preceding verbal structure. In any case, it is best to appreciate the independent nature of this construct—as a “parenthetical interjection”—which, while not syntactically related to any immediate structures, may provide comment on the indwelling of Christ and the “strength to comprehend.”⁷⁴ This is reasonable, especially given the use of the heavily marked perfect tense-forms, which stand out against the proximate aorists. Far from being ‘lost in the mix’ (given the density and convolution of prepositional modifiers, etc.), the abrupt tense-shifting in the immediate co-text brings the ‘mixed’ metaphor to the front-ground of the entire prayer.⁷⁵ As in Col 2:7, it seems important to the author to highlight these metaphorical processes. On the other hand, it is both participles that are front-grounded here. This points to a triple domain junction that attributes to comprehension and the indwelling of Christ the stability that is characteristic of plant roots and the foundations of buildings.

70 Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 197, cf. O'Brien, *Ephesians*, 260; Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 483.

71 Porter, *Idioms*, 85. For discussion of hanging nominatives see also A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in Light of Historical Research* (3rd ed; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1919), 1130, 1132–35; Maximilian Zerwick, *Biblical Greek: Illustrated by Examples* (trans. Joseph Smith; Rome: Scripta Pontifica Instituti Biblici, 1963) 9 (he only discusses nominative absolutes); Wallace, *Grammar*, 49–54, 654.

72 Porter, *Idioms*, 86.

73 Porter, *Idioms*, 86. Wallace may go too far in suggesting that the pendent nominative focuses attention on the main topic of the sentence in terms of emphasis or emotion (see Wallace, *Grammar*, 52). Even so, seeing this construction as a resource for drawing the readers' attention seems accurate.

74 See Thielman, *Ephesians*, 232, who insists that reading the participles as finite verbs is recommended. However, as Porter points out, the function of the participle does not really change whether or not it is read as a finite verb or anacoluthon (*Idioms*, 184).

75 Commentators make fewer remarks regarding the perfect tense-form here than they do with respect to Ephesians. However, Hoehner notes the “resulting state” emphasized by the perfect (*Ephesians*, 484). Notably, Hoehner relies on Fanning's approach to the Greek verbal system (see Buist Fanning, *Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], 416–18).

Why 'Rooting' Metaphor?

In light of the details particular to each passage, it is worth investigating the significance of the use of the "root" metaphor in general. Of primary concern is the author's lexical choice, namely, the choice of *ρίζω* over alternative realizations of *stability* through lexis.⁷⁶ An immediate choice is the verb *στηρίζω*, though its formal similarity to *ρίζω* is worth noting. Brief analysis of the lexeme reveals distinct usage from that of *ρίζω* in terms of collocates and semantic associations, though it is still used in relatively concrete contexts. Even so, it is noteworthy that these lexemes are somewhat interchangeable in the literature. Sirach includes an instance in which these paradigmatic variants are used in nearby co-texts, with both realizing *stability*. In Sir 24:10, lady wisdom describes her establishment in Zion (καὶ οὕτως ἐν Σιων ἐστηρίχθην), while further on in 24:12 she describes her taking root among glorified people (καὶ ἐρρίζωσα ἐν λαῷ δεδοξασμένῳ). The first instance uses the verb *στηρίζω*, while the second uses *ρίζω*. Both expressions convey similar concepts, namely, Wisdom's dwelling in a particular locale (as indicated by the preposition ἐν + dative noun). The author seems comfortable with moving freely between various lexical realizations of this expression. Other lexical choices available to Greek speakers/writers yield similar patterns.⁷⁷ The congruent patterns of realization for the *ρίζα* family help motivate metaphorical use elsewhere. If Thompson is correct that, in ideational metaphor, congruent and metaphorical expressions are experienced simultaneously,⁷⁸ the lexical choices in Eph 3:17 and Col 2:7 are made in order to generate domain junction. Readers were likely to integrate the concrete stability afforded by plant roots to their walking in Christ (in Col 2:7) and the indwelling of Christ.

Metaphor is not restricted to lexical choice. Taking my cues from grammatical metaphor theory, I have argued that metaphor operates at the clause level (at least) and incorporates the reorganization of lexical and grammatical constituents. Commentators have few problems with the lexical choice in Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17, yet use of the nominative participle causes some questions for interpreters. Deignan's corpus-based research on plant and animal metaphors in English has resulted in observations that are also appreciable for ancient Greek. She writes: "There are many words that have pairs of meanings, apparently related to each other by metaphor, that are not the same part of speech."⁷⁹

⁷⁶ The Louw–Nida lexicon provides a large number of synonyms.

⁷⁷ For example, the choice of the lexeme *στερεόω*.

⁷⁸ See Thompson, *Functional Grammar*, 224.

⁷⁹ Alice Deignan, "The Grammar of Linguistic Metaphors," in *Corpus-based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy* (ed. Anatol Stefanowitsch and Stefan Th. Gries; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006), 109.

For plant and animal words, nominal forms are found in “literal” contexts, while verbal forms make up the majority of “metaphorical” contexts.⁸⁰ In my corpus analysis of the ῥίζα family, congruent and metaphorical realizations were skewed in the same direction.

In spite of SFL’s preoccupation with nominalization, verbalization seems to be an important means of enabling some types of domain junction. Verbalization facilitates the reconstrual of experience, such that the process of ‘rooting’ (i.e., what roots do for a plant) can be attributed to some agent or used to describe some sort of action. In the case of Eph 3:17 and Col 2:7, adding description to an action is a primary function for the participle. The participle also plays a role in the textual organization of the discourse. Similar modes of description would involve more complex and ambiguous structures (such as ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἔχων ῥίζαν καὶ θεμέλιον for Eph 3:17).

In Col 2:7, as most commentators have pointed out, ἐρριζωμένοι appears in an atypical co-text with evident domain junction. The identification of a mixed metaphor may be accurate as well, inasmuch as the coordination of ἐρριζωμένοι and ἐποικοδομοῦμενοι realizes a more robust and diverse experience of *stability*.⁸¹ Lohse’s suggestion that ἐρριζωμένοι loses most of its meaning with its placement next to ἐποικοδομοῦμενοι should be rejected for several reasons.⁸² While the agriculture-architecture image is well-defined, the occurrence of the congruent application of the ῥίζα family in contemporaneous literature is high, enabling clear domain junction. The application of this type of junction to “walking in Christ” in particular is creative and experientially significant. Further, the perfect tense-form of ἐρριζωμένοι is more prominent than the subsequent present participle. A better alternative is to view this pattern of realization as a contoured and complex junction of domains. The Colossian *ekklesia* can identify their “walk in Christ” with a particular manner or quality, i.e., having their root and foundation in Christ. This metaphor becomes especially relevant in the context of false teaching, where the danger of being wooed by τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης (Col 2:8) is immediate.

Similar observations can be made with respect to the lexical choice in Eph 3:17, as the junction of ἐρριζωμένοι in the context of love provides a concrete

80 For example, in a corpus search of 229 total occurrences of the lexeme *blossom*, the “literal” sense was realized in 167 nominal forms and 5 verbal forms. On the other hand, the “metaphorical” sense was realized in 2 nominal forms and 55 verbal forms (see Deignan, “Grammar of Metaphors,” 109).

81 This counters Best’s hesitation to assign this clause a “mixed metaphor” status. See Best, *Ephesians*, 343.

82 See Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 93 n. 8.

experience for the readers. The mixing of metaphors is more striking in this instance compared to Col 2:7, given that both of the participles are in the perfect. The use of the participle is explicable through the notion of verbalization, which is common to plant domains. In this case, the stability metaphor is not employed as a counter to the pressures of false-teaching. Instead, it serves to comment on the features of Paul's intercessory prayer, fixing the actions and characteristics of the recipients in love. The creativity of the metaphor is no less striking than the occurrence in Colossians. The application of triple domain junction is relatively consistent with other instances of conceptual variation between the two epistles.

Conclusion

The "root" metaphors in Col 2:7 and Eph 3:17 are interesting examples of how metaphor functions in texts. An overemphasis on lexical or grammatical aspects of metaphor is an unfortunate distraction from how metaphor operates on the level of the clause or complex, involving the reorganization of the lexical and grammatical elements that work together to promote domain junction. Domain junction occurs because of language users' ability to construct emerging levels of discursive organization using a relatively finite stock of linguistic resources. Complex networks of discursive formations may be intuitively interpreted by native speakers. But for modern interpreters reading ancient texts, such intertextual appropriation requires an aid. Corpus linguistic based analysis helps us to engage in the same type of "pattern matching" that would have been accomplished by native speakers.

Language as Negotiation: Toward a Systemic Functional Model for Ideological Criticism with Application to James 2:1–13

Zachary K. Dawson

Introduction

In his 1999 essay, “Hallidayan Functional Grammar as Heir to New Testament Rhetorical Criticism,” Gustavo Martín-Asensio claims that the various methods used in the recent “volcanic eruption” of rhetorical analysis of the New Testament are “diverse, often seem incompatible, and reveal a field of study that is far from unified.”¹ Though he makes it sufficiently evident that rhetorical criticism has much to be criticized for, he also notes that various forms have appropriately stressed the importance of function in context.² However, Martín-Asensio correctly posits that, to yield more accurate results, a more “productive match” must be identified, that is to say, a different critical method.³ The method proposed by Martín-Asensio, namely, Michael Halliday’s functional grammar, approaches language as a means of social interaction, and is equipped with the necessary resources to extrapolate the rhetoric employed within the New Testament through linguistic analysis.⁴

In this essay, I will assume a consonant, yet more focused, approach for dealing with rhetoric in discourse—understood as the communicative effect accomplished through ideological strategies—and will use Jas 2:1–13 as a test case. My intention is to analyze the interpersonal function of language, with the goal of developing a sound method for rhetorical/ideological

1 Gustavo Martín-Asensio, “Hallidayan Functional Grammar as Heir to New Testament Rhetorical Criticism,” in *The Rhetorical Interpretation of Scripture: Essays from the 1996 Malibu Conference* (ed. Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps; JSNTSup 180; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 84.

2 Martín-Asensio, “Hallidayan Functional Grammar,” 92.

3 Martín-Asensio, “Hallidayan Functional Grammar,” 92.

4 Martín-Asensio, “Hallidayan Functional Grammar,” 92.

criticism of the Greek New Testament.⁵ Thus, the task at hand will be to model a system that maps the social relations negotiated in discourse and highlights an author's means of ideologically positioning his or her addressee(s). This linguistic model will draw largely on the system of ENGAGEMENT as developed by systemic functional linguists James Martin and Peter White,⁶ in an attempt to show how a writer utilizes resources within the Greek language to align his or her readers with with certain value positions.

Theoretical Assumptions in Engagement

Ideology

In this essay, I am specifically concerned with accounting for the ways in which a writer moves, through language, his/her audience toward the adoption of certain proposed values. This movement can also be thought of as ideological positioning or repositioning.⁷ Jay Lemke explains the concept of ideology as being relative to its context and to each specific language user: "Ideology is a protean notion. It can mean what we wish it to mean; it can be fit into many theories, many texts, many politics."⁸ Similarly, Terry Eagleton asserts

5 Stanley E. Porter, "Dialect and Register in the Greek of the New Testament: Theory," in *Rethinking Contexts, Rereading Texts: Contributions from the Social Sciences to Biblical Interpretation* (ed. M. Daniel Carroll R.; JSOTSup 299; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 203–4. I recognize that this is contrary to Halliday's view, who suggests that rhetorical purpose resides within the textual metafunction. See M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Language, Context, and Text: Aspects of Language in a Social-Semiotic Perspective* (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12.

6 See J.R. Martin and P.R.R. White, *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Cf. J.R. Martin and David Rose, *Working with Discourse: Meaning Beyond the Clause* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 44–54. It should be noted that Martin and White's development of the ENGAGEMENT system pertains to the Appraisal Theory model. It is this work's task to show that ENGAGEMENT also belongs in a model of Negotiation. It is my contention that Appraisal addresses the evaluative resources of language, which indeed does need to account for other voices, but ENGAGEMENT only comes into play for Appraisal Theory with respect to value positioning—this is a pervasive feature of Negotiation; thus, Appraisal is most accurately conceived as subservient to Negotiation as a means of negotiating attitudes. Cf. Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 33–35; see esp. Table 1.4.

7 James D. Dvorak, "The Tenor of Toughness: The Interpersonal Metafunction in 1 Corinthians 1–4" (PhD diss., McMaster Divinity College, 2012), 39.

8 Jay L. Lemke, *Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics* (Critical Perspectives on Literacy and Education; London: Taylor & Francis, 2005), 2.

that ideology can be defined in roughly six different ways.⁹ Thus, establishing a meaning for this term becomes quite important.

Discourse analysts and functional linguists tend to adopt social theories of which ideological positions are fundamentally a part. Norman Fairclough, a major proponent of Critical Discourse Analysis, has made ideology a term explicitly reserved for social dominance. In accordance with his critical perspective on ideology, he defines the term as “representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, dominance and exploitation.”¹⁰ Further, ideologies are inextricably linked with power,

because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving.¹¹

Because using language is the most common social behavior, ideology and language become linked, and thus the use of language becomes the ideological out-working of the exercise of power.¹² According to Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin understood the extreme result of this use of language under the term “official discourse.”¹³ He claimed that this “pathology” of language at its purest would be entirely compelling, meaning that no one would speak anything else—it essentially resists communication and does not recognize otherness.¹⁴ Such a concept of ideology has its place in the interpretation of the New Testament, though a carefully specified place; the New Testament writers often use language to cancel out all “otherness” so as to dominate in the discourse with the purpose of getting what they want from their audience—compliance.¹⁵ Bakhtin would refer to these instances as “monoglossic” texts

9 Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (New York: Verso, 1991), 28. For an account of these definitions, see Eagleton, *Ideology*, 28–30.

10 Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London: Routledge, 2003), 9.

11 Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (New York: Longman, 1989), 2.

12 Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 2.

13 Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World* (London: Routledge), 52.

14 Holquist, *Dialogism*, 52.

15 I qualify this concept as having a “carefully specified place” in New Testament interpretation because Bakhtin characterized this concept in light of the socio-political turmoil

(see discussion below). Such instances, I suggest, are principally realized in the Greek of the New Testament through commands, as the following example from Jas 4:7–10 indicates:

ὑποτάγητε οὖν τῷ θεῷ ἀντίστητε δὲ τῷ διαβόλῳ καὶ φεύξεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἐγγίσατε τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐγγίει ὑμῖν καθαρῖσατε χεῖρας ἁμαρτωλοὶ καὶ ἀγνίσατε καρδίας δίψυχοι ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενήσητε καὶ κλαύσατε ὃ γέλως ὑμῶν εἰς πένθος μετατραπήτω καὶ ἡ χαρὰ εἰς κατήφειαν ταπεινώθητε ἐνώπιον κυρίου καὶ ὑψώσει ὑμᾶς (Therefore, submit to God, and stand against the devil, and he will flee from you. Draw near to God, and he will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners, and purify your hearts, you double-minded. Be miserable and mourn and weep. Your laughter must be turned into mourning, and joy into gloom. Be humbled before the Lord, and he will exalt you).

In this example ten distinct commands are issued through imperatives (*italicized* in the Greek text), which shows the writer's move toward domination. This example of a writer using language as power, however, cannot be understood by adopting Fairclough's definition of "critical ideology" wholesale. The view of ideology presented by J.R. Martin begins to approach a more tempered understanding of ideological structures. Martin's view is as follows:

In our emerging model of discourse in social context, ideology is understood more generally as relations that permeate every level of semiosis; there is no meaning outside of power. Even in everyday contexts within our local kin and peer groups, our relative power and control in a context may be conditioned by age, gender and other status markers . . . Within specific situations, these register variables translate into our options to

of his day. Bakhtin wrote amidst the long night of Stalinism of the Soviet Union, and he experienced being arrested multiple times, being exiled to Kazakhstan, along with a number of other forced moves. Thus, "official discourse" for Bakhtin is described as "autism for the masses" where differing ideologies were completely intolerable—a fundamental characteristic of totalitarian societies. See Holquist, *Dialogism*, 8–9, 52. The concept of "official discourse" is only appropriate for interpreting New Testament texts once it has been re-contextualized, and thus becomes a concept directed to those values, beliefs, rituals, etc., that make up "non-negotiables" within the Christian community (e.g., Jesus is the Christ). This re-contextualization is assumed in applying Bakhtinian concepts in this essay.

dominate or defer, to assert or concede authority, and to command attention or pay attention to others.¹⁶

Alicia Batten has identified the strong development of ideological criticism within biblical studies, which has been pioneered especially by John H. Elliott and Vernon K. Robbins with respect to Christian origins.¹⁷ She explains that their methodology acknowledges ideology at multiple levels: author, text, and reader.¹⁸ It is important to note that the term *ideology* is explained in a number of ways with respect to its descriptive sense. I will use what Raymond Geuss calls “ideology in the positive sense”¹⁹ as a descriptive way of identifying the beliefs and values that biblical writers promote. I will speak about ideology in a negative or pejorative sense when discussing the values and beliefs that biblical writers contest, because the New Testament writers often “criticize a form of consciousness because it incorporates beliefs which are false, or because it functions in a reprehensible way, or because it has a tainted origin.”²⁰ This pejorative sense is crucial for analyzing discourses, as will be exemplified through the explanation of the dialogic nature of texts below.

Terry Eagleton, through the lens of literary criticism, has theorized that ideological strategies are used in a number of ways: (1) they function to unify social groups under a common identity; (2) they are action-oriented, geared towards furnishing their adherents with goals and motivations; (3) they rationalize certain feelings, ideas, attitudes, etc.; (4) they legitimate social interests against opposing interests; and (5) they naturalize values as commonsensical

16 J.R. Martin and David Rose, *Genre Relations: Mapping Culture* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17–18.

17 Alicia Batten, “Ideological Strategies in the Letter of James,” in *Reading James with New Eyes: Methodological Reassessments of the Letter of James* (ed. Robert L. Webb and John S. Kloppenborg; LNTS 342; London: T&T Clark, 2007), 7. Cf. John H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 106; V.K. Robbins, *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society and Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 192–236.

18 Batten, “Ideological Strategies,” 7–8. Cf. Gale A. Yee, “Ideological Criticism,” *DBI* 1:534–37.

19 Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 22. Cf. Batten, “Ideological Strategies,” 8.

20 Geuss, *Critical Theory*, 21. Cf. Batten, “Ideological Strategies,” 8. Eagleton, in explaining Geuss’s distinctions among the definitions of ideology, shows how the pejorative meaning and positive meaning are subservient to the understanding of the descriptive meaning, which is “a body of meanings and values encoding certain interests relevant to social power.” See Eagleton, *Ideology*, 43–45.

to the social group in light of social reality.²¹ These ideological strategies work to reflect both the critical (with necessary qualification) and descriptive definitions of ideology and to supply an encompassing framework for approaching an ideological analysis of a biblical text. The function of the present model is to map how these ideological strategies are accomplished in texts at the linguistic stratum of discourse semantics (see Figure 12.1 below), but these strategies need first be understood within the sociolinguistic theory of dialogism and heteroglossia.

Heteroglossia and Dialogism

As stated earlier, ideology as realized in discourse, is situated within a system of coding where meaning is selectively available by means of social status. As a consequence, ideological strategies indicate where language users reside in terms of their social status. For example, in first-century Mediterranean society, a wife would most likely not attempt to ideologically position her husband by means of language that assumed a superior social position lest she breach her social boundary as a subordinate.²² Her goal, if it were to be effectual, would have to be accomplished by means of assuming the appropriate social rank corresponding to culturally established social norms. This example sufficiently indicates the restrictions that social context and tenor relations place upon linguistic potential. This conclusion runs hand in hand with Bakhtin's concepts of heteroglossia and dialogism, which are highly formational for Martin and White's system of ENGAGEMENT and crucial for accurately interpreting texts in light of their context of culture.

According to Bakhtin, when a writer begins to form an utterance, that person goes through a process of selecting words, and these words are not selected in a neutral sense (i.e., dictionary form), but rather derive from other similar utterances that share in the writer's theme, composition, and style.²³ As a consequence, every utterance is shaped and developed through constant

21 Eagleton, *Ideology*, 45–58. Cf. Batten, "Ideological Strategies," 9.

22 See Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (3rd ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 30, 144. See also David A. deSilva, *Honor, Patronage, Kinship, & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2000), 180–85.

23 Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 87. Holquist clarifies how Bakhtin conceived of the formation of utterances: "Meaning comes about in both the individual psyche and in shared social experience through the medium of the sign, for in both spheres understanding comes about as a response to a sign with signs" (Holquist, *Dialogism*, 49 [emphasis original]). In other words, an utterance represents a preconceived meaning that a language user intends to

interaction with other utterances.²⁴ This is known as the polyphony of social and discursive forces that represent the myriad of responses available to a writer/speaker in the context of the multi-voiced backdrop.²⁵ That is, every utterance primarily functions as a response to former utterances, and so somehow “refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account.”²⁶ When a writer makes an utterance, it creates a unique meaning with reference to the immediate context and to the heteroglossic backdrop, and does so in a way that anticipates the addressee’s response: “The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the answer’s direction.”²⁷ This explanation corresponds to Martin’s view of ideological positioning in texts, whereby all texts are positioned in some way, and whereby they encode their ideology towards the context of situation within which their discourse takes place.²⁸ The language user’s task is to accomplish something through the use of language, and he or she does so by means of considering his or her social limitations and other opinions, stances, values, etc. among the ‘other voices’ and addressees. Consequently, given this consideration of the innumerable other voices that exist, or could potentially arise from social context, I suggest that it is appropriate to designate an even more abstract stratum within the context of culture—the heteroglossic backdrop—given that a language user is constrained by the heteroglossic

communicate, which is then expressed through signs (i.e., words), which aligns with the functional-semantic orientation of SFL.

24 Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, 89.

25 Holquist, *Dialogism*, 69. Cf. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, 87–96.

26 Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, 91.

27 Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, 279–80. Lemke adds that these utterances orient themselves to what other utterances have occurred previously or could possibly occur in the future regardless of the writer’s awareness of them. See Lemke, *Textual Politics*, 19. Concerning this point Bakhtin clarifies, “The utterance is related not only to preceding, but also to subsequent links in the chain of speech communion. . . . But from the very beginning, the utterance is constructed while taking into account possible responsive reactions, for whose sake, in essence, it is actually created. As we know, the role of the others for whom the utterance is constructed is extremely great. . . . From the very beginning, the speaker expects a response from them, an active responsive understanding. The entire utterance is constructed, as it were, in anticipation of encountering this response.” Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*, 94. Cf. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination* (ed. Michael Holquist; trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 281.

28 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 92. Cf. Michael Stubbs, *Text and Corpus Analysis: Computer Assisted Studies of Language and Culture* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 197.

backdrop in promoting her/his ideology. The system of ENGAGEMENT, as a means to negotiate a language user's ideology, accounts for this dialogic perspective of discourse and provides a way for analyzing discourse amidst the heteroglossic backdrop. This will be discussed in the following sections.

ENGAGEMENT as a Negotiation Strategy

Martin and White's system of ENGAGEMENT is a system that operates at the level of discourse semantics and that focuses on interpersonal meanings in text. The purpose of the network is to describe how language users utilize the available linguistic resources to position audiences to align with their value positions by means of interacting with other "voices" residing in the social context, while simultaneously accounting for the tenor relations indicating the limitations of linguistic potential due to a writer's/speaker's social status. The resources available to writers/speakers allow them to present themselves as "recognising, answering, ignoring, challenging, rejecting, fending off, anticipating or accommodating actual or potential interlocutors and the value positions they represent."²⁹ When a writer uses language to promote an ideology, that person chooses a genre—a culturally institutionalized way of accomplishing something—which the text thus embodies. The genre of a text then redounds with the register, or context of situation, which comprises a particular configuration of field, tenor, and mode. Field, tenor, and mode correspond to ideational meaning, interpersonal meaning, and textual meaning respectively. The system of ENGAGEMENT is a feature of interpersonal meaning; therefore, NEGOTIATION with respect to ENGAGEMENT comprises part of the interpersonal metafunction of language. The lower levels of the linguistic system, graphology and lexicogrammar, provide formal structures that a language user employs to communicate meaning realized at the level of discourse semantics. It is to the modeling of the ENGAGEMENT system for NEGOTIATION that this paper now turns its attention.

Modeling Engagement for Negotiation

ENGAGEMENT and Value Positioning

The model being constructed has been traditionally dealt with under the terms "epistemic modality" and "evidentiality."³⁰ However, I intend for the

29 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 2.

30 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 2.




FIGURE 12.1 Stratification of text and context.

present study to go beyond the concerns of truth value³¹ and to incorporate the dialogic principle of Bakhtin and Vološinov that, when a writer makes an utterance, that person means to engage with their audience—the utterance “responds to something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and objections, seeks support, and so on.”³² This view, in contrast to the Truth-Value view, understands that there is something at stake ideologically in texts, and, therefore, acknowledges an essential aspect for creating better models that show how language users position themselves and their audiences inter-subjectively.³³

The semantic option of ENGAGEMENT presumes that a language user has a value position, which compels them to dialogue. Being that the aim of the

31 The Truth-Value theory argues that the sole function of the words—whether through modal verbs, hedges such as *perhaps*, or *I think that*, or assertions of certainty—are to reveal the language user’s state of mind or knowledge. See P.R.R. White, “Beyond Modality and Hedging: A Dialogic View of the Language of Intersubjective Stance,” *Text* 23 (2003): 261. Cf. P.R.R. White, “Appraisal Outline,” n.p. [cited 25 February 2013] (online: <http://grammatics.com/appraisal/AppraisalOutline/AppraisalOutlineWPFiles.html>).

32 Valentin N. Vološinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (trans. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik; London: Routledge, 1995), 139. Cf. White, “Beyond Modality and Hedging,” 261.

33 P.R.R. White, “Dialogue and Inter-Subjectivity: Reinterpreting the Semantics of Modality and Hedging,” in *Dialogic Analysis VII: Working with Dialogue* (ed. Malcolm Coulthard et al.; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2000), 67.

discourse is to obtain agreement or alignment from the addressee(s), the writer expresses their own values, and negotiates with the addressee(s) by means of a number of engagement strategies,³⁴ which become, in effect, types of ideological strategies. In so doing the writer also creates an 'ideal' audience by which the real audience can be depicted as more or less aligned.³⁵ Clarifying this point, Martin and White explain,

Thus one of our central concerns is with the ways in which these resources act to 'write the reader into the text' by presenting the speaker/writer as, for example, taking it for granted that the addressee shares with them a particular viewpoint, or as anticipating that a given proposition will be problematic (or unproblematic) for the putative reader, or as assuming that the reader may need to be won over to a particular viewpoint, and so on.³⁶

The framework for this system is designed to show how language users accomplish their positioning by linguistic means. The outline will reveal the interpersonal styles and rhetorical strategies of language users by mapping what sorts of heteroglossic viewpoints they choose to interact with—how they are engaged.³⁷ Even though this system's orientation focuses on rhetorical effects and meanings in context, there will be necessary considerations given to New Testament Greek grammar and syntax, given that this model was originally developed for English.

Heteroglossia and Its Semantic Resources in Greek

In this section, an account of resources in Greek for ENGAGEMENT is supplied. In modeling ENGAGEMENT for English, Martin and White simplify engagement strategies, dividing them into two categories: dialogic contraction and dialogic expansion.³⁸ Martin and White sufficiently show that a language user's options for engaging with the heteroglossic backdrop is essentially binary. Dialogically contractive utterances function to fend off, challenge, or, in terms of monoglossic texts, completely cancel out other voices.³⁹ Dialogically expansive utterances allow, through various means, other voices into the

34 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 95.

35 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 95.

36 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 95.

37 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 93.

38 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 102.

39 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 102.




FIGURE 12.2 *The system of engagement.*

discourse to service the writer's purpose in some way.⁴⁰ It is important to note that even dialogically contractive engagement strategies are heteroglossic, so that engagement should be conceived as Figure 12.2 indicates.

Every utterance that a language user makes can be categorized under one of these dialogic options, and thus, the purpose of this section will be to address these dialogic realizations. Concerning this, three semantic resource categories will be discussed: projection, modality, and concession.⁴¹

Projection

Projection refers to ways of reporting or quoting what other voices say, think, reason, etc.⁴² The Greek of the New Testament possesses various means of projecting sources. McKay helpfully categorizes these resources as “direct quotations” and “indirect quotations.”⁴³ Most often, direct quotations must be deduced in context, but in some cases the conjunction $\delta\tau\iota$ is used as a kind of “open-quotes” to introduce a direct quotation.⁴⁴ Further, there are three common formations in New Testament Greek for sourcing other voices indirectly: the infinitive construction, the $\delta\tau\iota$ construction, and the participial construction.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 102.

⁴¹ These semantic resource categories are adapted from Martin and Rose's ENGAGEMENT system. See J.R. Martin and David Rose, *Working with Discourse: Meaning Beyond the Clause* (New York: Continuum, 2003), 44–54.

⁴² Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 44. Cf. M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (rev. Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; 3rd ed.; London: Hodder Arnold, 2004), 376–77.

⁴³ K.L. McKay, *A New Syntax of the Verb in New Testament Greek: An Aspectual Approach* (SBG 5; New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 97–106. McKay remarks, “Ancient Greek texts usually gave little or no formal indication of the beginning or end of a quotation, and some of the indications that were given are to some extent ambiguous. In many instances the writer's intention is quite clear from the sense, but in many others we need to make a subjective judgment based on an assessment of the context.” John 3:10–22 offers an example of this ambiguity where uncertainty surrounds where the words of Jesus end and the words of the author begin. See McKay, *New Syntax*, 97.

⁴⁴ McKay, *New Syntax*, 98. Cf. Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; BLG 2; London: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 238.

⁴⁵ McKay, *New Syntax*, 99.

In the infinitive construction, when statements are indirectly quoted they become subordinate clauses, and the finite verbs of their main clauses are changed to infinitives.⁴⁶ An example can be found in Rom 1:22: φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν ('professing to be wise, they became fools'). The ὅτι construction, which normally contains a finite verb, usually one of thinking, saying, etc., is used to create an indirect statement equivalent to the English example, *He said that he was finished*.⁴⁷ An example is John 6:65: εἶρηκα ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρὸς με ἐὰν μὴ ἡ δεδομένον αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ('I have said to you, that no one is able to come to me unless it has been given to him from the father'). Finally, the participial construction uses a participle, usually modifying verbs of knowing or perceiving, or even others' opinions, in a dependent clause to generate an indirect quotation.⁴⁸ These constructions often convey the writer's thoughts or a character's thoughts in a narrative, but they can be used for other sources as well, as 2 Cor 10:2 indicates: δέομαι δὲ τὸ μὴ παρῶν θαρρῆσαι τῇ πεποιθήσει ἢ λογιζομαι τολμῆσαι ἐπὶ τινὰς τοὺς λογιζομένους ἡμᾶς ὡς κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦντας ('But I ask when I am present that I not need to show boldness with the confidence with which I expect to be courageous against some, who regard us as ones who live according to the flesh').

Though this account of projection is rather cursory, it sufficiently establishes it as an important semantic resource for engagement in Greek.

Modality

The next category for engaging with other voices is modality. It is appropriate to note here that Halliday discusses the nature of dialogue—that is, language used between communicative participants to accomplish some sort of exchange—as involving either the exchange of goods and services or the exchange of information.⁴⁹ Therefore, the writer of a monologic text assumes the speech role of either a giver of information or a demander of goods and services.⁵⁰ With this come two forms of modality: one that negotiates

46 McKay, *New Syntax*, 99.

47 McKay, *New Syntax*, 101–2.

48 McKay, *New Syntax*, 105.

49 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 106–7. Cf. Martin, *English Text*, 31–35.

50 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 106. In respect to 'roles of exchange,' there are four primary speech roles identified for English (i.e., offer, statement, command, and question), and these are realized chiefly by grammatical mood choices. Offers and statements pertain to the giving of information/goods and services, and commands and questions pertain to the demanding of information/goods and services. Adopting these speech functions "whole sale" for the Greek attitude system is problematic on two accounts. (1) Halliday (Martin is included here too) addresses these functions in relation to dialogic texts that are at least "co-authored" by two language users. Apart from reported conversations in narrative texts, the texts of the New Testament are monologic, which results in nuances of

information, and one that negotiates goods and services, both of which are set on a scale from positive to negative polarity—a semantic space between ‘yes’ and ‘no.’⁵¹ These two forms of modality are referred to as modalization and modulation, respectively.⁵²

Contrary to the traditional view of Greek mood forms, which failed to account for a subjective element in the indicative mood, this essay will proceed while assuming Gonda’s refined description of Greek moods:

If we may describe the verbal category of mood (such as it appears in Greek or Sanskrit) as a means of intimating the speaker’s view or conception of the relation of the process expressed by the verb to reality, it will be clear that the main distinction made is between what the speaker puts forward as fact (whether it be true or not) and what he does not regard as such.⁵³

these basic speech functions (e.g., questions are not primarily used to demand information/goods & services, but are used as a rhetorical/ideological means to lead addressee[s] to a conclusion/value position). (2) Halliday (and maintained by Martin) addresses the English mood system with regard to the binary choice between indicative and imperative moods. While all utterances can be systematized into categories of giving and demanding, the Greek mood system has four distinct mood forms (not counting the future tense-form and the functions of infinitives and participles), which demands a more delicate system for interpreting the Greek moods in relation to speech functions. See Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 106–8; Martin, *English Text*, 31–35. Reed adopts these speech functions for his model of New Testament discourse analysis of Philippians. Though he qualifies these speech functions as the four primary functions, he makes no attempt to adapt this Hallidayan view of categories based on English dialogic texts for Greek monologic texts. See Jeffrey T. Reed, *A Discourse Analysis of Philippians: Method and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity* (JSNTSup 136; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 80–81.

51 Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 48.

52 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 618–19. Cf. Jay L. Lemke, “Interpersonal Meaning in Discourse: Value Orientations,” in Martin Davies and Louise Ravelli, eds., *Advances in Systemic Linguistics: Recent Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1992), 84. With respect to modality, Greek moods only code PROBABILITY in the modalization scale and OBLIGATION in the modulation scale. The other two systems associated with modality, USUALITY and INCLINATION, are only coded by means of lexis. See Martin, *English Text*, 38–39. For a list of modal adjuncts that code USUALITY and INCLINATION, see Reed, *Philippians*, 83–84.

53 Jan Gonda, *The Character of Indo-European Moods, with Special Reference to Greek and Sanskrit* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1956), 6. Cf. Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 164–65.

Given that subjectivity permeates all the Greek mood forms, this section will approach the categories of modulation and modalization while giving primary attention to Greek mood forms. Generalizations concerning the semantic features grammaticalized by Greek mood forms (i.e., attitudes) will have to suffice given the confinements of this essay; however, it should be noted, that there remains much work to be done in exploring the semantic nuances of attitude with regard to modulation and modalization.

The modalization scale deals with statements of information that operate from the writer's sense of certainty. Therefore, on a scale that spans 'it is' and 'it is not,' those formations that grammaticalize the writer's subjective certainty constitute the poles of the scale, and these formulations are recognized as declarative statements or assertions. If a writer asserts something as factual, the appropriate mood for the writer to use is the indicative, which grammaticalizes the semantic feature of assertive attitude, or [+assertion].⁵⁴ On the opposite end of the scale are negative statements of fact, which are marked by the negative particle οὐ. These assertions situated at the poles of the modalization scale are called monoglossic with respect to the principle of heteroglossia; they do not allow other voices to intrude into the text because they are cast as non-negotiable statements of information. In other words, these texts are "single-voiced" and "undialogised."⁵⁵

Before moving on to the mood forms that are heteroglossic, the future form warrants mention here. Though it is not fully modal, the future is rightfully mentioned with regard to modalization as it possesses a "marked and emphatic expectation toward a process," grammaticalizing the semantic feature of [+expectation].⁵⁶ As an exception, the future will therefore be included

54 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 165–66. Porter categorizes moods into two categories: the indicative and the non-indicative. These are divided based on the speaker's belief of the factuality of what s/he is saying: "Thus it is seen that factuality cuts across the two major categories of epistemic [+assertion] and deontic [-assertion] attitudes" (Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 165). Cf. F.R. Palmer, *Mood and Modality* (2nd ed.; CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18. John Lyons, *Semantics* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:736

55 Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 99.

56 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 403. The future form is exceedingly difficult to explain, and Porter asserts that grammarians have not uniformly determined the unifying principle of the future. Porter is certain that a strictly temporal scheme is wholly insufficient for describing the semantic feature of the future. The best answer is to describe the future as a form that grammaticalizes the semantic feature of expectation, which explains how it operates in relation to aspect and mood. For Porter's complete analysis of the future form see Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 403–39.

in the modalization scale as a monoglossic form because the semantic feature of [+expectation] does not function to expand a text dialogically, but simply states what is expected to occur.

The non-indicative mood forms, specifically the subjunctive and optative moods, function between the poles of 'it is' and 'it is not'—"they are used when no claim is made about the state of the world, but some non-existent state is hypothesized or projected, whatever its relationship to the actual world."⁵⁷ The subjunctive mood grammaticalizes the semantic feature of [+projection],⁵⁸ or a "projected realm which may at some time exist and may even now exist, but which is held up for examination."⁵⁹ In English, these projections often are translated with modals such as *may* and *might*, which communicates the heteroglossic nature of the subjunctive mood; if something is held up for consideration, then other voices are allowed to respond to such examinations or hypotheticals. Statements made in the subjunctive mood are typically negated by μή.

Next on the scale are statements that employ the optative mood. This mood situates itself after the subjunctive mood, because in addition to grammaticalizing [+projection] it also grammaticalizes [+contingency],⁶⁰ being more remote, less assured, and vaguer than the subjunctive.⁶¹ With reference to

57 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 168.

58 The term 'projection' is used in two senses in this paper: (1) as a semantic resource category for ENGAGEMENT concerning directed speech, and (2) the semantic feature grammaticalized by non-indicative mood forms. One should only take note of these two senses so as to avoid any confusion. In the analysis below, context will make clear which category is in view.

59 Porter, *Idioms*, 56–57. Gonda claims, "The subjunctive... expresses visualization. A process in the subj. represents a mental image on the part of the speaker which, in his opinion is capable of realization, or even awaits realization." See Gonda, *The Character of the Indo-European Moods*, 70. McKay adds, "In subordinate clauses, where it is more commonly found, it expresses purpose, apprehension and, usually with ἕν (ἐάν), generality... the future indicative is sometimes found instead of the subjunctive." See McKay, *New Syntax*, 54. Turner says that the subjunctive "introduces an element of uncertainty and supposition." See Nigel Turner, *Syntax* (vol. 3 of *A Grammar of New Testament Greek* by James H. Moulton; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), 106.

60 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 322.

61 Porter, *Idioms*, 59. Robertson claims that the optative is a kind of 'weaker' subjunctive. See A.T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (3rd ed.; New York: George H. Doran, 1919), 936. Moulton refers to the optative as a "milder" form. See James H. Moulton, *Prolegomena* (vol. 1 of *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*; 2nd ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906), 197.

modalization, writers use the optative mood to form so-called “statements of potentiality”—that is, statements of possibility or probability commonly referred to as “deliberative.”⁶² Statements such as these illustrate, in terms of the Greek mood system, the opening of the greatest amount of dialogical space for other voices to intrude into the text. The dialogue is open for outside responses within the social context. When these kinds of expressions are constructed as closed potential statements by negatives, the indicative is used instead of the optative because the possibility no longer exists.⁶³

The modulation scale deals with behavioral negotiations between ‘do’ and ‘do not do.’ In New Testament Greek there are many ways of expressing behavioral negotiations along this scale. Beginning at opposite poles, positive and negative direct commands warrant first consideration. One way of expressing positive volition in New Testament Greek is with the imperative mood in the second and third persons. The imperative mood grammaticalizes directive attitude, or [+direction],⁶⁴ and thus provides the semantic resource for forming commands or entreaties. Such expressions are monoglossic because they expel all dialogical space; they absolutely demand compliance.⁶⁵ Therefore, the imperative mood establishes the poles of the modulation scale—positive commands and negative commands (or prohibitions, negated by μή).

The indicative mood has a rightful place on the scale of modulation. Though it does not possess the semantic feature of direction, it has widespread use in so-called indirect commands—commands that are made by use of a commanding or exhorting verb accompanied by an objective infinitive.⁶⁶ An example is Rom 12:1: παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς... παραστήσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν

62 McKay, *New Syntax*, 54, 74. The particle ἄν is commonly found accompanying the optative in certain verb forms. These types of statements make up the apodosis of an incomplete fourth-class condition, given that there are no complete fourth-class conditions in the New Testament. Daniel Wallace says this construction is used “to indicate a consequence (in the future) of an unlikely condition.” Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 483–84.

63 McKay, *New Syntax*, 75.

64 Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 335.

65 As a clarification, though the directive attitude cancels out all dialogic space, this does not claim to account for the audience's will to comply. The point here is the dialogic space in the discourse has been completely cancelled out; the writer leaves no “room” for argument.

66 McKay, *New Syntax*, 81.

θυσίαν ζῶσαν ('Therefore, I urge you . . . to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice'). Formations such as this function as commands, requests, or entreaties; they are what Halliday calls "grammatical metaphors."⁶⁷ The effect of grammatical metaphor, specifically interpersonal metaphor here, is the construal of an additional layer of meaning of a text. In the example of mood metaphor above, παρακαλῶ . . . ὑμᾶς functions as a proposal, or command, realized by a clause nexus of projection as opposed to a single clause with an imperative verb. This is accomplished by drawing on the resources of lexicogrammar of what Halliday and Matthiessen term verbal or mental clauses.⁶⁸ Providing extensive examples of these metaphorical realizations, Halliday and Matthiessen show that mood metaphors allow for a more elaborate delicacy for the speech function system—writers can employ lexicogrammar in formulations such as I urge you/command you/tell you (verbal) and I want you to/would wish you to/would desire you to (mental).⁶⁹ This affects how biblical texts should be interpreted given that the lexicogrammar used by a writer will reflect the tenor relations between the writer and his or her addressees. These statements are monoglossic; however, lexical items have a dominating influence on the strength of these formations. Commanding verbs are strongest in terms of directing (e.g., ἀπαγγέλλω, διατάσσω, ἐντέλλομαι, ἐπιτιμᾶω, κλέύω, among others). Verbs of wanting and wishing are weaker than verbs of commanding for directing because they simply express the writer's will, desire, or appeal (e.g., βούλομαι, ἐπικαλέομαι, εὐχομαι, θέλω, among others). Gregory Fewster's recent work that models lexicogrammatical metaphor for New Testament Greek supports this conclusion. Fewster states, "Interpersonal metaphor can occur in a mood shift from the imperative to the indicative in the realization of commands. . . . Thus, interpersonal metaphor softens imperative commands and recasts the interpersonal relationship between speaker and recipient."⁷⁰ With respect to this softening, Halliday and Matthiessen explain that lexical items of this kind function to expand meaning potential. The metaphor of mood, *I urge you to* [+verb], can impose obligation on an addressee in a more delicate way so as to optimize the potential for negotiation.⁷¹ Writers employ these metaphors because they function as interpersonal tools for navigating through various social factors such as status, formality, and

67 See Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 626–35.

68 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 630–31.

69 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 630–31.

70 Gregory P. Fewster, *Creation Language in Romans 8: A Study in Monosemy* (LBS 8; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 81.

71 Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 626, 631–35. Cf. Fewster, *Creation Language*, 80–81.

politeness.⁷² These types of formations function similarly in Greek; though they vary in levels of strength, they nevertheless remain monoglossic in the text.

The future form also warrants mention with respect to modulation because it is commonly used to express commands.⁷³ Expressions of will made by the future form are monoglossic; they simply state the will of the language user. It is through means of interpersonal metaphor that they are interpreted as commands.

Next on the modulation scale are expressions of will that use the subjunctive mood. The subjunctive mood is used in Greek to express commands and prohibitions in the first person singular and plural as a “hortatory subjunctive.”⁷⁴ It is of great importance that the hortatory subjunctive not be thought of as equivalent in function to the imperative, because it still only grammaticalizes the semantic feature of projection and not direction. In this respect it will prove helpful to refer to commands in the subjunctive as exhortations.⁷⁵ Due to this feature, exhortations do not form monoglossic texts—they are subtly opened to objections by means of the writer’s use of the subjunctive. This can be illustrated in English by the sentence: *We really should go to class*. There remains a measurable response potential for the addressee to agree or disagree, to comply or not comply. Negative exhortations, or prohibitions, with the subjunctive are negated by μή, and sometimes prohibitions with the subjunctive are emphatically negated by οὐ μή.⁷⁶

Lastly, the optative mood situates itself on the modulation scale as the most dialogically expansive. Writers use the optative mood to express wishes, which are more remote than commands and exhortations.⁷⁷ McKay defines a wish as an expression of a desire ranging from what will probably

⁷² Halliday, *Functional Grammar*, 631.

⁷³ Porter, *Idioms*, 44. Cf. McKay, *New Syntax*, 81.

⁷⁴ Porter, *Idioms*, 57. Some grammarians have distinguished between the hortatory subjunctive and the deliberative subjunctive, particularly in reference to questions. See Moulton, *Prolegomena*, 184–86; Robertson, *Grammar*, 927. Moule claims, however, that the deliberative subjunctive “is merely the hortatory turned into a question: the hortatory says let me do so-and-so, the deliberative says am I to do . . . ?” See C.F.D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 22. Cf. Porter, *Idioms*, 58.

⁷⁵ See McKay, *New Syntax*, 78.

⁷⁶ Porter, *Idioms*, 59. It should be noted that not all grammarians are convinced that οὐ μή is actually emphatic. See especially Moulton, *Prolegomena*, 187–92.

⁷⁷ McKay, *New Syntax*, 85.




FIGURE 12.3 *Modality in light of Greek mood forms.*

occur to what is impossible.⁷⁸ As noted above, these formations through the optative mood grammaticalize the semantic features of [+projection] and [+contingency], and therefore, in terms of mood, the optative grammaticalizes the least amount of directing with the most potential for the intrusion of other voices. Wishes with the optative are typically negated by μή.

In summation, the Greek moods are a primary formal indicator of the role the writer assumes in discourse, and they correspond to the strength a writer exercises in relation to exchanging information and exchanging goods and services. Figure 12.3 illustrates the Greek moods in relation to modulation and modalization.⁷⁹

78 McKay, *New Syntax*, 85–86. Other grammarians only concede the usage for attainable wishes. See Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (trans. and rev. Robert W. Funk; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), §384.

79 The principle of heteroglossia is integrated into the complete system network of ENGAGEMENT below in Figure 12.4. In this system network the semantic feature of the future ([+expectation]) has been intentionally placed alongside the semantic features of [+assertion] and [-assertion] because the future does not grammaticalize [-assertion] like the subjunctive and optative mood forms, though it does seem to share semantic compatibility with this feature in many instances. See Porter, *Verbal Aspect*, 414. However, the principle of heteroglossia may shed some more light on the nature of the future in Greek. The future should not be associated with those mood forms that necessarily grammaticalize [-assertion], and consequently heteroglossic formations, because [+expectation] grammaticalizes monoglossic formations, which connects it more sensibly with the indicative and imperative mood forms.

Concession

The last category of semantic resources that I will consider is concession, which pertains to “counter-expectancy” in discourse—that is, the ways in which a writer directs the addressee(s) away from what might be expected in the text, to where the writer ultimately wants the addressee(s) to be positioned.⁸⁰ Martin and Rose refer to the concept of concession as a means of monitoring expectations and then adjusting them as the discourse unfolds. They identify this as a “pervasive feature of conjunctions.”⁸¹ Though Martin and Rose develop this concept as it applies to English, the same pervasive features appear in the lexical resources of Greek, particularly in conjunctions and adverbs. In Greek, common resources for tracking and adjusting audience expectations are adversative conjunctions, such as ἀλλά, δέ, μέν, and πλὴν, among others.⁸²

In addition to contrastive resources, Greek is equipped with other concessive resources as well. Along with the concessive use of participles (e.g., Heb 5:8; 7:5), Greek also has a number of concessive particles, such as καίπερ and καίτοι among others.⁸³ Additional resources pertaining to concession are the continuatives, which deal with temporal reference. Also commonly referred to as deictic indicators,⁸⁴ continuatives provide temporal information about something occurring either sooner or later than expected.⁸⁵ In Greek, items like ἀκμήν, ἔτι, τὸ λοιπόν, and οὐπω, among others, provide the means for constructing these kinds of formations.⁸⁶

Though these categories do not provide an exhaustive account of the resources in Greek that writers had to engage with their audiences and other voices in the social context, they provide a means for analyzing engagement strategies that writers employed to position their recipients. Provided in

80 Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 51–52.

81 Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 51–52.

82 Martin and Rose term contrasting conjunctions concessive. See Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 52.

83 For an organized listing of concessive particles, see Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, eds., *Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (2 vols.; 2nd ed.; New York: UBS, 1989), 1:794.

84 Stephen C. Levinson, *Pragmatics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 73–79. Cf. Porter, *Idioms*, 25–26.

85 Martin and Rose, *Working with Discourse*, 53.

86 See Louw and Nida, *Greek–English Lexicon*, 1:646, specifically §67.128 and §67.129.




FIGURE 12.4 *Systems of negotiation.*

Figure 12.4 is a system network illustrating this paper's model of NEGOTIATION as presently developed with respect to the system of ENGAGEMENT.⁸⁷

An Analysis of Engagement in James 2:1–13

It is important that in developing this system for Greek that a Greek text not be forced into Martin and White's categories developed in their work on ENGAGEMENT.⁸⁸ Thus, Jas 2:1–13 will be analyzed in terms of its ENGAGEMENT resources and how these resources are used.

James 2:1

Ἀδελφοί μου μὴ ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης ('My brothers and sisters, do not have faith in our glorious Lord Jesus Christ accompanied by acts of partiality').

87 It should be noted that this network is not meant to suggest that engaging with other voices is the only means of negotiating through discourse. Negotiation denotes the initial environment, or the point of origin, of this system network; this concept provides the possibilities of what a writer can 'do' in terms of meaning. The aim of the present work is to map a system within a more broadly conceived system of Negotiation; this is the system of ENGAGEMENT, which thus becomes the subsequent environment, or the entry point. This system of ENGAGEMENT denotes a systemic feature of Negotiation that becomes an environment "for a more delicate systemic option" by which meaning potential is furnished with choices of how a writer can engage with other voices—which is in accordance with the principle of heteroglossia. See Ruqaiya Hasan, "Semantic Networks: A Tool for the Analysis of Meaning," in *Ways of Saying, Ways of Meaning: Selected Papers of Ruqaiya Hasan* (ed. Carmel Cloran et al.; London: Cassell, 1996), 106–8.

88 To view a figure of Martin and White's fully developed system network of ENGAGEMENT see Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 134.

James leads off this pericope with a prohibition, ἔχετε negated by μή.⁸⁹ This monoglossic negative command initially situates the writer as the demander of a service—he orders that the actions of his recipients comply with his value position, i.e., having faith without partiality (προσωπολημψίας). Also, in employing the directive attitude, the writer completely cancels out all opposing voices, even those of the recipients; the writer gives them only one option: to comply. Thus, this text exemplifies an engagement strategy of [+modality], realizing modulation for a monoglossic attitudinal formation of [+direction]. The direct address, ἀδελφοί μου, along with the realized value position, establishes the topic for this pericope.⁹⁰ This first verse corresponds to the critical view of ideology as the writer assumes the role of demander—he assumes a power position by which he orders the recipients to perform a specific behavior, thus qualifying this ideological strategy as action-oriented.

James 2:2–4

ἐάν γάρ εισέλθῃ εἰς συναγωγὴν ὑμῶν ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος ἐν ἐσθῇτι λαμπρᾷ εἰσέλθῃ δὲ καὶ πτωχὸς ἐν ῥυπαρᾷ ἐσθῇτι ἐπιβλέψῃτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν φοροῦντα τὴν ἐσθῆτα τὴν λαμπράν καὶ εἰπῃτε σὺ κάθου ὧδε καλῶς καὶ τῷ πτωχῷ εἰπῃτε σὺ στήθι ἐκεῖ ἢ κάθου ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιόν μου οὐ διεκρίθητε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἐγένεσθε κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν (‘For if a man with a gold ring and fine clothing might enter into your synagogue, and also a poor person in dirty clothes comes in, and you should happen to give attention to the one wearing fine clothes, and should say, “You sit in a good place,” and to the poor person you should say, “You stand there,” or, “Sit before my feet,”

89 Though a few commentators see 1:26–27 as the beginning of a new section, most identify 2:1 as the start of a new section. Taylor writes, “Virtually every cohesion field shifts between 1:27 and 2:1 as the topic turns to the incompatibility of faith and showing partiality. It is often noted that the characteristics of the Greek diatribe most abound in chapter two: direct address, use of apostrophe, rhetorical questions, hypothetical examples and the use of exempla from Torah.” Mark E. Taylor, *A Text-Linguistic Investigation into the Discourse Structure of James* (LNTS 311; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 51. Cf. Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Letter of James* (AB 37A; New York: Doubleday, 1995), 218. Douglas J. Moo, *The Letter of James* (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 100. Porter’s generalizations concerning pericope markers and the paragraph are consistent with the decision to designate 2:1–13 as a pericope. See Stanley E. Porter, “Pericope Markers and the Paragraph: Textual and Linguistic Implications,” in *The Impact of Unit Delimitation on Exegesis* (ed. Raymond de Hoop et al.; Pericope 7; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 180–82.

90 See William Varner, *The Book of James: A New Perspective: A Linguistic Commentary Applying Discourse Analysis* (The Woodlands, TX: Kress, 2010), 83; Chris A. Vlachos, *James* (EGGNT; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2013), 67.

have you not been distinguished among yourselves, and become judges of evil thoughts?')

These three verses comprise a single third class condition, which is indicated by ἐάν and the following five subjunctive forms. In concert with the semantic feature of [+projection] of the subjunctive, the third class condition "projects some action or event for hypothetical consideration."⁹¹ Thus, third class conditions, by means of being further removed from reality than first class conditions, dialogically expand the discourse to allow for other voices to intrude. In this case, the discourse expands to allow the audience to consider whether they resemble the hypothetical person who shows partiality, which results in the protasis realizing the semantics of the negotiation of information. Thus, the protasis functions as an ideological semantic strategy, so far being composed of [+modality] and realizing a heteroglossic formation on the scale of modulation.

Encapsulated within the third class conditional is reported speech. The reported speech characterizes a hypothetical person who shows partiality to one wearing a gold ring and fine clothing (ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος ἐν ἐσθῇ τι λαμπρᾷ) by privileging him with the seat of honor. This hypothetical person also directs the poor person (πτωχός) to stand elsewhere, or to sit in degradation at the host's feet. Thus, the reported speech realizes [+projection], which dialogically expands the discourse by attributing a voice to the hypothetical person.

The last element of this condition—the apodosis—reveals the ideological position with which the writer wishes his addressees to align. The author invites the recipients to align with this value position by means of a leading question: "Have you not been distinguished among yourselves, and become judges of evil thoughts?" This question functions on the presupposition that the recipients have indeed shown partiality. The question expects the positive conceding answer that, yes, they have become judges of evil thoughts—and this functions dialogically to contract the discourse through the author's expectation of a certain answer. Therefore, this hypothetical condition functions in the discourse to prompt its readers to align themselves with behavior that combats partiality—which is a legitimating ideological strategy.

This passage has shown so far that syntax, specifically the formation of questions, has the potential of trumping the assertive attitude with regard to creating monoglossic texts. When the writer orients him/herself to become

91 Porter, *Idioms*, 262.

a demander of information or goods & services, and the utterance takes the form of a question, the language user no longer produces a monoglossic text. Though the assertive attitude may characterize questions, as seen here, there is by necessity dialogic space opened with the asking of questions. And even though the dialogic space is extremely limited with leading questions—questions that only account for one expected answer—a dialogic space for the audience exists nonetheless.⁹²

James 2:5–7

Ἀκούσατε ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἐξελέξατο τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ πλουσίους ἐν πίστει καὶ κληρονόμους τῆς βασιλείας ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτὸν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡτιμάσατε τὸν πτωχὸν οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι καταδυναστεύουσιν ὑμῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔλκουσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς κριτήρια οὐκ αὐτοὶ βλασφημοῦσιν τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα τὸ ἐπικληθὲν ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς (‘Listen, my beloved brothers and sisters. Did God not choose the poor in the world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom, which he promised to those who love him? But you dishonor the poor person. Do the rich not oppress you and drag you into courts? Do they not slander the honorable name, which has been pronounced over you?’)

Here the writer employs a monoglossic command demanding that the recipients pay attention to him—a [+modality] engagement strategy realizing modulation by means of the imperative ἀκούσατε. He then proceeds to expand the dialogicality of the text by means of another leading question. In the same manner as the previous question, this question, negated by οὐχ, expects a positive answer—the poor were indeed chosen by God to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom. This concept is presented as one apparently known and accepted by the audience, thus the writer has positioned the recipients in alignment with him.⁹³ This ideological strategy illustrates the naturalizing of values as commonsensical. But in the following clause, the author uses an adversative δέ and focuses on the audience via the second person pronoun

92 Questions can appear identical to statements, so that an “interrogative tone of voice” may be the determining factor in interpreting a text as a question. For an explanation regarding the formation of direct questions and indirect questions in New Testament Greek, see McKay, *New Syntax*, 89–95, 107–12.

93 It has been widely attested that the idea of the poor being chosen by God would have been well known among the audience of James as it is a *verbum Christi*, or a Jesus saying. See Dan G. McCartney, *James* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 141; Varner, *Book of James*, 91. Cf. Moo, *Letter of James*, 103–4.

ὕμεις, which makes an emphatic assertive claim about them. This engagement strategy of [+concession +modality] makes a claim that was not expected by the audience and is non-negotiable (modulation), given the monoglossic attitudinal formation established by the assertive attitude (ἡτιμάσατε). The writer has effectively placed his audience into a category that they should have been ideologically positioned to stand against—they are those who show partiality and dishonor the poor.

Two more leading questions follow, which expect positive answers: yes, the rich do oppress the poor and drag them into courts, and, yes, they do slander the name that has been pronounced over them. These questions, characterized by the assertive attitude [+modality], but remaining heteroglossic, function to negotiate information. The writer employs these questions to rationalize his position by coupling it with relevant situations present among the audience, and thus legitimizing the value of impartiality. By being positioned to concede positive answers to these questions, the audience is positioned to admit to the status to which they have relegated themselves. Further, these questions are [+projection],⁹⁴ since through the verbs καταδυναστεύουσιν and βλασφημοῦσιν (verbs of speaking) the content of the oppressors' voices is identified. Also, the verb ἐπικληθέν gives a voice to the implied subject, i.e., God, who imparted honor to the audience by his projected proclamation.

James 2:8–9

Εἰ μέντοι νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικὸν κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτὸν καλῶς ποιεῖτε εἰ δὲ προσωπολημπτεῖτε ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε ἐλεγχόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ὡς παραβάται ('If, on the one hand, you fulfill the royal law according to the Scripture, "You will love your neighbor as yourself," you are doing well. But on the other hand, if you are showing partiality, you are committing sin being convicted by the Law as transgressors').

All three semantic categories are at play in these two verses. First, [+modality] is realized through five indicative forms, making this section almost entirely monoglossic. Even though a condition is raised, the purpose of it is to assert something about reality.⁹⁵ Thus, these two verses are primarily concerned with the negotiation of information—information concerning what constitutes appropriate behavior. Second, [+projection] is realized through a quotation of Scripture, which dialogically expands the text to bring in one

94 This is an instance of [+projection] not accounted for above.

95 Porter, *Idioms*, 256. Cf. BDF §372.

other voice—that is the authoritative voice of the Law, which is an acknowledged voice that supports the writer's value position.⁹⁶ Further, within the quotation, there exists a realization of negotiating services through a commanding use of the future verb ἀγαπήσεις—a monoglossic attitudinal formation of [+expectation] on the modulation scale. However, given that the quotation is embedded within the condition's protasis, it loses its original function to negotiate a service and is reoriented to fit the function of the condition, i.e., to negotiate information. This has illuminated a semantic relationship that exists between the resources of projection and modality. When a writer makes an utterance that incorporates, for example, a quotation, the quotation's verbal attitude no longer determines the speech function of the utterance. Instead, the speech function is determined by the modality in the main verb of the independent clause. For example, in the sentence, *He said, "Follow me,"* the speech function is to give information concerning what was said. It is not to demand that the addressee will follow. Therefore, modality within projected speech does not figure into engagement strategies. The prevailing purpose for negotiating information in v. 8 is seen in the writer's assertion in the apodosis: καλῶς ποιείτε. Therefore, this first class condition by itself can be described by the engagement strategy [+modality] on the modalization scale and [+projection], where modality in the projected speech has been shown to be uninvolved in the engagement strategy.

This first condition becomes connected with a reciprocal first class condition by means of a μέντοι . . . δέ construction, which realizes [+concession]. On the one hand, if the audience falls into the category of the first condition, then they do well; however, if they fall into the category of the second condition, they are sinners and convicts. The monoglossic verbs προσωπολημπτεῖτε and ἐργάζεσθε assert [+modality]. Interpersonally, these two didactic conditions function to show the audience the distance they have created between themselves and the values with which they should be associated. The quotation, having its primary point of contact with Lev 19:18, a summation of the

96 Martin and White identify the "acknowledging attribution" as a dialogically expansive engagement strategy, and their explanation readily corresponds to how the voice of Scripture is employed in this text: "Acknowledgements are obviously dialogic in that they associate the proposition being advanced with voices and/or positions which are external to that of the text itself and present the authorial voice as engaging interactively with those voices . . . This aspect of acknowledgment has been widely attended to in the extensive literature on reported speech and citation." Martin and White, *Language of Evaluation*, 112–13.

whole Law,⁹⁷ in conjunction with the writer's strategic positioning of the audience in opposition to the Law via their partiality, pinpoints them presently as apostates. A rhetorical move such as this logically indicates the writer's goal of creating angst within his recipients, which is intended to motivate the audience to change their behavior. This suggests that the ideological strategy at play here is action-oriented. However, this ideological strategy only arises out of the negotiation of the information concerning what constitutes good behavior, which is accomplished by the naturalizing function of the first class conditions and the μέντοι . . . δέ construction. These structures make the values seem commonsensical to the addressees, especially given the quotation from the Law.

James 2:10–11

ὅστις γὰρ ὅλον τὸν νόμον τηρήσῃ πταίσῃ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ γέγονεν πάντων ἔνοχος ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν μὴ μοιχεύσῃς εἶπεν καὶ μὴ φονεύσῃς εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύεις φονεύεις δὲ γέγονας παραβάτης νόμου (‘For whoever might keep the whole law, but should stumble in one place has become liable for all of it. For the one who said, “Do not commit adultery,” also said, “Do not murder.” Now if you do not commit adultery, but you murder you become a transgressor of the law’).

Verse 10 begins by expanding the dialogicality of the text by means of an indefinite relative pronoun (ὅστις) with the use of the subjunctive. The writer acknowledges the heteroglossic backdrop by considering the voice who says, “I have done well.” However, the writer dialogically expands the text with the intent of immediately contracting the text on this voice by means of a counter-ing. This is realized through the adversative conjunction δέ and the assertive attitude of the verb γέγονεν. The one who by her or his own standards does well is shown in fact to be still a sinner and a convict. The engagement strategy realized here utilizes both dialogic expansion and contraction with the semantic categories of [+modality] on the modalization scale and [+concession].

Verse 11 imports two direct quotations ([+projection]) as a means of making a declarative statement (a negotiation of information), whereby

97 McCartney writes, “The ‘royal law’ refers to the law of God generally, as summed up in the command of love. Some commentators take ‘royal law’ to refer specifically to the Lev. 19:18 command, which Jesus made the centerpiece of ethical behavior between humans (Matt. 22:39) . . . But James is hardly setting one part of the law over against the rest (2:10–11), and ‘law’ . . . generally refers to God’s instruction as a whole rather than a specific commandment” (McCartney, *James*, 147).

[+modality] is realized. It should be mentioned that these projections of direct speech are exhortations made with the so-called hortatory subjunctive. As expressed above, hortatory subjunctives should not be conceived as semantically identical to the imperative on the modulation scale because they do not grammaticalize the semantic feature of direction. Further, as also stated above, the semantic resource of modality realized in projected voices does not factor into negotiation. Though the original letter that contained the reported speech here likely functioned to negotiate services within a particular social scenerio, it is the engagement strategy itself, which imports this voice, that is in the process of negotiating information. The writer uses these projections to conclude that even though one may not be guilty of one particular sin, any other sin makes one guilty of violating the whole Law. Interpersonally, vv. 10–11 function to counter a potential argument by acknowledging its existence then denying its validity. Therefore, the greater purpose of these verses is to negotiate information, and more specifically, to convince the audience of an erroneous view via rationalization.

James 2:12–13

οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας μέλλοντες κρίνεσθαι. ἡ γὰρ κρίσις ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεος κρίσεως ('So speak and so act as those who are to be judged by the law of liberty. For judgment will be merciless to the one who has shown no mercy; mercy triumphs over judgment').

These two verses are exclusively monoglossic. They begin with two imperatives that direct the audience's speech and actions, while leaving no room for objection in the discourse. Verse 12, then, can be categorized as a simple engagement strategy of [+modality] on the modulation scale. Verse 13 consists of two bare assertions of [+modality] on the modalization scale. And they both function interpersonally to align the audience's behavior with the writer's notion of what constitutes right speech and right action. The persuasive component here lies in the natural response to avoid mercilessness, and the natural drive to triumph, which indicates the text is functioning as an action-oriented ideological strategy.

Summary

The system of NEGOTIATION has revealed the ideological strategies in Jas 2:1–13: to legitimize, naturalize, and rationalize the value position that showing partiality is wrong. On the other hand, action-oriented strategies are employed to move the audience toward the promoted social behavior of not

showing partiality. Further, the analysis of the semantic categories of projection, modality, and concession highlight a number of ways in which the writer of James dialogically contracts and expands the text to direct his audience toward not showing partiality. Further, using Jas 2:1–13 as a test case has uncovered two important exceptions within the NEGOTIATION system. (1) Although questions can take the form of monoglossic attitudinal formations, they can still dialogically expand a text, because the purpose of a question remains to ask for a response from another ‘voice.’ (2) In instances where a writer employs the semantic category of projection, modality does not influence the means of negotiating in such instances of reported speech.

Conclusion

This work has shown the potential for an engagement analysis to reveal rhetorical strategies as they reside within the interpersonal metafunction. When a text is composed, its purpose is to negotiate values, opinions, beliefs, etc. This is true for New Testament documents as well. Present in the discourses of the New Testament are ways of promoting ideologies that exist among a polyphony of other ideologies within the culture in which they were written. The New Testament writers had to negotiate by drawing upon the semantic resources at their disposal to accomplish their ideological goals in the midst of competing ‘voices.’ Although the analysis in this work has been limited to a small test case, the system of ENGAGEMENT as means to negotiate information and goods & services as they correspond to ideological strategies in texts has shown itself to be a promising and fresh avenue for further research in the areas of ideological and rhetorical criticism.

Meaning in Bulk: The Greek Clause Complex and 1 Peter 1:3–12

Benjamin B. Hunt

Introduction

It is typically assumed that those who wrote the New Testament intended to communicate logically and to make sense. They did not intend to put clauses and sentences together with unintelligible connections between them. This essay is an investigation into the systemic choices and linguistic resources available to Koine Greek language users for combining single clauses into clause complexes. As a point of application, it discusses how the writer of 1 Peter constructs logical relations between the clauses in 1:3–12, a unit which, in the words of Leonhard Goppelt, “is one complete sentence thought, structured with stylistic care . . . It speaks a sophisticated language.”¹ It will be shown that the text of 1 Pet 1:3–12 is presented in a systematic and logical manner, creating one continual and intricate clause complex that develops the reasons that God is (or perhaps ought to be) blessed (εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεός).

SFL: Logical Mode of Ideational Meaning

Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) theorizes that language performs three functions. The one most appropriate here is ideational, whereby a language user is able to construe experience.² Typically, ideational meaning is realized in explicit and concrete terms, as well as in metaphorical representations of the real world that fall within the parameters of the experiential mode of

¹ Leonhard Goppelt, *A Commentary on 1 Peter* (trans. J.E. Alsup; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 79.

² M.A.K. Halliday and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, “Systemic Functional Grammar: A First Step into the Theory,” in *Foundations of Syntax: An Advanced Study of Current Theories* (ed. James W. Ney; Tokyo: International Language Sciences, 1997), 13.

ideational meaning.³ However, there is a second mode of ideational meaning that is representative of reality in more abstract terms than the experiential mode—namely, the logical mode,⁴ which, with regard to clause complexes, Halliday and Matthiessen summarize as “the representation of the relations between one process and another.”⁵ The ideational metafunction consists of actions and events (experiential mode) as well as the relationships between them (logical mode) that are *re-presented* by the writer through text.⁶ That is, when dealing with clause complexes and clausal relations, the logical mode of ideational meaning is concerned with how the writer represents the abstract and logical relations between two or more processes communicated via clauses.

Clause Complex

A clause complex is defined as that which comes about through the combination of a number of simple sentences or clauses.⁷ As information flows forward, clauses are linked to each other to create clause complexes.⁸ Any two

3 M.A.K. Halliday, “Modes of Meaning and Modes of Expression: Types of Grammatical Structure and Their Determination by Different Semantic Functions,” in *On Grammar* (ed. Jonathan Webster; New York: Continuum, 2002), 202–5. These concrete reflections of the real world fall under functional-grammatical labels termed predicator (grammaticalization of the action that is taking place in a clause [i.e. verbs]), adjunct (grammaticalization of the circumstances that attend to the predicator such as time, place, cause, purpose, and manner [i.e. adverbs, non-finite clauses, and prepositional phrases]), subject and complement (grammaticalization of the participants involved [subject—who/what acts in the clause; complement—who/what is acted upon in the clause]).

4 Halliday, “Modes,” 211–12.

5 M.A.K. Halliday and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, *Construing Experience through Meaning: A Language-based Approach to Cognition* (New York: Continuum, 1999), 511.

6 Buijs provides a similar understanding of how language is used to represent different levels of reality. Whereas true reality cannot be seen in a text, the writer is still able to “(re-)present” or mimic real situations and the connections between them (Michel Buijs, *Clause Combining in Ancient Greek Narrative Discourse: The Distribution of Subclauses and Participial Clauses in Xenophon’s Hellenica and Anabasis* [Leiden: Brill, 2005], 11).

7 John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 178. See also M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (3rd ed.; revised and updated by Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen; London: Arnold, 2004), 8. Certainly, the logical systems imply relations between two or more clauses; however, clause complexes may also be created by lone primary clauses. Take, for instance, 1 John 5:21. Having little, if any, thematic connection to the previous section, and as the final clause in the letter, this is a clause complex composed of a single clause.

8 Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, “Lexicogrammar in Discourse Development: Logogenetic Patterns of Wording,” in *Discourse and Language Functions* (ed. G. Huang and Z. Wang;

clauses that are logically related to one another are called a clause nexus, so that a clause complex composed of three clauses contains two clause nexuses. This phenomenon is referred to as nesting and occurs when “what is being linked are not two single clauses, but rather a ‘sub-complex’—a clause nexus in its own right.”⁹ Consider the following examples from Jas 4:3–4:¹⁰

||^{Clause 1} αἰτεῖτε ||^{Clause 2} καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε ||^{Clause 3} διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθαι
 ||^{Clause 4} ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἡμῶν δαπανήσητε ||
 ||^{Clause 5} μοιχαλίδες, οὐκ οἴδατε ||^{Clause 6} ὅτι ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ
 θεοῦ ἐστίν ||
 ||^{Clause 1} You ask ||^{Clause 2} yet you do not receive ||^{Clause 3} because you ask
 with the wrong motives ||^{Clause 4} so that you might waste [what you ask
 for] on your desires ||
 ||^{Clause 5} Adulteresses! Do you not know ||^{Clause 6} that clientage with the
 world is enmity towards God? ||

In this example there are six clauses comprising two clause complexes. In the first complex, *Clauses 1–4* are combined, resulting in a relationship between *Clause 1* and the sub-complex of *Clauses 2–4*. This is the concept of nesting, where a complex is composed of a clause and a sub-complex. In the second complex, *Clauses 5* and *6* compose a clause complex made up of only two interdependent clauses. But what are the logical connections between these clauses? How do language users construct logical bridges between clauses? These questions are answered by an appeal to the logico-semantic and tactic choices available in the Greek language.

Systems Explaining Clausal Relations

There are many ways to linguistically represent relationships between actions and events. This is due to the nature of creating meaning—choice.¹¹ These choices are given visual representation in system networks, which map out the

Shanghai: Foreign Language Teaching and Research, 1991), 4. This process of creating meaning as a text unfolds is referred to as *logogenesis*.

9 Halliday, *Introduction*, 376.

10 All New Testament citations and their subsequent translations are broken up by clauses. The clauses are shown between the double pipes (||).

11 The notion that meaning is dependent upon choice is one of the basic tenets of SFL. For introduction into this aspect of SFL, see Suzanne Eggins, *An Introduction to Systemic*

meaning potential that is available to language users and the way this potential is grammaticalized. With regard to clause complexes in Koine Greek, there are essentially three choices for creating meaning within a text: RECURSION, LOGICO-SEMANTICS, and TAXIS.

Recursion

The first choice available is whether or not a language user desires to further develop a grammatical element, whether a clause or a substantive within a clause. This choice of whether or not to further develop a grammatical element is labeled as the system of RECURSION, which can be thought of as the basic decision of whether to *stop* or *go on*. In terms of clause complexes, the method by which one clause or substantive within a clause is further developed is another clause. Take the following two English sentences for instance:

I rode my bike to school because I did not want to waste gas.

I burned my hands on the pot, which was on the stove only seconds before.

In both examples, the writer has chosen to further develop a grammatical unit (a clause in the former and a substantive in the latter) by employing an additional clause. Take, for instance, the second example: if only the first clause were present, it may be guessed that the pot was hot; however, with the introduction of the second clause, the reason for the pot's heat is made explicit. In this way, the clause complex creates more nuanced and specific meaning than can be presented with a single clause.




FIGURE 13.1 *Recursion.*

Logico-Semantics

The system of LOGICO-SEMANTICS describes the different ways that language users are able to semantically represent the logical relations between clauses. In this recursive activity (termed *expansion*) one or more clauses will further develop a grammatical unit, either another clause or substantive contained

Functional Linguistics (2nd ed.; New York: Continuum, 2004), 188–205. See also Halliday and Matthiessen, “Systemic Functional Grammar,” 3–7.

within another clause.¹² There are three types of logico-semantic relationships a writer may choose from in order to further develop these grammatical units—*elaboration*, *extension*, and *enhancement*. In the case of *elaboration*, a clause or substantive is expanded by other clauses that provide clarifications, restatements, specifications of detail, comments, or examples. If a clause is expanded by other clauses that provide additional information, exceptions, and alternatives it is the logico-semantic relation of *extension*. Finally, in instances of *enhancement* a clause is expanded by another clause that provides circumstantial information such as time, place, cause, and condition.¹³

Elaboration can be seen in the following example from 2 Thess 3:3, as ὁ κύριος is given further detail in the second clause—that is, ὁ κύριος is not merely named, but is specified as the one who will strengthen.

|| Clause 1 Πιστὸς δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ κύριος || Clause 2 ὃς στηρίξει ἡμᾶς ||
 || Clause 1 But, faithful is the Lord || Clause 2 who will strengthen you ||

In the following example of *extension* from Heb 12:9, there are two coordinated processes. *Clause 1* grammaticalizes a process (εἰχομεν), to which *Clause 2* adds an additional process (ἐνετρεπόμεθα), thus extending the first clause. According to Hebrews, not only has each person had a father, but they have *also* revered them.

12 Halliday, *Introduction*, 376–77. According to Halliday's conception of English clause complexes, there is a second type of logico-semantic relation between clauses. This is termed *projection*, and it refers to the method by which writers relay the thoughts and sayings of others. In these relations, one clause holds a predicator that represents either a verbal (locution) or mental (thought) process; the second clause, then, contains the contents projected by that process (Halliday, *Introduction*, 377). See also M.A.K. Halliday, "Language Structure and Language Function," in *On Grammar*, 184–85; and Halliday and Matthiessen, *Introduction*, 377. For Matthiessen and Halliday, the lack of a linking particle ("linker") such as a conjunction indicates clauses of paratactic-projection (Halliday, *Introduction*, 386). Though this may be true of English, this is not a rule for Greek, because ὅτι can be seen introducing paratactic locutions on a number of occasions. An instance par excellence is Mark 1:37, where it is best to think of the ὅτι as a marker of quoted material.

13 Eija Ventola, "The Logical Relations in Exchanges," in *Systemic Functional Perspectives to Discourse: Selected Papers from the 12th International Systemic Workshop* (ed. James D. Benson and William S. Greaves; Advances in Discourse Processes 26; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1988), 60–61. See also Jeffrey T. Reed, *A Discourse Analysis of Philippians: Method and Rhetoric in the Debate over Literary Integrity* (JSNTSup 136; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 90–93.

||^{Clause 1} εἶτα τοὺς μὲν τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν πατέρας εἶχομεν παιδευτὰς ||^{Clause 2}
καὶ ἐνετρεπόμεθα ||
||^{Clause 1} Moreover, each of us has had/has a fleshly father who disciplined
||^{Clause 2} and we revered them ||

1 John 1:4 exemplifies the relation of *enhancement* by adding as an accompanying circumstance John's purpose for writing to his addressees.

||^{Clause 1} καὶ ταῦτα γράφομεν ἡμεῖς ||^{Clause 2} ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ἡμῶν ᾗ πεπληρωμένη ||
||^{Clause 1} And we write these things ||^{Clause 2} so that your joy may become
complete ||

In sum, logico-semantics explains the relational meanings that exist between two or more clauses. A language user is able to linguistically represent how multiple clauses are related to one another by expanding one clause into two or more. The three logico-semantic relations of expansion (i.e., *extension*, *elaboration*, and *enhancement*), describe how the language user wishes to represent the relationship between two or more clauses, or the relationship between a substantive in one clause and other clauses.




FIGURE 13.2 Recursion and logico-semantics.

Taxis

The third choice for creating meaning recognizes that each clause is necessarily interdependent on its surrounding co-text, because “each new link is defined in relation to the previous link.”¹⁴ The system of *taxis* explains this level of interdependency between clauses, describing the linguistic potential of the language user concerning whether to represent two clauses as having equal or unequal semantic status.¹⁵ *Hypotaxis* refers to clause complexes of

14 Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, “Representational Issues in Systemic Functional Grammar,” in *Systemic Functional Perspectives on Discourse* (ed. James D. Benson and William S. Greaves; Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1998), 167.

15 Halliday, *Introduction*, 374. With regard to the Greek of the New Testament, a helpful representation of the tactic system can be seen in the model on the OpenText.org web-

unequal status in which one clause is semantically modified by one or more secondary-dependent clause, while *parataxis* refers to clause complexes containing two semantically related clauses of equal status.¹⁶

Lexico-grammatical Realizations of Taxis

Verbal mood-form is sometimes referenced to determine from grammar whether clauses are of equal or unequal status.¹⁷ Based on an observable frequency, it might seem as though the indicative mood-form would always grammaticalize main clauses and the subjunctive would always grammaticalize dependent. However, the construction (*Clause*) + ($\delta\tau\acute{\iota}$ + *Indicative Clause*) grammaticalizes a hypotactic clausal relation in which ($\delta\tau\acute{\iota}$ + *Indicative Clause*) is the secondary-dependent. The same can be said of ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ + *Indicative Clause*) + (*Clause*).¹⁸ Likewise, although the subjunctive mood-form regularly appears in secondary-dependent clauses in hypotactic relationships, it can also be seen in a main clause, when it functions as the so-called hortatory subjunctive.¹⁹ Based on this, a mood-form's discourse function must be determined in order for Greek verbal mood to be used as an indicator of tactic relationships, yet a mood-form's discourse function is largely dependent upon the co-text in which it appears.²⁰ Thus, some other grammatical element must be determinative of the tactic relationships between clauses.

site. Here the editors have shown interdependency in clauses by indenting secondary-dependent (i.e., hypotactically related) clauses.

- 16 The following formulae may be representative of Parataxis: (Main + Main) or (Dependent + Dependent). With the second formula, the two dependent clauses will be hypotactically related to the same main clause, yet paratactically related to one another. Moreover, the following formulae may be representative of Hypotaxis: (Main + Dependent) or (Dependent + Dependent). In the case of the second formula, the first dependent clause will be hypotactically related to a main clause, as in the first formula, while the second dependent clause will be hypotactically related to the first dependent clause.
- 17 F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (trans. R.W. Funk; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 185–94. See also Stanley E. Porter and Matthew Brook O'Donnell, "Conjunctions, Clines and Levels of Discourse," *FN 20* (2007): 13.
- 18 Stanley E. Porter, *Idioms of the Greek New Testament* (2nd ed.; BLG 2; London: Sheffield Academic, 1999), 237–38.
- 19 Blass and Debrunner, *Greek Grammar*, 185; and Porter, *Idioms*, 221–22.
- 20 Porter, Reed, and O'Donnell acknowledge that verbal mood is highly dependent upon whether or not a mood form—particularly the subjunctive—will be dependent or main (Stanley E. Porter, Jeffrey T. Reed, and Matthew Brook O'Donnell, *Fundamentals of New Testament Greek* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010], 155–56). I cannot address the discourse

As it happens, these clausal relations are most easily recognized by words and grammatical constructions that help govern the flow of information as a text unfolds,²¹ organic cohesive ties (i.e., particles, conjunctions, etc.) that “make up the logical system of natural language.”²² Such organic ties grammatically signal how the language user semantically relates one clause to another, and how these relations are to be understood by the addressee. Tactic relationships are typically, though by no means exclusively, grammaticalized by a class of particles called conjunctions.

Lyons refers to hypotaxis as a clausal relationship in which “one of the clauses . . . is ‘modified’ by one or more subordinate clauses grammatically dependent upon it.”²³ Lyons’ definition of hypotaxis is significant for ideational meaning because of the word *modified*. With Greek hypotactic clause complexes, a secondary clause further elucidates (i.e., modifies) the clause upon which it is dependent or a substantive found within it. Porter and O’Donnell recognize their logical-semantic axis as an overarching reference to hypotaxis in which these organic ties show the grammatical relationship of one clause as dependent upon another.²⁴ These conjunctions represent the further

function of moods in this short section; however, perhaps a Bakhtinian understanding of heteroglossia may contribute to this discussion. For instance, the construction of $\epsilon\lambda$ + indicative, a secondary-dependent clause, is heteroglossic in that it allows room for other voices to contribute to the conversation, regardless of how the writer presents it as the condition of reality for the sake of argument (Porter, *Idioms*, 256–57). In this same vein, the hortatory subjunctive, a main clause, is monoglossic and does not allow other voices to speak. Perhaps a mood-form’s heteroglossic function determines its clause’s tactic status. However, even this demands certain *a priori* decisions about what constitutes the heteroglossic function of a mood-form. For more information on a Bakhtinian perspective in Greek linguistics, see the essay by Dawson in the current volume.

21 Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen, “Combining Clauses into Clause Complexes: A Multifaceted View,” in *Complex Sentences in Grammar and Discourse* (ed. J. Bybee and M. Noonan; Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2002), 4.

22 Jeffrey T. Reed, “Discourse Analysis,” in *Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 205–8.

23 Lyons, *Introduction*, 178.

24 Porter and O’Donnell have written a study of the Greek conjunctions in which they separated conjunctions by their specificity and function at respective levels of discourse. In it, it was shown that one class of conjunctions grammaticalizes certain highly specific logical-semantic relations between processes. A second class of conjunctions is procedural in that the conjunctions link the discourse in less specific ways through continuity or discontinuity, traditionally labeled “coordinating” and “adversative” conjunctions (Porter and O’Donnell, “Conjunctions,” 3–14). This bifurcation is helpful for determining a general trend in tactic relationships, as will be shown in the ensuing paragraphs.

development of a clause by grammaticalizing the *specific* manner in which the secondary clause expounds upon the primary clause or substantive.²⁵ The following table displays a fair amount of the Greek organic ties that represent hypotaxis.

TABLE 13.1 *Hypotactic conjunctions + ὅς*

ὥς; ὅς; ὥσπερ; καθὼς; καθό; ὅπου; ὅτε; ὅταν; ἕως; εἰ; ἔάν; ὅτι; διότι; ἐπεὶ; ἵνα; ὅπως; ὥστε
--

In following example from Phil 2:9–10, *Clause 1* is modified by the use of a secondary-dependent clause, which grammaticalizes the purpose that motivated God to give Jesus the “name above all names.”

||^{Clause 1} καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάν ὄνομα ||^{Clause 2} ἵνα ἐν τῷ
ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ . . . πάντα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσῃται ||
||^{Clause 1} And [God] gave him the name above all names ||^{Clause 2} so that by
the name of Jesus . . . every tongue might confess ||

In distinction to hypotaxis, Greek paratactic relations are those existent between two or more clauses of equal semantic status. However, though the clauses are shown to relate to one another, they are related in a less specific manner than the clauses in hypotactic relations. That is, the writers present each clause in succession, sequentially. Paratactic relationships are typically realized by what have traditionally been called the “coordinating conjunctions” of a language, which correspond with Porter and O’Donnell’s classification of (dis)continuous conjunctions.²⁶ The following table shows the conjunctions that regularly function at the level of the clause complex in order to grammaticalize parataxis, though others may be seen in the New Testament.

25 Porter and O’Donnell, “Conjunctions,” 13. At least one more organic tie deserves recognition, as it signals a hypotactic clausal relation in which a substantive is being specified—the declinable relative pronoun ὅς.

26 Lyons, *Introduction*, 178. These conjunctions are concerned with linking the discourse in a procedural way, whether continuously or discontinuously (Porter and O’Donnell, “Conjunctions,” 13).

TABLE 13.2 *Paratactic constructions*

Continuous Conjunctions ——— Discontinuous Conjunctions	
καί	τέ τότε γάρ οὕτως δέ μέν ἀλλά

Besides the fact that they are taken from different writings of the LXX, both clauses in the following example from 1 Cor 1:19 could likely appear independently of one another; the meaning of neither clause is dependent upon the other. However, a linear reading of these clauses is possible when they are presented one after another, so that the second clause restates the semantics of the first.

||^{Clause 1} πολῶ τήν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν ||^{Clause 2} καὶ τήν σύνεσιν τῶν συνετῶν
θετήσω ||
||^{Clause 1} I will destroy the wisdom of the wise ||^{Clause 2} and the intelligence
of the intelligent I will abolish ||

Summary of the System of Taxis

The Greek tactic system refers to the level of interdependency between clauses. Hypotactic clause complexes involve clauses of unequal semantic status. Conversely, paratactic clause complexes involve clauses of equal semantic status. The class of conjunction used to connect the clauses remains the method that most easily distinguishes parataxis and hypotaxis grammatically. The classes of conjunction presented here were the logical-semantic and (dis)continuous. Hypotaxis, in which the secondary clause further specifies a grammatical unit, is realized by logical-semantic conjunctions and ὅς, depending upon whether a clause or a substantive is being further specified. In distinction, parataxis, realized by (dis)continuous conjunctions, presents a procedural reading between clauses.

Combining the Systems

It must be understood that taxis and logico-semantics are not exclusive. It is only through a combination of these systems that clause complexing is a viable resource for creating meaning. That is, clauses that are logico-semantically related are in some way interdependent. So, it must be kept in mind that particular logico-semantic relations exist in particular tactic

relations—the logico-semantic relations between Greek clauses limit the type of tactic relations that can exist between clauses.

The logico-semantics of *enhancement* exist in hypotactic clausal relations due to the organic ties that grammaticalize semantically specific hypotactic clausal relations.²⁷ Hypotactic-enhancements entail a secondary-dependent clause that provides circumstantial information (i.e., time, place, cause, purpose, result, and condition) by which the main clause is to be understood.²⁸ In the following example from 1 Pet 5:6, purpose is communicated as realized in the conjunction ἵνα.

|| Clause 1 ταπεινώθητε οὖν ὑπὸ τὴν κραταίαν χεῖρα τοῦ θεοῦ || Clause 2 ἵνα ὑμεῖς
 ὑψώσῃ ἐν καιρῷ ||
 || Clause 1 Be humbled, therefore, by the mighty hand of God || Clause 2 so
 that he may exalt you in time ||

The tactic relation that exists in the logico-semantic relation of *extension* is that of parataxis. In paratactic-extensions, subsequent clauses provide additional information or alternatives to that communicated in the first clause. These types of clausal relations are those that are grammaticalized by Greek (dis)continuous conjunctions—continuous conjunctions are shown in clauses that provide additional processes, while discontinuous conjunctions provide alternatives and concessions.²⁹ Nevertheless, through the combination of these clauses, the clause complexes create nuanced semantics that differ from that of either clause in isolation.³⁰ Two examples are given. First, a continuous example from Jas 1:11; then, a discontinuous example from Matt 10:20.

|| Clause 1 ἐνέτειλεν γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος σὺν τῷ καύσωνι || Clause 2 καὶ ἐξήρανεν τὸν χόρτον ||
 || Clause 1 For the sun rises along with its heat || Clause 2 and scorches the
 grass ||
 || Clause 1 οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες || Clause 2 ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς
 ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν ||
 || Clause 1 For you will be not speaking || Clause 2 but the spirit of your father
 will be speaking through you ||

27 Porter and O'Donnell, "Conjunctions," 13.

28 Halliday, *Introduction*, 416. See also Porter, *Idioms*, 230–43.

29 Porter and O'Donnell assert that these conjunctions "contribute the least semantic significance to the discourse" ("Conjunctions," 10), which may understate their contribution to the Greek language.

30 Halliday, *Introduction*, 375.

The logico-semantic relation of *elaboration* entails further conversation, as both paratactic- and hypotactic-elaborations exist, depending upon whether a clause or a substantive is being elaborated by another clause. Hypotactic-elaborations involve what Halliday refers to as the “non-defining relative clause,” which “functions as a kind of descriptive gloss to the primary clause.”³¹ Greek hypotactic-elaborations have a grammar all their own—the relative pronoun ὅς—and are those in which a secondary-dependent clause elaborates upon a substantive in the clause on which it depends (i.e., gives examples, details, or restatements). In the following example from Luke 2:30–31, the clause denoting hypotactic-elaboration provides clarification for the nominal word group τὸ σωτήριόν σου.

||^{Clause 1} εἶδον οἱ ὀφθαλμοί μου τὸ σωτήριόν σου ||^{Clause 2} ὃ ἡτοίμασας κατὰ πρόσωπον πάντων τῶν λαῶν ||
 ||^{Clause 1} My eyes have seen your salvation ||^{Clause 2} which you have prepared in the presence of all people ||

Paratactic-elaborations are relations containing clauses with separate processes, one expounding upon the other. Though conjunctions are able to connect clauses in this way, the clauses may also be related by apposition. In either case, a second clause provides examples and/or restatements of the first.³² The following example, taken from Rev 20:19, is a very good representative of paratactic-elaboration. The second clause in this nexus further explains, indeed clarifies, ἡ λίμνη τοῦ πυρός.

||^{Clause 1} καὶ ὁ θάνατος καὶ ὁ ᾗδης ἐβλήθησαν εἰς τὴν λίμνην τοῦ πυρός ||^{Clause 2} οὗτος ὁ θάνατος ὁ δεύτερος ἐστίν, ἡ λίμνη τοῦ πυρός ||
 ||^{Clause 1} And death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire ||^{Clause 2} this is the second death, the lake of fire ||

Logico-Semantics and Embedded Clauses

The category of secondary or dependent clauses has traditionally included all clauses that function in subordination to another clausal unit, whether they are stand-alone or embedded.³³ As Matthiessen and Thompson have shown,

³¹ Halliday, *Introduction*, 399.

³² Halliday, *Introduction*, 398.

³³ Moule draws a distinction between common paratactic Semitic manner of showing temporality in a text, and the more Greek use of “subordinated” clauses: temporal [finite] clauses and participial clauses (C.F.D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek*

these headings are misleading because they do not differentiate between embedded³⁴ and unembedded clausal relationships.³⁵ Halliday argues that embedded clauses cannot be hypotactically related to the clause in which they are found, due to a linguistic phenomenon referred to as “downward rankshifting.”³⁶ He explains:

In cases of (downward) rankshift, an item normally having the function of (entering in the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations associated with) rank *x* characteristically ‘loses’ these functions on taking over those of rank *y*: a clause operating in group structure cannot enter into direct syntagmatic relations with clauses outside of that group.³⁷

So, with regards to participial and infinitival clauses, these are clausal units that are downward rankshifted to fit within a word group, functioning as an adjunct, substantive, or substantival modifier.³⁸ Using the language of slot-and-filler, participial clauses can fill the slot traditionally attributed to such things as adverbs, adjectives, subjects, and objects. Thus, there is no tactic relationship, but rather a clause acting like a functional-grammatical unit on a “lower level” than the clause.³⁹

This does not mean that embedded clauses are not logically related to the clauses in which they are found. In fact, embedded clauses are of particular importance in the Greek of the New Testament, as they provide an abundance of logical connections throughout. It is helpful to understand the logico-semantics of embedded clauses based on the function of the word-group into which they have been rank-shifted—that is, whether they function to modify a nominal or predicator as an adjunct word-group, embedded

[2nd ed.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959], 172–73. See also David Alan Black, *It's Still Greek to Me: An Easy-to-Understand Guide to Intermediate Greek* [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998], 35–37; and Daniel B. Wallace, *The Basics of New Testament Syntax: An Intermediate Greek Grammar* [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000], 286–92).

34 Embedded clauses, in New Testament Greek, are those usually composed of participles and infinitives.

35 Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen and Sandra A. Thompson, “The Structure of Discourse and ‘Subordination,’” in *Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse* (ed. J. Haiman and S.A. Thompson; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1988), 277–86.

36 Halliday, *Introduction*, 426–37 (esp. 434–35).

37 M.A.K. Halliday, “The Concept of Rank: A Reply,” in *On Grammar*, 122.

38 For an overview of functional word-groups, see “Introduction to the Annotation Model,” n.p. [cited 8 July 2013]. Online: <http://OpenText.org/model/introduction.html>.

39 Halliday, *Introduction*, 426–27.

clauses provide information by which some unit of the clause in which they are embedded is to be understood. Thus, when a participial clause functions as a nominal modifier (i.e., the so-called “adjectival” participle) the logico-semantic relationship is one of *elaboration*.⁴⁰ Further, upon being downwardly rank-shifted into an adjunct position so as to function as a verbal modifier (i.e., the so-called “adverbial” participle), a participial clause will communicate the logico-semantics of *enhancement*. This means that the participial clauses provide relationships of circumstance (i.e., cause, means, instrumentality, purpose) between the process of the participle and the process of the predicator being modified.⁴¹ Take for instance Jude 20–21:⁴²

|| Ὑμεῖς δέ, ἀγαπητοί [[ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἑαυτοὺς τῇ ἀγιωτάτῃ ὑμῶν πίστει]]
 [[ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ προσευχόμενοι]] ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ τηρήσατε
 [[προσδχόμενοι τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον]] ||
 || But you, beloved, [[by building yourselves up on the most holy faith]]
 [[by praying in the holy spirit]] keep one another in the love of God
 [[while awaiting the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life]] ||

In this example, each of the participles has been rank-shifted to function as an adjunct. Consequently the relationship between events shown is one of enhancement in every case. However, an area of discussion is the so-called “concessive” participle, which may perhaps be understood as an *extension*, as it provides a possible alternative to the main predicator, though the concessive participle may be accompanied by a discontinuous conjunction or “concessive particle,” which provides grammatical evidence for *extension*.⁴³

Summary of the Clause Complex

In order to create meaning in a text, a language user is able to combine clauses in meaningful ways. Choosing whether to further develop a clause (recursion), the writer can show subsequent clauses as semantically and logically

40 Black states, “the adjectival participle should normally be translated by a clause introduced by a relative pronoun but may sometimes be translated by a noun” (Black, *Still Greek*, 122). Although I would not go so far as to prescribe the translation formula, I do agree with Black that a participle modifying a nominal word group can be thought of in terms of elaboration most recognizable in a so-called “relative clause.”

41 These have traditionally been referred to as “adverbial participles,” because they function as verbal modifiers in the same way adverbs do (Black, *Still Greek*, 122–24).

42 Embedded clauses are bracketed ([[]]) in both the Greek and English.

43 For more information on the “concessive” use of the participle, see Porter, *Idioms*, 191.

related to the first (logico-semantics). Such semantic relations are communicated through clauses of equal or unequal semantic status in relation to the original clause (taxis). Further, clues from the textual metafunction (cohesive ties) demonstrate how the language user wishes the clauses to be understood in relation to one another. However, the particular logico-semantic relation is partially indicative of the type of tactic clausal relation, and thus its textual realization. If the clauses are of equal semantic status (parataxis), one clause will either present additional information or alternatives (extension), or one clause will present clarifications or exemplifications (elaboration). If the clauses are shown to be of unequal semantic status (hypotaxis), the secondary clause will either present circumstantial information (enhancement), or the secondary clause will present clarifications and examples (elaboration). The system of the Greek clause complex, as presented in this paper, is given visual representation in Figure 13.3.




FIGURE 13.3 *The Greek clause complex.*

The Complex Clause of 1 Peter 1:3–12

In order to illustrate this model of Greek clause complexing, I will demonstrate that the whole of 1 Pet 1:3–12 is one clause complex, an intricate nest consisting of twelve clauses, containing twenty-three embedded clauses that cooperate to elaborate upon God the Father and the cause for his benediction (εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεὸς [1 Pet 1:3]). Each clause is broken into its constituent clauses according to the model articulated on OpenText.org. Finite clauses can be found between two sets of double pipes (e.g., || clause ||), while the constituent functional-grammatical word-groups of each clause (i.e. subject, complement, adjunct,

and predicator) are shown between single pipes, with raised letters indicating their function (e.g., | ^A group | or | ^S group |). Further, in order to preserve the order of the wording of the text, ellipses are employed for split word-groups (e.g., | ^C ... group | ^{CJ} καὶ | ... ^C group |). Finally, embedded clauses are shown between two sets of double brackets (e.g., [[clause]]).

Regarding the systems discussed previously, this essay marks logico-semantic relationships using a few characteristic abbreviations, whereby elaboration is marked by the equals sign (=), extension by the addition sign (+), and enhancement by the multiplication sign (×). For the purposes of this paper, these visual clues will be shown on a separate line between each finite clause and on either side of the double brackets of embedded clauses. Levels of indentation are indicative of the tactic relationships between clauses—in clause nexuses, indented clauses show hypotaxis, while non-indented clauses show parataxis. Because embedded clauses account for the majority of the clauses in this text, and also provide a wealth of logico-semantic information by which the clauses in which they are embedded are to be understood, these clauses will be addressed first. Following the analysis of embedded clausal functions, the tactic and logico-semantic relations between stand-alone clauses will be discussed.

Embedded Clauses

Within *Clause 1* there are five embedded clauses, or, more specifically, there is one embedded clause with four clauses embedded inside it. Interestingly, each embedded clause in *Clause 1* semantically modifies a substantive, giving these substantives further definition and thereby grammaticalizing the logico-semantics of *elaboration*.⁴⁴ In the case of the first embedded clause, the participle ἀναγεννήσας *elaborates* upon God the Father by defining him as the one who has given ‘rebirth’ to the addressees. Similarly, the embedded participial clause ζῶσαν defines the type of hope into which the addressees have been reborn—it is a ‘living’ hope. The embedded clause τετηρημένη *elaborates* upon the Christians’ inheritance (κληρονομίαν), defining that the inheritance into

44 ‘Definition’ is used here in a functional-grammatical manner to describe modifying words/phrases/clauses that attribute features or further define some word. Common examples of definers are adjectives (both attributive and predicate structure) and appositional words or phrases (see “Introduction to the Annotation Model,” n.p. [cited 8 July 2013]. Online: <http://OpenText.org/model/introduction.html>). See also the discussion of Halliday and Matthiessen on epithets and classifiers (Halliday, *Introduction*, 318–20).

Annotation

- 1) $||^C \text{Εὐλογητὸς } |^S \text{ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ} = [|^P \dots \text{ὁ } |^A \text{κατὰ τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ} \text{ἔλεος } | \dots ^P \text{ἀναγεννήσας } |^C \text{ἡμᾶς } |^A \text{εἰς ἐλπίδα} = [|^P \text{ζῶσαν}] = |^A \text{δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ νεκρῶν } |^A \text{εἰς κληρονομίαν ἀφθαρτον καὶ ἀμίαντον καὶ ἀμάραντον} = [|^P \text{τετηρημένην } |^A \text{ἐν οὐρανοῖς } |^A \text{εἰς ὑμᾶς} = [|^P \dots \text{τοὺς } |^A \text{ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ } | \dots ^P \text{φρουρουμένους } |^A \text{διὰ πίστεως } |^A \text{εἰς σωτηρίαν ἐτοίμην} = [|^P \text{ἀποκαλυφθῆναι } |^A \text{ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ}] =] =] ||$
- =
- 2) $||^A \text{ἐν } |^C \text{ᾧ } |^P \text{ἀγαλλιάσθε } |^A + [|^A \text{ὄλγον ἄρτι } x [|^C \text{εἰ } |^C [|^P \text{δέον}]] |^P \text{ἐστὶν}]] x |^P \text{λυπηθέντες } |^A \text{ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς}] +] ||$
- x
- 3) $||^C |^A \text{ἵνα } |^S \text{τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως πολυτιμότερον χρυσίου} = ([|^P \text{τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου}] + [|^A \text{διὰ πυρός } |^C \text{δὲ } |^P \text{δοκιμαζομένου}] +) = |^P \text{εὕρεθῇ } |^A \text{εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν } |^A \text{ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ} ||$
- x
- 4) $||^C \text{ὃν } |^A + [|^A \text{οὐκ } |^P \text{ἰδόντες}] + |^P \text{ἀγαπάτε} ||$
- =
- 5) $||^A \text{εἰς ὃν } |^A x ([|^A \text{ἄρτι } |^A \text{μὴ } |^P \text{ὀρώντες}] + [|^P \text{πιστεύοντες } |^C \text{δὲ}]) x |^P \text{ἀγαλλιάσθε } |^A \text{χαρᾷ ἀνεκλαλήτῳ καὶ} = [|^P \text{δεδοξασμένη}] = |^A x [|^P \text{κοιμζόμενοι } |^C \text{τὸ τέλος τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν σωτηρίαν ψυχῶν}]] x ||$
- =
- 6) $||^A \text{περὶ ἧς σωτηρίας } |^P \text{ἐξεζήτησαν} ||$
- +
- 7) $||^C \text{καὶ } |^P \text{ἐξηραύνησαν } |^S \text{προφῆται} = [|^P \dots \text{οἱ } |^A \text{περὶ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς χάριτος } | \dots ^P \text{προφητεύσαντες}] = |^A x [|^P \text{ἐραυνῶντες } |^C [|^A \text{εἰς τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρὸν } |^P \text{ἐδήλου } |^S \text{τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ } |^A x [|^P \text{προμαρτυρόμενον } |^C \text{τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας}]] x]] x ||$
- =
- 8) $||^C \text{οἷς } |^P \text{ἀπεκαλύφθη} ||$
- ,
- 9) $||^C |^A \text{ὅτι } |^A \text{οὐχ } |^C \text{ἑαυτοῖς} ||$
- +
- 10) $||^C \text{ὕμιν } |^C \text{δὲ } |^P \text{διηκόνουν } |^C \text{αὐτὰ} ||$
- 11) $||^C \text{ἃ } |^A \text{νῦν } |^P \text{ἀνηγγέλη } |^C \text{ὕμιν } |^A x [|^P \text{διὰ τῶν εὐαγγελισαμένων } |^C \text{ὕμᾶς } |^A \text{ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ} = [|^P \text{ἀποσταλέντι } |^A \text{ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ}] =]] x ||$
- =
- 12) $||^C \dots [|^C \text{εἰς } |^C \text{ἃ}]] |^P \text{ἐπιθυμοῦσιν } |^S \text{ἄγγελιοι } | \dots ^C [|^P \text{παρακύψαι}]] ||$

FIGURE 13.4 Annotation of the 1 Pet 1:3–12 clause complex.

which the addressees have been reborn as in a 'kept' state.⁴⁵ The fourth embedded clause again grammaticalizes *elaboration* by detailing that the addressees (ὕμᾱς) are those who are 'guarded by God's power' (φρουρουμένους). The final embedded clause is infinitival, yet grammaticalizes much the same logico-semantics as the participial clauses—namely, *elaboration*. Specifically, this infinitival clause (ἀποκαλυφθῆναι) stands as a definer of salvation (σωτηρίαν), supplying the information that salvation 'is going to be revealed.' As can be seen, each of the participial clauses functions as a nominal-modifier and further defines its nominal head-term. This accords with the observation above, that embedded clauses which modify nominal word groups encode the logico-semantics of *elaboration*.

Embedded within *Clause 2* are two clauses, one embedded inside the other. The first embedded clause contains a concessive use of the participle, which admits a counter-point that may nullify the proposition of the verb on which it depends, but instead serves to further substantiate that proposition.⁴⁶ Concessive participles are best explained as instances of *extension*, because they provide alternative information to that proposed by the verb on which it depends. Embedded inside this concessive participial clause is a clause that provides circumstantial information by which the process of the participle is to be understood—that is, the condition provided shows the logico-semantics of *enhancement*, as grammaticalized by the logical-semantic conjunction εἰ. A helpful summary of *Clause 2* and all that is contained within is as follows: because [God has done great things for them], the addressees rejoice, even though now, if it is necessary (εἰ δέον ἔστί), the addressees have been grieved by many trials.

The clauses embedded in *Clause 3* provide the logico-semantics of *elaboration* for a substantive. In order to show the immense value of faithfulness, the writer portrays the valuable metal gold negatively with a participial clause that states that gold is 'passing away' (ἀπολλυμένου). Per the established pattern, this participial clause functions as a definer, *elaborating* upon the head term χρυσίου. However, the writer continues to *elaborate* upon gold. Most English translations rightly take the following participial clause as a concession in which the δοκιμαζομένου clause provides an alternative proposition

45 The *state* mentioned above is derived from the stative aspect of the perfect tense-form utilized by the writer (Stanley E. Porter, *Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament with Reference to Tense and Mood* [SBG 1; New York: Peter Lang, 1989], 258–59).

46 Porter, *Idioms*, 191; Black, *Still Greek*, 123. A helpful English gloss that demonstrates this relationship will likely use the term 'although.'

to ἀπολλυμένου.⁴⁷ Often, concessive participial clauses function as embedded adjunct clauses;⁴⁸ however, due to the appearance of the discontinuous conjunction δέ, the two participial clauses (ἀπολλυμένου and δοκιμαζομένου) are shown as semantic equals (i.e., paratactically related to one another) and the logico-semantic relation of extension exists between them. Thus, although one embedded clause provides an alternative proposition to the other, the ἀπολλυμένου and δοκιμαζομένου clauses cooperate to *elaborate* upon χρυσίου,⁴⁹ defining it as a perishing metal despite its being tested.

Clause 4 contains an embedded participial clause, which provides a statement that modifies the predicator ἀγαπάτε with yet another concessive participial clause. Thus, the logico-semantics of *extension* are expressed. Essentially, the writer states to the readers, “Though you have not seen [Jesus Christ], you love him.”

Continuing an established pattern, the writer embeds four clauses within *Clause 5*. The first clause (ἄρτι μὴ ὁρῶντες) is yet another use of the concessive participle, with respect to the second embedded clause (πιστεύοντες δέ). In other words, the writer concedes that the readers are not now seeing Jesus, yet counters with the observation that they nevertheless believe (πιστεύοντες) in him. Once again, due to the discontinuous conjunction δέ, the πιστεύοντες and ὁρῶντες clauses are shown to be paratactically related—the first providing an alternative to the second, thus indicating the logico-semantics of *extension*. Interestingly, together both clauses cooperate as a single adjunct, grammaticalizing the logico-semantic relationship of *enhancement*,⁵⁰ as they seem to provide contemporaneous temporal reference.⁵¹ This accords with another observation above, which states that embedded clauses functioning as adjuncts provide the logico-semantics of *enhancement* to the predicator being modified. The third embedded clause in *Clause 5* (δεδοξασμένη) follows the writer’s pattern of a participial clause showing the logico-semantic relationship of *elaboration* upon a substantive—χαρᾶς is defined through the participle

47 See NIV, NASB, NRSV, NET, and HCSB.

48 See the annotation of *Clause 2*, for an example of the concessive participle functioning as an embedded adjunct clause to the finite predicator of the main clause.

49 This is shown in the annotation of the Greek text by encasing both participial clauses within parentheses: χρυσίου = ([[^P τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου]] + [[^A διὰ πυρός |^{CJ} δέ |^P δοκιμαζομένου]]) =

50 This is shown in the annotation of the Greek text by encasing both participial clauses within parentheses: x(+ [[^A ἄρτι |^A μὴ |^P ὁρῶντες]] + [[^P πιστεύοντες |^{CJ} δέ]]) x |^P ἀγαλλιάσθε.

51 Porter states, “If a participle occurs after the finite verb on which it depends, it tends to refer to concurrent (simultaneous) or subsequent (following) action” (*Idioms*, 188).

δεδοξαμένη, which states that the addressees' joy is in a glorious state.⁵² The fourth embedded clause (χοιζόμενοι) functions as an adjunct to the predicator ἀγαλλιᾶσθε and thus grammaticalizes the logico-semantics of *enhancement* by providing circumstantial information by which it should be understood. This *enhancement* is best understood as referring to temporality, namely contemporaneous time in relation to the temporal realm of the main verb. The finite predicator is modified to show that rather than simply rejoicing, they are rejoicing *while* they await salvation of their souls.

In *Clause 7* certain prophetic searchers are mentioned, but the writer provides specific information about these προφῆται. The writer grammaticalizes the logico-semantics of *elaboration* with a participial clause (προφητεύσαντες) that defines προφῆται—these prophets are those who prophesied about the grace that was intended for the readers. The writer also provides an adjunct participial clause to the main predicator ἐξηράννησαν, grammaticalizing the logico-semantics of *enhancement*. This participial clause shows the means by which the prophets sought out salvation by employing the so-called “instrumental” use of the participle, which indicates that the prophets sought to understand this salvation *by* investigating (ἐραυνῶντες) into what or what kind of time the spirit of Christ was indicating (ἐδήλου).⁵³ Interestingly, the writer provides more information about the process of Christ's indicating with another participial clause functioning as an adjunct, thus grammaticalizing the logico-semantics of *enhancement*. This participial clause provides the circumstantial notion of temporality, showing the time at which the spirit of Christ indicated something to the prophets—*when* witnessing (προμαρτυρόμενον) about the sufferings and subsequent glory of Christ.

Embedded within *Clause 11* are two clauses, one inside another. The participle εὐαγγελισαμένων grammaticalizes the logico-semantic relation of *enhancement*, because of its function as an adjunct to ἀνγγέλη. This seems to be the so-called instrumental participle that explicitly states the means by which the message of Christ's suffering and subsequent glory had been preached to the readers. A second participial clause is embedded in the εὐαγγελισαμένων clause, yet modifies the nominal head term πνεύματι, which, as has been seen throughout this text, communicates the logico-semantics of *elaboration* and further defines πνεύματι. Here, the Spirit is not just holy (πνεύματι ἁγίῳ) but is also the Holy Spirit that is sent from heaven (ἀποσταλέντι ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ).

52 See n. 45. This is the second time that stative aspect “adjectival participle” has been used by the writer in this section.

53 Porter, *Idioms*, 192. See also Wallace, *Basics*, 274.

This section has shown that embedded clauses are vitally important to the Greek of the New Testament, as they provide logical connections throughout texts based on their function in particular word-groups. Embedded clauses can fill the slot traditionally attributed to such things as adverbs, adjectives, subjects, and objects.⁵⁴ It was seen that when acting *like* adjectives (i.e., modifying a nominal), they grammaticalize the logico-semantics of *elaboration*. Moreover, when embedded clauses function *like* adverbs, they grammaticalize the logico-semantics of *enhancement*. Thus, it is imperative to view the logico-semantics of embedded clauses as based on their function in the word-group into which they have been rank-shifted.⁵⁵

Logico-Semantics of Tactically Related Clauses

Having outlined how embedded clauses were utilized by the writer of 1 Pet 1:3–12 and how they express logico-semantic relations to their surrounding co-text, it is important to show how the clauses in which these were embedded relate to one another logico-semantically. As has been stated previously, the whole of 1 Pet 1:3–12 consists of twelve finite clauses. However, of these twelve clauses, eleven form a clause nest that is hypotactically related to *Clause 1*—that is, *Clauses 2–12* are semantically dependent upon *Clause 1* and together these clauses modify some portion of *Clause 1*. The logico-semantic relation between *Clause 1* and *Clauses 2–12* may at first seem obvious, because the relative pronoun $\hat{\kappa}\hat{\iota}$ in *Clause 2* seems to grammaticalize hypotactic-elaboration upon a substantive in *Clause 1*. Dubis argues for this interpretation saying that the $\kappa\alpha\iota\rho\hat{\kappa}$ in *Clause 1* provides an “explicit and highly proximate” referent for the relative pronoun.⁵⁶ Since $\hat{\kappa}\hat{\iota}$ is masculine in gender, Dubis is correct in asserting $\kappa\alpha\iota\rho\hat{\kappa}$ as the closest referent. However, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \hat{\kappa}\hat{\iota}$ is seen repeatedly in 1 Peter referring to multiple processes rather than a single nominal referent (2:12; 3:16, 19; 4:4). This implies that the relative pronoun $\hat{\kappa}\hat{\iota}$ may be neuter and may refer to the entirety of *Clause 1*.⁵⁷ Thus, *Clauses 2–12*—and the embedded clauses in *Clause 1*—seem to *elaborate* upon the call to bless

54 Halliday, *Introduction*, 426–27.

55 It is important to remember the so-called “concessive” participle, which should be understood as an *extension*, as it provides an alternative proposition to that of the main predicator (Porter, *Idioms*, 191).

56 Mark Dubis, *1 Peter: A Handbook on the Greek Text* (Baylor Handbook on the Greek New Testament; Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 9.

57 Paul J. Achtemeier, *1 Peter* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1996), 99; and Lauri Thurén, *Argument and Theology in 1 Peter: The Origins of Christian Paraenesis* (JSNTSup 114; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 71.

God (εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεός), stating that the things God has done for the addressed Christians are also those things in which they rejoice.⁵⁸

Clause 3 is hypotactically related to *Clause 2* as realized in the logical-semantic conjunction ἵνα. The specific logico-semantic relation between *Clauses 2* and *3* is that of *enhancement*. As such, *Clause 3* provides circumstantial information (purpose, in this case⁵⁹) by which *Clause 2* is to be understood. With *Clause 3*, the writer answers the question of why the readers are currently suffering affliction—so that their faithfulness will be proven and found to result in praise and glory.

Following *Clause 3*, many translations and commentators choose to begin a new English sentence, but doing so misrepresents the Greek text.⁶⁰ Rather than beginning a new sentence, *Clause 4* is a hypotactic-elaboration of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in *Clause 3*, which is grammaticalized by the organic tie ὃν. This elaborative relationship is displayed by the fact that the writer continues to give specific information about Jesus Christ, claiming him to be the one whom the readers love (ἀγαπάτε). Similarly, *Clause 5* is hypotactically related to *Clause 4*, which is again grammaticalized by the logico-semantic organic tie ὃν. This relative pronoun likewise refers to Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, though this referent is mediated through the ὃν in *Clause 4*.⁶¹ Not only is Jesus Christ elaborated upon as the one whom the Christians love, but also as the one in whom the readers rejoice.

Clause 6 is in a hypotactic relation to *Clause 5*, but specifically to σωτηρίαν. Again, this is given the lexico-grammatical realization in the relative pronoun ἧς, which—as with all other relative clauses—represents the logico-semantics of *elaboration*. The writer does not simply state that the addressees are awaiting salvation, but the writer chooses to tell them more explicit information about salvation—that some were actively engaged in seeking it out (ἐξεζητήσαν). *Clause 7* exhibits a paratactic-extension of *Clause 6*—grammaticalized by the continuous conjunction καί—and thus extends the *elaboration* upon σωτηρίαν.

58 Elliott argues that the repeated collocation of ἐν and ᾧ in 1 Peter communicate the semantics of “cause” (trans: “because of these things...”) (John H. Elliott, *1 Peter: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 37B; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 2000], 338–39). More convincing than Dubis, Elliott’s argument assumes the logico-semantics of *enhancement*, rather than *elaboration*.

59 Karen H. Jobes, *1 Peter* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 94. See also Achtemeier, *1 Peter*, 101; and Dubis, *1 Peter*, 12.

60 Cf. NET, ESV, NIV. See also Duane F. Watson and Terrance D. Callan, *First and Second Peter* (Paideia; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 27; as well as Dubis, *1 Peter*, 15; and Elliott, *1 Peter*, 342.

61 The ὃν in *Clause 5* refers to the ὃν in *Clause 4*, which has Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ as its referent. Therefore, *Clause 5* is to be understood as an elaboration upon Jesus Christ as well.

Thus, both *Clauses* 6 and 7 indicate that this salvation was sought out and also investigated (ἐξηραύνησαν) by the prophets.

Clause 8 is hypotactically related to a constituent of *Clause* 7, which is given textual realization in the relative pronoun οἷς. The grammar shows that the προφῆται are given further specificity through the logico-semantics of *elaboration*. In explicit terms, the προφῆται are those who were given some type of revelation (ἀπεκαλύφθη). The following clauses outline the content of what was revealed to the prophets. In essence, the following clauses communicate a *projection*. Here the projection (i.e., the content of what was revealed) grammaticalizes a hypotactic relation through the use of a logico-semantic conjunction ὅτι. According to the Louw–Nida lexicon, the verb ἀποκαλύπτω is a mental verb; thus, it would seem that the following two clauses represent hypotactic-thought, relaying the knowledge that was bestowed upon the prophets.⁶² The specific revelation given in *Clauses* 9 and 10 is given in terms of parataxis—that is, the predicators of each clause are presented as semantically independent from one another. Specifically, the writer presents these processes in a discontinuous manner, grammaticalized by the discontinuous conjunction δέ. The particular logico-semantic relationship given is one of *extension*—the writer adds a second predicator, in which an alternative proposition is given. It was revealed to the prophets that they were witnessing not their own time, but rather the time of the addressed Christians, when the spirit indicated the suffering and subsequent glory of Christ.

Clause 11 is hypotactically related to *Clause* 10. This can be seen lexico-grammatically in the organic tie ἃ, which links *Clause* 11 to the αὐτά in *Clause* 10.⁶³ Through the use of the relative pronoun ἃ, the writer creates the logico-semantics of *elaboration*. The writer now chooses to semantically modify the phrase εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας through the intermediary αὐτά by further *elaborating* upon the phrase and *elaborates* upon the phrase by positing that the phrase has been proclaimed to them (ἀνηγγέλη).

Clause 12—the final clause in this lengthy clause complex—is hypotactically related to *Clause* 11. Specifically, *Clause* 12 further elaborates upon a portion of *Clause* 11. This again is realized lexico-grammatically by the use of the organic tie ἃ. Following the referent chain anaphorically, it can be seen that

62 Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, *Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament based on Semantic Domains* (2 vols.; New York: United Bible Societies, 1988), “ἀποκαλύπτω,” 28:38. See also n. 12 in the current essay, for a brief discussion of the logico-semantics of *projection*.

63 It must be stated that αὐτά likely finds its referent in the phrase εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας found in *Clause* 7.

the α in *Clause 12* refers to the phrase εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας in *Clause 7*. Thus, this clause also elaborates upon the phrase in a specific manner—it further specifies some aspect of the suffering and glory of Christ. In particular, it is expressed that angels long to understand the sufferings and glory of Christ.

In summary, the writer communicates the following: The generosity and mercy of God caused the readers joy, even while they suffered. However, this suffering was the test of their faithfulness, and the endurance of such suffering would result in glory for the readers when Jesus—whom they love and in whom they rejoice, though they do not know and cannot see him—returns to bring the awaited salvation, which was brought about by the suffering of this glorified Christ. And it was this salvation that was spoken of by the prophets and sought out by the angels, but ultimately directly proclaimed to the readers. In all, 1 Pet 1:3–12 indeed presents all this information in a logical manner with the use of the linguistic resources available to the writer.

Conclusion

It was stated very early on in this paper that the text of 1 Pet 1:3–12 has been observed to be an intricate amassing of clauses. Although commentators and interpreters generally overlook the intricacies of these clauses in relation to one another in favour of theological motifs contained within certain phrases, it was the intent of this essay to explicitly describe the delicately structured clauses and processes that run throughout this section. In order to do so, it first had to be established that by combining clauses in certain ways, Greek language users were able to create nuanced meanings that otherwise could not be communicated with a single clause—i.e., the logico-semantic relations between clauses. Following this, parataxis and hypotaxis were established as varying levels of semantic interdependency between clauses. In hypotactic clausal relations, the secondary clause is semantically dependent upon the main clause. In paratactic relationships, the processes are presented as of equal semantic weight, with the processes furthering the discourse or providing an alternative direction for the discourse. It was also argued that the logico-semantics of a clause complex are dependent upon the tactic relationship. Parataxis can communicate elaboration and extension; while hypotaxis can communicate elaboration and enhancement. Finally, building upon the work of past Greek scholars, I have presented a theoretically rigorous account of how meaningful relations between clauses are grammaticalized in the Koine Greek language.

Index of Modern Authors

- Aaron, D.H. 201, 202
Aarts, B. 50
Abasciano, B.J. 285
Abbott, T.K. 74, 77, 356
Abernathy, D. 313
Achtemeier, P.J. 209, 411, 412
Ackroyd, P.R. 224
Adams, E. 251, 253, 261, 269, 271
Adams, S.L. 202
Adriaans, P. 77
Aichele, G. 278
Alexander, D.T. 311
Allen, G. 278
Allen, W.S. 10, 12
Allison, L.D. 348
Alter, R. 110
Amit, Y. 138
Ariel, M. 33, 60, 61
Asher, N. 85, 100
Aune, D.E. 49
- Bach, K. 60
Bache, C. 31, 55, 57, 58
Badenas, R. 277, 285, 292, 293, 297–300
Bakhtin, M. 207, 281, 364, 365, 367, 368, 370
Bal, M. 111
Barentsen, A. 55
Barr, J. 255, 257, 314
Barrett, C.K. 233, 241, 246
Barth, M. 340, 341, 353, 355–57
Barthes, R. 278
Batten, A. 366, 367
Battistella, E.L. 123
Batto, B.F. 202
Baur, F.C. 277
Bekken, P.J. 305, 307
Bell, R.H. 292
Belli, F. 303
Bellinger, W.H. 299
Bendor-Samuel, J.T. 10
Benson, J.D. 15, 34, 280, 395, 396
Berding, K. 312–14, 337
Bergen, R.D. 174
Bernstein, B. 21
Berry, M. 9, 10, 14–17, 27, 32, 39, 40, 42
- Bertuccelli-Papi, M. 60
Best, E. 340, 341, 356, 357, 360
Bianchi, C. 60, 61
Binnick, R.I. 50–52, 54, 57, 64, 77, 78, 88, 99
Birch, D. 206
Bird, M.F. 270
Bisschops, R. 213
Black, D.A. 174, 257, 318, 403, 404, 408
Black, M. 204, 213, 214
Black, S.L. 318
Blanke, H. 340, 341, 353, 355, 356
Blass, F. 380, 397
Blenkinsopp, J. 203
Block, D.I. 137–39, 141, 143, 209, 211, 216, 218, 219, 223, 224, 226
Boda, M.J. 200, 278
Bodine, W.R. 172, 174
Bohnemeyer, J. 56, 72
Bolton, K. 23
Bond, H.K. 242
Borik, O. 56, 72
Bratcher, R.G. 340
Brazil, D. 37
Brend, R.M. 173
Brettler, M.Z. 201, 203, 213, 227
Brodie, T.L. 279
Brown, G. 320, 321, 323
Brown, R.E. 233
Brownlee, W.H. 202, 218
Bruce, F.F. 274, 340
Bühler, K. 12
Buijs, M. 392
Bull, W.E. 75
Bullmore, M.A. 273
Bultmann, R. 315, 316
Burke, T.J. 273
Burton, D. 37, 38, 41, 42
Burton, E.D.W. 77, 86
Buth, R. 172
Butler, C.S. 10–18, 20, 21, 32, 34–39, 41, 42, 44, 206
Butler, T.C. 138–42, 152, 153, 164
Butt, D.G. 11
Bybee, J. 398
Byrne, B. 272, 286, 289, 290

- Caffarel, A. 16, 240
 Callan, T.D. 412
 Callow, K. 318
 Calvin, J. 341
 Cameron, D. 9
 Campbell, C.R. 48, 49, 57–59, 64, 65
 Campbell, D.A. 291
 Carnochan, J. 10
 Carroll, J.B. 13
 Carroll, S. 15
 Carroll R., M.D. 206, 363
 Carson, D.A. 48, 49, 57, 63, 64, 66, 70, 174,
 245, 246, 257, 322
 Carter, W. 243, 244, 246
 Casey, M. 234
 Čermák, F. 1
 Chae, Y.S. 211
 Channell, J. 119
 Chomsky, N. 9, 10
 Christie, W.M., Jr. 11
 Christoffersson, O. 251
 Ciampa, R.E. 49
 Cirafesi, W.V. 48, 79
 Claassens, L.J.M. 138
 Clarke, D.D. 254, 255
 Clayton, J. 278
 Cloran, C. 23, 27, 382
 Cody, A. 203
 Coffin, C. 205
 Collins, A.Y. 354
 Collins, J.J. 318
 Comrie, B. 50, 54, 55, 62, 79, 84
 Conway, M. 3, 109, 110
 Conybeare, F.C. 192
 Conzelmann, H. 315
 Cotterell, P. 319–21
 Coulthard, R.M. 14, 37, 38, 41, 42, 370
 Cranfield, C.E.B. 251–53, 270, 272, 285, 286,
 313
 Croft, W. 99
 Crouch, L. 256
 Cruse, D.A. 59–61, 348
 Culpepper, R.A. 242
 Cummings, L. 60
 Cunningham, V. 207

 Dahl, Ö. 53, 56, 62, 81, 84
 Das, A.A. 288

 Davies, M. 374
 Davies, P. 79
 Davis, S. 60
 Dawson, D.A. 174, 175, 183, 185
 Dawson, Z. 4, 348, 362, 398
 Day, J. 201
 de Beaugrande, R.A. 9, 173, 174
 de Hoop, R. 383
 de Moor, J.C. 202
 de Saussure, F. 1
 de Swart, H. 52, 53
 Debrunner, A. 380, 397
 Decker, R.J. 48, 57, 59, 64, 65
 Deeley, M.K. 203, 219, 223
 Deignan, A. 359, 360
 den Hollander, A. 200
 deSilva, D.A. 305, 367
 Dik, S.C. 71
 Dodd, C.H. 284
 Donaldson, T.L. 292
 Dowty, D.R. 53, 56, 67–71
 Draisma, S. 278
 Dressler, W.U. 173, 174
 Dubis, M. 411, 412
 Duke, P.D. 242, 249
 Dumbrell, W.J. 253
 Dunn, J.D.G. 251, 272, 275, 284–86, 288–90,
 292, 297, 301, 302, 313, 315, 316, 341, 355
 Duranti, A. 206
 Durbin, M.A. 175
 Dvorak, J.D. 143, 363

 Eagleton, T. 363, 364, 366, 367
 Eastman, S.G. 251
 Eggins, S. 211, 212, 393
 Ehrensperger, K. 283
 Ekem, J.D. 338
 Ellingworth, P. 309
 Elliott, J.H. 257, 366, 412
 Elliott, N. 283
 Ellis, E.E. 315
 Estes, D. 79, 80, 87
 Evans, C.A. 203
 Evans, T.V. 48, 58, 59, 64, 65, 68

 Fahlbusch, E. 89
 Fairclough, N. 364, 365
 Fanning, B.M. 48, 54, 57–59, 62–65, 71, 358

- Fantin, J.D. 49
 Farmer, W.R. 299
 Fawcett, R.P. 11, 13–18, 27, 32, 36
 Fee, G. 309, 311, 315, 318, 325, 327, 329
 Fewster, G.P. 3, 4, 250, 254, 261, 273, 314, 339, 344, 348–50, 353, 378
 Feyaerts, K. 202
 Filip, H. 51, 53–56, 67, 68, 70, 71
 Firth, J.R. 9–12
 Fischer, K. 255
 Fishbane, M. 209
 Fitzmyer, J.A. 251, 313
 Fleischman, S. 64, 78
 Floyd, M.H. 200
 Foley, T.S. 48
 Fontaine, L. 16
 Forsyth, J. 52, 54
 Foster, R.L. 341, 357
 Francis, J. 213
 Friedman, S.S. 278
 Friedrich, P. 51
 Fries, P.H. 279, 349
 Fung, R.Y.K. 86
- Gabbay, D. 82
 Gaffin, R.B. 315
 Gaizauskas, R. 85
 Gale, R.M. 73
 Gan, J. 201, 219
 Gardiner, A.H. 10
 Gaventa, B.R. 251
 Gee, J.P. 40
 Georgakopoulou, A. 79, 320
 Gerber, U. 251
 Getty, M.A. 277
 Geuss, R. 366
 Giblin, C. 242
 Givón, T. 75
 Gleason, H.A., Jr. 317
 Golding, T.A. 201, 219
 Gonda, J. 374, 376
 González-García, F. 11
 Goodman, M. 305
 Goodwin, C. 206
 Goppelt, L. 391
 Gordon, R.P. 202
 Gosse, B. 202
 Gotteri, N.J.C. 9, 14, 15, 21, 22, 27, 31, 47
- Goutsos, D. 79, 320
 Greaves, W.S. 15, 34, 280, 395, 396
 Green, G.L. 257
 Green, J.B. 311
 Greenberg, M. 218
 Gregory, M. 15, 279, 349
 Grice, H.P. 37
 Gries, S.Th. 359
 Grimes, J.E. 321
 Grottanelli, C. 215, 218
 Grudem, W.A. 315
 Gundry, R.H. 49
 Gushee, D.P. 312
 Gustason, W. 91, 92, 95, 101
 Gvozdanović, J. 52
- Hahne, H.A. 251, 253, 272
 Haiman, J. 403
 Hajicová, E. 1
 Halliday, M.A.K. 9–13, 16–30, 32–36, 38–41, 43, 44, 71, 112, 113, 122, 123, 200, 204–208, 225, 234, 241, 261, 288, 302, 323, 344, 345, 347–49, 362, 363, 372–74, 378, 379, 391–96, 401–403, 406, 411
 Hallo, W.W. 203
 Hamm, F. 76, 82
 Handford, M. 40
 Harris, R.L. 175
 Hartman, L. 327, 330, 335, 337
 Hasan, R. 11–13, 16, 23, 27, 29, 44, 45, 205–207, 216, 323, 363, 382
 Haspelmath, M. 51, 53
 Hatton, H. 309
 Hawking, S. 87
 Hawthorne, G.F. 311
 Hays, R.B. 278, 284, 286
 Headlam, A.C. 270
 Heidolph, K.-E. 173
 Heller, R.L. 175
 Henderson, E.J.A. 10
 Henry, C.F.H. 87, 89
 Hereke, M. 45
 Héring, J. 329
 Heyvaert, L. 344
 Hill, D. 256
 Hjelmslev, L. 12
 Hoehner, H.W. 340, 357, 358
 Hoey, M. 14, 17, 323, 349, 350, 353, 354

- Holladay, W.L. 223
 Hollebrandse, B. 56, 72
 Hollenbach, B. 173, 179
 Holquist, M. 364, 365, 367, 368
 Hoppe, L.J. 204, 209, 220, 221, 224
 Horrocks, G.C. 72
 Horsley, R.A. 251
 House, P.R. 223, 224
 Hovav, M.R. 56
 Huang, G. 15, 392
 Hubbard, D.A. 315
 Hudson, R. 17, 36, 38
 Hultgren, A.J. 251, 274
 Hunston, S. 109, 111, 112, 115
 Hunt, B. 4, 391
 Hyland, K. 40

 Ineichen, H. 89
 Isenberg, H. 173

 Jackson, T.R. 251
 Jackson, W.C. 312
 Jakobson, R. 1, 52
 Jaszczolt, K.M. 60, 76, 90
 Jespersen, O. 52, 75
 Jewett, R. 45, 251, 271, 275, 289
 Jobes, K.H. 412
 Johnson, E.E. 299
 Johnson, L.T. 251, 383
 Johnson, M. 200, 204, 207
 Jones, L.K. 175
 Joüon, P. 189, 192
 Joyce, P. 201

 Kabakchiev, K. 52, 53, 56
 Kamionkowski, S.T. 202
 Kamp, H. 76
 Kant, I. 77, 80
 Käsemann, E. 251
 Kearley, F.F. 256
 Keck, L.E. 275
 Keener, C.S. 315
 Keesmaat, S.C. 251, 252
 Kenny, A. 53, 66, 67, 70
 Kim, H. 201
 Kim, S. 292
 Klein, W. 67–71, 79, 80
 Kloppenborg, J.S. 366

 Knowles, F.E. 15
 Koenig, J. 315, 316
 Köstenberger, A.J. 31, 49, 233, 237, 238, 246
 Kowalski, R. 73, 85
 Kress, G.R. 21
 Kuyvenhoven, R. 200
 Kwok, H. 23

 Labov, W. 9, 119
 Laertius, D. 74
 Lakoff, G. 200, 204, 207
 Lam, M. 16, 43
 Lamb, S.M. 32
 Lambrecht, J. 252, 273
 Land, C.D. 1, 3, 9, 233
 Langacker, R.W. 75
 Langendoen, D.T. 10, 12
 Lascarides, A. 85, 100
 Lassen, I. 111
 Lawson, J.M. 273
 Leckie-Tarry, H. 206
 Lee, J.H. 79, 88, 89, 252, 321
 Leech, G. 12
 Lemke, J.L. 4, 277, 279–84, 292, 294, 339, 349, 350, 352, 363, 368, 374
 Levinson, S.C. 33, 59–61, 381
 Levirini, O. 76
 Li, P. 67
 Lightfoot, J.B. 46, 340, 356
 Lincoln, A.T. 341, 357, 358
 Locke, J. 87
 Lohse, E. 341, 353, 356, 360
 Longacre, R.E. 123, 173–75, 177–81, 183, 184, 186, 189, 193, 197, 199, 319, 321, 323, 329
 Lorient, J. 173, 179
 Louw, J.P. 237, 255, 256, 258, 259, 316, 327, 328, 332, 335, 337, 341, 343, 359, 381, 413
 Lowery, K.E. 174
 Lukin, A. 23, 27, 45
 Lyne, A.A. 15
 Lyons, J. 10, 12, 33, 55, 60, 61, 66, 77, 83, 95, 173, 255, 310, 375, 392, 398, 399

 Macauley, R.K.S. 50
 MacDonald, M.Y. 340, 341, 356
 Machen, J.G. 77
 Macken-Horarik, M. 111, 123
 Makkai, A. 32

- Malina, B.J. 367
 Malinowski, B. 11, 12, 205
 Mani, I. 73
 Marshall, I.H. 255
 Martin, J.R. 13, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 27, 30, 32, 35,
 39–44, 111–15, 118, 120–24, 126, 128,
 130–36, 139, 145, 147, 148, 205, 216, 217,
 363, 365–69, 371–75, 381, 382, 387
 Martin, L.R. 138
 Martín-Asensio, G. 11, 362
 Maslov, I.U.S. 52, 53
 Mathesius, V. 1
 Mathewson, D.L. 48
 Matthews, V.H. 140
 Matthiessen, C.M.I.M. 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21,
 23, 24, 32, 43, 71, 112–14, 118, 234, 240,
 261, 288, 302, 345, 348, 372, 378, 391, 392,
 394–96, 398, 402, 403, 406
 Mayes, J.L. 209
 McCartney, D.G. 385, 388
 McDonald, E. 241
 McDonald, L.M. 318
 McKay, K.L. 48, 57, 58, 79, 372, 373, 376, 377,
 379, 380, 385
 McMahon, A. 50
 McRae, W. 312
 McTaggart, J.M.E. 73
 Meeks, W. 237
 Mein, A. 203, 210, 212–14, 218, 226
 Metzger, B.M. 86
 Mey, J.L. 61
 Michaels, J.R. 251, 272, 273
 Miller, J.E. 52
 Milroy, J. 15
 Mitchell, M.M. 318
 Mitchell, T.F. 10, 12
 Montgomery, M. 37
 Moo, D.J. 49, 251, 257, 274, 275, 286, 289–91,
 293, 301, 303, 304, 313, 383, 385
 Moo, J. 272
 Moore, A.R. 45
 Moravcsik, E.A. 175
 Moravcsik, J. 82
 Morris, L. 74, 243, 253
 Moule, C.F.D. 98, 379, 402
 Moulton, J.H. 376, 379
 Mounce, R.H. 313
 Mounce, W.D. 48, 77, 329
 Mourelatos, A.P.D. 53, 55, 71, 81
 Muddiman, J. 340
 Munck, J. 285
 Muraoka, T. 189, 192
 Naselli, A.D. 49, 57, 59, 64
 Nerlich, B. 254, 255
 Neusner, J. 286
 Newman, B.M. 313
 Newsom, C.A. 153
 Ney, J.W. 391
 Niccacci, A. 174
 Nida, E.A. 172, 237, 254, 256, 258, 259, 313,
 316, 327, 328, 332, 335, 337, 340, 341, 343,
 359, 381, 413
 Nixon, G. 14
 Noonan, M. 398
 Nunn, H.P.V. 77
 O'Brien, P.T. 74, 96, 340, 341, 355, 356, 358
 O'Connor, M.P. 116
 O'Donnell, M.B. 27, 261, 329, 349, 350,
 397–99, 401
 O'Neill, J.C. 285
 Ogden, C.K. 11
 Olsen, M.B. 48, 54, 57, 58, 64, 71
 Ong, H. 4, 309, 315
 Ortony, A. 213
 Page, R.E. 111
 Pagin, P. 259, 260
 Painter, C. 112
 Palmer, F.R. 10–12, 375
 Paltridge, B. 40
 Pang, F.G.H. 2, 48, 57, 58
 Pearcey, N.R. 82
 Pelletier, F.J. 259, 260
 Perkins, M.R. 117
 Peter, G. 259
 Peterson, E. 242
 Pfeiffer, R. 74
 Pietersma, A. 187
 Pike, E.G. 177
 Pike, K.L. 3, 173, 175–77
 Pinnock, C.H. 315
 Pitts, A.W. 49, 57, 270
 Plummer, A. 247
 Pokorný, P. 341

- Polhill, J. 312
- Porter, S.E. 1, 2, 9, 15, 27, 31, 32, 45, 48, 49, 54, 57, 59, 62–66, 78–80, 83, 85, 90, 94, 95, 98, 100, 101, 105, 172, 174, 183, 206, 225, 255, 257, 261, 270, 273, 278, 300, 317–19, 322, 323, 329, 342, 356, 358, 362, 363, 372, 374–77, 379, 380, 383, 384, 386, 397–99, 401, 404, 408–11
- Poupynin, Y. 55
- Poythress, V.S. 312
- Press, J.I. 15
- Preyer, G. 259
- Pronk, C. 312
- Pyles, A. 3
- Räisänen, H. 286, 288
- Ravelli, L.J. 344, 348, 356, 374
- Reber, J. 2, 73
- Recanati, F. 259, 260, 344
- Reed, J.T. 174, 183, 319, 322, 323, 329, 356, 374, 395, 397, 398
- Reichenbach, H. 79, 82, 90, 94, 95
- Reinhart, T. 56, 72
- Reitzenstein, R. 315
- Richards, I.A. 11
- Ridderbos, H. 234, 248
- Riemer, N. 255
- Robbins, V.K. 366
- Roberts, J.J.M. 203
- Roberts, K.L. 203
- Robertson, A.T. 77, 78, 241, 245, 358, 376, 379
- Robins, R.H. 10, 12, 51, 99
- Rogerson, J. 14
- Rohrer, C. 82
- Römer, U. 350, 354
- Rose, D. 40, 42, 44, 111, 217, 363, 366, 372, 374, 381
- Rosner, B.S. 49
- Rothstein, E. 278
- Rothstein, S.D. 55, 56
- Ruether, R.R. 277
- Ruhl, C. 3, 253, 254, 258–60
- Runge, S.E. 62
- Ryle, G. 53
- Salvesen, A. 305
- Sampson, G. 11
- Sanday, W. 270
- Sanders, E.P. 288
- Sanders, J.A. 203
- Sapir, E. 52
- Sarangi, S. 109
- Sasse, H.-J. 51, 56, 70
- Satterthwaite, P.E. 187
- Schatzmann, S. 311, 315, 316
- Schleppegrell, M.J. 40
- Schlier, H. 272
- Schmidt, D.D. 59
- Schnackenburg, R. 245
- Schneider, T.J. 139, 140
- Schnelle, U. 252
- Schreiner, T.R. 285, 291–93
- Schultze, R. 350, 354
- Segot, M. 73, 85
- Seitz, C.R. 219, 224
- Seux, M.J. 203
- Shain, R.M. 68
- Shum, S.-L. 285
- Silva, M. 255–57, 310
- Simon-Vandenberg, A.M. 343, 348
- Sinclair, J.McH. 14, 37, 38, 41, 42, 350
- Sioupi, A. 72
- Smith, C.S. 52, 55, 56, 62, 68, 99
- Smith, Q. 91
- Soderlund, S.K. 251
- Soggin, J.A. 138, 140–42
- Spencer, F.S. 277
- Spicq, C. 329
- Spitaler, P. 252
- Sprinkle, P.M. 270, 297
- Stamps, D.L. 362
- Stanley, C.D. 298
- Stavrou, M. 72
- Stefanowitsch, A. 359
- Stegemann, E.W. 283
- Steiner, E.H. 15, 71, 281, 344
- Stendahl, K. 285
- Stock, St.G.W.J. 192
- Stoellger, P. 89
- Stokhof, M. 76
- Stovell, B.M. 3, 200, 202, 204, 207, 212
- Strine, C.A. 211
- Stubbs, M. 39, 44, 368
- Sumney, J.L. 356
- Swift, M. 56, 72

- Tanner, B.L. 203, 219, 228
 Tate, W.R. 110
 Tatevosov, S. 71
 Taverniers, M. 344–47
 Taylor, B. 51, 57, 257
 Taylor, M.E. 383
 Tedeschi, P.J. 53
 Ter Meulen, A.G.B. 81
 Teruya, K. 16, 43
 Teubert, W. 349
 Thaxton, C.B. 82
 Thibault, P.J. 344–46, 348, 350
 Thielman, F. 357, 358
 Thiselton, A.C. 14, 255, 309, 329
 Thomas, M. 9
 Thompson, G. 14, 109, 111, 112, 115, 323, 344, 346, 347, 349, 356, 359
 Thompson, S.A. 403
 Thurén, L. 411
 Toffelmire, C. 204, 210
 Tomasello, M. 75
 Trail, R. 309
 Trubetzkoy, N. 1
 Tsiamita, F. 354
 Tucker, J.B. 283
 Turner, K. 60
 Turner, Mark 200, 204
 Turner, Max 310–12, 316, 319–21, 336, 337
 Turner, N. 376
 Ulrich, D.E. 91, 92, 95, 101
 Vachek, J. 12
 Valupillai, V. 53
 van Benthem, J. 77, 79, 81
 van der Merwe, C.H.J. 188, 192
 van Dijk, T. 23
 van Hecke, P. 202, 214, 220, 222
 van Lambalgen, M. 76, 82
 van Valin, R.D. 67, 68, 71
 van Voorst, J. 88
 van Wolde, E.J. 174, 257, 278, 317
 Varner, W. 383, 385
 Vawter, B. 204, 209, 220, 221, 224
 Veltman, R. 344
 Vendler, Z. 50, 51, 53, 56–59, 66–71
 Ventola, E. 15, 395
 Verkuyl, H.J. 51, 53–56, 64, 69, 70, 72
 Verschueren, J. 60
 Vlachos, C.A. 383
 Vollmer, T. 252, 273
 Vološinov, V.N. 370
 von Heusinger, K. 51, 60
 Waetjen, H.C. 273
 Wagner, J.R. 298–300, 307
 Wakefield, A.H. 284, 285
 Wallace, D.B. 48, 49, 77, 358, 377, 403, 410
 Waltke, B.K. 116
 Wang, Z. 392
 Waterson, N. 10
 Watson, D.F. 412
 Watson, F. 292, 295, 296, 302, 305, 306
 Watts, I. 90
 Webb, R.L. 366
 Webster, J.J. 11, 13, 16, 21, 23, 26, 35, 40, 122, 208, 344, 392
 Wegener, R. 45
 Wenham, J.W. 77
 Wénin, A. 202
 Westfall, C.L. 225, 268, 272, 274, 287, 322–24, 343
 White, P.R.R. 41, 111–15, 118, 120–24, 126, 128, 130–36, 139, 145, 147, 148, 363, 367–72, 375, 382, 387
 Whitehouse, W.F. 251, 272, 273
 Whorf, B.L. 12, 13
 Wiles, J.K. 202
 Williams, G. 23, 27
 Williams, W.G. 252, 272, 273
 Wilson, A. 261
 Wilson, R.R. 215
 Winer, G.B. 77
 Winograd, T. 88
 Winter, P. 233
 Wirth, J.R. 175
 Wise, M.O. 295
 Witherington, B. 252, 272
 Wong, G.T.K. 138
 Wright, B.G. 187
 Wright, N.T. 251, 275, 283, 285, 286
 Wu, C. 45
 Xue, X.E. 4, 277

Yarbrough, R.W. 31, 49
Yee, G.A. 366
Young, D.J. 14, 15
Young, R. 278
Young, R.A. 48, 83
Younger, K.L. 110
Yule, G. 320, 321, 323

Zaenen, A.E. 53
Zerwick, M. 358
Zimmerli, W. 203
Zuidema, S.U. 81
Zyro, F.F. 252, 273

Index of Ancient Sources

Old Testament		30:12–14 (LXX)	299
		30:12–13	306
Genesis		30:12	299
2:8	354	30:13	299
6:6	128	30:14	299, 301
11:5–6	129	30:15–20	305
21:33	354	31:24	300
25:27	354		
26:28	152	Joshua	
47:6	132	24:15	129
48:15	202, 214		
Exodus		Judges	
32:9–14	290	1:22	152
Leviticus		1:27	131
18:1–5	297	2:2	118
18:5	292, 297, 300	2:4	124, 125
19:18	387, 388	2:7	133
26:40–41	306	2:11	110, 119
26:42–43	306	2:12	119
Numbers		2:13	119
14:43	152	2:14	119, 124, 125
25:1–13	291	2:15	125
Deuteronomy		2:17	133
4:7	303	2:20	119
8:17	298, 299, 301	3:7	110, 119
9:4	298, 299, 301	3:8	119
9:18–20	290	3:11	125
27:3	300	3:12	110
27:26	300, 305	3:25b	127
28:47	118	4:1	110
28:58	300	4:3	135
29:20–28	305	4:9	116
29:28	300	5:31	118
30	304	6–8	136
30:1–2	306	6	3, 109, 111, 112, 124, 134, 135, 137, 141, 143, 144
30:5	306	6:1–5	141
30:6	306	6:1	110, 144
30:11–14	297, 298, 300, 304	6:2	144
30:11–12	301	6:3–4	137
30:11	298	6:3	144
30:12–14	298, 300, 301, 304	6:4	146
		6:5	119, 146
		6:6	148
		6:7–10	138

Judges (cont.)

6:7	148	9:23	133
6:8	148	9:28	118, 132
6:9	150	10:6	110, 119
6:10	150	10:7	119
6:11	152	10:10	117, 119
6:12	132, 152	10:13	119
6:13	127, 139, 141, 152	10:15	110
6:14	120, 138, 154	11:35	129
6:15	132, 139, 154	12:2	116
6:16	154	13	3, 172, 186, 187, 191, 196–98
6:17	143, 156, 158, 159	13:1–5	196
6:18	156	13:1	110, 187, 191, 196
6:19	156	13:2	187, 191
6:20	156	13:3–5	196
6:21	140, 157, 158	13:3	187, 188, 191, 192, 196
6:22	158	13:4–5	188, 192, 196
6:23	141, 158	13:4	188, 192
6:24	158	13:5	188, 192
6:25–26	140	13:6–7	188, 192, 196
6:25	160	13:6	188, 192, 197
6:26	160	13:7	188, 192, 193, 196
6:27	141, 160	13:8	189, 193, 196, 197
6:27b	127	13:9	189, 193, 199
6:28	162	13:10	189, 193, 196, 197
6:29	162	13:11	189, 193, 196, 197
6:30	162	13:12	189, 194, 196
6:31	141, 142, 164	13:13–14	194
6:32	164	13:13	190, 194, 196, 197
6:33	164	13:14	190, 194, 197
6:34	141, 164	13:15	190, 194, 196
6:35	166	13:16	190, 194, 196
6:36–37	142	13:17	190, 194, 196
6:36	166, 170	13:18	190, 194, 196
6:37	117, 166	13:19	190, 195
6:38	142, 166	13:20	190, 191, 195
6:39	119, 142, 168	13:21	191, 195, 197
6:40	132, 142, 168	13:22	191, 195–97
7:15	127	13:23	191, 195–97
8:1	132	13:24	191, 195
8:9	127	13:25	191, 195
8:20	131	14:3	110, 129
8:23	131	14:7	110
8:28	142, 170	16:2	303
8:35	120	16:4	125
9:3	131	16:23	129
9:4	116	16:25	125
9:16	116	17:6	110, 121

17:13	127	Proverbs	
18:19	127	3:16 (LXX)	296
18:20	117, 125	Isaiah	
19:3	125	7:10–25	141
20:40–41	127	7:14	192
21:25	110, 121	8:14	289
Ruth		9:33	302
2:4	152	28:16	289, 302, 303
1 Samuel		40:24 (LXX)	351
7:5–11	290	55:6	303
9:6	132	Jeremiah	
16:18	152	12:2	354
18:12	152	23	218
18:14	152	23:1–8	224
20:13	152	30:3	306
28:12	116	31:33	306
2 Samuel		42:2–4	290
3:13	130	42:19–22	290
7:3	152	Ezekiel	
1 Kings		1–33	229
17:24	133	4–24	209
19:10	291	11:13	290
2 Kings		13	210
18:7	152	16	202
1 Chronicles		17:9	354
9:20	152	18:5–9	295
15:2	152	18:21–22	295
20:17	152	20:11	297
22:11	152	20:13	297
22:16	152	20:21	297
Nehemiah		23	202
9:29	297	33	219, 220
13:13	132	33:10–19	219
Job		33:10–11	219
28:9	353	33:11–16	219
34:9	129	33:11	219
Psalms		33:20	223
23	203, 218, 219	33:27	219
99:6	290	34	3, 200–204, 206–13, 215, 216, 218–20, 223–30
		34:1–16	220–23
		34:1–6	226
		34:1–3	221
		34:1–2	208, 209, 216
		34:1	208, 219

Ezekiel (cont.)

34:2-10	223
34:2-6	221
34:2-4	210, 217, 221
34:2-3	208, 222
34:2	208, 216, 217, 226
34:3-4	216, 226
34:3	213, 226
34:4-5	221
34:4	209, 226
34:4a	222
34:4b	222
34:4c	222
34:5-6	210
34:5	208, 209, 222, 225
34:6-9	221
34:6	209, 211
34:6a	222
34:6b	222
34:6c	222
34:7-11	221
34:7-10	208
34:7-8	216, 226
34:7	216, 226
34:8	208, 216, 217, 219, 220, 225
34:9-10	216
34:9	216, 226
34:10-16	210
34:10	208, 209, 216, 221
34:11-22	223
34:11-16	221
34:11-15	216, 226
34:11-12	221
34:11	208, 217
34:12-16	208, 221
34:12	208, 209, 221, 222
34:13-14	211
34:13	209, 211, 222
34:14-15	209, 211
34:14	208
34:14a	222
34:14b	222
34:15	217, 222, 226
34:16-22	228
34:16	209, 216, 226
34:16b	222
34:16c	222
34:17-24	217
34:17-22	204, 216, 222, 223

34:17-21	223
34:17-19	216, 226
34:17	208, 210, 216, 217, 221, 222
34:18-19	208, 218, 223
34:20-24	224
34:20-22	216
34:20	208, 217, 223, 226
34:21	209, 223
34:22-23	209
34:22	208, 209, 223
34:23-31	223
34:23-24	210, 223
34:23	208, 217, 224
34:23a	216
34:23b	216
34:24	216, 217, 224
34:25-31	204, 224
34:25	209, 211, 224
34:26-29	209
34:27	208, 209, 211, 217
34:28	209, 211, 224, 225
34:30-31	219
34:30	208, 209, 216, 217
34:31	216, 217, 224, 225
36:11	306
36:28	306

Daniel

4	355
4:15	354
4:26	351
6:28	129
6:29	129

Joel

3:5	302-304
4	303
4:1-2	303

Zechariah

10:5	152
------	-----

Old Testament Apocrypha

Baruch

1:1-14	305
1:15-4:4	307

1:15–3:8	305		
1:15	305		
1:17–21	305		
2:21	305		
2:24	305		
2:27–35	305		
2:31–33	306		
2:34a	306		
2:34b	306		
2:35	306		
3:9–4:5	306		
3:9–4:4	305		
3:12	306		
3:13–14	306		
3:29–30	306		
3:36–4:4	306		
3:37–38	306		
4:1–2	306		
4:2–4	306		
4:5–5:9	305		
1 Maccabees			
2:26	291		
2:27	291		
2:50	291		
2:54	291		
2:58	291		
2 Maccabees			
3:22	303		
4:2	291		
7:23	264		
3 Maccabees			
2:2	263, 268		
4 Maccabees			
18:12	291		
Sirach			
16:17	266		
24:10	359		
24:12	359		
45:23–24	291		
48:2	291		
Susanna			
1:3	296		
		Tobit	
		8:5	267
		Wisdom	
		1:16	289
		2:10–11	289, 296
		4:20	289
		7:20	353
		19:6	267
		Old Testament Pseudepigrapha	
		Psalms of Solomon	
		8:7	266
		14:1–2	296
		14:4	354
		Testament of Asher	
		4:5	291
		Testament of Naphtali	
		2	267
		2:2–6	267
		2:3	267
		New Testament	
		Matthew	
		7:16–20	324
		8:15	84, 85
		10:20	401
		13	354
		13:1–9	354
		13:18–23	354
		20:22	240
		21:42	289
		22:39	288
		27:17	240
		Mark	
		1:37	395
		4:1–9	354
		4:13–20	354
		5	183, 184
		11:20	351

Mark (cont.)

12:10–11 290

15:4 241

Luke

2:30–31 402

8:4–15 354

20:17–18 290

John

1:21 240

3:10–22 372

3:13 237

5:19 241

5:30 241

6:38 237

6:65 373

7:17–18 241

7:28 241

8:28 241

8:42 241

8:43–47 238

10 203, 224

10:11 203

10:18 241

11:49–53 248

11:51 241

12:46 237

14:10 241

15:4 241

16:13 241

16:28 237

18:7 240

18:9 233

18:33–38 233–36, 239, 241,
246–49

18:33–34 245, 246

18:33 235, 245

18:34 236, 245

18:35 244, 246

18:37 235, 245

18:38a 235, 236

18:38b 235

18:39 245

19:9 238

19:11 248, 249

19:12 234, 245

19:21 245

21:5 241

21:24 233

Acts

3:15 301

4:10 301

4:11 290

6:9 102

6:12–15 101, 102, 105

6:12–13a 101

6:12 101, 102

6:13 83, 102, 103

6:13a 104

6:13b–14a 104

6:13b 104

6:14a 103, 104

6:14b 103, 104

6:14c 103, 105

6:15 105

6:15a–b 105

6:15a 103

6:15b 103

6:15c 104, 105

9:14 304

10:40 301

22:16 304

Romans

1–8 284, 286

1 252, 270, 272, 275

1:1–4 325

1:2 99

1:5 99

1:6 99

1:8 90

1:11 312, 313, 315

1:13 325

1:18 270

1:20 265, 269, 270, 276

1:22 373

1:25 269, 271, 276

2:15 301

2:29 301

3:9–20 306

3:20 288

3:31 288

4:13 288

4:15 288

4:24-25	301	9:30-10:4	284, 286, 287, 293, 307
4:25	301	9:30-33	290, 293, 294
5-8	274	9:30-32	286
5:1	45	9:30-32ab	291, 295
5:15	310	9:30-32b	288, 289, 291, 293
5:16	310	9:30-31	288
5:20	288	9:31	288
6:5-11	293	9:32a	288
6:17	301	9:32b	288
6:21-22	292	9:32c-33	289
6:23	310	9:32c	289
7	292	10:1-3	291
7:5	288	10:1	290, 293, 304
7:7-25	292	10:2-4	294
7:10	292	10:2-3	290, 293, 294
7:10b	292	10:2	290
7:10c	292	10:3	290, 291
7:12	288, 292	10:4	292-94, 298, 304
7:14	288	10:4a	291
7:16	288	10:5-21	306
7:25	288	10:5-13	284, 294, 296, 297, 304, 305, 307
8	252, 257, 261, 267, 271	10:5-10	304
8:1-4	293	10:5-8	292, 300
8:3	293	10:5	297, 300
8:4	288	10:6-8	297-300, 306
8:11	301	10:6-7	299
8:18-23	250, 252, 267	10:6	298, 300
8:18-22	271	10:8-12	285
8:19-23	250, 276	10:8-10	301
8:19-22	269, 272	10:8	298, 300, 301
8:19-21	272	10:9-10	300, 301
8:19	252, 272	10:9	300-302, 304
8:20	252, 272	10:9a	301
8:21	272, 273	10:9b	301
8:22	271, 272, 274, 275	10:10	300-304
8:23	252, 273	10:11-13	302-304
8:38-39	274	10:11	302-304
8:39	269, 276	10:12	303, 304
9-11	277, 284-86, 288, 291	10:13	302-304
9:1-5	285, 286	10:19-20	285
9:1-3	290	10:20-21	286
9:4	291	11:1-32	285, 286
9:6-11:32	285	11:5-7	285
9:6-29	285, 286	11:29	310, 312
9:24-26	285	11:33-36	285, 286
9:27-29	285	12	336
9:30-10:21	285, 286, 291	12:1	377
9:30-10:13	4, 277, 284, 286		

Romans (cont.)

12:3-8	314
12:6-8	310, 312, 315, 317
13:8	288

1 Corinthians

1:2	304
1:7	310, 312
1:10-2:5	318
1:19	400
1:23	290
2:6-16	318
3:1-23	318
6:14	301
7:1	318
7:7	310
7:15-28	318
7:17	318
7:25	318
7:29-35	318
7:36-40	318
8:1-13	318
8:1	318
8:4	318
9:1-27	318
10:1-22	318
10:1	318
10:4	290
11:2-16	318, 337
11:17-34	318, 337
11:17	318
12-14	4, 309, 310, 312, 315-19, 321, 327, 328, 331, 336-38
12	313, 314, 318, 324, 326-29, 336
12:1-31	318
12:1-3	325
12:1-2	333
12:1	309, 310, 317, 318, 327, 338
12:1a-3	327
12:1a	338
12:1b-3	336
12:1b	333, 334, 336
12:2-3	309, 327, 336
12:2	328
12:3	327, 328, 336
12:4-6	316, 325, 327, 336
12:7-11	325, 327, 328, 336

12:7-8	327
12:7	327
12:8-10	309, 312, 315, 317, 324, 327, 331
12:11	327
12:12-30	325, 328
12:12-13	328, 336
12:13	328
12:14-15	324
12:15	328
12:16	328
12:18	328
12:19	328
12:20	328
12:21	328
12:24	328
12:27-31	314
12:27-30	331
12:27-28	328, 336
12:28-31	309, 317
12:28-30	324, 327, 331, 337
12:28-29	328
12:28	328
12:30	328
12:31	323, 328, 330, 331, 336, 337
12:31a	325, 332
12:31b	328
13	318, 325, 328-32
13:1-13	318, 323, 328
13:1-3	323, 324, 327, 329-33
13:1	318, 323, 328, 329, 331
13:1a	325, 326
13:1b	325, 326
13:2-3	325, 326
13:2	328, 332
13:3-8a	330
13:3	328, 331, 332
13:4-13	330
13:4-10	329
13:4-8a	331, 332
13:4-6	325, 326
13:7-11	325, 326
13:8-9	324
13:8b-14:1b	337
13:8b-13	330-33
13:8	327, 328
13:9	328
13:11	323, 328, 329, 331, 332

13:12-26	325, 326	14:27-40	333
13:12	328	14:27-35	333-36
13:27-31a	325, 326	14:30	328
13:31	326	14:33	309, 336, 337
14	318, 325-27, 330, 331, 333	14:35	328
14:1-40	318	14:36-40	333, 336
14:1-26	333	14:36-38	309, 333, 334, 336
14:1-19	335	14:36-37	336
14:1-12	333, 335	14:36	328
14:1-6	333	14:37	336
14:1-5	333, 334	14:38	326
14:1	309, 310, 317, 323, 326, 328, 330, 331, 335-38	14:39-40	333, 334, 336, 337
14:1a	325, 330, 332	14:39	323, 330, 336, 337
14:1b	330, 332	14:40	333, 336, 337
14:2	336	15:1	318
14:3-5	330, 335	15:4	301
14:3	325	15:12	301, 318
14:4	325	15:20	301
14:5	325, 328	15:35	318
14:6-12	333, 334, 337	15:50	318
14:6	324, 327, 328, 331, 335	16:1	318
14:7-11	335	16:12	318
14:7-9	335	2 Corinthians	
14:7-8	335	1:8	325
14:7	328, 335	1:11	310
14:8	328, 335	3:3	292
14:9	328, 333, 335	4:14	301
14:10	328	10:2	373
14:11	328, 329, 333, 335	13:13	325
14:12	309, 310, 317, 323, 325, 330, 334-36, 338	Galatians	
14:13-26	333, 335, 336	1:1	301
14:13-19	333-35	1:7	94
14:13	335	1:16	307
14:15	328	2:12	80, 86
14:16	328, 329	2:20	94
14:17	325, 330	3:5-4:7	292
14:18-19	335	3:29	91, 93
14:18	328, 336	4:4-6	325
14:20-26	333-35	5:13-15	314
14:20	328, 332, 336	6:10	314
14:21-26	335	Ephesians	
14:21	328, 329	1:3-11	325
14:23	328	1:20	301
14:24	328	3	357
14:25	328, 336	3:14-19	357
14:26	324, 325, 327, 331, 336		

Ephesians (cont.)

3:16	357
3:17–18	342
3:17	339, 340, 342, 355, 359–61
3:18–19	357
3:18	357
3:19	357
4:4–6	325
4:11–16	314
4:11–13	314
4:11	310, 312, 317

Philippians

1:12	112, 325
2:9–10	399
2:12–18	95, 96, 101
2:12–16a	95, 96, 98
2:12–13	96
2:12	98, 101
2:13	98
2:14	98
2:15	94, 97, 98
2:16	98
2:16a	97, 98, 100
2:16b–18	95, 96, 100
2:16b	97, 99, 100
2:17–18	100
2:17	97
2:18	95, 97
3:6–9	291
3:9	291

Colossians

1:14	347
1:15–16	347
1:15	346, 347
1:16	347
1:23	266
2	355
2:6–7	342, 355
2:7	339–43, 355, 357–61
2:8	360
2:12	301

1 Thessalonians

1:10	301
2:1	325

2 Thessalonians

3:3	395
-----	-----

1 Timothy

1:5	292
3:2–7	268
4:13–14	314

2 Timothy

1:6	310, 314
2:22	304
4:2	314
4:5	314

Hebrews

5:8	381
7:5	381
12:9	395

James

1:11	401
1:26–27	383
1:27	383
2:1–13	4, 362, 382, 389, 390
2:1	382, 383
2:2–4	383
2:5–7	385
2:8–9	386
2:8	387
2:10–11	388, 389
2:10	388
2:11	388
2:12–13	389
2:12	389
2:13	389
4:3–4	393
4:7–10	365

1 Peter

1:3–12	4, 391, 405, 411, 414
1:3	405
1:17	304
1:21	301
2:6–8	289
2:12	411
3:16	411

3:19	411
4:4	411
4:10–11	310, 312, 314, 317
5:6	401

1 John	
1:4	396
4:8	94
5:21	392

Jude	
1:5	99
1:6	90, 99
1:7	90, 99
1:20–21	404

Revelation	
20:19	402

Dead Sea Scrolls

1QH	
14.14	291

1Qp Hab	
viii.1–3	295

1QS	
4.4	291
9.23	291

Hellenistic Jewish Literature

Josephus, <i>Ant.</i>	
9.181	353
15.1	264

Philo, <i>Mos.</i>	
2.285	354

Philo, <i>Plant.</i>	
3	353
46	354
74	354

Early Christian Authors

Athanasius, <i>Syn. Scr. Sacr.</i>	
28.381	265

Augustine, <i>Epist. Rom.</i>	
22–25	251

Barnabas	
6:2–4	290

Eusebius, <i>Comm. Pss.</i>	
23.1133	265

Gregorius Nysennus, <i>Cont. Eun.</i>	
2.1.223	265

Hermas, <i>Pastor</i>	
3.4	263, 265

Hippolytus, <i>Haer.</i>	
6.33.1	265
7.23.5	265

Origen, <i>Comm. Epist. Rom.</i>	
Book 6–10	251

Origen, <i>Comm. Jo.</i>	
19.22.149	265

Origen, <i>Hom. Jer.</i>	
1.10	265

Pseudo-Justin Martyr, <i>Quaest. Gen. ad Christ.</i>	
210.A	265

Theophilus, <i>Autol.</i>	
2.9	265

Greek and Roman Authors

Apollonius Rhodius, <i>Argon.</i>	
1.1121–22	353
1.1122	351

Aristotle, <i>Metaphys.</i>	
1048b.18–36	53

Aristotle, *On Interpr.*

1.3.5 99

Aristotle, *Org. Cat.*

4.2a 90

6.5a 81

Aristotle, *Phys.*

4.11.218b 76

4.11.219b 81

Diodorus Siculus

1.80.5 353

4.45.3 351

17.99.2 353

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.*

1.67.1 266

1.73.3 264

Hippocrates, *Nat. puer.*

21.2 353

Homer, *Il.*

21.243 351, 353

Homer, *Od.*

7.121 351

7.122 353

13.61–64 353

Plato, *Rep.*

334b 241

Plato, *Soph.*

265c 351, 353

Plutarch, *Rom.*

10–120 263

12.2 266

Plutarch, *Frag.*

104 353

Polybius, *Hist.*

9.1.4–5 268

36.9.7 353

Sophocles, *Oed. col.*

1591 353

Soranus, *Gynaec.*

2.53.1 351

Strabo, *Geogr.*

5.3.3 263

11.5.4 264

15.1.70 351

15.4.19 353